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This thesis investigates the relationship of the work of Walter Benjamin and 
Sigmund Freud, reading Benjamin’s use of Freud based around the concept of the 
fractured subject. Through a reading of Benjamin’s work on sovereignty and myth in 
the Trauerspiel study, it establishes the emergence of this fractured subject in the 
Baroque. It then links these themes to Freud’s ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ (1917) 
as well as two case studies, showing that melancholia and possession emerge as two 
responses to the baroque subject’s fracturing in its loss of a cosmological horizon. 
Turning to Benjamin’s work on the nineteenth century in the Arcades Project, it then 
delineates the persistence of this fractured subject, showing how Benjamin 
conceptualises its development over the course of modernity. Combining Marxian 
and Freudian categories, the importance of the commodity form comes to the fore as 
the contemporary form of the mediation of myth and loss. Investigating the change 
of memory and experience in modernity, it discusses the resurfacing of melancholia 
as spleen, and the refracting of the fractured subject into types. Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle (1920) is established as a central reference point for Benjamin’s work on 
the nineteenth century. The thesis then examines Benjamin’s dream theory in the 
Arcades Project and associated texts, exploring the ways in which it draws from 
Freud’s dream interpretation. It is argued that the 19th century dream is 
conceptualised by Benjamin as both emblematic of the type of subjectivity of the 
fractured subject, and constitutes an opening beyond it. It then examines Benjamin’s 
concept of awakening as a therapeutic, collective, political gesture that points 
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In 1935, Theodor Adorno wrote to Walter Benjamin that “Perhaps without being 
aware of the fact…you find yourself . . . in the most profound agreement with Freud; 
there is certainly much to be thought about in this connection” (CC, 93). In this 
thesis I investigate Benjamin’s use of Freud based on the concept of the fractured 
subject. Where Susan Buck-Morss states that for Benjamin, “the cognitive 
experience of history, no less than that of the empirical world, required the active 
intervention of the thinking subject” (Buck-Morss 1993, 314), I suggest it is a more 
fruitful avenue of inquiry to focus on Benjamin’s critique of the subject and 
subjectivism; his abiding interest in movements that overcome such a “thinking 
subject”, and the attention he pays to its historical situatedness. All of these, I 
suggest, can be grouped together as the subject’s fracturing.  
As Elizabeth Stewart states in her book on the subject in Benjamin’s work,  
Throughout Benjamin’s work, from his early statements regarding modernity’s 
siege on meaningful experience, in his descriptions of the modern world of 
meaning and relationship as empty, to his preoccupations with perception in 
ordinary and extraordinary conditions, in particular in relation to modern 
technology, the topography of the subject is central to it all (Stewart 2010, 67). 
A problem in Stewart's reading is what we might term the “ethicisation” of 
Benjamin. Her book constitutes a quest for Benjamin’s post-catastrophic, post-
totalitarian subject, to be distilled chiefly from the book on German tragic drama. 
However, these questions about the 'good life' for the ‘good subject’ seem to run 
counter to the more interesting issues raised by Benjamin's text. Its aim is not to 
provide guidance for the reconstruction of the psyche of an already-existing subject; 
rather, it performs a reading of the historical situation of the production of an art 
form and through this reading provides a commentary on the inauguration of a mode 





My investigation takes Benjamin’s 1928 Origin of the German Mourning Play as its 
starting point. However, this is not the first text in which the question of subjectivity 
appears in Benjamin’s work. In what follows, I will briefly discuss the precursors to 
the Trauerspiel study in which Benjamin first touches on the question of the subject, 
via a critique of the Kantian concept of experience. I will also consider Benjamin’s 
dissertation on criticism in German Romanticism. These preliminary investigations 
will serve to set the scene for Benjamin’s elaboration of the fractured subject in the 
book on German Trauerspiel. 
 
1. 
The subject before Benjamin 
The subject is, at heart, a fraught concept, uniting several distinct yet overlapping 
conceptual genealogies. In his genealogy of the concept of the subject in the history 
of Philosophy, Etienne Balibar attempts to disentangle some of these confluent and 
conflicting meanings, starting with the Greek hupokeimenon, often translated as 
‘substrate’ or the Latin subiectum. Balibar identifies three main overlapping but 
somewhat distinct aspects of the modern usage of the term ‘subject’: subjectness 
(subjectité in French), subjectivity (subjectivité), and subjection (sujétion) (Balibar 
2014, 1069), and states that “the psychological meaning of the term [subjectivity], 
which is dominant in ordinary usage, is the result of a series of transformations that 
began in the Middle Ages” (Balibar 2014, 1073) , setting in motion a process in 
which these three aspects began to coalesce. Of particular importance is what Balibar 
calls a “pun” on two Latin etymologies at the heart of the modern usage of subject:  
“that of the neuter subjectum (which, like suppositum, has, ever since the 
Scholastics, been regarded by philosophers as a translation of the Greek 
hupokeimenon), and that of the masculine subjectus (equated with subditus in the 





transcendental meanings, and the other to a lineage of juridical, political, and 
theological meanings. Far from remaining independent of one another, they have 
constantly overdetermined one another, because, following Kant, the problematic 
articulation of “subjectivity” and “subjection” came to be defined as a theory of the 
constituent subject.” (Balibar 2014, 1078) 
This tension constitutes for Balibar one of the central problems of modern 
philosophy.1 Oberprantacher and Siclodi, commenting on this distinction, suggest 
that “The ‘play on words’, to which Balibar directs our attention, involves also the 
history of institutions insofar as the term ‘subject’ refers to all the variable 
submissions (aka ‘subjection’) to the authority of a power … besides referring to an 
invariable substance (aka ‘subjectivity’), capable of transporting specific properties.” 
(Oberprantacher and Siclodi 2016, 10-11). Oberprantacher and Siclodi also draw 
attention to the tension between “autonomous subjectivity” and “heteronomous 
subjection” mediated in the concept of subjectivation, which they identify as central 
to any discussion of the subject “given that it confronts us with an apparent 
contradiction in terms that concerns the emergence of the subject itself” 
(Oberprantacher and Siclodi 2016, 1-2). 
What we can discern from these brief preliminary remarks is that the concept of the 
subject is characterised by internal tensions - fractures - that encompass differing 
genealogies and lineages that philosophy has attempted to unite or conflate in 
different ways over the course of history. The implication of Balibar’s study of the 
concept of the subject is that it was always already fractured, the result not of a direct 
transmission of Greek philosophy into early modern accounts, but the unstable result 
of sometimes contesting, sometimes conflated genealogies. As we shall see, this is to 
                                               
1 Balibar takes issue with the conventional account that he identifies as Heidegger’s genealogy of the 
subject from hypokeimenon straight to Descarte’s supposed subjectum, complicating it with the 
introduction (or intrusion) of medieval Augustine philosophy.  He contests Heidegger’s attribution of 





play a central part in Benjamin’s concept of the subject, which he explores both in 
terms of epistemological questions regarding possible forms of experience and 
knowledge, and in terms of questions of power. I will begin with a discussion of 
Benjamin’s engagement with the two most important sources of the modern concept 




Benjamin references both Cartesian dualism and Descartes lesser-known work 
Passions of the Soul (1649) in his book on German Trauerspiel. The reference 
appears in a passage discussing the centrality of the body, that is, the physis capable 
of pain and suffering, in distinguishing Trauerspiel from tragedy, which is one of 
Benjamin’s central aims in the book. Benjamin writes 
“It is not only the Dualism of Descartes that is baroque; as a consequence of the 
doctrine of psycho-physical determination, the theory of the passions also 
deserves the closest consideration. Since, in fact, the spirit is in itself pure 
reason, true to itself, and it is physical influences alone which bring it into 
contact with the world, the torture which it endures was a more immediate basis 
of violent emotions than so-called tragic conflicts.” (OT, 217) 
Benjamin thus identifies Cartesian dualism as a quintessentially baroque conception 
of the subject. As I discuss in more detail in my first chapter, the 1928 Trauerspiel 
book charts how the advent of modernity in the era of the wars of religion sets in 
motion a cataclysmic event for baroque humanity. Subjectivity is borne out of this, 
but, as also seen in Balibar’s account, it is fractured from the start. To wit, the 
Cartesian subject is fractured, into thinking cogito and that which it is not – the body, 





God as a foundational condition for his cogito2, the latter is radically divided from 
the divine.  
Further, Benjamin reads Descartes’ model of the mind-body connection as 
conceptualising a mind completely detached from empirical reality. Only via 
embodiment is this link provided. Thus we arrive at the first, dual fracture of the 
subject in the baroque: mind from body, and from the divine. This model of the 
division of the body from the mind was only capable of emerging in the baroque due 
to the experience of theologico-political conflict specific to it. The suffering and 
melancholy mood reflected in the mourning plays is thus very different from tragic 
conflict such as that of Greek antiquity and instead grounded in physical suffering. 
Only in the context of such a baroque model of subjectivity – of a mind radically 
sundered from the body – is this melancholy experience possible. The body remains 
bereft: the “entseelte…Koerper” (GS1 393) by its very definition lacking a soul. 
Benjamin investigates how Cartesian dualism is experienced as painful fallout of this 
fracture, a physis devoid of transcendent meaning.3 In the Trauerspiel book, 
Benjamin complicates Descartes’ account of the subject by investigating the 
mourning that is provoked by its self-discovery in the split from nature and God. 
Benjamin’s account thus implicitly brings to light what is repressed in the emergence 
of Descartes’ subject: one, that this is not a universal, transhistorical subject, but that 
it could only have emerged at a certain time and in a certain historico-political 
configuration; and two, that the historical processes that made this new 
conceptualisation of subjectivity possible carried with them an experience of loss 
                                               
2 Benjamin does not discuss this aspect of Descartes Meditations. Also worth noting is the fact that 
Balibar, as mentioned above, contests this reading of Descartes as foundational for the modern 
concept of the subject. However, even if this ascription to Descartes is a mistake first by Kant and 
then repeated by Heidegger, as Balibar himself points out, “we cannot undo what Kant has done.” 
(1081). He also acknowledges that Descartes cogito “anticipates” (ibid) its nominalization.  
3 Despite Descartes’ own insistence on the existence of God, this is not a God in the pre-Baroque, pre- 
Reformation, pre-modern sense that is precisely shattered in the loss of the fullness of experience 





and lack. Benjamin investigates how this dual division – from the divine / cosmos, 
and from the body – remains operative in the modern, post-baroque subject as a 
fracture.  
 
Knowledge / Evil: The demonic quality of pure cogito 
 
The question of forms of experience and the possibility of knowledge are central to 
Benjamin’s fractured subject. Experience and the possibility of the attainment of 
knowledge undergo a crisis with the advent of modernity. The loss of a spiritual 
teleology that has God as its center and goal in the wake of the reformation and the 
wars of religion – what Howard Caygill terms the “decay of Christian experience 
following the Reformation” (Caygill 1998, xii) - results in Baroque mourning and a 
situation in which all reflection is doomed to godless infinity. Read from the 
standpoint of Christian doctrine, to which for Benjamin the Baroque remains 
mournfully faithful, the loss of the concept of the sacred, the desacralisation of life, 
is satanic. This evil then extends to reflection – the spiritual / geistig – and the 
material – as both are devoid of transcendence, eschatology, an ultimate end in the 
form of the divine. Benjamin here implicitly connects this to the fundamental tenet 
of Cartesian self-recognition of the subject: the semblance of autonomy, the 
“secession from the community of the faithful” (GS1, 404).  
The complement of this “soulless materiality” (entseelte Stofflichkeit) is “the purely 
material” (absolute Geistigkeit) (OT, 230 / GS1, 404). Both are untruths in the sense 
that they state ontological difference where there is none4 : “The purely material and 
this absolute spiritual are the poles of the satanic realm, and … consciousness is their 
illusory synthesis, in which the genuine synthesis, that of life, is imitated” (OT, 230). 
                                               
4 In the Schemata zum psychophysischen Problem, they are identified as different perspectives, as 





Consciousness is thus revealed as an effect of the profanation, the cosmological 
rupture constitutive of the Baroque; nothing but a semblance of a synthesis between 
two artificially- sundered aspects of the subject. This is linked to Benjamin’s critique 
of philosophical subjectivism: “In the form of knowledge instinct leads down into 
the empty abyss of evil in order to make sure of infinity. But this is also the 
bottomless pit of contemplation. Its data are not capable of being incorporated into 
philosophical constellations.” (OT, 231). This search for knowledge must remain 
without end as the ultimate end point – God – no longer serves to contain or absorb 
its dynamic. Benjamin again equates this infinite search for knowledge through the 
inward-looking reflection of Tiefsinn with evil – that is, the absence of the divine. 
The “data” thus gained cannot enter into philosophical constellations because it is 
missing the possibility of accessing truth, of transcendence. There is no end to its 
reflection, no possibility of verification, no guarantor of meaning outside the subject.  
This bad speculation of bottomless reflection gets lost in its own internal hall of 
mirrors; there is no object against which to measure itself and no divine telos in 
which it can find an end. Thus the ‘knowledge’ it seemingly accesses in its brooding 
merely serves to drag it further into the infinite process of brooding. Evil itself, then, 
is a phenomenon of subjectivity for Benjamin, an “effect of the knowledge of evil” 
(Caygill 1998, 60). Objects, too, are affected by this development: Baroque 
allegories signifiy “the triumph of subjectivity and the onset of an arbitrary rule over 
things” (OT 233). The meaning of the allegorical images is not ‘true’ in the sense of 
an objective, or a revealed truth; rather, they are imposed by fiat by the allegorist.  
Benjamin traces how bereft Baroque humanity attempts to elevate itself from its 
reduced status through the intellectuality exemplified by the intriguer of the 
mourning plays. However, in the absence of a theological center, this attempt at 
gaining knowledge is doomed: base matter flips over into its obverse, a Geistigkeit 
so extreme it exceeds language (and is no closer to true knowledge). This fantasy of 
an “absolute, that is, godless intellectuality” (GS1, 403) rather than the physis, is the 





subjective gaze on the objects of the world that turns them into allegories is 
mournful – for the symbol, which Benjamin identifies with the fulness that precedes 
the fractures of modernity.  
The relationship between fractured subject and object-world will be further 
investigated in Chapters 3 and 4, where I shift my focus to Benjamin’s unfinished 
magnum opus on high modernity, the Arcades Project. For now, in the baroque, a 
subject emerges that is characterised by fracture - cogito sundered from the body, 
and from the possibility of divine truth and with it transcendence per se. This leads 
me to Benjamin’s critique of Kant. 
 
b) Kant 
Benjamin changed his position vis a vis Kant over the course of his life. Late in 1917 
he wrote to Gershom Scholem that  
“there will never be any question of the Kantian system’s being shaken and toppled. 
Rather, the question is much more one of the system's being set in granite and 
universally developed. The most profound typology of conceiving doctrine has thus 
far always become clear to me in Kant’s words and ideas. And no matter how great 
the number of Kantian minutiae that may have to fade away, his system’s typology 
must last forever”.  (CC 97)  
and that whoever was not “looking on even the least letter as a tradendum to be 
transmitted (however much it is necessary to recast him afterwards), knows 
nothing of philosophy” (CC 98). 
By the spring of 1918, however, Benjamin had changed his mind enough that he 





“For me, certain - as it were, revolutionary - thoughts bear within themselves an 
urgent need to study their great adversaries very thoroughly so that it is possible to 
remain steadfastly objective when expounding them. The greatest adversary of these 
thoughts is always Kant. I have become engrossed in his ethics-it is unbelievable 
how necessary it is to- track down this despot, to track down his mercilessly 
philosophizing spirit which has philosophized certain insights that are among the 
reprehensible ones to be found in ethics in particular.” (CC 125) 
This tension between venerating, preserving, and destroying the Kantian system 
comes to the fore in Benjamin’s engagement with Kant’s concept of experience in 
some of his early work, in particular his ‘On the Program of the Coming 
Philosophy’. This text was to provide an initial formulation of the problem of the 
subject by questioning its status as a basis for experience. 
 
The subject of experience / the experience of the subject 
In the fragment ‘On Perception’, which serves as a preparatory note for his ‘On the 
Program of the Coming Philosophy’, Benjamin lays out his theory of the change of 
experience, here locating it in the Enlightenment:  “Previously the symbol of the 
unity of knowledge that we know of as “experience” had been an exalted one; it had, 
even though to varying degrees, been close to God and divine. During the 
Enlightenment, however, it was increasingly stripped of its proximity to God” (SW1, 
95). The profound changes in the nature of experience in modernity were the result 
of profanation. The unity of the pre-Enlightenment concept of experience with that 
of the divine was so strong that, following the loss of certainty about the latter, the 
former was also profoundly affected. Moreover, the Enlightenment is paradigmatic 
for modernity as a whole, in particular its secularising, profaning character; its 





As in his brief engagement with Descartes in the Trauerspiel book, Benjamin’s early 
writings on Kant are thus concerned with loss. Here, his focus is on what is lost in 
the process of admitting only certain types of experience; what must have already 
been lost in order for a flattened-out, impoverished model of experience to become 
possible, and thus what loss is expressed, negatively, in such a concept of 
experience. Just as Benjamin sees Cartesian dualism – the inauguration of modern 
subjectivity - as an expression of the loss of the baroque age, Kantian experience is – 
tentatively - revealed as a product of its time: “We may perhaps venture the 
supposition that in an age in which experience was characterized by an extraordinary 
superficiality and godlessness, philosophy, if it was honest, could have no interest in 
salvaging this experience for its concept of knowledge” (SW1, 95). Benjamin 
ultimately aims to enlarge the Kantian concept of experience, to detach it from the 
empirical sphere into which it is relentlessly being dragged, and thereby open it up to 
forms of experience deemed impermissible by Kant and the Neo-Kantians in their 
conflation of scientific experience with experience per se. This would make it 
possible to overcome the subject-object split, and open up a sphere of Erkenntnis 
beyond the empirical. 
As Peter Fenves points out, the concept of experience Benjamin’s program for a 
coming Philosophy seeks to develop is unlike any previous one (Fenves 2006, 134). 
For Benjamin, at stake is not merely a return to a lost fulness of experience – as I 
discuss below, this is incompatible with Benjamin’s conceptualisation of historical 
change. At stake in this text is thus a “new and higher kind of experience yet to 
come” – which is the challenge for Benjamin: “according to the typology of Kantian 
thought, to undertake the epistemological foundation of a higher concept of 
experience”. Here, I focus on the ways in which the problems with Enlightenment – 
and thus modern – experience raised in this text foreshadow the fractured subject 






Pure versus empirical consciousness 
Benjamin starts the ‘Program’ text off with a distinction, grounded in the second part 
of Kant’s Prolegomena, where judgements of perception (Wahrnehmungsurteile) are 
derived from empirical consciousness, while judgements of experience 
(Erfahrungsurteile) are based in pure consciousness. Benjamin concludes that for 
Kant, at stake is never just the former, but always more characteristically the latter. 
Benjamin resolutely temporalises this experience, pointing to the historical 
contingency and specificity of Kant’s own experience – its “unique and temporally 
limited” character; “naked, primitive, self-evident experience, which, for Kant, as a 
man who somehow shared the horizon of his times, seemed to be the only experience 
given – indeed, the only experience possible”  (SW1, 101). Importantly, this 
experience expresses the character of its age – it is that of the Enlightenment, and in 
this is not too different from that of any other century “of the modern era”. Thus it is 
linked to the profaned experience of the Baroque which for Benjamin gave rise to 
Cartesian dualism and the subject fractured from its body and from God. Benjamin 
further describes this experience as “reduced to…a minimum of significance”, and, 
thus emptied out, a “sad” experience. This further links Kantian experience to the 
fractured Cartesian subject of the baroque with its attendant affect of mourning. 
However, where in the book on Trauerspiel, Benjamin’s focus is on theorising 
baroque experience via the mourning plays, the critique of Kantian experience in the 
earlier text aims more explicitly at its overcoming. Central to this is an overcoming 
of the subject. 
At stake in the reworking of the Kantian project proposed by Benjamin is the 
recentering and reorganisation of a metaphysics, and, relatedly, of reconnecting the 
concepts of knowledge (Erkenntnis) and of experience (Erfahrung). Kant’s mistake, 
which extends to modernity in toto, was not only to restrict his concept because of 
the conditions specific to his age, but to then to universalize this “religious and 
historical blindness” in his epistemology: “The notion of experience held in the 





Kant’s day was to deny [vernichten, destroy] its claims, because the demand of his 
contemporaries for metaphysics was weakness or hypocrisy” (SW1, 102). Kant’s 
thought is insufficiently metaphysical for Benjamin in that it employs the wrong 
metaphysics, an “unproductive” one, which forecloses rather than opens up gateways 
between knowledge and experience: “In [this] epistemology every metaphysical 
element is the germ of a disease that expresses itself in the separation of knowledge 
from the realm of experience in its full freedom and depth”. Likewise, the subject – 
object division on which Kantian epistemology is premised is read by Benjamin as 
mythical, a vestige of a bad metaphysics. Thus, “Even to the extent that Kant and the 
neo-Kantians have overcome the object nature of the thing-in-itself as the cause of 
sensations, there remains the subject nature of the cognizing consciousness to be 
eliminated” (SW1, 103). Benjamin seeks to investigate ways to overcome this 
subject-object split and arrive at a concept of experience that is not premised on it.  
The way to overcome this separation is to annihilate the elements of the bad 
metaphysics within epistemology, a process that “simultaneously refers it to a 
deeper, more metaphysically fulfilled experience” (SW1, 102). Benjamin locates the 
seed for this method in Kant’s thought itself, whenever it draws close to “the 
exploration of experience on the basis of epistemologically secured principles” 
(SW1, 103). But Benjamin proceeds to go far beyond Kant in what follows, 
ultimately arguing for a concept of experience and of knowledge freed from the 
strictures “human empirical consciousness”. Because the Kantian concept of the 
cognizing consciousness is formed not independently, but precisely out of, empirical 
matter, indeed, Kant’s own empirical existence at a specific historico-political 
juncture – the Enlightenment - it displays the same aspects as the “empirical 
consciousness”, which, in being confronted by objects in the material world, 
becomes a subject. Insofar as “This subject nature of this cognizing consciousness, 
however, stems from the fact that it is formed in analogy to the empirical 
consciousness, which of course has objects confronting it”, this means that what is to 
be eliminated is the empirical. Fenves summarises this as Benjamin’s quest for “a 





behind it not just empirical consciousness, but consciousness in general” [Fenves 
2006, 135, transl. mine]. Here, then, we see Benjamin’s early anti-subjectivist 
thought at its clearest.  
The connection between cognition and subjectivism becomes apparent at this point. 
Cognition is modelled on empirical experience, thus the subject – object split is built 
into Kant’s model, because the experience of Kant and his contemporaries was 
emptied out of a fullness, a sense of oneness with the world (and God). In a 
secularising age where religious certainties are dissolving and no longer offer firm 
ground for knowledge, the subject becomes the only such pole of certainty, opening 
the floodgates to a withdrawal into the self and a radical severance between 
individual and world  - and, as we see in Benjamin’s comments on the Cartesian 
cogito, between body and mind. To assume this particular experience is universal is 
for Benjamin metaphysical in the bad sense, that is, mythical. Kant purports to have 
emptied his philosophy of such metaphysical residue, but it is inadvertently – 
unconsciously – smuggled in, precisely because he did not recognise his experience 
as contingent and specific to his time. Benjamin’s aim is to transcend Kant’s 
ontologisation of the subject-object split and make it possible for philosophy to 
attain concepts of knowledge and experience beyond the restrictions put in place by 
this split. 
This foreshadows many of the themes taken up again in Trauerspiel: the tyranny of 
the concept of the subject, its radical division from the world, and its groundedness 
in a loss of a different mode of experience, one characterised by spiritual fulness, 
which results in mournfulness. This subject is fractured from the moment of its 
inception, wrested from a now unnameable other mode of existing and experiencing, 
a differing relationship between humanity and cosmos.5 What in the Trauerspiel 
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book functions as a characteristic of baroque subjectivity – the subjectivist thrust of 
the futile search for knowledge in the absence of the possibility of transcendence – is 
formulated as a critique of a model of experience reliant on the subject-object split in 
his early work on Kant. In his dissertation on Romantic Criticism, Benjamin further 
expanded his investigation into the overcoming of subjectivism. 
 
3. Romantic criticism as a counter to subjectivism? 
For Benjamin, "Criticism, which today is grasped as the most subjective of activities, 
was for the Romantics a regulative of subjectivity, contingency and arbitrariness in 
the emergence of works" (SW1, 160). Samuel Weber, commenting on this passage, 
observes that in his dissertation on Romantic Criticism, Benjamin is attempting to 
grasp “a notion or practice of "reflexivity" that would not be rooted ultimately in a 
constitutive subject” (Weber 2008, 23). Benjamin turned to the Romantics because, 
as Beatrice Hansen and Andrew Benjamin observe, their model of criticism “did not 
simply amount to a subject-centred, speculative appropriation of the object under 
analysis or to the passing of judgment in evaluation. Rather, Romantic criticism 
demanded an altogether different thinking, indeed 'activation', of the object and 
hence a different construction of the artwork” (Hansen and Benjamin 2002, 1). 
While explicitly related to art criticism, Benjamin’s dissertation “may be read as a 
programmatic statement of a philosophical criticism…The claim for the objectivity 
of the work of art and the related necessity of the practice of immanent critique 
formed the ‘epistemo- theoretical presupposition’ of Benjamin’s own criticism, 
beginning with the essay on Goethe’s Wahlverwandschaften which Benjamin wrote 
during the autumn of 1921” (Caygill 1998, 46). Thus Romantic Criticism provided 
Benjamin with a promising approach for thinking through alternatives to the subject-
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object split he bemoaned in the Kantian project. Following the romantics, for 
Benjamin, the “truth of the object cannot be found in its appearance as an extension 
of subject but in the immanent content that fundamentally resists any attempt at such 
a subordination” (Homburg 2018, 126). Homburg conceptualises this as a “resistant 
objectivity” in the work, which Benjamin seeks to preserve in the face of 
subjectivising tendencies of contemporary criticism.  
However, as Homburg observes, Romantic Criticism did not ultimately take the truly 
novel thrust of its approach far enough: “Romanticism fails in its attempt to 
overcome its object by positing its immanent reconciliation in the form of a singular 
universal…Romantic criticism misses the mark when it idealises its object and, in 
this process, dissolves the object’s particularity”. Conversely, “Benjamin aims to 
maintain the integrity and particularity of the object and experience. At the same 
time, Benjamin also aims to account for the absence of the Absolute as an object of 
experience, that is, the fundamental condition of modernity (Homburg 2018, 127). 
As Beatrice Hansen and Andrew Benjamin argue, the shift in Benjamin’s critical 
project from a focus on the Absolute in art to that on its disappearance in 
secularising modernity played out in his book on the German Trauerspiel, where  
“Benjamin would start to cast doubt on the merits of a Romantic, reflective 
criticism that proceeded through 'potentiation' and a (melancholic) immersion 
in the object…Instead, Benjamin was to dedicate himself to modernity's 
physiognomy of ruins, to the allegorical narrative of death or the jagged line 
that separated nature and history from the plenitude of meaning” (Hansen and 
Benjamin 2002, 4).6 
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the Trauerspiel book: “Taking the concept of Kritik even further, Benjamin now distinguished 
between the Sach- and Wahrheitsgehalt (material and truth contents) of Goethe's novel, between 





The work on Trauerspiel thus serves as a point of transition between Benjamin’s 
earlier work, where he formulated critiques of the Kantian and the Romantic projects 
that were still steeped in the conceptual language of their object of critique, towards 
the more ‘materialist’ analyses of his later work. 
 
4. From the sphere of Erkenntnis to changing Erfahrung 
In much the same way, Benjamin turned his attention in the Trauerspiel book not 
just to a possible overcoming of subjectivism in new forms of critique, but to an 
immersion in the experience of a depleted, fractured modern subject.  As delineated 
above, in the Programmschrift, Erkenntnis no longer functions as the relationship 
between a subject and an object; rather, Erkenntnis becomes, over the course of 
Benjamin’s text, something with its own sphere, quite separate from empirical 
experience, and within which the subject-object dichotomy can be overcome. What 
we see is a shift in Benjamin’s interest in delimiting experience as detached from the 
empirical, towards delving into the empirical in order to develop a critique of what is 
happening within it, the better to go beyond it.  
We can thus reconstruct in Benjamin’s work a critique of this fractured subject, 
aimed at its overcoming, beginning in the period following the Programmschrift – 
the transition identified by Hansen and Benjamin in the Trauerspiel book. It is this 
subject’s impoverished form of experience which Benjamin also investigates in his 
later writing, its split from the divine, and its split from the body. As I examine in 
Chapters 3 and 4, this critique of subjectivity, taken as a function of historico-
political processes, was to be deepened in Benjamin’s later work on the modern city. 
As in the early work, the question of experience is central to this task, but it 
undergoes a shift: from the critique of a conceptualisation of experience that takes 






the subject/object split as its starting point, to critically examining the experience of 
this split in modernity in order to locate potential for its overcoming. Where in 
Benjamin’s earlier texts, the focus is on the contrasting pair of empirical experience 
(Erfahrung) opposed to Erkenntnis, his later work increasingly investigates the 
change in modernity from Erfahrung as a particular, rapidly-disappearing form of 
experience, to the individualised, disconnected Erlebnis characteristic of modernity. 
These changes, due in no small part to the changing technologies that form part of 
everyday life under Capitalist modernity, have profound effects on the subject: As 
Esther Leslie notes,  “When subjectivity becomes a matter of documents in the world 
and technological mediation it has become a social and a political issue rather than 
the preserve of the individual soul” (Leslie 70). 
However, the two streams in Benjamin’s thought on experience are not to be taken 
as totally separate: The considerations about experience as something to be had only 
at a specific time already form part of Benjamin’s early writings on the topic. As 
discussed above, the point of departure of Benjamin’s critique of Kant’s concept of 
experience is that it unwittingly reproduces certain assumptions because of his own 
specific empirical experience. Crucially, this experience is not purely subjective in 
the sense of deriving from within the subject – rather, it is a product of the conditions 
under which the subject lives; in this case, the modern world around Kant. Thus, 
Benjamin’s point of departure and way of reading Kant in the Programmschrift is 
consistent with his understanding of the philosophy of history in the Arcades Project 
and associated later writing.  
What, then, has changed? Where in his early text, Benjamin still aims at a 
transformation of epistemology from within itself, immanent to knowledge, and is in 
search of a metaphysics, even a theology, these insights are ‘materialised’ in the later 
work, leading Benjamin to the conclusion that a critical project cannot happen purely 
within spirit (nor within religion). Rather, it is the transformation of the concrete 
material organisation of life in capitalist modernity, that now forms the center of 





conditions of possibility of epistemology, and possible ways to enable continued 
transformation. Howard Caygill conceptualises this shift in Benjamin’s position 
from the Programmschrift and the even earlier ‘Life of Students’ to his 1933 
‘Experience and Poverty’: “In the later essay he does not seek an idea or redemptive 
absolute which will integrate a shattered experience, but looks for the intimations of 
new freedoms announced in the distorted, comical and even terrifying patterns of 
modern experience” (Caygill 1998, 32). What remains visible, however, in this 
“bereft experience” is the “removal of the absolute through…warps, distortions and 
exclusions” (Caygill 1998, 25). Thus, the depleted experience of the fractured 
subject becomes a focal point in Benjamin’s later writing, starting with the 
melancholic experience of the baroque.  
 
5. The fracture as an opening 
The subject’s fracture is also a site of potentiality: it is precisely in the constitutive 
fracture of the modern subject, the sense of loss and melancholia attendant on 
Cartesian mind-body dualism and Kantian foreclosure of metaphysical experience, 
that opens the way for something new. In the convolutes of the Arcades Project and 
associated texts, Benjamin charts the inauguration of a ‘more political’ being in 
modern Capitalism; a subject that is not one, fractured into types, capable of 
becoming a mass, a class, and thus going beyond both the limitations of the self-
contained individual subject and its (limited) intersubjectivity. This focus on the 
potential of the fracture is foreshadowed in Benjamin’s earlier work: Samuel Weber 
presents the link between the programmatic announcement in the Programmschrift 
and the Arcades Project as the refutation of a Hegelian dialectic, to include 
something beyond a perfect synthesis as a fracture that resists sublation or 
subsumption. Such breaking points (Bruchstellen in German) remain outside of the 





“As with the baroque allegory studied and construed by Benjamin, the tendency 
of such Bruchstellen, breaking points or places, is to bring to a halt, at least 
temporarily, the progress of time by fixing it into, and as, a place (however 
"broken"). The "break" in the place—the break as a place— is what results 
when the destructive course of time is temporarily brought to a halt” (Weber 
2008, 167). 
A similar arrest of time, of the flow of events, is present in Benjamin’s reorientation 
of critique towards the “mortification” of works of art in the Trauerspiel book. Only 
in such an arrest can critique, and with it, something new occur. Thus, these 
interruptions and fractures “are for Benjamin not primarily negative or privative in 
character. They constitute privileged moments of what, in the following note, he 
describes as a "constellation of awakening"” (Weber 2008, 167). The question of a 
true awakening will be investigated in my fourth chapter. As I discuss here, Freud’s 
dream interpretation in particular influenced Benjamin’s understanding of dreaming 
and awakening as sites where conscious and unconscious states merge, but can be 
analysed, and mutually illuminated in order to overcome the traumatic repetition of 
the same.  
Throughout his work, Benjamin is in search of such sites and critical methodologies 
that allow for overcoming the subject. In the 1915 fragment ‘Dialogue on the 
rainbow’, a dream becomes such a site of the dissolution of the subject where, as 
Caygill notes, “In place of the opposition between gazing subject and the gazed- 
upon surface, Benjamin elaborates a different relation” where “two components of 
Kant’s account of experience—sensibility and the understanding—collapse into each 
other, and the experiencing subject which would contain them dissolves into its 
experience” (Caygill 1998, 11). Benjamin later identifies a similar process of the 
overcoming of the subject-object split and thus the founds of experience of the 
fractured subject occurs in surrealism (SW2, 208). 
However, in Benjamin’s later work on dreams in the Arcades Project, what is 





consciousness such as the intoxication advocated by surrealism. Rather, along more 
Freudian lines, the dream reveals a distorted or displaced unconscious desire, which 
must be accessed in analysis and, for Benjamin, critique. Thus, Benjamin expands 
the analysis of individual dreams to an analysis of the 19th century as a “dreaming 
collective” (AP, 546). Psychoanalysis thus aids Benjamin in understanding the 
fractured subject as well as pointing beyond it: already in the Trauerspiel study it is 
the age as such that expresses something of the character of the subjectivity typical 
of it, and in the Arcades Project, the methods and concepts of psychoanalysis furnish 
some of the tools necessary to analyse the 19th century. Against the hypothetical or 
momentary state of dissolution of the subject-object split in a subject’s dream, a 
reconstruction of Benjamin’s work on the experience of this split is at stake in what 
follows. 
 
6. Reading Benjamin’s Freud  
The Verzeichnis der gelesenen Schriften, which Benjamin kept from about 
1916/1917 to around mid-June 1940 (GS7.1, 437f) contains a number of Freud’s 
works: Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious (1905), ‘Psycho-analytic Notes 
on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides), 
including Freud’s postscript7, ‘On Narcissism: An Introduction’ (1914), ‘Five 
Lectures on Psycho-Analysis’ (1909), and Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920).  
As Nadine Werner (2015, 85) and Sigrid Weigel (2016) point out, this list is 
incomplete. In ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’ (1935), 
Benjamin refers to Freud’s Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1904), and the 
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Interpretation of Dreams appears in the 1937 Fuchs essay. Benjamin also knew 
Freud’s ‘Über den Gegensinn der Urworte’ (1910), printed in ‘Kleine Schriften zur 
Neurosenlehre’ (1913), both mentioned in ‘Books by the Mentally Ill’. Gershom 
Scholem also states that Benjamin wrote a “detailed” paper about Freud’s theory of 
drives in 1918 (Scholem 1981, 71), thus we can assume he was familiar with ‘Triebe 
und Triebschicksale’ (1915). In a letter to Gretel Adorno in 1935, Benjamin mentions 
Freud’s text on telepathy from the Psychoanalytic Almanach. 
As Werner notes, “Frequently, Benjamin does not explicitly reference Freud when 
referring to him”8, speculating that this is due to Benjamin’s method of appropriating 
Freudian “theorems” “by detaching them from their original context in order to 
enrich his own thought” (Werner 2015, 84). Additionally, given the frequent reprisals 
of and detailed references to previous works in the corpus of Freud's work, Benjamin 
would have had at least a passing familiarity with the core presuppositions of more 
works than the ones he read. For instance, according to the Verzeichnis, Benjamin 
read Freud’s book on jokes in 1918. Here, he would also have encountered, in 
summary form, the themes of the Interpretation of Dreams, as Freud provides a 
synopsis, and stresses the links between dream-work and jokes throughout, in 
particular on condensation and displacement. Additionally, the ‘Five Lectures on 
Psycho-Analysis’ cover much of Freud's earlier work in summary fashion. Central 
touchstones for the Freudian inheritance in Benjamin discussed in this thesis are 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle, which Benjamin had read by 1928; memory theory 
from The Interpretation of Dreams in the Arcades Project and Benjamin’s other 
dream-theoretical work, and ‘Mourning and Melancholia’, as well as the two case 
studies of Haitzmann and Schreber discussed in Chapter 2.  
Where Susan Buck-Morss asserted that “It is wrong to emphasize the significance 
for Benjamin of psychonanalytic theory. In the 1930s, his reception of Freud was 
                                               





still largely mediated, coming from two distinctly unorthodox sources. Surrealism 
and the Frankfurt Institute” (Buck-Morss 1991, 464), this list should go some way 
towards dispelling this notion, and indeed it is one of the aims of this thesis. 
Contrary to Buck-Morss, whose verdict on the Benjamin-Freud connection is heavily 
influenced by Scholem, I will show that Freud was an important influence for 
Benjamin, in particular in relation to Benjamin’s investigation of the fractured 
subject. Benjamin’s reception was by no means mainly mediated by others – as 
evinced, among other evidence, by the Verzeichnis. Where Benjamin’s engagement 
with Freud is mediated, such as in Convolute K of the Arcades Project, it is mainly 
via Freudians such as Theodor Reik as well as Erich Fromm – a more ‘orthodox’ 
Freudian intellectual lineage than the one posited by Buck-Morss.  
Freud’s importance for Benjamin is increasingly being recognised, in particular in 
the German literature, which I engage with in what follows. In addition, a steady 
trickle of literature published in the anglophone world deals with various aspects of 
Benjamin’s relation to Freud, some of which will be examined below. Benjamin’s 
early verdict on Freud as part of the priesthood of the bourgeoisie is by no means to 
be taken as a dismissal of the latter’s work. Rather, we can identify at least two uses 
of Freud by Benjamin: As a theorist of the nineteenth century, the sage of the 
bourgeois psyche, and as a source of theoretical insight, concepts, and methodology. 
These two uses are interrelated, insofar as Benjamin makes similar claims about their 
rootedness in the age that produced them about every other thinker he draws from, 
including Marx.9  
There is much that connects the method of psychoanalysis to Benjamin’s theoretical 
endeavour. However, I am by no means proposing to read Benjamin ‘as’ a Freudian, 
or to collapse their theoretical lineages and projects. Going beyond the relationship 
of a “constellation” between the two thinkers proposed by Nägele (1991, 57), and 
                                               





with Lindner and Werner, I see Benjamin's reception of Freud as driven by the 
principle of Entwendung, a creative appropriation of Freudian concepts and 
methodology. As Werner points out, Benjamin is not concerned with proving Freud’s 
hypotheses, but with putting them to work in his own theoretical (and historical) 
context.10 Throughout, I note the ways in which Benjamin modifies and radicalises 
Freud’s concepts and methodological insights. As Margaret Cohen writes in Profane 
Illumination: Walter Benjamin and the Paris of Surrealist Revolution, Benjamin  
is particularly interested in the therapeutic treatment of irrational and 
symptomatic phenomena, the fact that psychoanalysis values such phenomena 
as rich forms of expression and seeks their significance with a battery of tactics 
that are not encompassed by the activity of rational critical construction. 
(Cohen 1993, 37)  
Freud himself was attuned to the pathological dimension of ‘normal’ modern 
subjects in phenomena such as dreams and slips of the tongue. The “healthy” suffer 
from the same complexes as the ill; they are merely expressed differently in the 
former, and Freud conceptualises the difference as largely a question of degree. 
These slippages between what is pathological or neurotic and what is normal are 
common to both Freud and Benjamin: in the Programmschrift, Benjamin describes 
the Kantian subject of experience as “mythology, on a par with any other 
“epistemological mythology” such as those of the mad, or ‘primitive’ peoples” 
(SW1, 103). In a radical step, Benjamin associates the empirical subject of 
consciousness itself with madness: 
                                               
10 In a similar vein, Sarah Ley Roff suggests in her article on ‘Benjamin and Psychoanalysis’ that 
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“Experience, as it is conceived in reference to the individual living human and 
his consciousness, instead of as a systematic specification of knowledge, is 
again in all of its types the mere object of this real knowledge, specifically of 
its psychological branch. The latter divides empirical consciousness 
systematically into types of madness. Cognizing man, the cognizing empirical 
consciousness, is a type of insane consciousness”.  (SW1, 103-104) 
Benjamin’s linking of Kantian epistemology to the experience of ‘primitive’ peoples 
and the mad serves to destabilise its claim to universal truth, showing instead its 
comparability to other forms of ‘myth’ that organise experience differently. Where 
in the Programmschrift, the concept of madness serves in part as a polemical 
formulation distancing Benjamin’s position from that of Kant, we already see in this 
early text a link between madness and the will to a taxonomy of the empirical mind. 
In the Trauerspiel book, Benjamin further expands this link, investigating the 
potential of psychologically ‘deranged’ states such as madness and melancholic 
affective states to express a truth in distorted form. What is revealed is its fracture: 
melancholia and madness are reactions of the modern subject to its fractured state, 
its loss of previous wholeness.  
 
Freud and the Fractured Subject 
In The Future of an Illusion (1927), Freud conceptualises the compulsion to work 
and the denial of impulses (Triebverzicht) as the starting points of culture. Over the 
course of history, Freud writes, the psyche has undergone a change: it internalises 
the external constraint imposed on it by society, forming the super-ego. This process 
is repeated in every child’s development, allowing it to become “moral and social”. 
Thus, “Such a strengthening of the super-ego is a most precious cultural asset in the 
psychological field” (SE21, 10), as it is what makes society possible. At the intra-





the individual, fractured as it is between different agencies, variously conceptualised 
by Freud as unconscious and conscious, ego, id and superego, who each have their 
own agenda and pull in different directions. Psychoanalysis makes visible this 
fracturing of the subject into different agencies and drives running counter to one 
another. For Freud, it is only in thus exposing, and ultimately accepting, these 
fractures that suffering can be eased.  
I will discuss how Benjamin radicalises this insight in pointing to the historical 
specificity of this process. In examining the specific circumstances that lead to the 
formation of symptoms at the social level, as well as their historical transmission, 
Benjamin extends Freud’s understanding of the fractured subject in showing that the 
demand of being a subject is itself untenable from the moment of its inception. Thus 
it is expressed in melancholia and other forms of psychopathology. I will discuss 
how Benjamin draws on the methodology and concepts of Freudian psychoanalysis 
in order to conceptualise these affective states of the fractured subject, and in order 
to point the way to the ultimate overcoming of this subjectivity. A reading of Freud 
with Benjamin thus heightens the visibility of the latent political charge of Freud’s 
work and psychoanalysis more generally, while a reading of Benjamin with Freud 
can make apparent the Freudian legacy in Benjamin’s thinking around such concepts 
as the dream, the unconscious and ultimately, the subject, and in particular the 
question of its fracture. It is such a reading this thesis attempts to provide. I will 
argue that what Benjamin draws from Freud, then, is not a cohesive model of the 
human psyche, but an experimental approach to the application of the psychoanalytic 
method and its concepts. 
 
7. Structure of the thesis 
In my first chapter, I perform a close reading of Benjamin's book on the German 
Trauerspiel, translated as tragic drama or mourning play, tracing how it paints a 





wars of religion and the Reformation. These signified a rift in the fabric of 
Christianity’s symbolic order: in their wake, its explanations, its theological truths 
were no longer universally valid. As Stewart puts it: “Everything within creation 
seems to have suffered an indelible catastrophic rupture” (Stewart 2010, 9). Christian 
religious doctrine as such was destabilised, shattering the cosmological horizon of 
European society. This historical and spiritual experience, Benjamin argues, finds 
expression in the mournfulness of the artistic production of the Baroque. Benjamin 
charts how religious forms, concerns and questions persist in a profaning age where 
the possibility of their being adequately answered has vanished. The discrepancy 
between the claims of a worldview that continues to be shaped by religion and the 
simultaneous inaccessibility of spiritual certainty are expressed as suffering and 
mournfulness in the Trauerspiele. Benjamin is interested in these plays because their 
the mournfulness goes beyond artistic style; they express the essential character of 
their age.   
This mood is crystallised in the baroque sovereign, torn between the poles of martyr 
and tyrant. Shakespeare’s Hamlet emerges as the quintessential baroque sovereign 
on Benjamin’s reading, which I contrast with that of Carl Schmitt. I will show that 
their different readings of the play are grounded in their different understandings of 
sovereignty, which has implications for the status of myth. Through my reading, I 
reconstruct Benjamin’s necessarily unwritten rejoinder to Schmitt’s argument about 
Hamlet in his 1956 Hamlet or Hecuba. This allows me to trace how the fractured 
sovereign becomes the model for subjectivity, inaugurated as a result of the loss of 
the cosmology of the middle ages, the fracturing of the ethical community 
exemplified in the yearning for the historically no longer possible tragic mode, 
resulting in the lapse into myth and melancholia. 
In my second chapter, I confront Benjamin’s Trauerspiel book with Freud’s 
‘Mourning and Melancholia’ (1917), and to two of his case studies. What I aim to 
show in this discussion is that the emergence of melancholia and possession in the 





impossible demand of subjectivity. I discuss the relationship of this formation of 
subjectivity in the Baroque and beyond in Benjamin’s work in relation to Freud’s 
work on paranoia and psychopathological world-building. 
I then turn to Aby Warburg, who like Benjamin looked to the resurfacing of myth in 
modernity to better understand European culture on the eve of Fascism. This 
confrontation will allow Benjamin’s position to become more sharply delineated. 
Benjamin, as John Osborne observes in his introduction to the English translation of 
Benjamin’s Trauerspiel book, “was among the very first to recognize the seminal 
power of what was to become the Warburg Institute approach to renaissance and 
baroque art and symbolism” (OT, 19), and drew on many of the sources investigated 
by Warburg. I examine their respective readings of this material, contrasting 
Warburg’s concept of the pathos formula and the afterlife of Greek antiquity with 
Benjamin’s position on myth. This forms an important component of his 
conceptualisation of the role of history and memory in modernity, and in turn serves 
to lay the groundwork for Benjamin’s engagement with Freud in his Arcades 
Project. 
While the previous chapter established melancholia and ‘madness’ more broadly 
conceived as a locus of the emergence of a truth – however wrong the subjective 
beliefs of the mad and the melancholic may be - in this chapter I critically examine 
the role of psychopathology in Benjamin’s work beyond the Trauerspiel. I will show 
that Benjamin ultimately conceived of these derangements as a moment in a 
dynamic process – one might call it a dialectic – of moving beyond, towards a non-
pathological mode of relating to the world and the self. In this context, I read 
Benjamin’s figure of the critic against Freud’s psychoanalyst. 
In my third chapter, I investigate the changes the fractured modern subject undergoes 
in the aftermath of the Baroque. I will argue that post-baroque society, examined in 
work produced by Benjamin after the Trauerspiel book, still reflects its splitting of 
the world from truth, and thus the uneasy position of the fractured subject. What 





understanding and trust in theological certainties; thus its structures of power 
become a reiteration of that initial, failed, iteration of sovereignty and the attempt at 
creating a new truth in a profaned, post-sacral world.  
In Benjamin’s Arcades Project, the processes of mourning and melancholia are 
transposed into nineteenth-century capitalism. Like Pausianas, who “produced his 
topography of Greece around A.D. 200 at a time when the cult sites and many other 
monuments had begun to fall into ruin” (AP, 82) Benjamin writes the history of the 
arcades after their heyday has passed. In ruin, their bones become visible, they are 
reduced to their essential characteristics. Similar to the translucent vessels of truth in 
the Trauerspiel study, it is this ruination that allows their truth content to shine 
through. The commodity form comes to dominate in this era with a more totalising 
reach than previously, mediating the experience of life in what Benjamin calls the 
“dream-world” of nineteenth-century Paris. Thus, it becomes apparent that Benjamin 
fuses Freudian and Marxian categories in his analysis of nineteenth-century 
capitalism. 
I argue that Freud’s account of the death drive and repetition-compulsion in Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle (1920) furnishes Benjamin with the tools to make sense of the 
mechanism of the resurfacing of the mythic in capitalist modernity. The life-world of 
the nineteenth century metropolis thus becomes a web of symptoms for Benjamin, a 
way of approaching the social that draws from Freud’s Psychopathology of Everyday 
Life (1904). One of the most prominent theoretical points of connection between 
them is methodological: As I discuss in my third chapter, Benjamin uses Freud’s 
approach in the Psychopathology of Everyday Life in reading symptoms, recognizing 
pathology from its signs. 
With the aid of Freud, Benjamin is undertaking an aetiology of capitalist modernity, 
investigating the expression of its pathology in its cultural forms.  The nineteenth 
century itself thus functions as an organism in its own right. Simultaneously, 
nineteenth-century capitalist society also brings forth several types which form some 





fractured post-baroque subjects embody the expressions of the pathology typical of 
their age: their futile search for novelty and ‘experience’ expressive of their 
melancholia, structured by loss and lack. I then turn to Benjamin’s discussion of the 
interrelated changes in memory and experience in modernity, highlighting the 
centrality of Freud to these reflections. The fractured subject’s experience has 
changed in modernity: Erfahrung, communal experience, is no longer possible, 
Erlebnis, isolated experience comes to replace it. At the same time, this means that 
life in the modern metropolis happens as in a dream.  
This leads to an examination of Freud’s influence on Benjamin’s dream theory in my 
fourth and final chapter. I will show that Benjamin follows Freud’s theory of the 
dream and the unconscious, but expands it to the collective. For Benjamin, as for 
Freud, a ‘false dawn’, an analysis from within the dream, is a threat to true 
awakening. I examine surrealism and art nouveau as two such moments, whose 
potential Benjamin recognises as much as their limitations.  
In the second part of the chapter, I discuss Benjamin’s emphasis on true awakening. 
I further pursue Benjamin’s fusion of Freud and Marx in his dream analysis, 
demonstrating that dream analysis has a pivotal historico-political function for 
Benjamin. He draws from Freud in formulating it as a therapeutic manoeuvre, and 
from Marx in conceptualising it as a move beyond class society. I trace how the 
“arrest of thinking” in the dialectical image is akin to the renarration and 
examination of memories in psychoanalysis. For both Freud and Benjamin, the 
possibility of going beyond memory narratives, the possibility rewriting the narrative 
is located precisely at the point where it breaks off, opening the possibility of using 
the fracture of the subject as a means for its overcoming. 
The importance of the historical materialist and a collective movement beyond the 
reiteration of trauma in history come to the fore here. This leads me to the question 
of what Benjamin’s pits against the fractured post-baroque subject and the bourgeois 
subject of nineteenth-century capitalism. While stressing that while Benjamin 


















































Chapter 1 - Baroque Sovereignty and the Fractured Subject  
 
“If the prince were not so mercurial, the text would be more stable.”11 
 
HAMLET: Ay, marry. Why was he sent into England? 
FIRST CLOWN: Why, because ’a was mad. ’A shall recover his wits there. Or, if ’a 
do not, ’tis no great matter there. 
HAMLET: Why? 




Benjamin’s book Ursprung des Deutschen Trauerspiels12, published in 1928, is the 
culmination of Benjamin’s early thought on history and epistemology, focusing on 
                                               
11 Edwards, P. (Ed.) (2003). Shakespeare, William. Hamlet, Prince of Denmark, Cambridge 
University Press, 8. 
12 On the problem of translating “Trauerspiel” as “tragic drama”, Ilit Ferber notes: “Taking into 
account Benjamin’s commitment to the distinction between Trauerspiel and tragedy and, moreover, 
its vital importance in justifying his claims, it is worth noting one grave error in the English 
translation of the text’s title. Osborne’s translation of Trauerspiel as “tragic drama” ignores the efforts 
Benjamin makes to precisely distinguish the Trauerspiel from tragedy. “Mourning Play” or simply 
Trauerspiel, rather than “German Tragic Drama,” would have been much more appropriate, and it 
does give the impression that the translator is at some odds with his own decision.” (Ferber 2013, 
177). Weber (2008, 143) also points to the problematic status of this translation: “The unstated 





the connection between truth, madness and sovereignty. As we shall see later, these 
also form important points of connection to his later work, such as the Arcades 
Project, compiled between 1927 and 1940, and the 1940 ‘On the Concept of 
History’.  
Benjamin here undertakes a critique of conventional theories of drama and calls for 
the revaluation of the baroque German mourning plays or Trauerspiele as important 
cultural artefacts in the face of their dismissal by conventional scholarship. In 
examining these plays in their historico-political context, it becomes clear that 
Benjamin is indeed providing more than a contribution to literary theory: The study 
of these side-lined texts not only serves as a challenge to the habitual classification 
of genres and epochs, but allows the connection between aesthetics, politics and 
history to be addressed in new ways. Crucially, the themes of baroque melancholia, 
sovereignty and truth emerge as an interconnected triad, a thematic constellation 
considered in this chapter. As I will show, this leads to a conceptualisation of the 
subject as a fractured figure in the aftermath of the Baroque. 
 
1. The Epistemo-Critical Prologue 
What emerges forcefully from the ‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’ to the Trauerspiel 
book is the question of the relationship between truth and history. Benjamin writes, 
“Again and again the statement that the object of knowledge is not identical with the 
                                               
the distinctions may be, they nevertheless take place within the continuity of a self-identical genre—








truth will prove itself to be one of the profoundest intentions of philosophy in its 
original form, the Platonic theory of ideas. Knowledge is open to question, but truth 
is not” (OT, 30). Truth, while linked to cognition, is not synonymous with it.  
Having focused on the “certainty of knowledge that is lasting” in his earlier 
philosophical sketches, in the ‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’, Benjamin returns to the 
question of empirical experience and restores some of its importance. Following this, 
in a dense exposition to the book on Trauerspiel, Benjamin explains how Erkenntnis 
functions as a mediating process, operating on empirically observable phenomena. 
Through the concept, the phenomena are ‘dissolved’ into their elements, the various 
parts of which form the ideas. These ideas must be assumed to be existing in a 
separate sphere, that of truth; however, they need the empirical to find expression. 
As Weber describes this process, the ideas  
can only be presented or staged—dargestellt—by taking leave of the realm of 
pure ideas and descending to that of empirical, phenomenal experience, and 
this in turn can be accomplished only through a reordering or reorganization, a 
dismantling and dispersion effectuated by the concept on the "thing-like 
elements" (dinglicher Elemente) that constitute the phenomena (Weber 2009, 
7).   
Thus there is a dialectical motion at work between empirical reality and the realm of 
ideas. Benjamin charts how the ideas enter empirical reality in the form of 
phenomena, which in turn can only attain salvation in the realm of ideas, as truth. 
Empirical reality thus contains a “latent” reference “to those objects of theology 
without which truth is inconceivable” (OT, 29).13 Crucially, truth, then, is not 
bildhaft, imagistic, nor an object of Anschauung; intuition or contemplation; it is 
rather an “intentionless state of being” (OT, 36). It follows that the most the objects 
                                               
13 Benjamin uses the term “latent” in the German original (GS1, 926), which Osborne’s translation 





of empirical enquiry –historical objects- can hope to attain in terms of an 
epistemological function is to be as transparent as possible, in order to let their “truth 
content” shine through. This distinction between factual and truth content is clarified 
in the first version of the prologue (GS1, 927).14 Immersion into the minutiae of the 
Sachgehalt is thus crucial for making visible the Wahrheitsgehalt contained therein. 
This, of course, is a methodological injunction and brings Benjamin to his 
examination of the baroque Trauerspiel.   
 
2. The Trauerspiel study 
In contrast to critics who would apply the standards of tragedy or stylistic unity 
derived from later romantic artworks to the baroque Trauerspiel and find it wanting, 
Benjamin considers the historico-political context within which this art form arose as 
central to an appreciation of its value. The Baroque is here understood as a 
fragmented, deeply riven era characterised by the European wars of religion. That its 
art should reflect these bloody conflicts is hardly surprising, and goes some way to 
explaining the pervasive mood of melancholia that Benjamin discerns in the 
mourning plays. However, the specificity of the mood of this era goes beyond a mere 
reflection of the strife of its age. Rather, this strife itself can only be understood as a 
war about truth, provoked by the Reformation and the European wars of religion.  
All of the energy of this profaning age is “concentrated on a complete revolution of 
the content of life, while orthodox ecclesiastical forms were preserved” (OT, 79). 
Crucially, the Baroque was still operating within a Christian religious context: “For 
all that the increasing worldliness of the Counter-Reformation prevailed in both 
confessions, religious aspirations did not lose their importance: it was just that this 
                                               
14 This version was not included in Benjamin’s Habilitationsschrift and does not appear in Osborne’s 





century denied them a religious fulfilment, demanding of them, or imposing upon 
them, a secular solution instead” (OT, 79). Hence the mournfulness of the Baroque, 
an epoch torn between religious concerns and the loss of meaning of religious 
answers. The European religious wars signified a rift in the fabric of Christianity’s 
symbolic order; its explanations, its theological truths were no longer universally 
valid. Therefore the validity of religious doctrine as such was destabilised – and the 
former claim to universal truth of church doctrine called into question, shattering the 
cosmological horizon of European society. This historical and spiritual experience 
finds expression in the mournfulness of the artistic production of the Baroque. 
Benjamin charts how religious forms, concerns and questions persist in a profaning 
age where the possibility of their being adequately answered has vanished. The 
discrepancy between the claims of a worldview that continued to be shaped by 
religion and the inaccessibility of spiritual certainty were expressed as suffering and 
mournfulness in the Trauerspiele, whose worldly, profane solutions to the loss of 
transcendence proved to be less than satisfactory. 
Early on in the text, Benjamin differentiates tragedy from the Trauerspiel, and their 
differential relation to history and myth forms the backbone of this distinction: 
“Historical life, as it was conceived at that time, is its content, its true object. In this 
it is different from tragedy. For the object of the latter is not history, but myth” (OT, 
62). As Max Pensky notes, “Tragedy arises from myth; Trauerspiel, however, is 
embedded thoroughly within historical time, and this embeddedness, so complete 
that it rarely need be expressed manifestly by the baroque dramatists themselves, 
underlies and generates the catastrophic violence and lamentation so characteristic of 
the genre” (Pensky 1993, 113). For Benjamin, the Trauerspiel forms an interruption 
within the genre of the tragic and can no longer be assessed according to the same 
criteria, as it is of an utterly different historical era, one that no longer allows the 
play to be external to its historical moment. It is thus, in a sense, itself a form of 
Ursprung – as Benjamin understands origin not as a specific point in time or an 





Origin [Ursprung], although an entirely historical category, has, nevertheless, 
nothing to do with genesis [Entstehung]. The term origin is not intended to 
describe the process by which the existent came into being, but rather to 
describe that which emerges from the process of becoming and disappearance. 
Origin is an eddy in the stream of becoming, and in its current it swallows the 
material involved in the process of genesis (OT, 45). 
This idea of the centrality of interruption and the break with a given form which the 
Ursprung reshapes through its own force is one of the factors that allows Benjamin 
to let Shakespeare’s Hamlet emerge as the most emblematic mourning play of all. 
The allusions to this are dotted throughout the text but leave no doubt as to 
Benjamin’s valorisation of the play: “The finest exemplifications of the Trauerspiel 
are not those which adhere strictly to the rules, but those in which there are playful 
modulations of the Lustspiel. For this reason Calderon and Shakespeare created more 
important Trauerspiele than the German writers of the seventeenth century, who 
never progressed beyond the rigidly orthodox type” (OT,127). Benjamin refers to 
Novalis, who writes that in the work of the “genius” Shakespeare “there is indeed an 
alternation between the poetic and the anti-poetic, harmony and disharmony, the 
common, the base, the ugly and the romantic, the lofty, the beautiful, the real and the 
imagined: in Greek tragedy the opposite is true” (OT, 128). This disruption of the 
conventions of classical Greek theatre through a muddying of its demarcations 
regarding what is and is not appropriate matter and form for a tragedy demonstrate 
the exemplary status of Hamlet as a Trauerspiel. As Benjamin goes on to discuss, 
the comparative “gravity” of German Trauerspiele is part of their nostalgia for 
precisely those Greek tragedies they can no longer be, but still attempt to imitate. 
Perhaps anticipating the obvious objection that Hamlet cannot be taken as 
emblematic of the German Trauerspiel, Benjamin also cautions against the 
overemphasis of the role of the nation for the assessment of the idea of the genre, 
suggesting that the conflation of ‘German’ and ‘Trauerspiel’ may function as a 





the artworks of specific linguistic groups and “Volksbezirke” often form ideas in 
themselves, Benjamin suggests that the Trauerspiel may be better understood as 
European in character – which would imply the “Wesenheit” of German 
Trauerspiele cannot be understood through themselves alone and are affected by the 
works of Calderon and Shakespeare. 
History is a central dimension of philosophy for Benjamin. The latter never arrives at 
its final form – the doctrine – through mere thinking, disconnected from an 
engagement with historical reality: “Philosophical doctrine is based on historical 
codification. It cannot therefore be evoked more geometrico” (OT, 27). The 
philosophical-critical method, for Benjamin, must thus consider the historical object, 
remain close to it in the manner of contemplation and, in its choice of objects, be 
broad in scope as well as inclusive of what is commonly considered lowly or 
unworthy of serious study. This informs Benjamin’s examination of the Trauerspiel 
– his, as he observes himself, seemingly overly extensive study. His reflections, he 
suggests, are informed by the consciousness that thinking is most fruitful when it 
dwells with the “Geringste” the least, or lowliest, as Benjamin suggests in the first 
version of his Epistemo-Critical Prologue. Thus his focus will be on this when 
considering works and forms of art in order to gauge their content.15 In this, 
Benjamin refers to his method and aim in the Trauerspiel book as the salvation of 
the phenomena through the philosopher who can deliver them into the realm of ideas 
– making visible their truth content which, as discussed in the ‘Epistemo-Critical 
Prologue’, will be all the more visible for the wretchedness and ruination of the form 
of the Trauerspiel. Caygill observes of The Life of Students that 
The thought of an immanent perfection present in the most derided aspects of 
experience moves from an absolute idealism which rejects the present in the 
name of an absolute idea to a materialism which discerns the absolute in what 
                                               





is rejected by the present order. The expulsion of the absolute from the present 
may be discerned precisely in those things that the present regards as 
insignificant, absurd and unwanted.” (Caygill 1998, 8) 
Benjamin retains this interest in the detritus of history, the possibility of gaining 
insights – accessing truth content – precisely in that which is sidelined. But his focus 
is slightly reframed: In the Trauerspiel book, he is on his way to developing his later 
materialist critique “dedicated to exploring the power of the rejected and outmoded, 
and to finding a form of critique which would ‘point out the crisis lying in the 
essence of things’ without having to translate the immanent absolute into a 
redemptive idea” (Caygill 1998, 9). What is at stake here is the temporal nature of 
such truth, the breakdown of the semblance of totality in the symbol, and the 
melancholy that accompanies any attempt to reconstruct totality in a profaned world. 
The melancholic mood so characteristic of the Trauerspiele interrupts the flow of 
(dramatic) action or ‘happening’ (Geschehen) within the play, making visible a truth 
value through their disruptive function. Wahnsinn thus becomes a kind of Wahr-sinn, 
a sense for the truth emerging in madness: The gaze of the melancholic is not simply 
deranged, it is also deranging, focusing on the cracks within the social fabric and the 
truths presented by the age. These derangements are a function of a social disorder, 
making it visible by mirroring the dislocation and displacement, the Ver-rücktheit, of 
formerly fixed theologico-political arrangements and institutions that declared 
themselves as eternal truths. 
On this reading, perhaps we can think of madness itself as an origin – in its function 
as an interruption, an “eddy in the stream of becoming” (OT, 45), changing the 
course of what would otherwise appear as the smooth flow of history. It is an 
injunction to understand its emergence, its (patho)genesis. This is at play in Hamlet, 
where the characters at court are concerned with understanding the cause of Prince 
Hamlet’s madness, as if isolating and then rectifying the single cause they are 
convinced must be at the root of his derangement would make him – and thus the 





embodiment of the idea of Trauerspiel is thus consistent with his characterisation of 
the baroque sovereign.  
 
3. The Baroque Sovereign 
The madness and melancholia of the Baroque are crystallised in its sovereign, who, 
due to the new political formation of this period, is emblematic of its spirit. As 
Samuel Weber writes, “the relationship between the Trauerspiel and history is far 
from a one-way street: if baroque theater is concerned primarily with history, this 
history is in turn construed as a kind of Trauerspiel”. At stake in the mourning plays 
is “not just ‘historical life’ as such, but rather ‘historical life as represented by its 
age’” (Weber 1992, 6). Likewise, the sovereign “represents” rather than “is” the 
epoch – a distinction Benjamin insists is derived from the juridico-political sphere, 
not art: “He holds the course of history in his hand like a sceptre. This view is by no 
means peculiar to the dramatists. It is based on certain constitutional notions. A new 
concept of sovereignty emerged in the seventeenth century from a final discussion of 
the juridical doctrines of the middle ages” (OT, 65). Benjamin details the nature of 
this new form of political power, charting the progressive defeat of the church in the 
seventeenth century, a development that establishes authority as thoroughly worldly:  
The publication of the Gallican articles in 1682 marked the final collapse of the 
theocratic doctrine of the state : the absolute right of the monarch had been 
established before the Curia… Whereas the modern concept of sovereignty 
amounts to a supreme executive power on the part of the prince, the baroque 
concept emerges from a discussion of the state of emergency, and makes it the 
most important function of the prince to avert this (OT, 65). 
Baroque, unlike modern sovereignty, is a response to an age riven with religious 
strife and derives its justification from the promise of stability. Crucially, the ‘state 





themselves, but by “war, revolt or other catastrophes” – events outside of the control 
of the sovereign. Benjamin sees this new order as “counter-reformatory”, “an 
antithesis to the historical ideal of restoration it is haunted by the idea of catastrophe. 
And it is in response to this antithesis that the theory of the state of emergency is 
devised” (OT, 66). This is an important point: from within the triumphantly 
humanistic Renaissance tradition emerges an absolutist political framework, an 
intensification of its “worldly-despotic” aspect become autonomous. Benjamin here 
draws attention to the tyranny and centralised power undergirding the idea of 
stability and a flourishing community in the Renaissance, premised on the ever-
present threat of a crisis, a state of exception. The frenetic fixation on the Diesseits in 
the Baroque is haunted by this sense of being under threat, made worse by the 
suspicion that the immanent is really all there is:  
The religious man of the baroque era clings so tightly to the world because of 
the feeling that he is being driven along to a cataract with it. The baroque 
knows no eschatology; and for that very reason it possesses no mechanism by 
which all earthly things are gathered in together and exalted before being 
consigned to their end. (OT, 66) 
There is nothing left beyond sovereign power in the Baroque; no higher authority, 
just the promise of averting the worst excesses of the state of exception.16 Thus this 
sovereignty takes centre stage and becomes a stand-in for the previous holder of this 
position of ultimate truth-giver: religion. This explains the occasional exaltation of 
the sovereign in baroque art; however, it remains “pagan”: “In the Trauerspiel 
monarch and martyr do not shake off their immanence” (OT, 67). Both are utterly of 
                                               
16 See Agamben (SE 56) for an alternative reading of this passage. Agamben asserts that Benjamin in 
fact wrote “eine” (a) rather than “keine” (no) eschatology. However, given Benjamin’s argument 
about the loss of transcendence in the Baroque, the more established version of “no eschatology” fits 





this world. The doctrine of the divine right of kings most forcefully revives the 
divine as an attempt to compensate for the loss of both political and religious 
authority. The sovereign is thus wretched and mortal, unable to stand the weight of 
his office, his “creaturely” nature not fit as a stand-in for ecclesiastical power, and 
thus unable to even meet the demands of his political office. 
As Beatrice Hanssen writes, the word Kreatur functioned as a Latinate equivalent of 
the German Geschöpf – that which is created, in its totality (Hanssen 1998, 103- 
104). She notes its use in the Trauerspiel book in relation to the sovereign, who is 
“the lord of creatures”, ambiguously embodying both his exalted position and at the 
same time his lowly nature, via the identification the creaturely with the physical, 
and sometimes “animality”.17 Andrew Benjamin conceptualises the dual character of 
the term as follows: “Kreatur embraces animals and human beings as creatures (of 
god, theologically) and as bodies and flesh subjugated and exposed to the sufferings 
of the body and the flesh, and ultimately exposed to death” (Benjamin 2005, 109). 
However, voided of the theological dimension in the wake of the Baroque crisis of 
religion, only the emptied-out physis remains in the creaturely.18 As Rainer Nägele 
puts it: “In the baroque Trauerspiel, the subject appears not as creator, but as 
Kreatur…In psychoanalytic terms we would have to speak of the status castration, 
that is, its symbolic representation as circumcision in the constitution of the subject 
and of the social community” (Nägele 1988, 13).  For Benjamin, this is encapsulated 
by baroque playwright Andreas Gryphius, whose lines “You who have lost sight of 
the image of the Highest: behold the image that has been born unto you! Ask not 
why it enters into a stable! He is seeking us, who are more like all the animals than 
                                               
17 In this work, Hanssen reads the concept of Kreatur as also carrying a more positive aspect: that of 
an attention to the non-human, exceeding the constraints of anthropocentric subjectivity, which she 
explores in relation to Benjamin’s work on Kafka. 
18 It is worth noting that Benjamin’s interest in the figure of the Kreatur went beyond his Trauerspiel 
book and resulted in his collaboration with Buber’s eponymous journal, aiming to explore 





the animals themselves” Benjamin comments with the words “This latter is 
demonstrated by despots in their madness” (OT, 86). It is precisely the loss, the fact 
of once having not been a mere animal that is at stake in the creatureliness of 
humanity: a dimension of suffering is opened up in the reduction of humanity to 
animality through the voiding of its transcendental aspect in the process of the loss 
of religious certainty. Thus Benjamin writes of “the punitive mark of creatureliness, 
the human visage” (SW2.1, 156). In this analogy, it is precisely the human side of 
the creaturely, in the loss of its aspect which could formerly be identified with the 
divine, that is turned into a punishment. The fractured subject is thus branded19, its 
dual loss in the Cartesian split - from transcendence, and from a holistic conception 
of the body/mind - rendered painfully visible.  
In this context, Benjamin charts how the sovereign becomes a stand-in for religion, 
the previous ultimate guarantor of stability and truth. This connection to the religious 
explains the occasional exaltation of the sovereign in Baroque art; however, he does 
not escape immanence: The sovereign is wretched and mortal, unable to stand the 
weight of his office, his “creaturely” nature not fit as a stand-in for the divine. What 
we witness in this age is the emergence of a new form of political power: Baroque 
sovereignty, ushering in the age of Absolutism. In the state-formation that forms the 
backdrop to the mourning plays, the sovereign represents history: he “holds the 
course of history in his hand like a sceptre” (OT, 65).  In this image, the links 
between sovereignty and subjectivity begin to become visible: It can be taken as a 
metaphor for the notion of the subject qua sovereign individual as such, in command 
of history, simultaneously representative of humanity as such as history-making, and 
of history itself.  
The sovereign functions as the only true subject in this account, the one imbued with 
the power, through his political position, to execute his will – but he fails to use this 
                                               





power successfully. He becomes the paradigmatic case of the modern subject, but 
the demand of being a subject is not limited to him. As a literary creation, the form 
of subjectivity showcased by the baroque sovereign is projected onto him as its most 
notable representative by the baroque playwrights who thus expressed the specific 
suffering of their age. It is important to note that unlike Carl Schmitt in Hamlet or 
Hecuba (1956), Benjamin is not referencing actually-existing, historical baroque 
monarchs but the figure of the baroque monarch as he functions in the Trauerspiele. 
As such, any claim about the political formation of the baroque era is mediated via 
its representations in its cultural production: We are dealing not merely with a 
historical account of the relation between sovereignty and subjectivity, but with the 
role given to these sovereigns by baroque playwrights reflecting on their age. This 
allows Benjamin to make the link between the community as a whole, as reflected by 
the mourning plays/playwrights, and the sovereign even clearer. Rather than 
representing an origin in the non-Benjaminian sense – as a source from which 
sovereignty flows – the sovereign of the Trauerspiel is a Benjaminian origin, an 
“eddy in the stream of becoming”, a momentary conflux of historical contingencies 
which allows the constitutive factors of the modern, fractured subject to become 
visible in a representation.  
The Trauerspiel thus serves as a study of the inauguration of the modern concept of 
the subject out of the destruction of what came before and the crisis of meaning and 
authority thus provoked; a subject capable of willing, decisiveness, action. Subject 
and agency are bound up with each other; a subject is a subject qua being an agent, 
an actor. However, Benjamin demonstrates that this command to decisiveness and 
the exertion of will on the external world is doomed to failure from the start. He first 
posits the emergence of the modern subject, and then shows the unattainability, the 
impossibility of any such state of subjecthood. Thus, the subject is revealed as 
fractured from the beginning, torn between the demand placed on it and its inability 
to meet it. This is expressed in its internal rivenness between the two affective poles 






The sovereign functions in the Trauerspiele as the paradigmatic embodiment of this 
fracture of the modern subject. The sovereign’s split between creature and political 
authority results in his refracting into two distinct genres and characters: the tyrant 
and the martyr. “This juxtaposition”, Benjamin notes,  
appears strange only as long as one neglects to consider the legal aspect of 
baroque princedom. Seen in ideological terms they are strictly complementary. 
In the baroque the tyrant and the martyr are but the two faces of the monarch. 
They are the necessarily extreme incarnations of the princely essence. (OT, 68)  
Once we consider the juridico-political aspect i.e. the political power enshrined in 
the office of the sovereign, these seemingly separate characters indeed reveal 
themselves as a Janus-faced tyrant/martyr, eliciting both pity and fear. However, 
unlike in Greek tragedy, these don’t result in catharsis, but remain as verdicts on the 
historical reality of baroque sovereign power, which, in the figure of the sovereign, 
becomes both pitiable and fearful. Eventually, the latter aspect takes over and the 
sovereign becomes synonymous with the tyrant: tyrannical power is latent in his 
role. The real or potential state of exception with its attendant emergence of 
dictatorial power comes to be the defining feature of sovereignty. 
Meanwhile, the fractured ruler remains drawn into his creaturely dimension, 
wretched and inadequate to the tasks that fall to him – unable to maintain order and 
make decisions that avoid the state of exception. It follows that, paradoxically, 
anyone called upon to rule, placed in the position of the ultimate, singular decision-
maker, is unable to do so: 
The antithesis between the power of the ruler and his capacity to rule led to a 
feature peculiar to the Trauerspiel which is, however, only apparently a generic 
feature and which can be illuminated only against the back ground of the theory 
of sovereignty. This is the indecisiveness of the tyrant. The prince, who is 





at the first opportunity, that he is almost incapable of making a decision. (OT, 
70-71) 
Melancholia takes hold, paralysing the ruler, who is meant to be holder of the 
sovereign power to act. Thus, the initial promise and raison d’être of sovereignty – 
averting the state of exception – fails, is indeed doomed to failure, as the sovereign, 
himself nothing but a creature, cannot make good on the promise and threat of 
stability through the sword with which the power of his office endows him. This is 
where the aspect of the martyr becomes visible again: 
 At the moment when the ruler indulges in the most violent display of power, 
both history and the higher power, which checks its vicissitudes, are recognized 
as manifest in him. And so there is this one thing to be said in favour of the 
Caesar as he loses himself in the ecstasy of power: he falls victim to the 
disproportion between the unlimited hierarchical dignity, with which he is 
divinely invested and the humble estate of his humanity. (OT, 70) 
In the Baroque, the certainty of divine appointment has vanished; all that remains is 
a dialectic of power and the creaturely, the wretched humanity, played out in the 
figure of the sovereign. The disproportion of his power to his being, the deranged 
relationship between the two, thus comes to be mirrored in the sovereign’s own de-
rangement, his “Machtrausch”, intoxication with power. However, this only forms 
the obverse of the Handlungshemmung of the melancholic; the tyrant’s 
Machtrausch, wild and irrational action, is just as different from decisive action to 
stabilise the realm as the inactivity of the martyr. Benjamin specifies the form of 
stability meant to avert the state of exception: “a dictatorship whose utopian goal 
will always be to replace the unpredictability of historical accident with the iron 
constitution of the laws of nature. But the stoic technique [of the martyr] also aims to 
establish a corresponding fortification against a state of emergency of the soul, the 
rule of the emotion” (OT, 74). This is the repressive function of the tyrant transposed 
into the psychic level: asceticism, “chastity”, and specifically the regulation of 





political authority, psychic repression, and the pathology of male rule which will 
become apparent throughout the Trauerspiel book, and beyond: it will resurface in 
the nineteenth century in figures such as Baudelaire, discussed in Chapter 3.  
 This, then, is the moment where sovereign power becomes dictatorial, and where for 
Benjamin the question of nature and history come into play again: In the attempt to 
restore order precisely within the state of exception, establishing the person of the 
sovereign as the sole guarantor of this order, with no recourse to a legal framework 
or any division of power. The attempt to replace human history, its changing 
political and legal formations, with one transcendental, “iron” one, is equal to a fall 
back into the natural order and thus into myth.  
The baroque age thus ushers in and simultaneously undermines the absolute 
sovereign – neither as tyrant nor as martyr can he act successfully, politically. 
Sovereignty must assert meaning and ‘truth’ and thus avoid the state of exception, 
but, in the context of the historical circumstances of the baroque era, fails to do so, in 
Benjamin’s reading; cannot but fail to do so, as its sovereign is torn between 
creaturely powerlessness and subjection to mortality, nature, and the simultaneous 
task of precisely instantiating these very same iron laws of nature to which he is 
himself subject. Baroque sovereignty, as a response to the downfall of the pinnacle 
of certainty in the form of transcendental religious truths, thus suffers from its status 
as ‘post-history’: anything that follows the downfall of such truths will always be 
haunted by the suspicion that it, too, is transient. This is the melancholy of its 
immanence. In this profaned and profaning age, Benjamin writes, the exercise of 
dictatorial power comes to be the touchstone of spirit (Geist); but this exercise of 
power places an unbearable strain on the sovereign: 
This capacity requires both strict inner discipline and unscrupulous external 
action. Its practice brought to the course of the world an icy disillusion which is 
matched in intensity only by the fierce aspiration of the will to power. Such a 





mood of mourning [Trauer] in the creature stripped of all naive impulses. (OT, 
98) 
It is thus precisely at the point where the sovereign attains the pinnacle of 
worldliness that his creaturely side begins to mourn – for the loss of something 
beyond this worldly immanence.  
The baroque sovereign, representing the rivenness of the age that brought him into 
being, not only embodies melancholy in his inability to act, its creaturely 
wretchedness in the form of the martyr, but also its inverse, the sudden rage of the 
tyrant. (As such, he becomes an object of fascination for the people:) “the 
seventeenth-century ruler, the summit of creation, erupting into madness like a 
volcano and destroying himself and his entire court” (OT, 70). It is not surprising 
that the sovereign, fractured between his creaturely-human and his exalted-political 
aspects, “entkleidet” of his creaturely instincts, robed instead in the mantle of 
absolute power, is riven between melancholia and the ultimate lapse into madness. 
Rather, it expresses the untenable strain of subjectivity in the wake of the dissolution 
of transcendence. As Weber notes, 
 “… it is clear that the dilemma of the sovereign in baroque drama is also and 
above all that of the subject as such: it is no longer determined by its head—
that is, by its consciousness, its intentions—but by forces that act independently 
of conscious volition, that buffet and drive it from one extreme to another…like 
torn flags whipped about in the wind, baroque figures are driven by 
tempestuous affects over which they have little control”. (Weber 2008, 190) 
However, what the Trauerspiel book demonstrates is that what is at stake for 
Benjamin is not the “no longer”, the loss of a supposed previous rationality of the 
subject. Rather, the “dilemma” of the subject – its fracture – is, as Benjamin notes in 
his comments on Descartes, inaugurated in the moment that physis and the mind are 
split, and that, as in Benjamin’s critique of Kant, metaphysics is sundered from 





madness and other impediments to the rational volition of the sovereign-subject 
emerge as symptoms of this constitutive split in modernity, and they present an 
opening of Benjamin’s thought to psychoanalysis. Before further pursuing this link 
in my next chapter, I will further investigate the link between sovereign and 
fractured subject in the figure of Hamlet.   
 
4. Hamlet: Benjamin contra Carl Schmitt 
It is hard to overlook the parallels to Shakespeare’s Prince Hamlet in Benjamin’s 
observations on the sovereign martyr-tyrant, and indeed Benjamin refers to Hamlet 
as the paradigmatic baroque sovereign. In particular, Hamlet’s second soliloquy in 
2.2 springs to mind, in which he raves about the contrast between the exalted nature 
of man and his own disillusionment with humanity; also his speech in the freshly-
dug grave in 5.1, and indeed the ending of the play. The crucial passage that relates 
Hamlet’s madness to the doubling/rendering apart of baroque sovereignty occurs in 
5.2, where Hamlet, prior to his duel with Laertes, declares his madness as not only 
separate from himself, but his enemy. 
The two faces of the sovereign as martyr/tyrant are thus emblematised in Hamlet, 
who is always at the mercy of his changing moods and cannot command them, nor 
marshal his rage when a decision is called for regarding Claudius –he is aware of 
this, but unable to change it.  This is one of the many features that lead Benjamin to 
read Hamlet as the sovereign of a Trauerspiel rather than a tragic hero: for Greek 
tragedy, “It is not the intensity but the duration of high feeling which makes the high 
man” (OT, 115); this is a stable mode of being that has become entirely impossible 
in the baroque, characterised instead by the instability of the “sheer arbitrariness of a 
constantly shifting emotional storm” (OT, 71). This rivenness and the mental 
anguish it causes thus expresses a thoroughly historical truth. Hamlet’s madness, 
which seems to fluctuate throughout the text, destabilises the very idea of rationality 





contemporaries appear irritated and unsettled at least as much by the inconsistency of 
his madness as by its appearing in the first place. Hamlet’s friend Horatio functions 
as the voice of “reason” or at least scepticism within the text - but he is destabilized 
from the outset. The vexing question of whether Hamlet is mad or not; feigns 
madness, and if so, whether that would not in fact imply rationality; whether he is 
mad some of the time or all of the time; and so on, is not so much about an inner 
truth pertaining to Hamlet himself. In Benjamin’s reading, there is no inner truth of 
the character Hamlet contained within the play. Rather, in his vacillations he is 
representative of an age characterised by strife and disintegration. 
Hamlet’s much-lamented powerlessness stands in striking contrast to his political 
role as a Prince. What sets Shakespeare’s play apart from the German Trauerspiele - 
even as it makes it the most ‘successful’ of its kind in Benjamin’s eyes - is the self-
awareness of the play, its playing with politics as play, the central role given to the 
play within the play. It thus embodies the performativity of the role of the baroque 
sovereign, placing the question of truth, play and representation at the heart of the 
political.20 It is a feature of Hamlet’s melancholic derangement that he fails to see 
himself as a sovereign, and thus fails to act as one. Hamlet relates everything back to 
himself in his private capacity as grieving son and scholar; all events he encounters 
in the play act as fuel for his melancholy musings on humanity and later, death. His 
failure as a sovereign is thus grounded in an excess of subjectivity. Hamlet’s 
madness not only drags the court down into ruination with him; it also affects the 
people of Denmark, cryptically hinted at throughout the play as a faceless multitude. 
This, for Benjamin, is a typical feature of baroque sovereignty: “For if the tyrant 
falls, not simply in his own name, as an individual, but as a ruler and in the name of 
mankind and history, then his fall has the quality of a judgment, in which the subject 
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[Untertan] too is implicated” (OT, 72). His fate is a judgement on the state of the 
realm, and his madness no mere private affair; indeed, acting merely as a private 
person rather than a political one bound by the task of sovereignty – to assert 
dictatorial power – is what characterises his failure.  
Thus one of the sources of the dramatic tension of the play is the tension typical of 
the Baroque between the mere creaturely life of the sovereign and his exalted 
position of power. Hamlet’s mental breakdown, whether (partly) feigned or not, 
highlights the precariousness not just of the human mind, but that of the whole 
political community. Hamlet is “th’observed of all observed” as Ophelia comments 
in 3.1.156; his every move intensely watched over by his adversaries at court. His 
body itself is a stage on which the health of the country – or lack thereof – plays out, 
and should Hamlet’s mind be rotting, or appear to be rotting, then something is 
indeed “rotten in the state of Denmark” (1.4.90). This is the crux of Hamlet’s role: If 
he is seen to be acting mad, then it does not matter if Hamlet the private person ‘is’ 
mad, since as sovereign, he functions purely as a representative of his realm. 
However, Hamlet’s rivenness exceeds this tension - Hamlet’s central conflict, in 
Benjamin’s reading, is that he feels bound by the moral code of a bygone age, i.e. 
compelled to act like a tragic hero, even as that mode of acting has fallen out of 
favour, indeed has become senseless in his own age. He thus embodies the 
melancholy of the Baroque, doubly so in that he tries to be both mythic hero and act 
within a Christian context.  On this reading, Hamlet emerges as a Trauerspiel rather 
than a revenge tragedy. Naturally, Hamlet fails in his attempt to exact revenge in the 
manner of a tragic hero – rather than rushing to avenge his father, uncaring of the 
possible consequences, he wants to find out the truth of the Ghost’s words: whether 
his father truly was poisoned. Hamlet is thus torn between the injunction from the 
supernatural figure, and the urge to verify his words via empirical proof. As I discuss 






Hamlet or Hecuba 
In an infamous letter of 1930, Benjamin thanked German jurist and political theorist 
Carl Schmitt for his contribution to Benjamin’s book on German tragic drama:  
You will very quickly recognize how much my book is indebted to you for its 
presentation of the doctrine of sovereignty in the seventeenth century. Perhaps I 
may also say, in addition, that I have also derived from your later works, 
especially the “Diktatur”, a confirmation of my modes of research in the 
philosophy of art from yours in the philosophy of the state. (GS1, 887)21 
In response to this seeming endorsement of Schmitt, Scholem later observed that 
Benjamin   
had an extraordinarily precise and delicate feel for the subversive elements in 
the oeuvre of great scholars. He was able to perceive the subterranean rumbling 
of revolution even in the case of authors whose worldview bore reactionary 
traits; generally he was keenly aware of what he called "the strange interplay 
between reactionary theory and revolutionary practice. (Scholem 1976, 195) 
There has been a resurgence of interest in Benjamin’s controversial endorsement of 
Schmitt.22 Where Weber (1992) stresses the methodological focus on extremes as the 
main point of connection between the two thinkers, recent scholarship mostly 
                                               
21 transl. Samuel Weber (1992, 5). 
22 See for instance Weber, Samuel. “Taking Exception to Decision: Walter Benjamin and Carl 
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focuses on the legacy of Schmitt’s concept of sovereignty, in particular with 
reference to Hobbes.23 While in 1973, Schmitt himself retrospectively positioned his 
1938 book on Hobbes as a response to Benjamin24, I propose instead to read his 
1956 Hamlet or Hecuba as the more salient point of connection between the two 
thinkers, allowing their different understandings of sovereignty and myth to come to 
the fore.   
In the Appendix to Hamlet or Hecuba, Schmitt contests Benjamin’s central claim 
about Hamlet as a Trauerspiel. He states that, although Benjamin takes recourse to 
Schmitt’s definition of sovereignty, he underestimates the differences between the 
English and the German social and political situation and therefore their cultural and 
artistic products, such as plays, which for Schmitt “is  equally essential for the 
interpretation of Hamlet because the core of this play cannot be grasped by means of 
the categories of art and cultural history. such as Renaissance and Baroque” (Schmitt 
2006, 53). Schmitt locates this difference in the “antithesis between barbaric and 
political” (Schmitt 2006, 54) – for him, the early seventeenth century in England 
remained a ‘barbaric’ age; one where the differentiation and detachment of the 
political as a distinct sphere had not yet occurred. The same holds true for art; both 
art and the political, Schmitt states, were still embedded in ‘life’. Thus, he claims 
that no pre-modern state can meaningfully be termed a ‘state’ as the political power 
of the sovereign had not yet been established. The separation of worldly rule from 
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“esteem” for Schmitt as reflected in his art theoretical approach and “relentless politicisation of time”, 
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Schmitt’s positive view of Hobbes, suggesting instead that Hamlet or Hecuba is to be read as a 
rebuttal of the detrimental effects of Hobbes’ concept of sovereignty. 
24 See Schmitt’s letter to Viesel, 4 April 1973, in: Viesel, Jawohl, der Schmitt, 14. However, as 
Bredekamp observes, “At first glance, it may seem questionable whether Schmitt really had Benjamin 
in mind when he wrote his critique of Hobbes. It is possible that he, looking back in 1973, was 
seeking some share in Benjamin's fame. He may have viewed this as a welcome opportunity to 
disguise the book's open anti-Semitism by describing it as a veiled answer to a Jewish emigrant, in 





the church had not yet been accomplished; something, Schmitt asserts, that only 
occurred in the emerging state system of continental Europe, which was formed 
following the religious wars and put an end to them by detaching church and state, 
declaring the latter a political sphere above interreligious quarrels. The ensuing 
public order and ostensible stability serves, in turn, to legitimate this new political 
construct.  
Schmitt describes Tudor England as ‘on its way’ towards statehood in this sense in 
the period between 1588 and 1688 (the century spanning the destruction of the 
Spanish Armada and the expulsion of the Stuarts), but developing along a different 
path to that taken by continental Europe. Schmitt places Shakespeare’s play at the 
start of this development; it signifies an ‘Aufbruch’, a departure. Schmitt is as 
enthusiastic about this historical moment of England’s ascendancy as he is morose 
about what he perceives as the (momentary) downfall of European civilisation in the 
era of religious wars. This sharply contrasts with the period from which Hamlet 
emerges – the build-up to the civil war in England, itself concerned with the question 
of truth, reaching a bloody impasse. On Schmitt’s understanding, this could only be 
solved by the invention of sovereignty, which inaugurates an order above sectarian 
religious strife.  
The issues of sovereignty and stability discussed with regards to the later 
developments in the seventeenth century - dealt with in Schmitt’s other writings - are 
foreshadowed in the cusp-of-the-century timeframe of Hamlet or Hecuba. Schmitt 
was well aware of the political and religious tensions in England at this time, and a 
discussion of these forms the backdrop of much of his thinking in Hamlet or 
Hecuba. Ostensibly, there was no open civil war around the coronation of James I 





machinations25, a point reflected in the courtly intrigue of Hamlet) but as Schmitt 
discusses, the invasion of the Spanish Armada in 1588 signified a formative event 
for the political consciousness of the era and inaugurated a century of strife. Schmitt 
paints the picture of a society characterised by an unstable, “negative” peace; central 
to its landscape were certain political taboos surrounding James’ ascendancy to the 
throne. This, for Schmitt, is the root of their incursion into the play. The existence of 
this latent conflict was, of course, demonstrated by the eruption of the English civil 
war and the 30 Years War within a few decades. Schmitt thus identifies a partial 
resolution - more of a temporary cessation - of the ongoing religious strife of the 
Elizabethan era, but while it may last for a while, a model of governance that ensures 
a more lasting peace must be found. 
On Schmitt’s reading, what is absolutely pivotal to the overcoming of religious and 
political strife and attendant instability is a new myth to tie together the political 
community – and only a sovereign can provide this. Motivated by this quest, Schmitt 
undertakes a brief overview of the literature pertaining to the question of the origin 
of tragedy, dismissing Nietzsche’s views on music and the notion of particular 
myths, as the latter is a merely literary source. However, Schmitt states, “the 
definition is correct to the extent it considers the myth a piece of the heroic legend, 
not only the poet's literary source, but a living common knowledge, embracing poet 
and audience, a piece of historical reality in which all the participants are brought 
together by their historical existence” (Schmitt 2006, 40). Schmitt’s aim to establish 
the primacy of myth is further demonstrated in his question whether the 
“Bildungswissen” of Schiller and his contemporaries “is capable of creating a 
common presence and public space”, the answer indicating whether history here 
serves as an origin of tragedy or a mere literary source for a Trauerspiel (which 
Schmitt, contra Benjamin, regards as the inferior variety of what is essentially the 
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same genre). He bluntly states: “I do not think that knowledge of history may replace 
the myth” (Schmitt 2006, 40).26  
Where Benjamin is at pains to distinguish myth from history (indeed, this is what 
sets Trauerspiel apart from tragedy for him), Schmitt strives to collapse myth back 
into history, and thus to re-mythologise historical events. The tragic, for Schmitt, 
must remain a transhistorical category; Trauerspiele must retain the potential to 
become elevated to myth if post-Classical society is to enjoy any measure of 
stability, as the existence of a myth that ties together the community (be it national 
or, as in Hamlet or Hecuba, European) is so crucial to this. Thus, Schmitt suggests, 
even to him and his contemporaries, 
Mary Stuart is something more and something else than Hecuba. Neither is the 
fate of the Atrids so close to us as that of the unfortunate Stuarts. his royal 
lineage has been shattered by the fateful religious divisions of Europe. It was in 
the history of that lineage that the tragic myth of Hamlet germinated. (Schmitt 
2006, 45) 
Schmitt, like Benjamin, recognizes that Greek myth is not nearly as close to the 
mind of the baroque theatregoer, or indeed his own contemporaries, as the Stuarts, 
who are historical figures. However, for Schmitt, the possibility of the emergence, or 
rather, creation of a new myth out of this historical matter must be retained . What is 
so deeply tragic about the fate of the Stuarts, to Schmitt, is their embodiment of the 
fractured ‘European spirit’. This would, at first glance, appear not to be too far 
removed from Benjamin’s centering of the historical context of religious strife on the 
Baroque mourning play. However, the difference in emphasis is a crucial, and a 
political one: Where Benjamin is interested in the possibilities opened up by the 
experience of the loss of meaning, the melancholic mood resulting from the 
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disappearance of religious certainties, for its ability to destabilise the conventional 
narrative of historical events, Schmitt laments the downfall of ‘Europe’s fate’. His 
text is haunted by a sense of ‘greatness’ lost and not yet regained, perhaps that very 
same flourishing of Renaissance art which, in Benjamin’s reading, was the 
Vorgeschichte, the prehistory to the ensuing religious strife and instability of the 
Baroque.  
For Benjamin, the Baroque ushers in a sovereignty that is always under suspicion, 
undermining political authority into his own day, and thus destabilising the model of 
subjectivity that is modelled on this form of authority. Schmitt, on the other hand, 
regards the period that gave rise to Shakespeare’s dramas as a historical aberration. 
The tragedy of the Stuarts, for Schmitt, is that they did not read the sign of the times 
correctly, “incapable of freeing themselves from the ecclesiastical and feudal middle 
ages” (CS 56). Read through the lense of the historical figure of James the I. and VI., 
Hamlet thus becomes a tragic myth because he stands as a warning against the 
dangers of sectarianism. 
In his closing praise for Shakespeare, Schmitt attests the playwright the status of 
genius based on his scrupulous political sentiments. Schmitt ascribes Shakespeare 
the political foresight to know what figure, in a context of bewildering, frenetic 
Aktualität, would be capable of being elated, intensified into a myth. He does so 
guided by respect for the violence and political taboos of his age; these allow him, 
on Schmitt’s reading, to also obtain an inkling of a possible solution to the 
succession squabble and religious wars over truth: a new myth.  
For Benjamin, of course, the ‘Gestalt’ that Shakespeare pulled out of his Aktualität 
in the form of Hamlet is not capable of mythologization in this Schmittian sense; it 
cannot be, because this has become a historical impossibility. Benjamin traces how 
the inaugural step of sovereignty, enacted in baroque history and in the Trauerspiel, 





conceptualised as ruin from its inception. What follows can be nothing but the 
reiteration of that same failure throughout its post-history. 
Benjamin and Schmitt thus work from similar postulates – both understand the idea 
of sovereignty as premised on the promise of stability in an unstable age. Where they 
differ is in their response to and their perceived reason for its inauguration: For 
Benjamin, the sovereign’s task is to provide continuity, averting the state of 
exception. He is supposed to reinforce the existing order rather than break with it. 
Schmitt, in contrast, proposes a radical break in the political order as the 
foundational act of the sovereign– the creation of a new regime, ushering in a new 
truth, and ultimately ensuring peace through a foundation myth. For Benjamin, this 
attempt is doomed to failure – all the sovereign can aim to do is to stave off 
disintegration, and even in that he is ultimately doomed to ill-success. Hamlet is 
emblematic of this.  
Thus Schmitt and Benjamin disagree on what constitutes Hamlet’s failure: Schmitt 
reads the end of the play as an instance of an admittedly ineffective ruler, who, 
perhaps recognising this truth about himself in his final moments, gives his dying 
voice to Fortinbras, thus averting the state of emergency– Fortinbras, arriving with 
an invading army, seeming like a much more likely candidate for successful 
sovereignty on Schmitt’s reading. At the same time, Hamlet’s failure to himself act 
as a sovereign in his lifetime allows him to be turned into a myth, expressing the real 
historical failure of the Stuarts and the need for sovereignty beyond internecine 
religious conflicts.  
Schmitt crucially does not read Hamlet as synonymous with the Stuarts or any other 
particular historical figure; rather, he manages to represent and, as play, insofar as he 
embodies these political tensions of his age, transcend their fate, thus becoming 
tragic. Schmitt is not primarily concerned with the figure of Hamlet himself so much 
as he is with demonstrating that the play is precisely not a ‘pure’ play: it is the 





judged adequately. Hamlet’s failure thus designates Shakespeare’s success as a 
political playwright and myth-maker on Schmitt’s reading. 
This disagreement is partially grounded in Benjamin’s and Schmitt’s differing 
periodisation of Hamlet. On Benjamin’s reading it is baroque, while Schmitt sees it 
as premodern and thus ‘barbaric’. The implication is that this unstable form of 
sovereignty needs to be superseded by a more fully dictatorial –and thus successful – 
model.27 Published in 1956, and thus divided from Schmitt’s other works on 
sovereignty by the events of World War II and Schmitt’s post-war fall from grace in 
academic and political circles, it may thus be read as an attempt to revindicate his 
call for sovereign dictatorship through the (ostensibly) politically far less sensitive 
matter of literary criticism.28 Benjamin, meanwhile, reads Hamlet as an unsuccessful 
sovereign incapable of avoiding the state of exception; his melancholia and madness 
serving to make visible the rivenness of his age and the inherent instability of its 
concept of sovereignty. The play can thus be said to be successful precisely in its 
failure, but in a different way to Schmitt’s reading: Hamlet’s fractured consciousness 
is emblematic of the age and demonstrates the instability of any system of 
sovereignty and myth-making, rather than constituting a call for more effective 
myths.  
Hamlet’s relationship to myth cannot but be one of citation and ineffectual 
‘nachspielen’. This is to do with the historical boundedness of the tragic: as the 
product of a historically rooted age – antiquity, and place - Greece, the tragic form of 
the mythic age was the site of a split: fate is fractured, and the tragic hero breaks out 
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of its continuum. Benjamin conceptualises Greek tragedy itself as the locus of this 
rupture. Thus,  
in respect of its victim, the hero, the tragic sacrifice differs from any other kind, 
being at once a first and a final sacrifice. A final sacrifice in the sense of the 
atoning sacrifice to gods who arc upholding an ancient right; a first sacrifice in 
the sense of the representative action, in which new aspects of the life of the 
nation become manifest…The tragic death has a dual significance: it 
invalidates the ancient rights of the Olympians, and it offers up the hero to the 
unknown god as the first fruits of a new harvest of humanity. (OT, 107) 
The temporal dislocation of the sacrificial hero in Greek tragedy is thus grounded in 
its specific historical context, and concerns a movement away from myth. Benjamin 
quotes his own text ‘Fate and Character’ (1919) in this context, stressing that it is not 
in law that this process take place, but in tragedy. Here, “demonic fate is broken” – 
“Not, however, in the replacement of the inscrutable pagan concatenation of guilt 
and atonement by the purity of man, absolved and reconciled with the pure god. It is 
rather that in tragedy pagan man realizes that he is better than his gods” (OT, 109-
110). For Benjamin, this is what sets pagan myth apart from the truly theological. 
Scholem comments that 
In those years—between 1915 and at least 1927—the religious sphere assumed 
a central importance for Benjamin that was utterly removed from fundamental 
doubt. At its center was the concept of Lehre (teaching), which for him 
included the philosophical realm but definitely transcended it. In his early 
writings he reverted repeatedly to this concept, which he interpreted in the 
sense of the original meaning of the Hebrew torah as ‘instruction,’ instruction 
not only about the true condition and way of man in the world but also about 






As Georg Dörr observes, “The fact that myth is negatively connotated in this context 
is almost self-evident. Myth, like the Law, and the symbol, belong to natural or 
creaturely – and thus pagan life” (Dörr 2007, 115, transl. mine). This distinction is 
crucial – the lapse back into the mythic at the moment of the failure of Christian 
doctrine is precisely why the Baroque produces Trauerspiele rather than tragedies.29 
Hamlet is no tragic hero; he cannot be, because his struggle is thoroughly immanent 
to his age. He dithers and fails to carry out the revenge demanded by the Ghost. 
Rather than then elevating himself above it, Hamlet fails to act; fails to elevate 
himself above ambivalence. Thus, Hamlet settles on a mournfully acting-out the 
command of the lost object (fate, certainty) – but it is just that, acting, in the sense of 
putting on a show, a performance – both in his own conduct and literally, in the play 
within the play – which becomes a substitute for the decisive, political action of a 
sovereign.  
The specific madness and melancholia of Hamlet, his Handlungshemmung, finally 
turns into its obverse – rash action at the end of the play. On Benjamin’s reading, 
this signals not so much a decisive assertion as a final gesture of defiance and 
insanity. Hamlet has given up on finding the truth; he is mad at the world, and finally 
he succumbs to “this drossy age” (5.2). His revenge is not enacted as a measured or 
heroic act, but a wild scuffle involving the entire court and scores of accidental 
deaths. The attempt to be a tragic hero, which is sustained throughout the play, 
finally dissolves in an almost farcical slaughter scene, the point at which Hamlet is 
most obviously distanced from the tragic hero. Benjamin writes that “He wants to 
die by some accident, and as the fateful stage properties gather around him, as 
                                               
29 The opposition of Christianity and the mythic-pagan is destabilised throughout Benjamin’s work. 
See for example his remark in ‘Robert Walser’ (1929), where Benjamin, discussing the transition out 
of the “madness of myth”, states “It is commonly thought that this process of awakening took place in 
the positive religions. If that is the case, it did not do so in any very straightforward or unambiguous 
way. The latter has to be sought in that great profane debate with myth that the fairy tale represents” 
(SW2, 260).On Benjamin’s relegation of Christianity to the mythic, see also the discussion of 





around their lord and master, the drama of fate [Schicksalsdrama] flares up in the 
conclusion of this Trauerspiel, as something that is contained, but of course 
overcome, in it” (OT, 137). Hamlet’s conduct thus makes visible the mythic residue, 
the persistence of older forms of play and associated tropes in the Trauerspiel and, 
by extension, in the baroque mind. Fortinbras’ arrival on stage, for its part, 
completes the picture by illustrating the impossibility of the arising of a Schmittian 
Hamlet myth: after the end of history, the death of the king, there is always already a 
new king in waiting. This, ultimately, is the truth of sovereignty for Benjamin – far 
from performing ultimate closure and guaranteeing stability, it does precisely the 
opposite. The Trauerspiel is the form that expresses this most clearly. 
 
The Return of Religious Solutions? 
However, Benjamin does not conclude his reading of Hamlet at this point. Hamlet’s 
melancholia and madness, his failed attempt to act in accordance with both the 
model of the mythic hero and Christian doctrine finally point beyond the 
meaninglessness of baroque experience. However, they do not become mythic – 
rather, their solution is to be found within religion.  
After noting the Christian origin of the allegorical gaze of the Baroque, Benjamin 
explores the connection between antiquity and medieval Christianity, as the latter 
functions as a mediator between the other two. He highlights that European society 
as a hegemonically Christian culture was presented with a paradox: antique myths 
and gods were pagan demons, yet still provided the foundation for artistic 
production. The Baroque solved this problem by subsuming ancient Greece; 
assimilating antiquity and its Gods into Christianity. The Bildgedaechtnis  (image 
memory) of ancient Greece, revived in the Baroque, brought into existence a 
Bilderspekulation (image speculation) which brought these images of the mythic 
past into the present via the intervening ages. This was, as Benjamin explains, only 





corpse offering up its parts for reassembly by a later, melancholy gaze. Torn from 
their context, they become fragments the baroque artist can work with. This is the 
same principle underlying the “pious mortification of the flesh” which together with 
the Christian view of ancient gods as demonic formed the goal of “allegorical 
exegesis” (OT, 222). In being killed off, these cultural fragments attain an afterlife, 
are made sacred by the baroque allegorist. 
Crucially, the mediation of medieval Christianity remains partial, unsuccessful, 
incomplete. Pagan antiquity is never fully subsumed by the European Middle Ages.  
The Trauerspiele highlight the fragmentary nature of this form of mediation, 
showing the cracks in the opulent façade, the artifice, the stagedness. They attest to 
the existence of a remainder, and simultaneously constitute an attempt to banish the 
mythic residue of the previous civilisation and its cosmological horizon: “If the 
church had not been able quite simply to banish the gods from the memory of the 
faithful, allegorical language would never have come into being. For it is not an 
epigonal victory monument; but rather the word which is intended to exorcise a 
surviving remnant of antique life” (OT, 223). The relationship to Antiquity is 
ambivalent - for Benjamin, there is no triumphal march of history from ancient 
Greece through medieval Europe to the Renaissance and modernity. Instead, in the 
aftermath of the cosmological rupture of the Baroque, Europe turns to pagan 
Antiquity in its attempt to restore an ethical community in a founding myth. 
Benjamin states that “Ancient tragedy is the fettered slave on the triumphal car of the 
baroque Trauerspiel.” (OT, 100). This process of the subsumption of Greek myth is 
a violent one, and constitutes an attempt to restore order that is itself premised on 
violence. It merely replaces the ideal type of the philosophy of history of the 
counter-reformation, “the acme: a golden age of peace and culture, free of any 





Church” (OT, 80), with a political order equally stabilised not by ecclesiastical, but 
profane rule.30 
These tendencies become visible in the period of the desolate, worldly, absolutist 
rule of the Baroque. Before any legitimacy can truly take hold, before the space left 
empty when religious certainty was toppled is filled by a new authority, in mourning 
for the lost and unsuccessful attempts to revive it, another space is opened up where 
sovereignty itself appears as unstable. It is precisely this interval between two myths, 
the –momentary – disenchantment of the world that in its arrest of effective 
(sovereign) action, its melancholy, reveals the play of sovereignty as play – and thus 
destabilises it.31 As we shall see in the following chapters, Benjamin is to retain this 
focus on interruption and arrest throughout his work.32 We also see here, for the first 
time, that the fracturing of the subject in the early modern era constitutes an opening 
towards something else, a condition of its own overcoming.  
For Benjamin, this is where religion, seemingly paradoxically, once again resurfaces 
as a possibility. The space that melancholia and mad, ineffective sovereignty thus 
opens up also allows for a miracle, the intrusion of truth from ‘outside’. Crucially, it 
is the lack of a successful politician, in the Shakespearean sense – an intriguer - that 
leaves open these gaps – fractures- within the Baroque political community as well 
as in some of its artworks. The tension between ancient forms and post-reformatory 
Christianity, between the brief spell of Renaissance humanism and the melancholy 
of the Baroque is not only apparent in its sovereign, but also in the figure of the 
                                               
30 The German has “durchs Schwert der Kirche” (GS1, 259) – “by the sword of the Church”, 
rendering the violent aspect of ecclesiastical authority more apparent. 
31 Weber (1991, 493) also locates the potential of Trauerspiel to resist mythical law at this moment of 
the “dislocation” of tragedy.  
32 This, of course, provides a bridge to Benjamin’s earlier ‘Critique of Violence’ (1921), where he 
draws from Sorel’s model of the general strike as a way to conceptualise a “real” state of exception. 
See Butler (2012, 73). Agamben (2005, 52-56) suggests Schmitt’s concept of sovereignty in Political 





courtier, most notably Polonius. Like Hamlet, he teeters on the brink of his age, but 
where the former refracts into the martyr-tyrant, Polonius is torn between the earlier 
humanist vision of an advisor as a sage truth-sayer to the sovereign, and the 
emerging Machiavellian concept of the courtier as intriguer.33 For Benjamin, the 
presence of a successful intriguer within the Trauerspiel would bring it the closure 
that would stabilise sovereignty – transmuting the Baroque into a Machiavellian 
Utopia, where its martyr/tyrant is completed through the political acumen of the 
intriguer. Were that to be the case, the Trauerspiel would attain allegorical 
completion, its mournfulness vanishing from the picture. It is precisely the absence 
of such a figure that lets the Trauerspiel remain open to the entrance of theological 
truth. 
In the final passage of the book, Benjamin thus again asserts the Christian character 
of the Baroque, which he finds present in Hamlet. Schmitt disagrees on this point 
and asserts that Hamlet is not Christian “in any specific sense” (OT, 52). This 
formulation inadvertently draws close to its own refutation; what is at stake in 
Hamlet is precisely an ‘unspecific’ Christian-ness –as discussed earlier, its 
theological forms still provide the backdrop; only its answers can no longer suffice. 
We are dealing with a profaned, but not secular world – hence its mournfulness.  
Benjamin’s study of the Baroque traces its move from wretched godlessness to a 
final implicit reaffirmation of the theology whose downfall forms the backdrop of its 
existence. Precisely because it ‘knows no eschatology’, the Trauerspiel becomes 
eschatological. This is the meaning of Benjamin’s cryptic last sentence: “In the spirit 
of allegory”, the Trauerspiel “is conceived from the outset as a ruin, a fragment. 
Others may shine resplendently as on the first day; this form preserves the image of 
beauty to the very last” (OT, 235). It opens up a negative space for beauty-as-truth to 
                                               
33 On this point, see Paul, Joanne. “The Best Counsellors are the Dead: Counsel and Shakespeare’s 





enter, via philosophical criticism. This links back to the concept of origin, discussed 
at the beginning of the text – Benjamin writes that it will only be accessible to the 
dual insight that understands it as the “restoration of revelation” [Restauration der 
Offenbarung, transl.mine] (GS1, 935) which must necessarily remain unfinished at 
the same time. 
With this in mind, it becomes possible to understand more clearly why Benjamin 
takes Hamlet’s declaration that “There’s special providence in the fall of a sparrow” 
(5.2.215 –16) as an indication of the Christian ethos of the play. On this reading, 
Hamlet’s life, in all its wretchedness, points to the inversion of its sadness into 
blissful existence in Christian providence: “Only in a princely life such as this is 
melancholy redeemed, by being confronted with itself” (OT, 158). In passing 
through the stages of baroque melancholia, madness, and finally a turn towards those 
very same religious truths whose downfall initiated the melancholia and indeed the 
Baroque itself, Hamlet mirrors Benjamin’s reading of the Baroque age in toto. In 
this, and in recognising his transience and demise as a historical fact, something to 
be narrated (as Hamlet instructs Horatio to do in his last words), Shakespeare allows 
Hamlet that very self-reflexivity about his age which is missing in the German 
Trauerspiele. It is this self-recognition that, for Benjamin, evens the ground for the 
inversion of melancholy into its opposite, the potential arrival of truth, as alterity, 
and it is this that makes Hamlet the ‘perfect’ baroque mourning play as it both 
inaugurates and abolishes the genre, providing a study in the riven consciousness of 
the baroque sovereign, only to then cancel it out at last within the context of 
potential redemption. 
It is also here that the problem of subjectivity comes to the fore again. At the end of 
his study, Benjamin resolves the figures of the Baroque mourning plays back into 
allegories, revealing that it was the subjective gaze of melancholy of the Baroque, 
crystallising in its playwright, that created them in the first place. In a theoretically 
and stylistically dense passage, Benjamin traces the passing of the allegorical 





moment of intersection of guilt and transience” (Pensky 1993, 127)  to the 
introduction of the problem of evil into the text, to its final dialectical inversion, in 
the recognition that evil belongs to the sphere of myth and thus signifies, in a 
theological register, nothing but the absence of God. As Pensky notes,  
Melancholia, at the bottom of its descent, transforms itself from absolute 
subjectivity to the selflessness of absolute faith. Once again, subjectivity stands 
for the whole breadth of experience of the world as godforsaken and 
meaningless; the end of melancholia in faith is the self-extinction of the 
mournful subject, and this means that the allegories, creations of the subject, 
deconstruct themselves into ciphers of God's presence. (Pensky 1993, 134-135) 
Pensky concludes that this surprising ending of Benjamin’s study cannot be read 
straightforwardly as either embracing what he calls the “dialectics of mourning” as 
moving towards an ‘actual’ encounter with God, or as rejecting this particular type 
of baroque theology as an ultimate relapse into myth as a result of the dissolution of 
any materialist content in the dialectic. The main problem for Benjamin in Pensky’s 
reading becomes the formulation of a critical methodology that avoids the pitfalls of 
the melancholy hypersubjectivity that marks the end of his Trauerspiel study, 
including its political petrification, while preserving the dialectical relationship 
between potentially messianic insights and the objects of the world contained in 
baroque allegory.  
Stewart links the moment of illusory, absolute subjectivity, to psychopathology:  
This inflation of the subjective, though it presents itself as leaving subjectivity 
behind as “evil,” suffers from the same flawed and faithless Christian reversal. 
A subjectivity that lets go of itself only when it believes to be mirrored by the 
fullness of God, has been faithless and mythical all along. Such belief is typical 





She also notes that Benjamin’s introduction of the miracle of the visions of Saint 
Theresa at this point in the text link back to Schmitt’s analogy of the miracle to the 
state of exception, as does the Baroque’s narcissistic self-representation in the 
balcony:  
An empty space. Subjectively, one is to imagine—hallucinate—the Sovereign-
God standing there. On the other hand, objectively, there is no one there, and 
this fact turns the baroque symbolism of power into ostentatious spectacle, just 
as it turns that baroque “upswing” of allegory that loses itself—empties itself, 
in fact— into miraculous delusion and phantasmagoria. (Stewart 2010, 70) 
Thus, Benjamin’s conclusion leaves the Baroque suspended between its religious 
concerns and its inadequate religious solutions, freezing its allegorical dialectic in 
place. With this gesture, subjectivity is likewise suspended between absolute 
emptiness and creaturely dejection – melancholia – and grandiose self-inflatory 
identification with the divine – narcissism.  
Schmitt refutes Benjamin’s point about providence, citing variation between the 
versions of the play. He concludes that to pay attention to these variations would be 
to open up the theological controversies at the heart of the religious wars once again. 
This, of course, is what Schmitt wants to avoid at all costs. He needs Hamlet to not 
be Christian, as otherwise it would not point the way towards a suprareligious 
sovereign capable of containing the antinomies of Protestant and Catholic doctrine 
that lead to the religious wars. His reading of Benjamin’s understanding of the 
protagonist Hamlet as emblematic of the rivenness of his age is thus dismissive of 
Benjamin’s aporetic take on the play, performing discursive closure in strongly 
rejecting the claim about its Christian character. 
For Benjamin, Fortinbras’ takeover signals the restitution of ‘business as usual’ of 
early modern sovereignty – the arrival of a monarch fit to govern, ensuring the 
ongoing stability of the realm. Everyone in Hamlet’s family is somehow implicated 





external to it, he is still part of the historical moment that gave rise to the plot of the 
play – implying that the same scenario could repeat itself. What Hamlet’s assertion 
and the continuation of sovereignty-as-usual off-stage thus mean for Benjamin, in 
opposition to Schmitt, is the continuation of the instability of sovereignty. 
In not paying attention to the wretchedness of the Baroque and the melancholy 
suffering and madness of its ruler, Schmitt elides the questions these pose to the very 
foundation of sovereignty. Schmitt performs the same movement on Hamlet the play 
as the characters within the play attempt to perform on Hamlet – to find the root of 
the instability and excise it; to suture the tear, to perform closure, discursive or 
otherwise. For Schmitt, the question of the madness of the sovereign simply never 
poses itself – after all, the sovereign decides what is true and sane, thus he cannot be 
mad. Of course, such a conception of truth is far removed from any normative or 
logical category, purely immanent to power, and thus either loses its intelligibility 
completely, or else must be seen as itself ‘deranged’.34 
 
5. Conclusion: Historical Rupture versus Myth-Making 
For Schmitt, post-classical society must retain the potential to produce more than 
Trauerspiel, that is, a capacity for the tragic, as post-reformatory stability in Europe 
depends on the creation of a new myth. The sovereign must be decisive and declare 
the state of exception, providing such a new myth for the foundation of the body 
politic. For Benjamin, as we have seen, the resurgence of myth is bound up with 
                                               
34 It is noteworthy that all three mythological figures of European literature quoted by Schmitt – Don 
Quijote, Hamlet and Faust – are not only scholars: They are also similar in their madness. In the case 
of Don Quijote and Hamlet, this madness is intimately bound up with their “untimeliness” and 
inability to detach from previous social formations, be it the spectre of feudalism or that of ancient 
Greece. In the case of Faust, meanwhile, it is driven by the desire to strike a bargain with the devil 
that is caused by his unquenchable thirst for knowledge. The crucial role of madness in 
complementing the image of truth and sovereignty thus becomes visible even in – or perhaps because 





violence35 - on his view, the continuum of natural-mythic history of sovereignty is in 
need of interruption. The melancholy Trauerspiel and its deranged sovereign go 
some way towards accomplishing this: they present the gap between Heilsgeschichte 
and profane historical events as they are experienced in the Baroque and, in making 
visible this gap, open up a space for the alterity of truth to become discernible. If we 
take seriously the dialectical movement Benjamin delineates in the ‘Epistemo-
Critical Prologue’, history is the matter, the Sachgehalt, within which the 
Wahrheitsgehalt is hidden. In the midst of bloody historical happening, melancholia 
and other forms of ‘derangement’ – mania, “madness” - emerge as a chance to 
capture the ‘real’ truth beyond empirical reality as it presents itself.  
European historical consciousness is revealed as doubly riven – in its unsuccessful 
attempt to return to Christian doctrine, repressing the Reformation and the Thirty 
Years’ War, and in its attempt to take recourse to the ancient Greeks in its search for 
a way to ground both the community and the fractured modern subject. Where the 
Greek tragic hero has an inkling of his superiority over his gods, the Baroque lives in 
the wretched aftermath of the downfall of its divinity. The Trauerspiel is left turning 
back on itself and spinning incessantly, suspended between the religious solutions 
and their devaluation, the appeal to the ethos of classical antiquity and its historical 
impossibility. The sovereign, its paradigmatic figure, is torn between creatureliness 
and the echo of the absolute validity of divine truth that no longer holds. Thus the 
subject, too, is fractured – there is no longer any eternal, transcendental truth to be 
found in religion, and at the same time, the Baroque subject is not able to be an 
ancient Greek hero, elevating himself from out of mythic fate.  
 
                                               




























Chapter 2 – Melancholia, Possession, Critique 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I discuss the interrelationship of melancholia, possession and 
subjectivity in Benjamin and Freud. Building on the preceding discussion of the 
inauguration of the fractured subject in Benjamin's book on German tragic drama, I 
examine the relationship of the formation of subjectivity and melancholia in the 
Baroque in connection to Freud.  
In her discussion of Benjamin’s early work on theatre, Ilit Ferber states that the 
“division between mourning and melancholy is absent from Benjamin’s book on 
Trauerspiel, in which he uses the terms Trauer and Melancholie interchangeably, not 
surrendering to the distinction between normality and pathology which 
psychoanalysis has made commonplace” (Ferber 2006, 66). However, I maintain that 
reading Benjamin’s Trauerspiel book and Freud’s 1917 Mourning and Melancholia 
together not only reveals the influence of the latter on the former, but calls into 
question the distinction between the two concepts in Freud as “overly secure” 
(Ferber 2006, 66). 36 As this re-reading of Freud with Benjamin will show, there are 
slippages in Freud’s texts which contest the notion that psychoanalysis posits such a 
rigid distinction between mourning and melancholia, normality and 
psychopathology. 
                                               
36 See also Butler, J. Afterword: After Loss, What Then? In Eng, D. and Kazanjian, D. (eds.). Loss: 
The Politics of Mourning. Los Angeles, University of California Press, 2003, 467-474; Lupton, Julia 
R.; Reinhard, Kenneth. After Oedipus: Shakespeare in Psychoanalysis. Ithaca, Cornell University 
Press, 1993, 34–59; Nägele, Rainer. “Beyond Psychology: Freud, Benjamin, and the Articulation of 
Modernity,” in:  Theater. Theory. Speculation: Walter Benjamin and the Scenes of Modernity. 







In the second part of my chapter, I examine the issue of possession in relation to 
Freud’s case studies of Schreber and Haitzmann. Known to both Freud and 
Benjamin, Schreber serves as an example from high modernity of the ongoing crisis 
of sovereignty in the post-baroque era. What I aim to show is that melancholia and 
possession form two poles of the fractured subject’s response to a loss, as well as an 
impossible demand, the demand of subjectivity itself. The subject is thus revealed as 
fractured between this demand and its inability to meet it.  
I then contrast Aby Warburg’s 1920 text Pagan-Antique Prophecy in the Age of 
Luther with Benjamin’s work on the Baroque, focusing on the question of the 
transmission of historical contents and the role of the ‘demonic’ and mythic in this 
context. Subjectivity and the pernicious slide towards subjectivism surface as 
problems in Benjamin's texts, including the question of his own subjectivity and its 
relation to his work. The chapter ends with an examination of Benjamin’s strategies 
for dealing with this problem, as well as contestation of the claim made in some of 
the literature that Benjamin ‘was’ a melancholic by gesturing towards his later 
writing.  
 
Melancholia and the Fractured Subject 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the fractured subject arises as the religious 
person of the Baroque, formerly bounded by a cosmological horizon and understood 
as primarily a member of the religious community of Christian humanity with God, 
is robbed of their former certainties about their standing in the order of the world in 
modernity. Bereft of these bonds, the former community fractures into subjects who 
are interpellated as individually responsible for their own spiritual salvation with the 
rise of Protestantism. Deeper than this, however, is the constitutive fracture of the 
subject: the Cartesian split which results in the overvaluation of “Geistigkeit” over 
and above the physis, which Benjamin sees as the root cause of the problem of 





knowledge remains fruitless, and the impossible demand to put the self in God's 
stead as the ultimate guarantor of truth and meaning is experienced as mournful 
suffering.  
There is a further dimension to the inactivity to which the melancholia of the 
Baroque gives rise. Robbed of all transcendence37 the martyr is closely linked to the 
figure of the brooder, who pores over the fragments of the past. Torn from their 
original context of meaning, they have become torso; ruins, and are repurposed for 
allegorical construction in the Baroque. In the absence of a stable context of 
signification, the meaning imposed on them by the brooding allegorist remains 
entirely subjective, and thus unstable. The brooder is the quintessential melancholic 
subject insofar as he is haunted by the sense that there is lost meaning to the 
fragments, which he tries to rearrange, but can never recapture. Subjectivity is linked 
to melancholia, then, for its prolonged state of mourning for an unknown object. 
Baroque melancholia is thus a state of inaction in the face of an overwhelming 
demand premised on the loss of stable, divine power, and the response of the brooder 
to the loss of the possibility of attaining stable meaning and truth. Understood 
through the book on German tragic drama, baroque and post-baroque subjects can be 
read as frustrated tragic heroes, enjoined to act as if they had a clearly defined ethical 
framework to uphold but finding only themselves as guarantors of meaning. This 
constitutes a doomed attempt by the fractured subject to regain a lost fulness, as the 
social configuration that gave rise to tragedy cannot be recaptured by fiat.  
The Baroque projects this lost wholeness and ethical community of classical 
antiquity onto ancient societies, which Benjamin alludes to throughout the book. 
There is thus a double process of mourning for two interconnected objects at play: 
for the loss of the tragic mode, the possibility of the ethical community of antiquity, 
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and for the cosmological wholeness of pre-Reformation Christianity. In the downfall 
of the latter, the former is appealed to as an alternative source of meaning and 
stability. Benjamin thus performs a radical re-reading of the Enlightenment and 
Renaissance appeal to antiquity as a founding moment of European identity: it 
emerges not as a straightforward origin at the root of later developments, but as an 
Urgeschichte, a mythic and mythologized origin-story that is quoted as a 
compensatory fantasy arising at a point of crisis. This, as I discuss below, contrasts 
with Warburg’s account, where antiquity does resurface essentially unchanged in the 
Pathosformeln, which posit an anthropological substratum of expression that 
transcends historical specificity. For Benjamin, at stake is the fractured subject’s 
attempted compensation for a loss. In what follows, I examine Freud’s account of the 
response to such a loss in ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ before relating it back to 
Benjamin. 
 
1.  Mourning and Melancholia 
Freud begins his 1917 text Mourning and Melancholia by commenting on some 
homologies in the functioning of dreams and pathologies and mourning and 
melancholia. If dreams are to “narcissistic mental disorders” as mourning is to 
melancholia – a process that is the “prototype” of the aberrant one in normal life 
(SE14, 243)  – then we might surmise from the start that the two are more 
interconnected than their analysis might suggest. The relationship of the affect to 
temporality – its duration – serves as the primary marker of difference between them 
in the text. In Mourning and Melancholia, Freud posits an ego that withdraws into 
itself as a result of the shock of the loss of a loved object. Both mourning and 
melancholia are a response to this object loss, but, in Freud's formulation, “in 
mourning it is the world which has become poor and empty. In melancholia it is the 
ego itself”. (SE14, 246). Freud goes on to describe this process, the turning inward 
of the ego: Libido is removed from the lost object and, rather than being displaced 





the lost object. Thus, the self-reproaches of the melancholic are actually directed 
against the loved object, but in internalised form. Ambivalence towards the lost 
object is expressed as self-hatred (SE14, 252). 
What notion of a self, then, are we dealing with here? A self that has absorbed the 
lost object through its identification with it. The return of object cathexis in 
melancholia thus allows, or even forces, the ego to treat itself as an object. It entails 
the redirection against itself of the destructive will which is its original response to 
objects in the world - an ultimately auto-cannibalising narcissism. Freud speculates 
about this correlation between narcissistic object-choice and proneness to 
melancholia and concludes that melancholia is a sort of hybrid pathology between 
mourning and narcissism: “Melancholia, therefore, borrows some of its features 
from mourning, and the others from the process of regression from narcissistic 
object-choice to narcissism” (SE14, 250). Thus, the split that occurs at the level of 
the subject in the process of melancholia indicates both a fracture that is a doubling – 
where a part of the ego becomes the judging conscience and another the judged ego-
object – and a reduction, a lessening – in terms of its own self-regard; in its emptying 
out.  
Much like the baroque sovereign is split between the martyr and the tyrant, 
melancholia for Freud has a tendency towards inversion into its opposite: “mania” 
(SE14, 253). Freud reaches the preliminary conclusion that even more than 
melancholy, mania is characterised by narcissism:  
The accumulation of cathexis which is at first bound and then, after the work of 
melancholia is finished, becomes free and makes mania possible must be linked 





melancholia substitutes for the struggle over the object, must act like a painful 
wound which calls for an extraordinarily high anti-cathexis. (SE 14, 257)38  
Freud’s starting point was the assumption, which “several psycho-analytic 
investigators have already put into words…that the content of mania is no different 
from that of melancholia, that both disorders are wrestling with the same ‘complex’, 
but that probably in melancholia the ego has succumbed to the complex whereas in 
mania it has mastered it or pushed it aside” (SE14, 253). However far from 
“mastering” the complex that gave rise to both melancholia and mania, the ego is 
shown to fall under the sway of its primary affect of narcissism.39 
As outlined above, Benjamin's baroque sovereign fractures into the tyrant and the 
martyr. Benjamin sees Gryphius’ first play as best representing the confusing 
interplay of these “antitheses”: “The sublime status of the Emperor on the one hand, 
and the infamous futility of his conduct on the other, create a fundamental 
uncertainty as to whether this is a drama of tyranny or a history of martyrdom” (OT, 
73). The tyrant, prone to rashness, governed by the id, and ultimately subject to 
mania; the martyr incapable of acting at all, inhibited by the superego demand to live 
up to his political role. We can see the closeness of the inner split of Benjamin’s 
baroque sovereign, caught between melancholia and mania, and the struggle of post-
baroque humanity between the creaturely and the demands of subjectivity, to Freud’s 
account of the struggle between ideal-I/ superego and the primary narcissism of the 
id.  
                                               
38 Freud here breaks off his analysis of mania, leaving the wound open for the time being. Further 
elaboration of the concept is to be found in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921c) 
[SE18, 130-3].  
39 Sándor Ferenczi, drawing from mass psychology, later states in his 1926 ‘Present-Day Problems in 
Psychoanalysis’ that mania for Freud is characterisesd by “a periodic or temporary attempt to 
overthrow the tyranny of the super-ego”. (Ferenczi 2002, 31). Allthough this is Ferenczi’s 






The relevance of Benjamin’s Trauerspiel book to a broadly conceived 
psychoanalytic tradition was not lost on Imago, the journal edited by Freud, whose 
remit was the connection of psychoanalysis to the humanities and later the natural 
sciences. In his 1931 review of Benjamin’s book for Imago, Alexander Mette reads it 
against Freudian theory, in particular schizophrenia. He concludes that “the peculiar 
juxtaposition of melancholy and mania [in the baroque drama] and the strange way 
in which they coincide with the phenomena of schizophrenia point to a difficult 
struggle for the validation of the Super-Ego and the maintenance of object cathexes” 
(Mette 1931, 538).40 Moreover, Freud’s account of the ego's becoming ‘poor and 
empty’ in melancholia is mirrored in the ultimate flatness and lack of interiority of 
the sovereign of the mourning plays as described by Benjamin. Notably, a relation to 
power is at stake in both processes – in Freud’s account, the ego's power to reign in 
the id and withstand and filter superego commands is called into question; in 
Benjamin’s, the sovereign subject's power to act on the self and the world, always-
already impossible to exercise. 
Benjamin identifies the melancholic mood that permeates culture as a whole in the 
Baroque as a consequence of the lost religious certainties, a mood which is then 
crystallised in – with Freud, we might say projected onto - the figure of the 
sovereign in the mourning plays. Mourning as a cultural Lebensgefühl and mode of 
subjectivity in the Baroque is thus consistent with Freud's account of melancholic 
loss, insofar as the creators of Trauerspiele are not necessarily fully conscious of the 
loss that has been sustained, which is nevertheless expressed in their production. 
This unconscious nature of the loss is precisely what for Freud characterises 
melancholia: a sense of the loss of an unknown object. Indeed, as Freud outlines in 
                                               
40 Transl. by Ley Roff (2004, 122). 
As Heinrich Kaulen, editor of volume 13 of Benjamin’s Werke und Nachlass points out, “Benjamins 
interest in the symptomatology of schizophrenia was also apparent in 1928 in his planned review of 
Alexander Mette’s study” (WuN13.2, 145, transl.mine). The study in question is Mette’s 1928 Über 





his 1920 essay Beyond the Pleasure Principle, it is precisely the repression of a 
trauma that gives it its strength.41 Thus, it lingers, and it lingers as melancholia, 
precisely in that the original loss is obscured, experienced instead as a nonspecific 
lack, a pervasive mood of sadness and emptiness. The mourning plays serve as a 
repository of this mood, an index of the melancholia of their age, and catalogue its 
specific manifestation or symptoms. 
For Freud, melancholia is a temporary state, to be overcome by the ego once it has 
emerged victorious from an ambivalent struggle in the unconscious, finally knowing 
itself to be better than the lost object  (SE14, 257-258). On Freud’s account, 
melancholia will naturally come to an end, once its work has been accomplished. In 
this, it follows closely the accomplishment of the work of mourning – except that 
here, too, its end is often a swing into narcissism, an excessive self-love rather than 
the one that is 'just right' to overcome the pull of the loss. The stability of the subject 
is thus revealed as a delicate balancing act, the boundaries between normal and 
pathological as not only thin, but constantly shifting. Indeed, if we follow the 
account outlined above, reading Mourning and Melancholia with the Trauerspiel 
book, the subject is the object that is always-already lost, and simultaneously making 
an impossible demand on the individual – thus this struggle can never truly come to 
an end. The condition of mourning persists, its work never accomplished, for as long 
as humanity tries – and fails – to live up to subjecthood.  
As we saw before, the Baroque never achieves this state, characteristic of Greek 
tragedy, where the hero emerges superior to the gods. Melancholia thus functions as 
a disavowal of the finite work of mourning, a steadfast refusal to give up the lost 
object. This is the attitude displayed in the mourning plays where, as Benjamin 
notes, while the religious answers may have lost their validity, the questions 
                                               






themselves had lost none of their power. Benjamin writes, 
Mourning is the state of mind in which feeling revives the emptied world in the 
form of a mask, and derives an enigmatic satisfaction in contemplating it. 
Every feeling is bound to an a priori object, and the representation of this 
object is its phenomenology. Accordingly the theory of mourning, which 
emerged unmistakably as a pendant to the theory of tragedy, can only be 
developed in the description of that world which is revealed under the gaze of 
melancholy man. (OT, 139) 
What the melancholy gaze makes visible, then, is the impossibility of overcoming 
mourning in a world that is bound to the refusal of giving up the tragic mode even as 
the socio-historical conditions of its existence have ceased to be. Tragedy and 
mourning function in the same realm, they have an end, a resolution, an ultimate 
return to an ethical community. This cathartic aspect is present in psychoanalysis, 
especially its early phase, as noted by Jutta Wiegmann. She states that during in 
particular the “cathartic” period of his early writings (1880- 1895), Freud located 
present suffering exclusively in repressed traumatic events in the past, and later 
returns to the notion of catharsis (Wiegmann 1989, 36). At stake is the lessening of 
suffering, and ultimately the ability of the individual to function once more in a 
society of others.42 Conversely, the mourning plays are precisely what their name 
indicates – a theatrical re-enactment of mourning, an attempt at tragedy that is bound 
to fail. They function in the realm of melancholy, where the revival and 
contemplation of the emptied world is endlessly drawn out.  
This “revival” or “reanimation” of the emptied-out world in the form of a mask, 
then, is what plays out in the subjectivity of the fractured subject: Much as for the 
                                               
42 As discussed in particular in chapters 3 and 4, this runs counter to Benjamin’s thought, for whom 
there must be no catharsis from within “guilt history”. This is also at the root of his later interest in 





later Freud in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, the ego serves as a shell, buffering 
from the shocks of the experience of modernity, the subject’s supposed sovereignty 
functions as a mask for the emptiness of the baroque world, and the fracture running 
through the early modern subject. It can thus be seen as on a par with other excessive 
ornamentation that is compulsively accumulated and heaped skywards, another 
feature of the mourning plays noted by Benjamin. This “enigmatic satisfaction” of 
which Benjamin writes can be made sense of with Freud’s account of melancholia: 
in this state, the subject remains attached to the lost object in the reiteration of the 
feeling of loss, thus perversely prolonging its suffering in the attempt to ease it.43 
Stewart likewise notes that mourning, for Benjamin, serves as a “coping mechanism. 
It begins an idiosyncratically baroque attempt to re-master and re-intend the world. 
In it the subject confronts loss by recollecting ‘reality’ in bits and pieces and by re-
building itself in constant dialogue with the objects that it must ultimately 
relinquish” (Stewart 2010, 37). However, this attempt is doomed to failure. As 
Monagle and Vardoulakis suggest in pointing to “the nothing at the core of 
sovereignty”, the subject is ultimately hollow: “sovereign claims to authority are 
always grasping towards an illusory universality. They claim an always deferred 
higher power as a source of legitimacy” (Monagle and Vardoulakis 2003, 1). At the 
same time, the modern subject is fractured between the demand to act as a subject, 
that is, to be a coherent subject exerting its will on the world, and the impossibility 
of occupying such a position.  
Thus the subject itself is a symptom – a representation of the loss of the concept of 
God as a guarantor of stable meaning, an uneasy representation that mimics and 
                                               
43 We can see, too, the proximity to Freud’s concept of pathological gain. In his lecture on ‘The 
Common Neurotic State’ from his Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, Freud writes of the 
formation of neuroses as an attempt of the ego to cure itself, displacing the experience of an inner 
conflict into symptoms. However, Freud notes that this easing of the conflict comes at a cost, and 
speculates that the suffering attached to symptoms may be “an equivalent substitute for the torments 
of conflict, but they probably involve an increase in unpleasure. The ego would like to free itself from 
this unpleasure of the symptoms without giving up the gain from illness, and this is just what it cannot 





simultaneously marks the loss of an imagined fullness of experience. It indicates, 
too, the imaginary quality of that fullness itself: as Rebecca Comay (2005, 89-90) 
posits, 
Melancholia would thus be a way of staging a dispossession of that which was 
never one’s own to lose in the first place – and thus, precisely by occluding 
structural lack as determinate loss, would exemplify the strictly perverse effort 
to assert a relation with the non-relational...Could perversion be the mark of the 
subject’s impossible relationship to a loss which is ultimately not its own to 
acknowledge in the first place – but so too, equally, the index of a certain 
promise? 
The latter part of Comay’s question, the potential of melancholia to make visible in 
its perversion that there may be a 'promise' or a possibility for a changed gaze that 
does away with the mask of subjectivity, will be explored in Chapter 4 in 
conjunction with the question of a therapeutic model in Benjamin, related to the 
question of the political. Of note is the process by which the theory of mourning is to 
be developed here: by working through the symptoms, the representations of the 
feeling of melancholy, from the standpoint of melancholia. This again draws the 
Trauerspiel book into proximity to Freud. Benjamin continues his reflections on the 
enigmatic satisfaction of the contemplation of the masklike façade, the appearance of 
the empty world. As Judith Butler comments, “The world is revived in a masked 
form, in a masked way, not as a mask, but through a form of masking and as its 
result. The masking does not precisely conceal, since what is lost cannot be 
recovered, but it marks the simultaneous condition of an irrecoverable loss that gives 
way to a reanimation of an evacuated world” (Butler 2003, 471). This “marking” of 
an irrecoverable, ultimately unknowable loss is expressed as a symptom. It does not 
conceal; there is no “underneath” the mask, no recoverable content that remains 
unchanged in the process of masking. Rather, it is an unconscious registering of a 
trauma, pointing to a caesura in whose aftermath the world and the self are 





fullness of meaning.  
It is important to note that the perversion of subjectivity extends further than 
melancholia – or, rather, that melancholia is not its only aspect. The mask is revealed 
as that of the “Janus-faced sovereign” of the Trauerspiel, displaying both the aspect 
of mourning and of acting out in rage. I will develop the second of these twin aspects 
in relation to possession. As we shall see, in possession, too, the “empty world” is 
revived in masked form, which hints at an underlying pathology. 
 
2. Possession and the Lingering of the Fractured Subject beyond the 
Baroque 
In the book on German Tragic drama, Benjamin radically historicises the concept of 
the subject in providing a snapshot of an era in which it undergoes profound change, 
contesting its transcendental or ontological status. Consequently, as objects of 
history, concepts are passed on and persist after the moment of their inauguration has 
passed. The fractured subject of the baroque world, suspended perilously between 
the two poles of the demand for decisive action and stable meaning and their 
impossibility, nevertheless endures, but endures changes over the course of its 
development in modernity. Likewise, the attempt to construct meaning, an utterly 
subjective endeavour in Baroque allegoresis, is transformed with the development of 
Capitalism, as I discuss in my next chapter.  
What emerges forcefully in both Freud’s Mourning and Melancholia and 
Benjamin’s book on German Tragic Drama is the porosity of the subject to contents 
that are other to it. Its generation out of loss, its fracture, its emptiness, demand a 
constant attempt to be filled anew, through being possessed or taking possession. In 
the Baroque, this demand manifests in the form of stylistic hyperornamentalisation 
in visual art, music, and drama. In the commodity world of nineteenth-century 





much the same purpose. The Baroque serves not only as prehistory for Benjamin's 
own day, it does so by lingering into the nineteenth century. The accumulative drive 
to fill the world with objects and to possess them is a way to attempt to compensate 
for the haunting of Capitalism at the moment of high modernity by early modernity's 
loss of the fullness of life.  
The change from the early modern period of the baroque to the high modern one of 
the 19th century and ultimately Benjamin’s own day is captured in Benjamin’s first 
review from 1926 of Hugo von Hofmannsthal’s play ‘Der Turm’, where Benjamin 
praises the play as a contemporary Trauerspiel. Benjamin sketches an image of a 
parabola, with creature and Christ as the two poles on either side and the prince at its 
apex, as characteristic of the “old”, that is, Baroque, Trauerspiel. In contrast, the 
new, contemporary Trauerspiel reserves no triumph for its hero: “Sigismund 
perishes. The demonic forces of the tower become his master. Dreams rise up from 
out of the earth, and the Christian heaven is long since vanished from them. (GS3, 
33, transl. mine).44 This stands in stark contrast to the possibility of divine 
intervention present in the works of baroque playwrights such as Calderon, 
identifying the baroque Trauerspiel as an ultimately Christian form, expressing how 
much the culture that produced it remained faithful to Christian cosmological 
horizons even as these were torn apart. In the nineteenth and twentieth century, even 
the ultimately unsuccessful appeal to this cosmology is overcome.  
These themes are explored in Benjamin’s 1921 ‘Capitalism as Religion’. Here, he 
explores how the function of religion as emptied-out ritual is transposed to the 
economic sphere in Capitalism, so that it comes to function as religion: “A religion 
                                               
44 „Das alte Trauerspiel schlug seinen Bogen zwischen Kreatur und Christ. In dessen Scheitelhöhe 
steht der vollkommene Prinz. Wo Calderons christlicher Optimismus den sah, da zeigt sich der 
Wahrhaftigkeit des neueren Autors Untergang. Sigismund geht zugrunde. Die dämonischen Gewalten 
des Turms werden sein Herr. Die Träume steigen aus der Erde auf und der christliche Himmel ist 
längst aus ihnen gewichen” (GS3, 33).This passage does not appear in Benjamin’s 1928 review of the 





may be discerned in capitalism – that is to say, capitalism serves essentially to allay 
the same anxieties, torments, and disturbances to which the so-called religions 
offered answers” (SW1, 288). The religious questions whose answers the Baroque 
book reveals as insufficient here answered by Capitalism.45 The text also establishes 
the opposition between the theological and the cultic, which is to remain throughout 
Benjamin’s work and is manifest in later works such as the Arcades Project: “In 
capitalism, things have meaning only in their relationship to the cult; capitalism has 
no specific body of dogma, no theology” (SW1, 288). It is thoroughly immanent, a 
religion emptied out of any reference to the transcendental, and thus the actually 
theological. Formerly a “parasite” of Christianity in Western culture, the economic 
formation of Capitalism developed and grew “until it reached the point where 
Christianity’s history is essentially that of its parasite – that is to say, of capitalism” 
(SW1, 289). Thus, the later development takes over the former in the transition from 
the Baroque to high modernity in the universalisation of the commodity form, a 
development which was in its early phase in early modernity and thus did not have 
quite the same reach.  
Benjamin here also follows Nietzsche, the third figure he connects to the cult of 
Capitalism, insofar as he takes on his development of morality as the capacity to 
make promises, which is at the root of the tradition of guilt in Christianity. Moral 
guilt lays the groundwork for people capable of having debts – thus the “demonic 
ambiguity” of the concept itself hints at the entanglement of the cultic religious 
(Christianity) and the economic (capitalism) (SW1, 289). In the originary unfolding 
of capitalism, that out of which it developed, upon which it was parasitic, becomes a 
moment in its history.46 
                                               
45 As discussed in the next chapter, this theme is fleshed out in relation to the gambler in the Arcades 
Project and other work of the 1930s. 
46 For a discussion linking ‘Capitalism as Religion’, On the Origin of German Tragic Drama and 





Before moving on to a closer reading of this development, traced by Benjamin in the 
Arcades Project, in the next chapter, I will examine how the twin issues of 
melancholic loss and possession play out in Freud's 1923 case study ‘A Seventeenth-
Century Demonological Neurosis’ and his 1911 study of the Schreber case, ‘Psycho-
analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia 
Paranoides)’, from which Benjamin drew. 
 
2.1 Two Case Studies: ‘A Seventeenth-Century Demonological Neurosis’ 
and the Schreber Case 
At stake in possession is a process similar to that at play in melancholia. In his book 
on the Schreber case, Eric Santner even suggests that “Freud admits that his analysis 
of paranoid mechanisms do not sufficiently delimit them from other psychic 
disturbances in which libido is withdrawn from the world, such as occurs, for 
example, in mourning”. Santner observes that Freud uses similar language to define 
both paranoia and mourning: “In paranoia, thanks to a fixation point at the stage of 
narcissism, the free-floating libido withdrawn from the world becomes the source of 
a pathologically heightened secondary narcissism”. (Santner 1996, 58). However, 
Freud remarks a propos of the Schreber case that “The mechanism of symptom-
formation in paranoia requires that internal perceptions-feelings-shall be replaced by 
external perceptions” (SE12, 63). In this, we see a relationship of inside and outside, 
world and self in paranoia that is the inverse of that which occurs in melancholia – 
where the self absorbs everything in the latter, it is experienced as porous, penetrated 
by the world, in the symptomatology of the former. There is, then, good reason to 
                                               







consider melancholia and possession as two closely related responses to a similar 
trauma, while investigating the ways in which they differ. 
 
a) ‘A Seventeenth-Century Demonological Neurosis’ (1923) 
That possession and melancholia both function as responses to a loss becomes 
apparent in Freud’s ‘A Seventeenth-Century Demonological Neurosis’. The specific 
neurosis of possession Freud examines in the text is premised on the loss of the 
father of the painter Haitzmann, who in the aftermath of his bereavement falls into a 
deep depression, becoming unable to work. Haitzmann strikes a bargain with the 
devil, who pledges to replace his father for nine years, after which time the painter 
will entirely belong to him. 
Akin to melancholia, which on Freud’s account can prolong and intensify mourning 
unduly, Haitzmann’s fantasy of possession emerges from his mourning for his father. 
This may give rise to the conclusion “that the man had been attached to his father 
with an especially strong love, and we remember how often a severe melancholia 
appears as a neurotic form of mourning”. This, Freud states, is correct. However, 
“we are not right if we conclude further that this relation has been merely one of 
love. On the contrary, his mourning over the loss of his father is the more likely to 
turn into melancholia, the more his attitude to him bore the stamp of ambivalence” 
(SE19, 87). As also posited in ‘Mourning and Melancholia’, ambivalence towards 
the lost object is a key feature in the emergence of melancholia. Of note, too, is the 
fact that Haitzmann’s case occurs in the same temporal context as the mourning 
plays, and, as we shall see, exhibits the baroque condition.  
This links Haitzmann to Hamlet: In The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), Freud 
refers to Shakespeare’s play in connection to Oedipus Rex. Freud is attentive to the 
historical difference between the two figures, suggesting that the repression 





too dissimilar to that of Benjamin: a break occurs with the advent of the early 
modern era, that is, in the Baroque; Hamlet’s wish fantasy is visible only in its 
symptoms, that is, its “inhibiting consequences” (SE4, 264). Freud locates the source 
of this Handlungshemmung in what he later was to term the ‘Oedipus complex’: the 
ambivalent relationship to his father grounded in his desire for his mother.47 This is 
the reason “Hamlet is able to do anything—except take vengeance on the man who 
did away with his father and took that father's place with his mother, the man who 
shows him the repressed wishes of his own childhood realized” (SE4, 265). The 
conclusion to be drawn from his analysis is thus that Hamlet is a “hysteric” (SE4, 
265). At the same time, Hamlet allows Freud to stress once again his theory that 
“though this be madness, yet there is method in’t” (2.2.205) – Hamlet “had to 
disguise himself as a madman”, in the sense that all psychopathology (among which 
Freud numbers dreams) is ultimately a disfigured expression of “true circumstances” 
(SE5, 444).48 
The text of the Haitzmann case study performs a curious double movement with 
regards to the question of the source of neuroses of possession, and thus of the 
relationship between psyche and world. Freud implicitly recognizes but suppresses 
their interconnectedness, as the point of the text is the translatability of earlier forms 
                                               
47 In his ‘Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis’ (1910), which according to the ‘Verzeichnis’ Benjamin 
had read, Freud likewise grounds Hamlet in the ‘incest complex’ in the ‘Fourth Lecture’ (SE11, 47), 
which is soon to become the Oedipus complex in his ‘Contributions to the Psychology of Love’ 
(1910).  
48 Hamlet also serves as an example of the difficulty of making visible this hidden truth: his 1905 ‘On 
Psychotherapy’, Freud refers to Hamlet’s soliloquy in 3.2, where Hamlet refuses to be ‘played like a 
pipe’. He thus rebuffs Rosencrantz and Guildenstern’s attempt to penetrate the mystery of his 
madness. For Freud, these words of “world-famous neurotic” Hamlet illustrate that “it is not so easy 
to play upon the instrument of the mind”, thus serving as a cautionary note to psychoanalysts (SE7, 
262). Unlike Benjamin, Freud ultimately grounds the appearance of this complex in the play in 
Shakespeare’s own life. However, given the similar historical context and the parallels in the grounds 
of their symptoms – ambivalence in the aftermath of the death of the father - we can thus insert 






of accounting for what psychoanalysis sees as psychopathologies into its own 
register. At the same time, Freud states that what sets seventeenth-century notions of 
possession apart from neuroses as diagnosed by modern psychoanalysis is that the 
latter are contained within the psyche of the individual. The demons not only dwell 
in, but emanate from, the mind of the “ill”, in the form of unconscious, repressed 
wishes and drives. What modern psychoanalysis rejects, Freud writes, is the 
projection of these “mental beings” into the outside world. In trying to account fully 
for early modern neuroses through the concepts of psychoanalysis, Freud thus goes 
one step further and denies the reciprocal relationship between the psyche and the 
world, positing instead a unidirectional move from the psyche of an individual 
outwards. We are confronted here with the issue of borders and boundaries and the 
porosity of the subject – both between the object-world it encounters and the 
historical other. These issues resurface later on in Freud's text in the form of the 
interlinking of historical and psychological processes, destabilising the notion that 
there is one easily identifiable source of neuroses. 
Nevertheless, possession is experienced as an attack from without, a fantasy of being 
taken over by an other. More forcefully than melancholia, possession in the early 
modern era was seen as coming from outside, so much so that “The official liturgy 
of the Catholic Church itself insisted that exorcists must know the symptoms that 
distinguish a possessed person from other individuals who suffer from melancholia 
or any other illness” (Clark 1999, 394). It forms a response to a loss of original 
fulness - the loss of the unity of God and the world in Benjamin’s account of the 
Baroque – a pathological way the shadow of primary narcissism resurfaces in a 
psychoanalytic register. It fills the gap between how the self and the world are 
experienced (as not full, lacking) and the demands of subjectivity, itself a response to 
a loss.  
Like the Baroque sovereign/subject, Haitzmann’s melancholia manifests as the 
inability to carry out the task he is called upon to perform – to work, and thus ensure 





attempt to solve this inability to work – if the loss of his father, the original cause for 
his catatonia, is cancelled out by being filled with a new father- figure, perhaps his 
ability to act will return. Freud then turns to the most puzzling aspect revealed by his 
analysis: How is it that the devil can become a possible object of transference for 
filial love? Freud offers up the ambivalence experienced towards the father, and any 
father figure, as an answer. He proceeds to discuss that the feminisation of the devil 
in Haitzmann's neurosis can be explained by the repressed desires to both bear his 
father a child, and be nurtured by him.  
 
b) The Schreber Case 
This links the Haitzmann case to that of Daniel Paul Schreber, a prominent jurist 
whose delusions sexualized his relationship to God.49 Bearing, as Freud notes, strong 
resemblance to Schreber’s father, this God was to procreate with Schreber in order to 
raise a new, superior species of humans. Freud describes the process of transference 
in which the lost relationship with the father or brother – the latter himself being a 
‘surrogate’ – is recreated in that with Schreber’s doctor, and ultimately projected 
onto God. As in Haitzmann’s case, the ambivalence of the relationship to the father-
figure, be it Schreber’s biological father or God, comes to the fore here, this time in 
the doubling and splitting Schreber performs with regards to both God and his stand-
in, his doctor, Flechsig. Where Haitzmann veils his identification of God and the 
father further by disfiguring or displacing it onto the devil, Schreber’s delusion takes 
the form of a more straightforward identification, but via the intermediary of his 
doctor, and the attribution of quasi-demonic traits to his God-figure. 
                                               
49 Indeed, Freud credits the Schreber’s memoirs with making the psychoanalytic insights into the 






Schreber attributed his paranoid episodes to the stress associated with his 
appointment to posts of increasing responsibility. As Santner (1996, xiii) notes:  
Schreber made his discoveries at the very moment he entered, by way of a 
symbolic investiture, one of the key centers of power and authority in 
Wilhelmine Germany, the Saxon Supreme Court. His discoveries were 
grounded in an intuition that his symptoms were, so to speak, symptomatic, that 
they were a form of knowledge concerning profound malfunctions in those 
politicotheological procedures that otherwise sustain the very ontological 
consistency of what we call the ‘world’. 
This, in turn, links Schreber’s case to that of the Baroque sovereign, who, faced with 
the tension between his creaturely, finite existence and the exalted demands of his 
political position, becomes unable to make a decision and refracts into the 
martyr/tyrant. As previously discussed, the sovereign, robbed of the originary father 
figure, God, becomes inactive and despondent. Haitzmann’s solution to this 
Handlungshemmung is to appeal to the demonic side of God, becoming possessed by 
the devil, just as Schreber is possessed by an evil god who directs all of his actions.  
It is also in this way Freud’s case studies of Haitzmann’s seventeenth-century 
demonological neurosis and of nineteenth-century judge Schreber are relevant to 
Benjamin’s sovereign/subject of the baroque: Encapsulated in possession is an 
aspiration to, as Freud was to write of the hysteric, become the representative not 
just of a self, but of all of humanity. As Stuart Clark (1999, 393) observes in his 
study of witchcraft and possession, in the early modern era,  
Possession was interpreted as an eschatological sign and exorcism (in the 
Catholic rite) as an enactment of the promises of Revelation. The stages 
through which the history of a case passed—from the loosing of devils to 
possess, to their binding to pronounce and depart—were seen as analogous to 
those which regulated the course of history in its entirety. Conversely, the 





human society as it moved into its final phase; in this state, the whole world 
was (as Pierre Viret put it) ‘possessed by devils’. 
Possession thus functioned as a kind of spectacle; an enactment, a dramatisation, a 
staging of the course of human history and its hope for redemption. Thus, possession 
signifies also an attempt to become like the sovereign in this respect: the 
representative of humanity.  
Such, too, is Schreber’s quasi-messianic delusion – he is to save humanity via his 
suffering. Like the baroque sovereign, Schreber embodies and expresses the 
suffering of his age. Schreber links himself and his condition explicitly to Hamlet – 
As Santner points out, “At one point, Schreber cites Hamlet’s words that ‘there is 
something rotten in Denmark’ …to indicate the extent of the corruption of the 
normal relationship between God and himself as well as the physical states of 
decomposition that were among the byproducts of that disordered relation” (Santner 
1996, 6). Schreber’s delusions of being dead and decaying fit into this pattern too: 
“The metaphors Schreber uses to evoke this literal and figurative rottenness strongly 
resonate with the terms with which a general sense of decay, degeneration, and 
enervation were registered in fin-de-siècle social and cultural criticism” (Santner 
1996, 6). Thus, “Schreber’s Memoirs [1903] attempt to bring into a narrative and 
theological system the crisis of authority—the rottenness in the state of Denmark, 
the breach in the Order of the World—which manifests itself at least in part as a 
demonic imbalance in the “professional” relationships imposed on him by his 
illness” (Santner 1996, 37). 
 
c) A Crisis of the Masculine Subject 
The fixation on emasculation and an experience of sexual fluidity, experienced as 
threatening by both Haitzmann and Schreber, is no coincidence. As Santner puts it, 





question implicit in this list of pathologies: What remains of virility at the end of the 
nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century?” (Santner 1996, 9). In the 
Haitzmann case study, Freud also points to the prevalence of this particular form of 
neurosis in his own age, grounded in a simultaneous fear of and fascination with the 
loss of masculinity. Such “masculine protest” expresses an unresolved conflict 
between “masculine and feminine attitudes (fear of castration and a desire for 
castration)” (SE19, 92), torn, then between the fear of the loss of male power and the 
wish to be relieved of its burden. In both Schreber’s and Haitzmann’s delusions, 
femininity is equated with (sexual) passivity.  Masculinity itself remains intact, is 
impenetrable, thus both Schreber and Haitzmann have to become women if they are 
to be used by God/the father. What Freud terms the “feminine attitude to the father” 
(SE19, 91) common to both can be read, in its passivity, as a reaction against the 
demands of – male – subjectivity. 
As I discuss in the next chapter, Benjamin was alert to the way this anxiety about 
masculinity played out in high modernity in the figure of Baudelaire, and in fears 
over femininity linked to death.50 Of particular interest in this context is Benjamin’s 
pronouncement in ‘Central Park’ (1939) that “It belongs to the Via Dolorosa of male 
sexuality that Baudelaire regarded pregnancy as a kind of unfair competition” (SW4, 
173). Like Schreber, who solved the problem of remaining heirless in imagining 
himself as the incubator of a future humanity engendered by God, and like 
Haitzmann, who imagined himself impregnated by the devil-father, Baudelaire’s is a 
specifically masculine psychopathology centred on the reproductive capacity, or 
                                               
50 It is worth noting Benjamin interest in Johann Jakob Bachofen’s studies of matriarchy in primitive 
society at this point. Matriarchy, or as Bachofen terms it, “Gynaecocracy” is characterised by a “high 
degree of democratic order and ideas of political equality” (GS2, 230). As Mali (1999, 182) notes, “as 
Benjamin well saw, Bachofen's matriarchal vision, which implied that women were superior to men 
in the moral and political conduction of society, was part of a larger and more radical political 






perceived lack thereof.51 Schreber ties the ability to reproduce to a yearning for 
death, and redemption, exemplified in his feeling that “enormous numbers of 
"female nerves" have already passed over into his body, and out of them a new race 
of men will proceed, through a process of direct impregnation by God. Not until 
then, it seems, will he be able to die a natural death, and, along with the rest of 
mankind, will he regain a state of bliss” (SE12, 17). We see here the inauguration of 
the death drive of the subject expressed in the desire to be redeemed in the moment 
of creaturely, biological reproduction. At the same time, a way to make the 
thoroughgoing immanence of life – its creatureliness, lacking in all transcendence – 
sacred once more is thus opened up precisely in the profane reproductive act.52 
 
d) The Aftermath of the Death of God 
Common to the sovereign, to Haitzmann, and to Schreber is an ambivalence 
characteristic of the relationship to God. Given Benjamin’s diagnosis in the book on 
                                               
51 It is interesting to note that where Freud proposes the concept of on penis envy on the part of 
women, Benjamin inverts this in proposing an incident of ‘pregnancy envy’. 
52 The example of Schreber also functions as a paradigmatic case where individual psychopathologies 
are symptomatic of a social prohibition, in this case on homosexuality. Freud notes the large amount 
of his contemporaries succumbing to paranoia as a means of warding off homosexual desires, which 
to him is surprising as “Paranoia is precisely a disorder in which a sexual aetiology is by no means 
obvious; far from this, the strikingly prominent features in the causation of paranoia, especially 
among males, are social humiliations and slights” (SE12, 60). Thus the social comes to the fore in 
connection to the repression of homosexuality. Freud traces it back to the psyche: “delusions never 
fail to uncover these relations and to trace back the social feelings to their roots in a directly sensual 
erotic wish” (SE12, 60). Freud then postulates a teleology of sexuality via a sublimated 
homosexuality, which is channelled into fellow feeling for humanity as a whole. 
 If Scholem’s account is to be believed, Benjamin found the original Schreber text more interesting 
that Freud’s commentary, with its stress on the teleology of sexuality. Benjamin goes beyond Freud 
on this issue, too, in suggesting it might be treated as a political question of emancipation rather than 
a pathology – or rather, recognising in the pathologisation of homosexual desire itself a larger, social 
pathology of modernity (See the discussion of lesbianism in ‘The Paris of the Second Empire in 





German tragic drama, we might reformulate the complexes of all three as responding 
to the question ‘What happens after God dies?’. Melancholia, protracted mourning is 
thus recast as a ‘nachträglicher Gehorsam’ and its obverse, a continuation of the 
ambivalent relationship with the father-figure, culminating in the denigration of God 
as punishment for his abandonment of modern man – bearing all the features of the 
relationship to, and mourning for, the father as described by Freud. 
Indeed, Schreber casts his paranoid delusions in the grandiose terms of a struggle 
with God, from which he emerges triumphantly: “From this apparently unequal 
struggle between one weak man and God Himself, I have emerged as the victor-
though not without undergoing much bitter suffering and privation - because the 
Order of Things [Weltordnung] stands upon my side” (SE12, 19).53 This is then a 
further compensatory dimension to Schreber’s paranoia: the suffering of the post-
baroque condition is recast as a victorious, triumphant affect. Freud and Benjamin 
both note that Schreber’s peculiar theological system, where God can only approach 
humanity in the form of corpses, gives us a glimpse into the destiny of the divine in 
the aftermath of the devaluation of religious answers: far from elevating humanity in 
a redemptive gesture, God is no longer adequate to living humans, and can only deal 
with the dead. 
                                               
53 As Freud notes, “In a footnote attached to the words ‘contrary to the Order of Things’ in the above 
passage, the author foreshadows the subsequent transformation in his delusion of emasculation and in 
his relation to God:  ‘I shall show later on that emasculation for quite another purpose-a purpose in 
consonance with the Order of Things-is within the bounds of possibility, and, indeed, that it may quite 
probably afford the solution of the conflict.’” (SE12, 20). Thus, Schreber’s initial victory over God is 
transformed into a compensatory fantasy of being emasculated in keeping with the order of the world. 
Just as masculinity itself is kept intact in Schreber’s delusion, so the order of the world is not just 
followed, but later to be restored in his symptom, which he should – and does – experience as 







However, the victorious emergence of the subject from this struggle is not to last 
long. As Freud notes, Schreber was “‘the only real man left alive’, and the few 
human shapes that he still saw - the doctor, the attendants, the other patients - he 
explained as being ‘miracled up, cursorily improvised men’” (SE12, 68). Elias 
Canetti (1978, 448) links this survivorship to a sadistic, and indeed narcissistic drive 
in Schreber that speaks of a pathological ‘will to power’:  
Schreber is left as the sole survivor because this is what he himself wants. He 
wants to be the only man left alive, standing in an immense field of corpses; 
and he wants this field of corpses to contain all men but himself. It is not only 
as a paranoiac that he reveals himself here. To be the last man to remain alive is 
the deepest urge of every seeker after power. 
On this reading, Schreber’s delusion “in which the ego was retained and the world 
sacrificed” (SE12, 69) again points to the narcissistic tendency inherent in the 
demand of subjectivity: its reach always pointing beyond the self, striving to either 
annihilate the world outright, or annihilate it in absorbing it into the self. 
In this apocalyptic fantasy, Schreber expresses the characteristic mood of the 
nineteenth century, just like the Baroque sovereign is emblematic of the suffering of 
his age. As we shall see in the following chapters, many of the elements of his 
delusions appear in Benjamin’s study of nineteenth-century Paris in the Arcades 
Project, where melancholia is transformed into spleen, with an attendant sense of 
history as an ongoing catastrophe, and individuality is a semblance erected in the 
face of the increasing massification in cities. The fleeting nature of experience in 
modernity is mirrored in Schreber’s sense of hasty, provisional human beings who 
are not ‘real’ in the sense of being full subjects. As we shall see, this also manifests 
in nineteenth-century culture in the form of anxieties about automata and living 
dolls.  
Despite his victory over God and the rest of humanity, the sense of not being an 





himself. He describes his life as an ongoing survival of torturous physical destruction 
and dismemberment, his organs subject to destruction and miraculous reconstruction 
at the hands of God. This constant process of divine restitution following 
mortification of his body results in his immortality – as long as he remains a man, 
Schreber cannot die. All his bodily processes have become directed by miracles. He 
is directly animated by the divine, taken out of the context of the world and its laws 
and subject to direct, unmediated intervention by God in every aspect of his 
biological life. His most creaturely, bodily processes are themselves guided by 
constant divine intervention, while Schreber is under a “thinking compulsion” in 
order to prove to God at every moment his mental or psychic activity.54 
 Thus, Schreber solves the dilemma of the baroque sovereign by elevating his 
creaturely aspect itself to the sacred by way of his psychopathology, aiming to 
restore the theological dimension of the creaturely. Here, the fractured, empty post-
Baroque subject is literally filled anew – with God himself.55 This conceptualisation 
of the relationship between self and God bears striking resemblance to Benjamin’s 
account of the sovereign in the Trauerspiele, who “in conformity to the occasionalist 
image of God, is constantly intervening directly in the workings of the state so as to 
arrange the data of the historical process in a regular and harmonious sequence” 
(OT, 97). Not only is Schreber subject to divine intervention at his most creaturely, 
this also happens as a way to reaffirm the order of the world.  
Schreber, incapable of carrying out his task as a judge adequately – that is, to come 
                                               
54 In connection to this, Santner stresses the importance of language in Schreber’s delusions: 
“Schreber’s experience of voices and fragments of speech being projected into his body by way of a 
kind of miraculous ventriloquism is among the torments that most directly endangers his capacity to 
experience himself as a source of individual agency and initiative” (Santner 1996, 33). Language here 
functions as a pathological link. 
55  Freud also points to the inversion of a repressed narcissism in paranoia. Akin to the mechanism of 
love, where “das Ich, der finstere Despot” (“the ego, the gloomy despot” [transl.mine]) is made to die, 





to decisions – resolves his inner tension by succumbing to God's commands. The 
religious, the absolute will of God, is appealed to precisely at the moment where 
personal will fails political office, and both are revealed as inadequate. What these 
cases make visible, if read in conjunction with Benjamin's book on German tragic 
drama, is the condition of the post-Baroque subject and the untenability of 
sovereignty and ultimately subjectivity itself, also intimated in the work of Freud. 
Subjectivity itself is revealed to be a fantasy of possession, an attempt to gain a 
fulness of being in the absence of God. The baroque subject fails to provide a stable 
signifier around which to construct itself; there is, in fact, nothing transcendental 
about it, it is, like the baroque age, fully immanent. 
Meanwhile, Freud diagnoses that what is ultimately at stake in Haitzmann’s 
psychopathology is the wish to secure his material existence. The creaturely aspect, 
his material need and dependence on society for his ongoing survival are heightened 
in his delusions and transposed into a theological register, manifesting as struggles 
over his soul between the devil and God. In the end, the latter wins: Haitzmann 
enters a religious order, which, as Freud notes, lays both his inner turmoil and his 
material struggles to rest. Religion as something that, at its etymological root, is a 
binding together (religare) was to offer Haitzmann the means to remain bound to a 
community, and to life. Freud concludes with an acknowledgement that at the heart 
of this demonological neurosis was a battle for individual survival, culminating in 
the struggle to accept the renunciation of his desires, his libidinal lust for life, and the 
acceptance of the ascetic lifestyle to which the monastic order would compel him. 
However, this renunciation remained perilous – as Freud notes, Haitzmann was 
repeatedly subject to temptation by the devil, especially when drunk –able to avert 
him each time “by the grace of God” (SE19, 78). This formulation is to be taken 
literally in Haitzmann’s case – again and again, he restaged the battle for his soul, in 
a way that reassured him of God’s ongoing presence. Thus the religious answers, 
which for Benjamin lost their validity after the reformation and the religious wars of 
the early modern era, were to provide only an uneasy answer for Haitzmann. 





psychopathology that nevertheless expresses something essential about his age. 
Where Haitzmann still had a common religious symbolism at his disposal, Schreber 
has to resort to a novel and convoluted expression. Nevertheless, he also draws on 
ancient symbolisms, as in the case of the sun-god – his pathology, encompassing 
both modern technologies and mythic Urgeschichte, is thus typical of the nineteenth 
century.  
In his ‘Books by the Mentally Ill’ (1928), Benjamin notes the modernity of 
Schreber's text, where knowledge of technology, specifically railways, is projected 
onto the divine. The modernity of Schreber’s psychopathology is also apparent in 
Freud‘s reference to the testimony one of Schreber’s doctors: Schreber comes to 
terms with his heightened sensitivity to light and sound, his perception of being 
already dead, his feeling of being submitted to manipulations at the hand of 
something alien, by compensating for it with the delusion that all of this serves a 
higher, sacred purpose. As Benjamin notes, Schreber’s perception of other people is 
consistent with this:  
The idea of the end of the world, not uncommon among paranoids, obsesses 
him to such a degree that he can conceive of other people's existence only as a 
frivolous delusion. To enable him to come to terms with it, his writings abound 
in references to ‘casually improvised men,’ ‘miracle dolls,’ people who have 
been ‘magicked away,’ and so forth. (SW4, 124). 
Scholem (1981, 71) notes the impression Schreber’s formulation of the “flüchtig 
hingemachten Männer”, here translated as “fleeting-improvised-men”, made on 
Benjamin. No longer proof of the existence of a world exterior to the subject, these 
rushed, artificial creations are met with distrust; but so is Schreber’s own 
subjectivity. At stake is the condition of post-baroque suffering of the fractured 
subject in high modernity: As Santner writes, 
Schreber experienced what threatened his rights/rites of institution under a 





to homosexualization; as the threat of contamination by machine-like, 
depersonalized linguistic operations; as the prospect of “Jewification” 
(metamorphosis into the Wandering Jew) (Santner 1996, 55). 
Schreber’s “own private Germany”, Santner’s term for Schreber’s response to these 
threats, “consists of his attempts, using the available repertoire of cultural values and 
valences, to interpret and to assign meaning to a maddening blockage in meaning 
that prevented him from assuming his place as a master of juridical hermeneutics and 
judgment” (Santner 1996, 55). In other words, Schreber’s paranoid delusions 
function as a response to the fracture of the subject in the aftermath of the loss of 
universally-valid theological truth. 
 
3. Taking Possession of the Other 
The complement of this compensation for a loss in the form of possession by an 
other is the taking possession of an other in a narcissistic gesture of subsumption. 
For Freud, the ambivalence displayed by Haitzmann to his devil-father is 
characteristic of the relationship to the ultimate father figure, God, and unearths the 
source of this ambivalent tension: The gods of antiquity contained a good/evil 
dualism within themselves, which was subsequently split into God and his obverse 
in Christianity. In his analysis of Schreber, Freud also r1ecognizes this process of 
splitting as a psychological, but also a historical one. He links the Manichean 
worldview of good and evil in Christianity to historical processes of conquest and 
ensuing cultural change. For Freud, the gods of the conquered attain demonic traits 
over time and become reviled.  
Benjamin shares Freud’s awareness of this process, and his writings show clear 
traces of Freud’s ‘Notes on a Case of Paranoia’. Referring to the “gnostic-manichean 
doctrine” according to which the world is destined to take the demonic into itself, he 





“scorning all emblematic disguise, the undisguised visage of the devil can raise itself 
up from out of the depths of the earth into the view of the allegorist, in triumphant 
vitality and nakedness. It was only in the middle ages that these sharp, angular 
features were etched in the originally greater demonic head of antiquity” (OT, 227).  
As I discuss below, this process of the demonisation of pagan Antiquity in the 
Middle Ages is mirrored in the valorisation of Classical culture in the Renaissance 
and Baroque.  
Crucially, for Freud this historical process of ambivalent splitting is mirrored in the 
psychological one. Freud thus alerts us to the presence of the other at the heart of 
European Christianity, as well as to the homology between psyche and world. Freud 
often alludes to the relationship of cultural-historical development (phylogenesis) 
and individual development (ontogenesis) as analogous; ‘primitive society’ appears 
in his texts to illustrate points about the development of the psyche, towards greater 
complexity of social organisation and thus greater repression. For Freud, there is 
thus a remainder, a remnant of the past and traumatic experience in particular that 
lingers and informs later moments of history as well as individuals.56 
For Benjamin, of course, these remainders are also present – as ruin, distorted in 
their form, necessarily incomplete and fragmented; as allegories are to thoughts, 
material ruins are to the “realm of things”. In the book on German tragic drama, 
Benjamin states that in ruins, human history is physically merged into the natural 
setting (OT 177-8) – the ruin functions as a nexus between human history and nature 
                                               
56 Freud here also notes, though he does not thematise, the role of political power in the condensation 
of the father and the divine: “It is true that we cannot help feeling that there is an impassable gulf 
between the personality of God and that of any human being, however eminent he may be. But we 
must remember that this has not always been so. The gods of the peoples of antiquity stood in a closer 
human relationship to them. The Romans used to deify their dead emperors as a matter of routine” 
(SE12, 52). With Benjamin, we see how this re-emerges in the Baroque where the sovereign acts as 
an intermediary between the divine and the creaturely, who is however doomed to remain fractured 





which points to the limits of autonomous, willed action and thus of the subject. Just 
as for Freud the atavistic past, personal and world-historical, appears time and again 
at the level of the individual, calling its power over itself into question just as surely 
as the id does within Freud’s second topography of 1923, Benjamin's ruins 
destabilise the present and the subject within it. Ruins, too, point to an other that 
came before, an other that must be dealt with somehow – accounted for, absorbed, 
destroyed, and so on. 
Benjamin was to write in his last text, ‘On the Concept of History’ (1940) that 
“[t]here is no document of culture which is not at the same time a document of 
barbarism. And just as such a document is never free of barbarism, so barbarism 
taints the manner in which it was transmitted from one hand to another” (SW4, 392). 
This insight is already at play in his book on the German mourning plays, where the 
subsumption of Greek culture in the Baroque is described as a most violent act. 
Here, Baroque interpretation “penetrates” antiquity in what Benjamin terms a 
“gesture of submission”, a gesture which functions as a guarantor of the authority of 
the new era, confirming the “power of the present” it the medium of the past. Hence, 
it “regarded its own forms as ‘natural’, not so much the antithesis, as the conquest 
and elevation of its rival” (OT, 100). A teleology is presupposed by the Baroque’s 
self-understanding as the heir of Antiquity. Benjamin here reveals this 
historiographical notion of an unbroken line running from Ancient Greece into 
Renaissance Europe as a fantasy, covering up a real act of historical violence – an 
act which, if we read it with the statement from ‘On the Concept of History’, 
commits further violence itself in passing on this tradition.57  
This allows us to relate the supposedly high regard in which Renaissance and 
Baroque culture hold 'the Classics' to the process of the over-valorisation of the 
murdered father by his descendants that Freud was to outline in Moses and 
                                               





Monotheism (1939). Benjamin’s account, however, goes one step further than 
Freud’s: for him, antiquity is only imagined to be a murdered father, and a further 
gesture of violence is enacted in this imagining: The Baroque may not recognise this, 
repurposing it as an ‘origin’, but it has subsumed its “rival”, antiquity, in a violent 
fashion. Far from a mimetic naturalism, its forms, such as the Trauerspiele, are the 
result of the process of historical change, an ultimately unsuccessful incorporation of 
the past other into the present. 
We can read Benjamin's writings on his own time as a commentary on the 
catastrophic results of the attempt to make everything subject to the self; to subject 
every other to the subject. Benjamin's writing thus traces the precursors of twentieth-
century fascism to the nineteenth century and the Baroque, connecting it through the 
Renaissance of European culture with its ‘shackling’ of Greece to the triumphal 
procession of early European modernity. What we see in Freud and Benjamin is the 
subsumption and ostensible valorisation of cultural and historic others as two sides 
of the same coin: the killing of the other, which is then readmitted and venerated as 
an ‘ancestor’. This opens up an additional perspective on Baroque melancholia. It 
finds its ground not just in the wretchedness of its own age, with the loss of the 
certainty of the undivided truth of Christianity. Hidden beneath that lies a deeper, 
more obscured history of the killing and cannibalisation of the pagan other that 
preceded it. 
The totalising reach of subjectivity in its ultimate form – narcissism – can thus be 
linked in Freud and Benjamin to historical processes of conquest and ensuing 
cultural change, notably the absorption of pagan gods into Christianity. In what 
follows, I will perform a comparison of Benjamin's thought on this absorption of the 
historical other with that of cultural historian Aby Warburg, whose account of 
renaissance melancholia was influential for Benjamin's work on the Baroque.58 
                                               





Doing so will allow the specificity of Benjamin's account to become more fully 
delineated.  
 
3.1 Warburg: Athens, Alexandria, Pathos Formula 
As noted by Andrew Benjamin, common to both Warburg and Walter Benjamin is 
the rejection of a conceptualisation of historical time as mere chronology (Andrew 
Benjamin 2017, 22), and Benjamin drew on Warburg in his discussion of the 
reception of Greek pagan antiquity in medieval, Renaissance and Baroque European 
culture. In archiving renaissance visual culture in his laboratory of 
“kulturwissenschaftliche Bildgeschichte” (GSW II, 535)59, Warburg tried to take 
seriously its importance as a repository of knowledge, as well as to give due 
scholarly consideration to the function of Classical Antiquity in the construction of a 
European identity. For Benjamin, as we have seen, Allegory emerges in the Baroque 
as a new form of accounting for the tension between the image of heroic antiquity of 
the renaissance and the demonic side revived in the middle ages. The baroque 
embodies the tension not just between the Christian and the pagan, but between their 
tradition and revival in the middle ages, the renaissance, and the counter-
reformation. Based on Warburg’s work, Benjamin develops his own account of the 
assimilation of the Greek gods in European post-antiquity. Benjamin’s discussion of 
Warburg in the Trauerspiel book demonstrates his interest in the tension in 
Warburg’s work between the Ausgleich, balance, and that which remains 
                                               
59 See Weigel (2013, 19) for the cautionary note that the emphasis of the German on the 
kulturwissenschaftlich aspect is lost in the habitual English translation of “laboratory of the 





unassimilated and unassimilable, the poles between which the Ausgleichsformeln are 
supposed to mediate.60 
Stewart also notes the parallels between Warburg and Benjamin: he “was drawn to 
the irrational, to magic and religion” but asserts that, unlike Benjamin, “he purported 
to be the guardian of Enlightenment even as he insisted on the fundamental 
importance of irrational immersion into or empathy with cultural artifacts to the life 
of a civilization” (Stewart 2010, 100). An early advocate of this view is Ernst 
Gombrich, director of the Warburg Institute for much of the 1960s and 1970s. His 
account of Warburg as unequivocally subscribing to a view of history that equates 
ever-greater rationalisation with progress was influential for much of 20th century 
Warburg scholarship.61 This points to a tension in the critical reception of Warburg, 
grounded in a tension in Warburg’s work itself, centering on the question of 
historical teleology and the status of empathy.  
As for Benjamin, melancholia for Warburg is related to mythic history and fate; his 
account of the genesis of melancholia addresses the issue of the reception and 
reappearance of the pagan Other in Renaissance Europe. In Pagan-Antique Prophecy 
in Words and Images in the Age of Luther (1920), originally presented as a lecture in 
1919, Warburg discusses how Dürer's Melencolia exhibits the metamorphosis from 
creaturely humanity, at the mercy of the planetary gods, towards the “thinking 
Arbeitsmensch”, the labouring person. Out of dejected melancholia, the creative 
genius is born; the threatening Saturnian element is tempered by Jupiter, and 
channelled into “the active work of reason” (GSW II, 530). As Pensky comments, 
                                               
60 See for instance GS1, 399f. 
61 See for instance Gombrich, Ernst H. Aby Warburg: An Intellectual Biography. London: Phaidon 
Press, 1986, and ‘Aby Warburg und der Evolutionismus des 19, Jahrhunderts’ in Gallitz, Robert and 
Reimers, Brita (eds). Aby M. Warburg. “Ekstatische Nymphe, trauernder Flussgott.” Porträt eines 





“This constitutes a small but significant historical victory for the forces of reason, a 
moment in which the freedom of the human condition is able to triumph over its 
subjection to its own fears” (Pensky 1993, 98). Here as in his other work, Warburg 
contrasts two versions of antiquity: a demonic, mythic one whose influence reaches 
into the Renaissance, with another, “Olympic” side, which must be wrested away 
from the former: “Again and again, Athens wants to be recaptured from Alexandria” 
(GSW I.2, 534).  ‘Athens’ serves as a model for humanism even as it is newly 
created by it, while ‘Alexandria’ stands in for the demonic forces of myth.62  
This raises the question whether for Warburg, pagan antiquity survives directly in 
the Renaissance: In this text, Warburg argues that it is the same “entirely authentic, 
antique spirit” (GSWI, 446) that is manifest in its cultural production. Both “Athens” 
and “Alexandria” are transhistorical poles of humanities' relation to the world, 
locked in eternal struggle. Despite his martial metaphor, for Warburg, the 
recapturing of Athens is a “reawakening” of the positive aspects of pagan antiquity, 
while for Benjamin this process of historical transmission is a violent one. Although 
Warburg acknowledges that the Pathosformeln make visible a struggle in the 
construction of the “Olympic” Hellenism idealised in the Renaissance, this is 
conceptualised as a struggle between transhistorically progressive, quasi proto-
Enlightenment aspects, and mythic, irrational aspects. 
Matthew Rampley points to this as a significant tension in Warburg's work, which 
sometimes asserts the subjective character of the afterlife in favour of the objective 
content of history, while “at the same time, however, classical antiquity appears to 
possess a determinate content that serves as the foundation of European culture” 
(Rampley 2000, 54). Giovanni Careri, otherwise at pains to stress the open-
                                               
62 For a reading that contests Warburg’s take on this dualism, see Jennifer Zahrt, (2012, 83f). Zahrt 
notes that Warburg’s interpretation conflates astrology with demonology, suggesting that it is 
Warburg that relegates the star signs/constellations to ‘demons’, not the early moderns themselves, 
contesting Warburg’s account of a historical struggle to emerge from “magic fear” into rationality. 





endedness and novelty contained in Warburg’s Pathosformeln, acknowledges that 
“Sometimes one gets the impression that the renaissance of “antiquity” according to 
Warburg is a strange fantasmatic fiction in which Orpheus, the Maenads or Saturn 
are eternal figures, capable of coming back to life independently of those who have 
reinvented their forms” (Careri 2003, 45, transl. mine).63 Dimitros Latsis, in the 
preface to his translation of Warburg’s text on Manet, comments in a similar vein 
that “it was not Manet who needed this return to the sources in order ‘to appear as a 
faithful guardian of tradition’ (the question Warburg poses himself at the outset), but 
rather tradition who needed artists like Manet for its afterlife” (Latsis 2015, 7). 
Gombrich and Stewart’s reading of Warburg is contested by Chris Johnson, who in 
his study of the Mnemosyne-Atlas asserts the absence of any teleology to Warburg’s 
Pathosformeln (Johnson 2012, 15). 64 Johnson cites Gombrich’s interpretation that 
while the images on the panels of the Mnemosyne are not to be understood as 
depicting a linear historical progression of humanity, they do offer a juxtaposition of 
historical eras based on their achievement of Denkraum, thought-space, distancing 
humanity from primitive imagistic thought. Critiquing Gombrich’s reading, Johnson 
suggests Warburg’s choice of images and their arrangements in the panels 
undermines this clear-cut distinction between different eras. Warburg’s Denkraum, 
Johnson suggests, is not to be understood as something “permanently viable” 
(Johnson 2012, 25). Matthew Rampley echoes this reading, highlighting that it was a 
                                               
63 Careri aims to dispel this impression by referring to Warburg’s statement that he realises this 
transmission of ideas does not occur “parthenogenetically”, and by stressing that artists play an active 
part in it. However, what is at stake is not so much the question of active involvement, but the 
inherently transhistorical character of what the images convey.  
64 See for instance Rampley (1997) and Didi-Huberman (2002) for a discussion of Warburg’s 
concepts of pathos formula and after-life (Nachleben) in relation to theories of empathy. For a reading 
of the pathos formula as originating in an even more primeval struggle between humanity and an 
essentially hostile, chaotic nature, see Gombrich (1970). Böhme (1997, 10) discusses the pathos 
formula in relation to the “eloquentia corporis”, “ 12die zu Bildern und Figuren geronnenen 
Interferenzen zwischen Affektenergien und kulturellen Verarbeitungsmustern (the interferences 





point on which Warburg drew close to Benjamin: “in contrast to the optimistic belief 
in progress, both were profoundly aware that 'modernity' was not to be seen as an 
unequivocal victory of reason over the irrationality of the pre-modern era, and also 
that where ‘progress’ had been achieved, its place was fragile” (Rampley 2000, 14 ). 
These interpretations suggest that both Warburg’s arrangement of the panels of his 
Mnemosyne-Atlas, as well as his written work, put forward contradictory positions 
regarding the question of Enlightenment and progress. 
However, these moments of tension are somewhat undercut by the understanding of 
history that undergirds Warburg’s pathos formula. While they may not be as 
uniformly teleological in intention as some of the scholarship asserts; as Johnson 
summarises, the pathos formula are for Warburg “recurring “images of life in 
motion” … the most appropriate vehicles for mediating strong emotions, becoming 
thereby Ausdruckswerte [values of expression] possessing universal cultural, 
psychological, and phenomenological meaning” (Johnson 2012, 50-51). The 
Ausdruckswerte “concern less aesthetic values than visual art’s capacity to serve as a 
repository or …savings bank for energetic expressive values. Simply put, Warburg 
regards such “values” as timeless psychological truths giving art its ethical and 
spiritual worth (Johnson 2012, 21). Careri notes that at the heart of the concept lies 
the belief that a heightening of pathos can be attained by infusing an artwork with an 
antique pathos formula (Careri 2003, 60). Pathos formula are linked to an 
intensification of feeling, specifically in tragedy, resulting in a catharsis, which for 
Warburg was the measure of art (Careri 2003, 47).  
Summing up the effect of pathos in Warburg’s dissertation on Botticelli, asserts that 
“the representation of intense bodily movement constitutes, for Warburg, a primitive 
impulse where the painter (and the spectator) are empathetically drawn into the 
narrative event” (Rampley 2000, 52). This account of pathos also appears in many 
other of Warburg’s writings, for instance in his lecture on Laocoon. Against 
Winckelman, Warburg here asserts the pathos of form as the central focus of the 





2000, 57). Meanwhile, Rampley locates contradictions to this conceptualisation of 
pathos formula as transhistorical expressive values of the human body in Warburg’s 
own work, which “Paradoxically … contradicts this view, in particular, his 
distinction between the mannered and rather restricted gestures of medieval courtly 
society and the much more dynamic gestural language of classical antiquity” 
(Rampley 2012, 94). Additionally, the possibility of ‘mis-readings’ of history 
Warburg acknowledges complicate this picture. Nevertheless, these critics are more 
or less united in noting the influence of “empathy theory” on Warburg’s concept of 
the pathos formula – which would set Warburg at odds with Benjamin, who was 
writing in opposition to such a notion of empathy in art. Empathy presents “not the 
view of the object, resolved in the idea, but that of subjective states of the recipient 
projected into the work” and as such is “the opposite” of Benjamin’s method (OT, 
42). 
Against the supposed centrality of empathy to Warburg’s work, Andrew Benjamin 
locates both Warburg’s and Walter Benjamin’s thought on the philosophy of art at 
“the precise point at which singularity and empathy as providing a way into art’s 
work breaks down” (A. Benjamin 2017, 28). Andrew Benjamin theorises a 
‘doubling’ of the body in art, pointing to the irreconcilability of the tensions between 
pagan-antique and Christian iconography in the same artwork. By stating that 
Warburg followed Vischer’s definition of empathy as “a unity in multiplicity”, the 
existence of a doubling or a tension that resists becoming resolved into one, Andrew 
Benjamin (2017, 29) suggests that “empathy’s very condition of possibility” is 
dissolved.  
Together with Johnson, Andrew Benjamin is of the school that, reading Warburg 
against Warburg, concludes that there is an inherent untenability or instability of 
reconciliation in his work: “Reconciliation can be posited. Its success is always 
another question” (A. Benjamin 2017, 30). Nevertheless, reconciliation and balance 
remain the aim of Warburg’s work, unlike that of Benjamin. Andrew Benjamin also 





friend/enemy distinction and which adopts the garb of neutrality engenders a feint 
that is inherently unstable…This, it can be argued, is the radical point of separation 
between Warburg and Benjamin” (A. Benjamin 2017, 37). Or, as Sigrid Weigel puts 
it: “By referring, for instance, to…the ‘major universal processes of development’ in 
his texts, or by describing a comprehensive system of symbolic forms in terms of 
typological stages of developments, Warburg’s oeuvre tends toward a 
universalization” (Weigel 1995, 142-144). What is at stake for Benjamin, 
conversely, is a kind of grasping for a materialist understanding of history – 
unsurprisingly perhaps; it is often forgotten that One-Way Street (1928), usually 
counted amongst Benjamin's ‘materialist’ writings, was written at the same time as 
the book on German tragic drama. As Benjamin writes a propos the Trauerspiel 
book in a 1931 letter to Max Rychner: 
This book, of course, was certainly not materialistic, even if it was dialectical. 
But what I did not know at the time I wrote it, soon thereafter became 
increasingly clear to me: namely, there is a bridge to the way dialectical 
materialism looks at things …But there is no bridge to the complacency of 
bourgeois scholarship. (C, 372) 
Drawing from Warburg’s successors Panofsky and Saxl, whom Pensky describes as 
“less encumbered by Warburg's obsession with the victory of rational self-control 
over the powers of myth” (Pensky 1993, 100), Benjamin transposes the Renaissance 
revival of melancholy heroism onto the Baroque in the Trauerspiel book. In this 
move, Pensky suggests that “Benjamin bends the interpretation from the spirit if not 
the letter of the reflections of the Warburg Institute toward a reading of melancholy 
genius concentrating specifically on the propensity of the melancholy mind toward 
the fragmentary, the earthly, the decayed” (Pensky 1993, 103-104).  
Crucially, Benjamin moves the focus away from individual creative genius, which as 
Pensky points out “may have prevented the Warburg Institute from grasping that the 
genuine theological impulse that underlies the emergence of melancholia as a mode 





development of a relationship between subjectivity as such and the physiognomy of 
its object realm” (Pensky 1993, 104). Concretely, it is in the cultural form most 
emblematic of the Baroque, the mourning plays as a genre, that “Trauer, intense 
mournfulness, penetrates through the model of the autonomous contemplative 
genius, and in this depersonalization points toward the image of the thinker too as 
merely one form of earthly mass” (Pensky 1993, 104-105).  Indeed, as Benjamin 
notes in the fragment “Das Heidentum ist eine dämonische Gemeinschaft” 
(Paganism is a demonic community): “Paganism arises when the sphere of the 
genius-like human quality…is elevated to the sphere of spirituality itself, to demonic 
community“65 (GS6, 90, transl. mine) – for Benjamin, the genius cannot rid himself 
of the demonic, and insofar as the subject is enjoined to act as a genius, it, too, must 
fall back into the mythic. As Rampley notes,  
Warburg was persistent in his belief that the ability to rise above the repetitive 
loss of self was fragile, its achievement tenuous. And here we see the parallel 
with Benjamin for whom capitalism, through the growth of commodity 
fetishism, was engaged in the process of reverting to a kind of primitive 
repetition. (Rampley 2000, 99) 
However, “Benjamin argues for something far more revolutionary. Less concerned 
with maintaining the sovereignty of bourgeois reason, Benjamin regards the rescuing 
of culture possible only through a dialectical reawakening of primitive memory, a 
revolutionary and subversive re-appropriation of history” (Rampley 2000, 99-100). 
This is of particular importance as, left unchecked – unanalysed – these primitive 
contents will, for Benjamin following Freud, continue to resurface in distorted form. 
                                               
65 “Heidentum entsteht wenn die Sphäre des geniushaft Menschlichen… zur Sphäre der Geistigkeit 





I will now investigate the question of psychopathology as an attempt to resolve this 
traumatic resurfacing of past forms in its appeal to theology and transcendence. 
 
3.2 Power, Madness – Truth? 
In his short text ‘Books by the Mentally Ill’, Benjamin sees the link between the 
items in his “little library of pathology” in “the elaboration of a theological 
cosmology, which encompasses an enormous range of perverse and imaginative 
permutations of the relations between the human, the cosmos, and the divine”, as 
Caygill (2016, 150) puts it. We can add Freud’s Haitzmann case to this list: In both 
the Schreber and the Haitzmann cases, what is at stake is not merely psychology, but 
also theology. Both neuroses revolve around religious symbols and the interplay of 
divine forces, too great a burden to bear for the fledgling subject, invaded by both 
God and the devil. At stake too is the question of political authority in the wake of 
the Baroque downfall of divine authority and its aftermath. Given the failure of God, 
and of the sovereign, to provide a stable centre of meaning and authority, who can 
posit the law, inaugurate or end the state of exception? 
These issues lead Santner to connect the Schreber case to Benjamin’s early text 
‘Critique of Violence’ (1921) via Benjamin’s review of Schreber in ‘Books by the 
Mentally Ill’, “as a displaced meditation on Schreber’s encounter with the force or 
violence immanent to law, with the ‘state of exception’ internal to the regulation of 
bodies and identities in society” (Santner 2001, 56). Benjamin’s ‘Critique’ unveils 
the rule of law as existing “without ultimate justification or legitimation, that the 
very space of juridical reason within which the rule of law obtains is established and 
sustained by a dimension of force and violence that, as it were, holds the place of 
those missing foundations” (Santner 2001, 57). This is consistent with Benjamin’s 
position in the Trauerspiel book, where he notes that the bipolarity of the sovereign, 
fractured into two distinct characters in the form of the tyrant and the martyr in most 





into account: “The theory of sovereignty which takes as its example the special case 
in which dictatorial powers are unfolded, positively demands the completion of the 
image of the sovereign, as tyrant” (OT, 69). Juridical power has a tendency towards 
the tyrannical extreme, just as, we might add, the subject has a tendency towards a 
return to narcissism. 
Benjamin's ‘Books by the Mentally Ill’ not only provides a link between the texts of 
his collection, but also connects them to Benjamin's own writing. He opens his brief 
study with a taxonomical conundrum of his own: how to class these books, while 
then pointing to the pathology of Gruppierungswahn, the compulsion to classify. 
The detailed taxonomies drawn up in these books, for Benjamin, points to a 
similarity of nineteenth-century epistemologies to the mode of knowing of mental 
illness. Benjamin ranges himself among the mad in the impossibility of finding a 
publisher for his book on German tragic drama – the very text in which he discusses 
the mad sovereign of the Baroque, melancholia and the pathology of subjectivity. 
The fact of the publication of these texts, Benjamin says, has something 
“disconcerting” about it – destabilising the notion of writing as “part of a higher, 
safer realm” (SW2.1, 130). Benjamin concludes the text with the words “If this brief 
essay should arouse interest in it, and if these all too brief excerpts could stimulate 
the reader to turn his attention to the posters and leaflets of the insane, then these 
lines would have fulfilled a twofold purpose” (SW2.1, 130). Thus, Benjamin 
positions his text alongside the production of the mentally ill writers of his 
collection, and indeed calls into question the divide between writing, judging, and 
knowing on the one hand, and the constructions of the ‘mad’ on the other.66 
                                               
66 In his 1933 fragment ‘Agesilaus Santander’ Benjamin wrote “I came into the world under the sign 
of Saturn, the planet of slow revolution, the star of hesitation and belatedness” (GS6,521) [transl. 
mine]. Scholem suggests this is the only place where Benjamin reveals his own melancholic 
disposition (Scholem 1988, 58-59); however, as discussed here, it would appear to resurface 





This, then, is also the locus of the re-emergence of the question of truth. Freudian 
psychoanalysis provides reality-testing and the psychoanalytic relationship between 
analyst and analysand as tools to relate psychopathology to truth. However, Santner 
complicates this picture by adding the figure of the analyst into the chronology of 
post-baroque sovereign-subjects: “…the analyst, like the classical monarch, has two 
bodies; the analyst’s second, call it ‘sublime’ body, is produced—and produces, in 
turn, analytical and therapeutic effects—to the extent that the analysand posits the 
analyst as a subject with special knowledge of one’s deepest desires and secrets” 
(Santner 1996, 25). Thus, he concludes that “Freud’s attraction to and passion for the 
Schreber material was above all a function of his own deep involvement with the 
“rites of institution” at a moment of significant crisis—one might even say at a 
moment of “signification crisis”—within the institution of psychoanalysis” (Santner 
1996, 26). Not only does the analyst draw close to the analysand, the reverse process 
occurs, too. Benjamin, writing on Schreber’s memoirs, notes that “references to the 
‘countermeaning of primal words’, a theme treated sporadically by Freud, also 
appear in this remarkable document. ‘Juice’ is called ‘poison,’ ‘poison’ is called 
‘food,’ ‘reward’ is called ‘punishment,’ and so on” (SW2.1, 124).67 Strikingly, 
Schreber’s idiosyncratic schizophrenic language seems to be following the findings 
of psychoanalysis.68  
Freud, too, notes such similarity in Schreber's account of “divine rays”, which are in 
reality nothing else than a concrete representation and projection outwards of 
libidinal cathexes” (SE12, 78): “these and many other details of Schreber's 
delusional structure sound almost like endopsychic perceptions of the processes 
whose existence I have assumed in these pages as the basis of our explanation of 
paranoia” (SE12, 79). We can perhaps make sense of this if, with Freud, we view 
                                               
67 A reference to Freud’s 1914 text ‘Gegensinn der Urworte’ (‘The Antithetical Meaning of Primal 
Words’). 





Schreber’s paranoia as an attempt at a cure. For Freud recognizes that in the 
constructions of psychopathology, “the paranoiac builds [the world] again, not more 
splendid, it is true, but at least so that he can once more live in it. He builds it up by 
the work of his delusions. The delusion-formation, which we take to be the 
pathological product, is in reality an attempt at recovery, a process of reconstruction” 
(SE12, 70).69 This links Schreber to the “enigmatic satisfaction”, the result of the 
masklike revival of the empty world in mourning described in the Trauerspiel 
book.70 Where just such a reconstruction of the world is attempted (OT, 139). 
For Schreber, part of the attempt to regain his freedom from confinement in 
psychiatric institutions was the publication of his memoirs. In sharing his 
reconstruction with the world, he was not, as Freud notes, denying his 
psychopathology: Schreber emphasized “the importance of his ideas to religious 
thought, and … their invulnerability to the attacks of modern science” (SE12, 16). 
For Schreber, delusion has become its own religion, its own truth-giver, and its own 
therapy. This, then, is the complement to the melancholic revival of the emptied-out 
world: it is revived, but, as Freud notes, “Such a reconstruction after the catastrophe 
is successful  to a greater or lesser extent, but never wholly so… the human subject 
has recaptured a relation, and often a very intense one, to the people and things in the 
world, even though the relation is a hostile one now, where formerly it was hopefully 
affectionate” (SE12, 70-71). As in Benjamin’s account of baroque melancholia, this 
masking remains visible as a masking, and as a marking: of the loss, different to its 
previous state, and lacking in comparison to it. 
                                               
69 Santner (1996, 57) emphasizes the quasi-kabbalistic element at play in this process, conceptualising 
paranoid world-building as a pathological version of tikkun, “the recollection of divine sparks 
scattered into earthly exile through the cosmic trauma of the ‘breaking of the vessels’”. 
70 The German - “rätselhaftes Genügen” [emphasis mine] - bears more overt similarity to Freud’s 






Careri (2003, 57) following Agamben, posits Warburg’s Pathosformeln as “an 
attempt at a solution or therapy of the ‘schizophrenia of Western man’ which 
occurred at a specific moment of his history and which his history has not ceased to 
reformulate” - an attempt at an unconscious collective auto-therapy of a culture 
through expressing an excess. However, we can also see a more personal dimension 
to this attempt: a parallel between Freud’s world-building paranoiac, Benjamin’s 
baroque mourning, and Warburg’s response to World War I. Though far from the 
front, the latter’s experience of the war was characterised by intense psychological 
suffering. The work on his Kriegskartothek, an attempt to contribute to the ordering 
of the world at a moment of chaos through collecting historical documentation for 
the war, became more and more frenetic and all-encompassing, finally resulting in a 
breakdown that was to lead to protracted physical and mental illness.71 Warburg’s 
disciple Carl Georg Heise, commenting on his mentor’s response to the war, 
described him as a “seismograph” (Heise 2005, 56): Here Warburg himself 
succumbed to the danger of hysteric identification with a suffering collective 
embodied by the baroque sovereign, and by Freud’s two case studies discussed 
above. Paradoxically, both Warburg’s Kriegskartothek and his 1923 lecture on 
Native American serpent rituals functioned as a form of therapeutic writing: The 
latter, much like Schreber’s project to publish his memoirs, were Warburg’s attempt 
to prove his sanity after work on the former resulted in his breakdown.  
It is possible to draw another line from Warburg to Benjamin here – both looked to 
past epochs marred by crises in order to understand those of their own, and both had 
a therapeutic dimension to their writing. Careri suggests that what Warburg intimates 
in his study of the death of Orpheus in the work of Dürer “is that the return of the 
antique Pathrosformel of the Renaissance corresponds to a particularly intense 
moment in the process of accounting for the tragic condition of western man” (2003, 
57, transl. mine), inviting the comparison to Warburg’s own historical moment in 
                                               





World War I. On Stewart’s account, Benjamin performs a similar gesture in turning 
to the Trauerspiel 
because he detects a mimetic relationship between the Baroque and his own 
Weimar. At key moments, his treatise illuminates the usefulness of an 
understanding of the Baroque for his own historical moment, the collapse of 
democracy, that is, and the rise of totalitarianism. The Trauerspiel is thus 
originary for Benjamin’s own historical and cultural context, and, though it 
would hardly seem so at first glance, the work is entirely relevant to 
understanding the rise of fascism: the German Trauerspiel arose just prior to 
the rise and establishment of Absolutism (Stewart 2010, 16). 
This is paralleled, as it is for Freud, in Benjamin’s interest in documents produced by 
the “mad”, and, also in Warburg’s case, esoteric material72 - attempts to understand 
the forces of irrationalism via a reading of the history of irrational production. 
Warburg’s preoccupation also finds an echo in Benjamin’s One-Way Street (1928), 
where in ‘To the Planetarium’ the first World War is described as “an attempt at a 
new and unprecedented commingling with the cosmic powers” (SW1, 486)– an 
appeal to a revival of a pre-modern fullness of experience in catastrophic form. At 
the same time, as Irving Wohlfarth (2002, 80) points out, “what Zum Planetarium 
attempts to do—and actually, rhetorically, performs—is to span the great world-
historical divide that separates cosmogony from cosmology, astrology from 
astronomy, myth from enlightenment, Gemeinschaft from Gesellschaft, and thereby 
to heal the rift on which the modern world is built”.73 It is interesting to note that in 
1930, Warburg staged an exhibition in the Hamburg Planetarium entitled ‘Collection 
                                               
72 See Zahrt (2012, 73) for a discussion of Warburg’s collection of wartime arcana in his 
Kriegskartothek.  
73  See also Caygill (2016) for a discussion of the technological and scientific discoveries which 
influenced Benjamin’s thinking on the possibility of a new form of cosmic experience of Rausch in 





of pictures portraying the history of belief in the stars and astronomy’ which, 
according to Dorothea McEwan (2006, 254), was intended as Warburg’s 
“contribution to the education of the young, to introduce them to enlightenment”. 
Common to Warburg, Benjamin, and Freud, then, is an attempt to distil from an 
engagement with myth, intoxication, and the irrational something that points beyond 
itself, and can be made useable in the present. However, as we have seen, where 
Warburg posits Enlightenment as an attainable goal, and for Freud individual 
improvement of symptoms is the chief aim of analysis – however unstable and thus 
subject to an infinite process both may be - matters are even less straightforward for 
Benjamin.  
Pensky draws attention to the precarity of the position of the critical subject in 
relation to objective truth in Benjamin’s early work. He suggests that Benjamin’s 
“refusal to speculate on the role of subjectivity in the critical process” is grounded in 
his “reluctance to incorporate idealist philosophical baggage into an exploration of 
the metaphysical structure of truth, which, as he had been convinced from very early 
on, was objectively present and objectively discoverable in the phenomena 
themselves” (Pensky 1993, 61). Benjamin, Pensky suggests, transcends the impulse 
to expunge late idealism and embarking on what was to be a life-long endeavour: the 
attempt to make visible, through the ‘right’ critique, an objective truth already 
residing in the historical object, together with a wariness of the pitfalls of subjective 
speculation. The difficulty with this endeavour is already sketched out in the 
conclusion from the prologue to the Trauerspiel book, where “the discovery of 
(divine) meaning is distinguished from the imposition of (allegorical) meaning only 
by fiat” (Pensky 1993, 73). Pensky charts the tensions in Benjamin’s concept of the 
critic as a conduit of ‘truth’ from his early work to the Trauerspiel book, where the 
question of the critical subject and its objects reveal themselves as the problem of 
melancholia.  
Melancholia in the mourning plays thus serves as the dialectical mediation between 





genius, “a process in which both ‘objective’ elements of a concrete world and 
dimensions of innermost subjectivity fuse and intertwine, illuminating in the process 
the theological grounds upon which the text, and indeed the very concepts of 
subjectivity and objectivity, originate.” (Pensky 1993, 87). This ‘origin’, as Pensky 
notes, is not about tracing a phenomenon back to its source, but precisely those 
“moments in which this same process is disrupted and crystallizes, monadically, into 
an image in which the entire course of historical happening lies encoded” (Pensky 
1993, 87). Pensky acknowledges that this process of fusion in the melancholy gaze 
and the world is less than smooth: “the question concerning the critical subject, that 
is, whether the critic himself must be a melancholic, or whether this is just a vestige 
of historicism and demands the strict suppression of any ‘subjective’ states or 
temperaments by the critic, remains here wholly unanswered” (Pensky 1993, 94). 
The distinction between symbol and allegory in Benjamin’s analysis parallels that 
between tragedy and Trauerspiel; the theological distinctions between both sets of 
poles refer back to the tension between myth and history. The aestheticisation of the 
essentially theological role of symbols is, for Benjamin, problematic, in that it makes 
exaggerated claims about the artwork’s ability to capture eternal (divine) ‘truth 
value’ and simultaneously consigns allegory to the status of a deficient symbol, 
unsuccessful in this grand venture. In reality, “just as the symbol bears indelible 
traces of its own mythic origin, so allegory, dispersed into historical happening, 
comes to acquire a petrifying power capable of ‘blasting apart myth’” (Pensky 1993, 
113). 
Benjamin's theory of art and art criticism in the Trauerspiel book revolves around 
the visibility of the immanent truth content of the object of criticism, which “should 
do nothing else than uncover the secret predisposition of the work itself, complete its 
hidden intentions” (OT, 35). This language of the work's ‘secret’, the process of 
hiding, links this passage to Freud's writing on the unconscious, which according to 
his records Benjamin had read by the time he was writing On the Origin of German 





imperfect forms of an age, in the expression of a generalised suffering in the 
production – of fantasies, of texts – of psychopathology. Nevertheless, the critic too 
can fall back into subjectivity through the imposition of his own subjective meaning 
rather than an uncovering of the objective truth, and a ‘making absolute’ of the work 
itself. What, then, can safeguard against this? 
The question thus remains what happens to truth when cultural forms, such as the 
baroque Trauerspiele, reflect and express the symptoms of their age without finding 
resolution in analysis – and indeed, when the tools of the analyst are not infallible. 
This is precisely the moment where historical legibility comes into play, for both 
Freud and Benjamin. For Freud, Haitzmann's neurosis is legible because we are so 
far removed from the objects of his fantasies that they seem simple and easy to 
decode. For Benjamin, as we have seen, these unconscious contents reside not just in 
historical ‘case studies’ of the possessed or otherwise mentally ill, but are equally 
preserved in art and other cultural artefacts, awaiting their analysis and deciphering 
by an ‘analyst’ at a later date. Freud’s position is thus close to that of Benjamin, in 
that historical distance can be a factor in cognition - we can know the neuroses of the 
past better now than we could then. As I discuss in my last chapter, this is no linear 
development for Benjamin - the ‘flash of recognition’ strikes only at a particular 
point in time, drawing together a specific past and present moment into a 
constellation.  
As Stewart (2010, 84) states in relation to the Arcades Project, “Benjamin made it 
his task to document as well as explode the cocoon-like slumber of the nineteenth 
century by way of reading and re-inscription processes and to recover the intricacies 
of linking that constitute the experience of truly waking life. He saw such faculties as 
individual defenses against fascist manipulation and fascistic narcissism”. However, 
as I discuss in my final chapter, what is at stake for Benjamin is not merely an 
individual, but a collective awakening from the dream-sleep of Capitalism. Where 
Schreber escapes the thrall of the narcissism of fascism only through a withdrawal 





world of his own construction costing him the world as it is, Benjamin is ultimately 
searching for a non-pathological and thus political overcoming of the impasses of 
modernity.74 In the following section, I will examine some of Benjamin’s strategies 
for the distillation of truth beyond the sway of the mythic. 
 
3.3 The Critic, the Analyst, the Bad New Things 
For Freud, psychoanalysis has a pedagogic function for the analyst; he can safeguard 
against the subjectivist tendency to censorship and partiality of memory only by 
undergoing analysis himself. It renders him capable of recognising potential blind 
spots and educates him to avoid them in order to listen with the attitude of free-
floating disinterestedness crucial to the analytic situation. For Freud, this attitude can 
and must be cultivated. In his 1912 ‘Recommendations to Physicians Practising 
Psycho-analysis’, he also has strong words of warning for those who want to begin 
analysing patients without undergoing analysis themselves: lacking self-knowledge, 
the analyst “will easily fall into the temptation of projecting outwards some of the 
peculiarities of his own personality, which he has dimly perceived, into the field of 
science, as a theory having universal validity; he will bring the psycho-analytic 
method into discredit, and lead the inexperienced astray” (SE12, 117). The danger of 
                                               
74 Where Schreber creates his “private Germany” in psychopathology, Benjamin attempted to 
establish a ‘private Germany’ of his own in opposition to the fascism engulfing the country: in 
Deutsche Menschen (1936), Benjamin collects some of the letters and comments he published 
between 1931 and 1932. Comprising twenty-five letters from German intellectuals, written in the 
period 1793-1883, Benjamin announces in an unpublished preface that “the purpose of this series is to 
show the countenance of a ‘secret Germany’” (GS 4, 945). Benjamin thus implicitly presents a 
subversive, sidelined German tradition, but only by implication. Hanssen suggests it is the principle 
of montage that guides the “critical potential” of the collection; that Benjamin saw himself as part of 
this tradition and that the letters of exile therein served to demonstrate a link between previous 
periods of repression and national socialism (Hanssen 1998, 109). Crucially, where Santner suggests 
Schreber escaped the pressures and temptations of fascism into delusion and disconnection from the 






subjectivity here lies in its projection onto the world at large, a particularism that 
under the assumption of universal validity becomes narcissism, just as it ultimately 
does in melancholia. As Santner’s comparison to the baroque sovereign highlights, 
this is a particular temptation for the analyst, as someone with the power to 
determine truth. 
In Berlin Childhood (1934) we can begin to see Benjamin performing something 
similar to what Freud enjoins the analyst to do: taking precautions against the fall 
back into subjectivism. Where undergoing psychoanalysis performs this function for 
Freud, Benjamin's “inoculation” (SW3, 344) against nostalgia or homesickness in 
the form of writing down his childhood memories fulfils a similar task in distilling 
from these fragmentary personal impressions a generally-accessible, if specific, 
experience of a place (the city) at a certain time. In a similar way to psychoanalysis, 
which, seemingly paradoxically, brings up the past again and again in order to lay it 
to rest, relying on the psychoanalytic situation to bring about a process of working 
through rather than an acting out of memory,75 for Benjamin the act of writing can 
itself be ‘therapeutic’ if it is done with the clear aim not of indulging in 
homesickness, but precisely to counter it through a specific form of engagement with 
memories in order to drag them out of their context of meaning and recathect them 
differently. The point of this is to divest them of their subjective and idiosyncratic 
character; that is, the qualities about them that lead them to the ultimately 
pathological end point of the ‘illness’ of homesickness, and to understand the 
irretrievability of the past as a social phenomenon. This is simultaneously to open up 
the possibility of a collective use of these individual impressions. 
This is a practice of writing that is consciously posited in opposition to the left 
melancholia Benjamin deplores in some of his contemporaries: In ‘Left-Wing 
Melancholy’ (1930), he writes that their stance “from the beginning, has nothing in 
                                               





mind but to enjoy itself in a negativistic quiet. The metamorphosis of political 
struggle from a compulsion to decision [Zwang zur Entscheidung] into an object of 
enjoyment, from a means of production to an article of consumption - that is this 
literature's latest hit” (GS3, 281, transl. mine). Benjamin thus hints at a Schmittian 
decisionism inherent to the political, eschewed by left melancholia, which results in 
an attitude of political quietism. Benjamin’s own practice is precisely meant to 
counteract any tendency towards such languor. Although, as discussed above, 
Benjamin often links himself to melancholics and the mentally ill, he does not 
merely stop at acknowledging this characteristic; but rather uses his auto-diagnosis 
as a starting point for a ‘working through’ of his own memories as well as those that 
reside at a more generalised, that is, cultural level, culminating in works such as the 
Berlin Childhood and its uncompleted precursor ‘Berlin Chronicle’ (ca 1932). This 
coincides with the political call for an “organisation of pessimism” in Benjamin’s 
Surrealism essay (1929) – what Alex Betancourt (2008, 78) terms Benjamin’s 
“active pessimism”. Of note is the intrusion of the political into Benjamin’s account 
of homesickness as unwanted pathology against which one should vaccinate oneself. 
Were it not for the circumstances – the descent into fascism in 1930s Germany - and 
Benjamin's place within them, perhaps homesickness would not be such a 
threatening concept. Nevertheless, Benjamin is adamant in other texts that the gaze 
backwards into one's own or an imagined collective past can never be 
straightforward; it is not an issue of returning to the ‘good old days’ but of 
embracing the “bad new” things (SW3, 340). 
 
 Conclusion 
Drawing on Heidegger, Ilit Ferber claims that the melancholic mood is fundamental 
to “philosophical disclosure” per se (Ferber 2013, 31). Further linking Benjamin to 
Heidegger, she states that this is central to the “philosophical structure” of 
Benjamin's Trauerspiel book in particular, and “determines its constitution” (Ferber 





Benjamin’s philosophy than has yet been articulated—that beyond being a personal 
trait or choice of subject, melancholy represents a cornerstone of his epistemological 
and metaphysical claims” (Ferber 2013, 35). However, this disregards the fact that 
not only in his later production cycle, but even within the Trauerspiel book itself, 
Benjamin performs a movement through melancholia – a movement that requires a 
dwelling within and staying with the melancholic moment – but as a moment that is 
to be overcome.76 Additionally, Benjamin's other writings such as the Berlin 
Childhood and ‘Left-Wing Melancholia’ briefly discussed here further counter the 
notion of Benjamin as a melancholic, i.e. someone who has thoroughly embraced 
melancholia as not just an unalterable character trait but something that must 
necessarily inflect all action. 
In Benjamin's early writings, the critic occupies the position that is later to be taken 
by the historical materialist, who is discussed in my fourth and final chapter. In both 
these figures and in his attitudes towards his own intellectual work, we see Benjamin 
grasping for a mode of cognition that does not fall prey to the pitfalls of subjectivity. 
In One-Way Street, Benjamin writes of his historical moment that “Fools lament the 
decay of criticism. For its day is long past. Criticism is a matter of correct distancing. 
It was at home in a world where perspectives and prospects counted and where it 
was still possible to take a standpoint. Now things press too [closely] on human 
society” (SW1, 476). However, much as the baroque allegorist is under the spell of 
subjectively-imposed meaning, and the critic likewise is threatened by its sway, 
these problems persist in the aftermath of the Baroque. Margaret Cohen formulates 
this conundrum as follows: “How is critical demystification to be practiced in late 
capitalist society where all viewpoints are saturated by the phantasmagorical 
experience of commodity fetishism?” (Cohen 1993, 177). I shall investigate this in 
                                               






the following two chapters. 
In this chapter, I traced how alongside melancholia, possession emerged as responses 
to a collective loss at the cultural level. At stake is the relation between self and 
other, world and humanity, and past and present forms. Implied is also struggle 
between a version of these relationships governed by myth or compensatory 
fantasies, premised on a subject that is somehow able to reconcile all these tensions 
within it, or an overcoming of such pathologies. Possession and neurosis ultimately 
emerge as effects of a social pathology – suggesting it is possible, even necessary, to 
read an epoch through its particular forms of psychopathology. How this plays out in 
the commodity-world of the nineteenth century examined in Benjamin’s Arcades 






































Chapter 3 – Spleen in the Arcades  
Introduction 
The fractured Baroque subject, suspended perilously between the two poles of the 
demand for decisive action and stable meaning and their impossibility, nevertheless 
endures, but endures changes over the course of its development in modernity. With 
Freud, it becomes possible for Benjamin to read the aftermath of the Baroque as a 
continuation of its processes of mourning and melancholia. In the Arcades Project 
and the two ‘Exposés’ he wrote for this work in 1935 and 1939, Benjamin 
investigates the way in which in the nineteenth century, this process occurs within 
burgeoning capitalism. Benjamin traces how a reversal of agency takes place – the 
encounter with the object results not in its possession, but in a possession by it.  
Commodities take on a life of their own, structuring the experience of life in the 
“dream-world” (AP, 13) of nineteenth-century capitalism.   
For Benjamin, the Paris arcades function like a microcosm of the nineteenth-century 
capitalist metropolis as a whole; they serve as both metaphor and actual site for the 
expression of its modes of subjectivity and experience. As such, they do not only 
reflect the relations of production, but, as Benjamin stresses, they are infused with 
desire, becoming a repository of the “wish- images” (AP, 4) of the “dreaming 
collective” (AP 546) of the nineteenth century. In this analysis, Benjamin draws 
heavily from Freud's dream interpretation as well as Beyond the Pleasure Principle 
(1920) and Totem and Taboo (1913). The wish-images of the arcades encapsulate an 
essentially collectivist quasi-utopian impulse, thwarted by the social relations of 
capitalism that hold it back: “the collective seeks both to sublate and to transfigure 
the incompleteness of the social product and the deficiencies in the social order” 
(AP, 4).  
At the same time as functioning as a collective organism, the nineteenth century also 
brings forth individuals who grapple with the forms of their age as fractured 





impossible demand from the moment of its inception, and as a pitfall of false 
meaning that stands opposed to the truth, which is objective in character. In the 
Arcades Project, subjectivity is mediated by capitalism: its tendencies towards 
massification and false individuation, its yearning for the forms of life of the past 
and its fixation on newness, the changing rhythms of work and life transforming 
experience.  
Of note is the relationship of Benjamin's investigation of these types to Freud’s case 
studies. In their insertion into the canon of psychoanalytic literature, the latter 
become ideal-typical figures, chosen for making most apparent something Freud 
seeks to highlight about his method. Beyond the specificity of their individual 
psychopathology, they are thus made into emblematic figures for the human psyche 
and psychoanalysis as a discipline. While stressing the importance of the 
psychoanalytic situation (with analyst and analysand present in the same room), 
Freud also goes against this in ‘analysing’ cases that are historical or fictional in 
character – as we saw in Chapter 2, Schreber and Haitzmann are two such cases, and 
even literary figures such as Hamlet appear. Benjamin's method in analysing these 
types draws from Freud, most explicitly in the case of the gambler, and in his 
writings on Baudelaire. Both Benjamin's types and Freud's case studies are trapped 
in the nineteenth century, their symptoms expressive of the particular 
psychopathology of individuals of this society and thus of the psychopathological 
character of that society itself. 
Benjamin investigates the nineteenth century as the Urgeschichte of the twentieth, its 
primal history, whose elements only come to full fruition in a later historical 
moment. Indeed, the central features of this age can only be recognized from the 
standpoint of a later one. For Benjamin, as was discussed in relation to the 
Trauerspiel book in Chapter 1, Ursprung, origin, is a category not of the past but of 
a dynamic temporality that only finds its true form in that which it originates – an 
inversion of the idea that the true form can be traced back through history to an 





the Arcades Project it is more closely related to the category of myth. As Cornelia 
Zumbusch notes, at stake in Benjamin’s Urgeschichte is not just a symptomatic 
return to past contents: “Rather, it seems to be the function of modernity itself to 
ceaselessly transform itself into Urgeschichte” (Zumbusch 2012, 149, transl. mine). 
As such, Urgeschichte represents remnants – residues – of myth that not only reside 
in the past, but form something new in their reiteration in the present. Benjamin here 
draws on Freud's notion of prehistory as something that continuously interacts with 
the present, be it in the form of neurotic or childhood fantasies in Totem and Taboo, 
or in the Urphantasien, primal or original fantasies that he characterises as 
phylogenetic in the Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, published in 1917. 
For Benjamin, however, there is something specific about the way primal history 
reappears in modernity, which I will examine it what follows.  
Like the mourning plays of the Baroque, the arcades have become ruins of their 
cultural moment when examined from the standpoint of the twentieth-century 
observer, revealing in their decline something that was invisible during their heyday. 
By the time of Benjamin's account, they have fallen out of fashion, and been reduced 
to “residues of a dream-world” (AP, 13). Thus it becomes possible to analyse them 
as one would a dream. This, of course, reprises Freud's notion of “day-residues”, 
conscious thoughts and experiences that become enmeshed with and stimulate 
unconscious wishes. Benjamin reverses this movement and sees “dream elements” 
themselves as residues, waiting to be analysed. Simultaneously, the residue is linked 
to the centrality of the ruin for Benjamin, explored in his book on the Trauerspiele. 
However, what is striking is the proximity to Freud's 1937 text ‘Analysis Terminable 
or Interminable’, where Freud writes of the tenacity with which all that “has once 
come to life clings…to its existence” (SE23, 229). As will be discussed below, this 
tenacity, also present in Freud's notion of the Id in The Ego and the Id (1923) as 
containing “residue of the existences of countless egos” (SE19, 38), an heir to past 





In what follows, I will examine Benjamin’s use of Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle (1920) in his analysis of the philosophy of history of the nineteenth century 
and the resurgence of myth in modernity. It will become apparent that the nineteenth 
century remains under the sway of the mythic, resurfacing in capitalist forms. The 
fractured post-baroque subject, torn between commodification, massification, and 
the demand to remain an individual, experiences melancholia as spleen, re-enacting 
the traumatic loss of cosmological integrity. Spleen expresses the fracture of the 
subject in high modernity: it emerges as the main form in which Baudelaire, the 
paradigmatic poet of this era, casts the modern, “and is usually counterposed to (“it 
fractures”) the ideal” (SW 3, 40). Spleen fractures the ideal – and as I discuss below, 
it is the recasting of the baroque melancholia of the fractured subject in the era of 
rapidly-developing Capitalism. Benjamin connects spleen to the interlinked loss of 
collective experience and the change in memory in modernity. I will conclude the 
chapter with an investigation of Benjamin’s theory of memory and experience, 
which as I will show draws heavily on Freud.  
 
1. Beyond the Pleasure Principle 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle signified a watershed moment in Freud's model of the 
psyche.  Previously, Freud described the psychic economy as subject to a constant 
cycle of a reduction in tension (when acting in accordance with the pleasure 
principle) or an increase in tension, or energy (Unlust, displeasure). The reality 
principle is introduced as a modifier on the pleasure principle, making possible the 
momentary acceptance of displeasure in the interest of self-preservation and long-
term maximisation of pleasure. 
In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud's focus shifts to the question of how it is 
possible that unpleasurable experiences often seem to be psychically repeated again 
and again, given the rule of the pleasure principle. After ruling our potential hidden 





that cannot be explained away. Among this he numbers dreams of accidents, as well 
as the return of repressed, painful experiences in analysis. These sometimes manifest 
as transference or are otherwise acted out and re-experienced as trauma in the 
analytical situation, rather than remembered, i.e. narrated by the analysand.  
The model of the psyche that underpins these processes is premised on an inner core 
of the unconscious, which is surrounded by consciousness as a protective mantle. 
Trauma occurs when this layer, the Reizschutz, is breached by a strong impression or 
shock (Erregung) from the outside. Crucially, in the chaos that ensues in the psychic 
economy of the organism as a result of this shock, the pleasure principle is at first 
disabled by the flooding of “the mental apparatus with large amounts of stimulus” 
(BPP, 23) and the subsequent attempt at “mastering”, the “psychic binding” of the 
incoming stimuli in order to process them. Only after this urgent task of doing away 
with the stimulus is achieved can the pleasure – and the reality principle take over. 
Freud speculates that what facilitated the breaching of the Reizschutz was the 
insufficient preparedness for whatever stimulus (Reiz) causes the trauma.  
Based on this, Freud states that dreams, play, and the acting out of repressed 
traumatic experiences are belated attempts by the organism to achieve what it failed 
to do at the moment the traumatic wound was incurred. The death drive thus 
overpowers the two life-preserving principles in an attempt to belatedly restore a 
psychic balance that was disturbed. Freud describes the second aspect of repetition-
compulsion as a tendency “inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of 
things which the living entity has been obliged to abandon under the pressure of 
external disturbing forces; that is, a kind of organic elasticity, or, to put it another 
way, the expression of the inertia inherent in organic life” (BPP, 30). The hidden 
motivator of repetition-compulsion is thus the tendency of all things towards the 
restoration of an earlier state of homeostasis. Freud uses a real-life anecdote of 
child’s play and a historical epic as examples, classing them all as repetition 
compulsion and concludes “that there really does exist in the mind a compulsion to 





compulsion is thus manifest across different aspects of life as well as reflected in 
cultural production, and can have a variety of sources: Freud opens the text with 
observations about severe trauma resulting from accidents and war-time experience, 
but then quickly moves to a discussion of the trauma resulting from narcissistic 
injury in early childhood. Freud concludes that  
What psycho-analysis reveals in the transference phenomena of neurotics can 
also be observed in the lives of some normal people. The impression they give 
is of being pursued by a malignant fate or possessed by some ‘daemonic’ 
power; but psycho-analysis has always taken the view that their fate is for the 
most part arranged by themselves and determined by early infantile 
influences.77 (BPP, 15)  
This passage posits the symptom as an expression of an internal conflict, an 
ambivalence. We can perceive the proximity to Benjamin's concept of phantasmagoria 
– the conjoining of two oppositional tendencies, resulting in something that is a 
distorted expression of them both. However, Freud notes that such symptoms are not 
displayed in all cases of repetition-compulsion: where in neurotic patients they are 
read as symptoms of their pathology, in the “normal person” these are explained as 
character traits or bad luck. The ‘psychical fixations’ of traumas thus don't always 
express as symptoms, or at least, are not interpreted as such. The question remains 
open whether this absence of symptoms is truly the preferable state – as trauma and 
repetition-compulsion are then more forcefully relegated to the realm of the mythic, 
seen as unalterable “fate” or even carrying something of the echo of demonic 
influence. 
In addition, repetition-compulsion is here linked to another term: Schicksalszwang, 
the compulsion to fate – which in Freud’s interpretation is largely self-imposed but by 
                                               





no means conscious. Rather, it is in experiences such as this pursuit of fate that the 
subject is revealed as fractured, encountering aspects of its own self as strange and 
alien, an other within it, which may be acting counter to the interests represented by 
the pleasure principle and even the reality principle. Once again we see that there is 
no clear, stable distinction between the pathological and the normal – both the neurotic 
and the normal person are subject to repetition-compulsion. As we shall see in Chapter 
4, the phenomenon of dreams emerges as the paradigmatic case of the dissolution of 
the boundary between normal and psychopathological mental states. Extrapolating 
from this, we can see that the symptom thus comes to be a phenomenon which 
expresses more than just an individual pathology – or, rather, it expresses the 
generalised suffering of being an individual in society, which is always-already 
pathological, insofar as it causes tension between individual desires and their 
fulfilment in the world. As we have seen, in The Future of an Illusion, Freud traces 
the internalisation of that which denies the wish in the form of the superego. The 
subject thus takes the fracture between itself and the world into itself. As we shall see, 
Benjamin follows Freud in reading cultural production, and indeed all of the social 
world, as symptomatic in modernity. 
 
2. Culture as Symptom 
“There was a Passage du Désir.” (AP,48) 
In the Arcades Project, Benjamin captures an impression of the arcades as a second 
nature, created by humanity to suit the needs of the specific socio-economic 
constellation of the nineteenth century, and thus the commodity form, adapting to the 
more basic human needs such as shelter almost as an afterthought. The many 
vignettes dealing with the absence of the elements in the arcades, their artificial light, 
the way they shelter the inhabitants of the city from unpredictable outside influence 
describe an artificial environment, which Benjamin reveals as far from the icon of 





Trade and traffic are the two components of the street. Now, in the arcades the 
second of these has effectively died out: the traffic there is rudimentary. The 
arcade is a street of lascivious commerce only; it is wholly adapted to arousing 
desires. Because in this street the juices slow to a standstill, the commodity 
proliferates along the margins and enters into fantastic combinations, like the 
tissue in tumours. (AP, 42) 
The second nature of the arcade is likened to a cancerous growth, arousing desires it 
can never fulfil, arresting the dynamic flow of traffic, of life, its stagnation leading to 
unrestrained, purposeless growth in its dazzling display of ‘fantastic’ combinations of 
commodities. In the arcades, the physically pathological (tumour) is brought into a 
constellation with the psychological (desire) and the commodity.  
Freud himself performs such a comparison in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, which 
Benjamin read at least twice, for the first time in or before 192878 - coinciding with 
the production of drafts of what was intended to become the Arcades Project. As 
outlined above, in this work, Freud elaborates the way in which the drives are no 
longer solely governed by the pleasure principle, but by the attempt to return to a 
previous state and restore equilibrium, encapsulated in what he termed the death drive, 
or drives. A propos the libido and the body, Freud speculates that the cells of an 
organism behave analogously to the psyche, in particular that germ cells act in a 
“completely ‘narcissistic’ fashion – to use the phrase we are accustomed to use in the 
theory of the neuroses to describe a whole individual who retains his libido in his ego 
and pays none of it out in object-cathexes” (BPP, 44). He takes this reflection further 
and considers that “the cells of the malignant neoplasms which destroy the organism 
should also perhaps be described as narcissistic in the same sense: pathology is 
prepared to regard their germs as innate and to ascribe embryonic attributes to them” 
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(BPP, 44). Thus we see a slippage between the psychic and the physical at play in 
Freud’s thought. 79 
Benjamin's method of reading the life-world of the nineteenth-century metropolis as 
a web of symptoms manifested in the arcades also bears traces of Freud's way of 
conceptualising the social in the Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1901). In this 
text, as its subtitle indicates, Freud deals with “Forgetting, Slips of the Tongue, 
Bungled Actions, Superstitions and Errors”, which are so characteristic of everyday 
life as to be unavoidable, as indicated in the motto of the text: “Now fills the air so 
many a haunting shape/ That no one knows how best he may escape”/ (SE6, vii). On 
the methodological issues of historical legibility and an analysis from fragments of 
everyday life, Benjamin's approach is informed by that of psychoanalysis – 
recognizing and diagnosing a state of affairs or state of mind from a small part, the 
seemingly unimportant and unintentional revealed as a symptom. The nineteenth 
century itself here functions as an organism: decentering the individual subject, the 
pathology resides at the level of the social totality. 
Observations on the nineteenth century acting without any reference to a human 
subject are dotted throughout the Arcades Project; for instance, Benjamin quotes 
from Sigfried Giedion's Bauen in Frankreich that “‘Wherever the nineteenth century 
feels itself to be unobserved, it grows bold’...In fact, this sentence holds good in the 
general form that it has here: the anonymous art of the illustrations in family 
magazines and children's books, for example, is proof of the point” (AP, 154). At 
stake is the age itself, the social body as a whole. This tendency is reflected in the 
literature of the nineteenth century, specifically that dealing with Paris: “We see a 
continuous stream of new works in which the city is the main character” (AP 415). 
The physical body of the nineteenth-century city – its commercial spaces, of which 
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the arcades are the most paradigmatic – demand a psychosomatic reading of its 
symptoms, thus Benjamin joins materialism and psychoanalysis to read the 
symptoms pointing to the psycho/pathology of the organism of the nineteenth 
century. At the same time as subjectivity is thus projected onto the age as a whole, 
fractured off from the human, the fracture of the modern subject comes to be 
expressed in the individuals that populate the 19th who refract into types. Before 
moving on to a discussion of these types, I will reconstruct Benjamin’s use of 
Freudian and Marxian concepts in his analysis of the 19th century. 
 
3. Obsolete Humans: Commodity Fetish and the Mass 
Not only the city as a whole, but the material objects of the nineteenth century have 
agency in Benjamin's text. Human agency has been divested into these things, thus 
they themselves exert a ghostly tenacity in the face of change, refusing to be 
supplanted easily by new technologies and products; they “resist” change. In the 
Arcades Project, Benjamin aims “to blaze a way into the heart of things abolished or 
superseded, in order to decipher the contours of the banal as picture puzzle” which, 
“as schemata of dreamwork, were long ago discovered by psycho-analysis. We, 
however, with a similar conviction, are less on the trail of the psyche than on the 
track of things” (AP, 212). The “similar conviction” Benjamin refers to here is that 
there are repressed, unconscious contents to be uncovered from the analysis of, in 
this case, the material object, which has undergone a process of deformation or 
encryption, becoming “picture-puzzles”.  
This is a direct reference to Freud's Interpretation of Dreams (1900), where Freud 
writes a propos of the rebus: “A dream is a picture puzzle of this sort and our 
predecessors in the field of dream interpretation have made the mistake of treating 
the rebus as a pictorial composition: and as such it has seemed to them nonsensical 
and worthless” (SE4, 278). For Freud, the rebus was rather a way in which the latent 





understanding it as more than its parts: “we can only form a proper judgment of the 
rebus if we put aside criticisms such as these of the whole composition and its parts 
and if, instead, we try to replace each separate element in some way or other” (SE4, 
278). What deciphers the rebus, then, is a transposition of its meaning into another 
register by way of replacing its components with something else.80  
Perhaps we can say that despite his assertion, Benjamin is not on the track of the 
thing more than that of the psyche; rather, he shows that their paths are 
interconnected: the object comes to contain unconscious residues – forming an 
‘object-unconscious’. Benjamin thus expands the Freudian notion of the unconscious 
beyond the individual, indeed beyond the human psychic apparatus, to encompass 
the material world.81 Moreover, the “schemata of dreamwork” is also at work in the 
nineteenth century as a whole, as the Arcades Project conceptualises its society as a 
“dreaming collective”. Unconscious wishes are expressed in the marketplace of the 
arcades, in deformed forms – just as Freud saw the dream as a deformed expression 
of an unconscious wish.  
This dream-sleep is filled with elements that issue not from the inner workings of the 
individual psychic apparatus, but from the collective wish-images contained in 
material production. Human inwardness is not the only way in which interiority and 
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interpretation will follow in Chapter 4. 
81 That Benjamin's thinking here is not entirely opposed to a Freudian logic is hinted at in Freud's note 
on the mystic writing pad from 1925: Freud here likens the human memory apparatus to a new 
invention, the “Wunderblock” which can simultaneously store writing and present a clean slate for 
new inscriptions. While important as an early elaboration Freud's theory of memory and experience, 
discussed below, of interest here is his comment on traditional writing methods: “...the surface upon 
which this note is preserved, the pocket-book or sheet of paper, is as it were a materialized portion of 
my mnemic apparatus [memory apparatus], the rest of which I carry about with me invisible [which I 
otherwise carry invisibly within myself]. I have only to bear in mind the place where this ‘memory’ 
has been deposited and I can then ‘reproduce’ it at any time I like, with the certainty that it will have 
remained unaltered and so have escaped the possible distortions to which it might have been 
subjected in my actual memory” (SE 19, 225). Thus, a sort of object-memory is presupposed by 





subjectivity is expressed for Benjamin; rather, the entire world becomes 
symptomatic, just as the innermost spaces of the psyche become colonised with 
objects and prevailing class relations and, at the level of the collective, are turned 
outwards and stored in the objects produced by nineteenth-century society. The 
fracturedness of the subject makes it porous to such invasion, and at the same time, 
as we have seen in the previous chapter, also leads it to the projection of itself onto 
the world at large. This points to Benjamin's fusion of Marxian and Freudian 
concepts and approaches, expanding on both by showing that they reveal most when 
understood as interconnected, mediating each other. This will be pursued further in 
my discussion of the interrelated concepts of the dream and awakening in the next 
chapter. For now, I will examine the role of the commodity fetish in the spaces of the 
nineteenth century examined by Benjamin in the exposes and the Arcades Project: 
the world exhibitions and the arcades. 
 
3.1 Consumption: Empathy with Exchange Value 
What, then, happens when the people of the nineteenth century encounter “fetish-
commodities” in the sphere of consumption? To investigate this, in section B, 
‘Grandville, or the World Exhibitions’ of the 1939 Exposé, Benjamin first examines 
the world exhibitions, whose modes of display find continuation in the arcades, 
department stores, and other spaces designed for masses, such as the amusement 
park. The mass of commodities on display comes to be reflected in the subjectivity 
brought about in these spaces:  
World exhibitions glorify the exchange value of the commodity. They create a 
framework in which its use value becomes secondary. They are a school in 
which the masses, forcibly excluded from consumption, are imbued with the 





touch the items on display.’’82 (AP, 18). 
Benjamin here describes a process of massification, where the individual is subjected 
through the identification with the commodity, and thus ultimately with exchange-
value itself. In the 1935 Exposé, Benjamin still retains a notion of actual 
consumption: “World exhibitions are places of pilgrimage to the commodity 
fetish...The worker occupies the foreground, as customer” and adds the Marxian 
concept of alienation: “The entertainment industry makes this easier by elevating the 
person to the level of the commodity. He surrenders to its manipulations while 
enjoying his alienation from himself and others” (AP, 7). The point of this 
vacillation regarding the concept of consumption is grounded in the fact that 
consumption in the sense of actual purchase is not necessary for the sensory 
consumption of the object. Thus its power to shape human subjectivity, to “imbue” 
the masses with exchange value, is not contingent on becoming personal property. 
Indeed, in the later version Benjamin seems to indicate that it is precisely the lack of 
consumption that allows the phantasmagoria of its possibility to distract the persons 
that together constitute the mass.  
Benjamin here develops the concept of empathy from its use in nineteenth-century 
German art history. Robert Vischer, first outlining the concept in his doctoral 
dissertation ‘On the Optical Sense of Form: A Contribution to Aesthetics’ in 1873, 
                                               
82 Benjamin continues, “world exhibitions thus provide access to a phantasmagoria which a person 
enters in order to be distracted. Within these divertissements, to which the individual abandons 
himself in the framework of the entertainment industry, he remains always an element of a compact 
mass...in an attitude that is pure reaction. It is thus led to that state of subjection which propaganda, 
industrial as well as political, relies on”.  
Worth noting is the conjunction of political and “industrial” propaganda (that is, advertising, but also 
events such as world exhibitions) in this passage – Benjamin recognises both as twin moments in 
capitalist domination. As Christine Blättler and Christian Voller write, “instead of describing the 
modern nation-state in the abstract as a function of capital…, [Benjamin] makes the glass- and iron 
constructions of the grands magasins of nineteenth-century Paris into the concrete indicators of the 
political tendencies of the time” (Blättler and Voller 2016, 10), transl. mine). Thus, in the arcades, the 





used it to refer to a process whereby an artwork is imbued with emotions by its 
creator, which can then be felt by the observer of the artwork, who 'enters' it by 
experiencing, or identifying with, these emotions. Willhelm Worringer later 
identified naturalism and its depiction of the human figure and social life as the 
quintessential art of empathy (Worringer 1997, 33). Benjamin expands this concept 
of empathy to the commodity, identifying its display in the arcades as akin to the 
display and function of artworks. The infusion of commodities with dead labour, that 
is, ultimately that which gives it its “sensuous-suprasensuous”83 quality, is linked to 
the process of the infusion of a work of art with the emotions of the artist. Together, 
these qualities of the industrially-produced and displayed commodity encourage 
identification and empathy in the spectator-consumer. The prohibition on touch, the 
way the items are displayed, seems to infuse them with the cultic value hitherto 
reserved for religious and art objects. This, then, opens up a lack: the injunction to 
consume as opposed to the practical inability to do so, resulting in a psychic state 
that is susceptible to identification with exchange value itself.  
The infinite potential of the commodity to become something else, its uncanny 
sensuous-suprasensuous quality which is not only due to the dead human labour that 
fills the object, but the fact that as commodity, it always contains within itself 
something more than itself: its quality of exchangeability. This, in Benjamin's terms, 
is its mythic dimension, leading to an identification not only with the promise, but 
also, connected to it, the essential lack of the commodity: People themselves come to 
be exchangeable. The fractured subject of modernity thus changes in the era of high 
Capitalism: something alien is introduced in the form of empathy with an object; 
further fracturing the integrity of the subject. Simultaneously, as we shall see, these 
                                               
83 Translation of Marx’s term “sinnlich-übersinnliches Ding” (MEW23, 85) by Khatib, Sami (2017, 
56). See also the discussion of the role of the commodity-form in the Arcades Project as an 





processes of disintegration which allow humanity to become a mass in the 19th 
century may also point the way beyond the fractured modern subject.  
In Convolute A, “Arcades, Magasins de Nouveautés, Sales Clerks”, Benjamin writes 
“For the first time in history, with the establishment of department stores, consumers 
begin to consider themselves a mass. (Earlier it was only scarcity which taught them 
that). Hence, the circus-like and theatrical element of commerce is quite 
extraordinarily heightened. [A4,1]” (AP, 43). Thus, the encounter with the 
commodity world is a passive one and, mediated through it, so is the encounter with 
others. Benjamin likens this form of consumption to a spectacle viewed on stage. As 
in the world exhibitions, it is the sensuous rather than the purely economic 
dimension of consumption that is at stake here. 
The arcades function as a metaphor for Paris and indeed Capitalist society in its 
entirety in the Arcades Project: As Benjamin suggests in the 1935 Expose, “the 
passage is a city, a world in miniature” (AP, 3), allowing Benjamin a condensed 
view on his object of study. In the arcades, like in the department shops and the 
world exhibitions, the phantasmagoric display of surplus commodity production is 
designed to engender desire for these objects of consumption in the worker – they 
bring the mode of experience of the world exhibition into everyday life in the city. 
Even when the masses are enjoined to consume and the world fairs are superseded 
by the arcade, the lack remains, needing to be filled with ever more distractions. This 
mass, as Benjamin writes, becomes vulnerable to the promise to make whole what is 
experienced as a lack under capitalism – this is what “propaganda” plays on. People 
may not be whole without possessing commodities, having alienated something of 
themselves in the products of their labour, which they then encounter as haunting 
objects not quite of themselves and not quite other. The object produced under 





insufficiency of the commodity in the quest for the satisfaction of desire.84  
Capitalist processes lead to the massification of individuals in cities: as a mass of 
workers, but also a mass of observers of the commodity, and, if not direct consumers 
as a result of their immiseration, they still consume phantasmagorically, through 
their senses, and in terms of their psyche, which is shaped by the commodity-form. 
This subject is a subjected one – vulnerable to propaganda, both commercial and 
political. The needs of the organism of capitalist society as a whole have thus shaped 
human subjectivity to the point where it is useful for its own ends – the continuation 
of the system, the ability of value to remain in circulation. The individuals in this 
mass are mere ‘elements’, compressed together in a ‘compact mass’, barely 
distinguishable from the point of view of the social organism in its totality, fungible 
and interchangeable. The expansionist drive of this capitalist organism, meanwhile, 
draws from Freud's assimilationist orientation of the libido, first conceptualised in 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle, here manifested at the collective level in the pulling-
together of humanity into a mass or collective. Simultaneously, as I discuss below, 
this mass is striated by different class positions, which relate to these tendencies of 
massification differently.    
Benjamin traces how political authoritarianism and the expansion of capitalist 
exchange and exploitation together create a space that is ultimately made almost 
uninhabitable for humanity: As Benjamin notes in the 1939 Expose, “the 
transformations made by Haussmann appear to Parisians as a monument of 
Napoleonic despotism. The inhabitants of the city no longer feel at home there; they 
start to become conscious of the inhuman character of the metropolis” (AP, 23). This 
process of ‘becoming conscious’ foreshadows what will be dealt with in more detail 
in the next chapter: the nineteenth century as a dream, and awakening as the 
                                               






interruption of its eternal return. Crucially, this moment of becoming conscious here 
occurs at a time of political foment, as a reaction against the unlivable, inhumane 
transformations wrought by the “detonation artist” Haussmann.  
 
3.2 Production 
In the era of industrial Capitalism, class emerges as a vector structuring the 
experience of the fractured subject. Benjamin delves into the “inhuman character” of 
the sphere of production and the changing forms of work in the nineteenth century. 
He quotes Conrad on this point, where a clerk describes his work for the harbour 
master, a “deputy Neptune”: 
I was, in common with the other seamen of the port, merely a subject for 
official writing, filling up of forms with all the artificial superiority of a man of 
pen and ink to the men who grapple with realities outside the consecrated walls 
of official buildings. What ghosts we must have been to him! Mere symbols to 
juggle with in books and heavy registers, without brains and muscles and 
perplexities; something hardly useful and decidedly inferior’.85 
The harbour master’s function as a “deputy-Neptune” signals the resurfacing of the 
mythic in the nineteenth-century workplace, where workers become abstracted 
through their labour. Where Marx writes of the ghostly aspects of the commodity, 
here the workers themselves become ghosts, “mere symbols” - thoroughly reified. 
Benjamin elaborates on what this quote encapsulates for him: the obsolescence of 
                                               
85 We can see a link here to Kafka's short story “Poseidon” (1920), where the sea-god himself is 
portrayed as a disgruntled administrator of the seas, making obscure calculations in his office while 
never seeing the sea himself. Kafka here satirises a profane age where the divinity of the sea-god is no 
longer possible, and he has been reduced to the status of a manager. We can read Benjamin's use of 
Conrad as performing a similar gesture to Kafka in its emphasis on the emptied-out, ghostly shells of 
the harbour administrators, robbed by the process of nineteenth-century Capitalist labour of even the 





the “human element” in the labour process: “Practice is eliminated from the 
productive process by machinery. In the process of administration, something 
analogous occurs with heightened organization. Knowledge of human nature, such 
as the senior employee could acquire through practice, ceases to be decisive” (AP, 
227). Where in the eighteenth century, the human element still proved crucial, 
factory labour serves as the paradigmatic form of nineteenth-century production. It is 
here that the human skills, qualities and experience that previously formed an 
important part of work cease to be of relevance, and human labour is dissected into 
units of abstract labour time.  
Conversely, the factory is the emblematic space of the divestment of human qualities 
into objects, where commodities are infused with dead labour, as noted by Jules 
Michelet: “The head turns and the heart tightens when, for the first time, we visit 
those fairy halls where polished iron and dazzling copper seem to move and think by 
themselves, while pale and feeble man is only the humble servant of those steel 
giants” [F7a,6] (AP, 168). Humanity is subordinated to the production process, the 
methods of production and ultimately its own products. In this context, Benjamin 
refers to Michelet’s indictment of the first factories as “true hells of boredom” (AP, 
109). This adjustment to the machine rhythms of modern life is experienced as 
hellish, repetitive suffering by the workers86, who come to embody its patterns and 
thus become machine-like themselves: subjects fractured not only from God, and 
their own bodies, but now also characterised by the fracture of the labourer from his 
                                               
86 Of note is Benjamin's inclusion of the observation by Georges Friedman, a sociologist and 
contemporary of Benjamin's: “Often the remarks of Michelet (for example, on reverie and the 
rhythms of different occupations) anticipate, on an intuitive level, the experimental analyses of 
modern psychologists” (AP 109-110). This linking of the boredom caused by the work rhythm of 
capitalist labour to experimental psychology resonates with Benjamin’s interest in not only the 
psychic dimension of the experience of capitalism in the nineteenth century, but specifically the 






capacity to labour.   
 
4.  Individual versus Collectivist Tendencies  
In opposition to this machine-rhythm of factory labour, and alongside the tendencies 
of massification and reification, individualism comes to the fore in consumption, in 
the private sphere. This is the flipside of the fractured proletarian subject: an 
ostensibly hyperindividualised bourgeoisie. 
Despite his awe at factory production, to Michelet the realm of consumption seems 
to vouchsafe the endurance of individuality: As Benjamin notes, “the author in no 
way fears that mechanical production will gain the upper hand over human beings. 
The individualism of the consumer seems to him to speak against this: each ‘man 
now…wants to be himself’” (AP, 168). For Benjamin, in contrast, this individuality 
is primarily a bourgeois phenomenon. The subject remains fractured between the 
semblance of individuality and the actual reification and loss of individuality in the 
mass. The public/private split of the citizen, ushered in with the political changes 
introduced by Louis Philippe, allows for a symbiotic relationship between the 
realities of capitalism and the illusions afforded by the interior. Capitalism needs the 
private individual in order to continue unabated, relies on the private sphere in which 
the phantasmagoria of autonomy and individuality can exist. This is the root cause 
for the proliferation of knickknacks and the stuffy interiors Benjamin describes in 
great detail in the Arcades Project, summarising in the 1939 expose that 
The private individual, who in the office has to deal with realities, needs the 
domestic interior to sustain him in his illusions. This necessity is all the more 
pressing since he has no intention of grafting onto his business interests a clear 
perception of his social function. In the arrangement of his private 





This suppression, or repression, points to Benjamin’s fusion of Marx and Freud: the 
repression of the true social function of classed individuals is what allows capitalism 
to flourish and sustains the deformed subjectivity of the bourgeoisie. Thus, where 
interiority appears, it is a smokescreen for – or semblance of – the emptiness of the 
subject fractured between the demand to be an individual subject, and the reality of 
commodification in capitalism. 
This, of course, draws from Freud's pronouncements on the interiority of the 
melancholic in Civilisation and its Discontents (1930), the withdrawal into one's 
own inner world, which is also present in neurosis: “an intention of making oneself 
independent of the external world by seeking satisfaction in internal psychic 
processes” (SE21, 79). One such melancholic type brought about by the nineteenth 
century is the collector. 
 
a)  The Collector 
Benjamin’s types are fractured modern subjects seeking to resist the anonymity of 
the crowd and the commodification of human life intrinsic to capitalism, and at the 
same time cannot exist as individual subjects. As we have seen, the collector seeks to 
solve this conundrum by investing himself in objects differently. Here, Benjamin 
unearths a further layer in his analysis: at the heart of the collector’s hoarding, his 
“most deeply hidden motive” is “the struggle against dispersion”. In this, he resists 
the chaos of human life and the material world: “the great collector is struck by the 
confusion, by the scatter, in which the things of the world are found” (AP, 211). The 
obverse of the massification in the urban crowd and the industrial production process 
is the dispersion and isolation of individual elements within it. The tension between 
these two poles is characteristic of the nineteenth century and produces the fractured 
nineteenth-century subject. 





libido as seeking to integrate elements into ever-greater wholes. The “hidden 
motive” of the collector, his unconscious motivation, is the attempt to repair the lack 
experienced in modernity, and to thus preserve life, expressing the libidinal pull of 
units of life together into an ever-greater network. At the same time, just as Freud 
characterises the libidinal drive as “circuitous paths to death” (BPP, 33), death is also 
the ultimate aim of collecting: it attempts to stabilise everything in its order. The 
inchoate world presents to the collector “the same spectacle that so preoccupied the 
men of the Baroque; in particular, the world image of the allegorist cannot be 
explained apart from the passionate, distraught concern with this spectacle” (AP, 
211). Just like the mortifying melancholy gaze of the baroque allegorist, the collector 
cannot bear the disorder of the world.  
However, his attempt at the completion of his collection is always overshadowed by 
the knowledge that one missing piece would render it incomplete – only provisional 
completeness is ever possible for the true collector. Crucially, it is also this 
incompleteness at the level of the individual that makes intersubjectivity possible, 
necessary, as Benjamin's quotation from Proust demonstrates:  
I had already lived long enough so that, for more than one of the human beings 
with whom I had come in contact, I found in antipodal regions of my past 
memories another being to complete the picture…In much the same way, when 
an art lover is shown a panel of an altar screen, he remembers in what 
church...and private collection the other panels are dispersed. (AP, 211). 
At stake is a relational way of being that seeks completion through an other – which 
in capitalist modernity is mediated by the commodity. This is also expressed in the 
fragmentary note “Broken-down matter: the elevation of the commodity to the status 
of allegory. Allegory and the fetish character of the commodity” [H2,6]. (AP, 207). 
The frequent linking between the collector and the allegorist – Benjamin’s 
positioning of “the collector as allegorist” [H2,1] (AP, 206 [emphasis mine]) – stress 
the lack central to this nineteenth-century subjectivity. Nevertheless, there is in the 





memory and life experience – the very human qualities capitalist production 
processes are rendering obsolete. Much as in the case of the Baroque allegorist, at 
the root of the nineteenth centuries' drive to collect is an attempt to fill an empty 
world with material objects. At the same time, with the advent of industrial 
capitalism and Benjamin's own turn to Marx, the account of the function of this 
Sammeltrieb in the nineteenth century goes beyond the horror vacui of the Baroque. 
Where allegorical intention in the seventeenth century was grounded in an attempt to 
fill up the loss of the holistic cosmological horizon that was riven, the nineteenth 
century represses the truth of the capitalist production process: the fetish character of 
the commodity and the commodification of fractured human subjects.   
For Benjamin, “the collector actualizes latent archaic representations of property. 
These representations may in fact be connected with taboo” (AP, 209). With Henri 
Lefebvre, Benjamin speculates that “declaring something taboo would have 
constituted a title. To appropriate to oneself an object is to render it sacred and 
redoubtable to others; it is to make it ‘participate’ in oneself.’” [H3a,6] (AP, 210). 
Here we see again the inversion of subject and object of commodity-fetishism in the 
concept of property. These are not entirely novel, however; rather, they only 
“actualize” the latent archaic nature of the category of property. In reviving the 
archaic function of objects as cultic, the collector makes visible the conflux of 
commodity-fetishism and older forms of religious veneration of fetish-objects. 
Fundamentally, Benjamin writes, “the true collector detaches the object from its 
functional relations”. Additionally, “for the collector, the world is present, and 
indeed ordered, in each of his objects. Ordered, however, according to a surprising 
and, for the profane understanding, incomprehensible collection” (AP, 207).  
This nod to the “surprising” nature of the arrangement and selection of objects in the 
collection may remind us of the taxonomies of the mad discussed in the previous 
chapter. In the attempt to overcome both the alienation of self and that of objects, the 
collector creates a subjective order of things, which, Benjamin hints, attempts to re-





their collection” (AP, 207). 
Collecting can border on pathology and relates not just to the pursuit and fulfilment 
of pleasure, but also the death drive: “With individuals as with societies, the need to 
accumulate is one of the signs of approaching death. This is confirmed in the acute 
stages of preparalysis. There is also the mania for collection, known in neurology as 
‘collectionism’…But compare collecting done by children!” [H2a,3] (AP, 208). 
Benjamin thus conceptualises two modes of collecting: The one which expresses the 
death drive, “borders on pathology” even in the normal person and is on a continuum 
with the “mania” of “collectionism” - and that of the child. The collector is a figure 
suspended between these two poles of pathology and possibility. It is the vision 
afforded by intoxication that allows the collector to become an allegorist. His gaze 
inserts the object-as-commodity into the totality of meaning created by his 
collection, thereby tearing it out of circulation and its ‘mere presence at hand’, 
allowing it to become allegorical; that is, suffused with particular historical meaning 
and the transience of history itself. In the Arcades Project, this mode of signification 
is transposed from the Baroque into high modernity in the commodity form. The 
fetish character of the commodity in Capitalism makes it amenable to such 
allegorisation. 
In the 1935 Expose, Benjamin writes “The collector delights in evoking a world that 
is not just distant and long gone but also better - a world in which, to be sure, human 
beings are no better provided with what they need than in the real world, but in 
which things are freed from the drudgery of being useful”.87 The collector displays a 
perverse utopian imagination where a “better world” is not considered superior on 
account of lessening human suffering, but merely because material objects are taken 
out of a means-ends relationship of fulfilling human needs. The emphasis for the 
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collector is not of divesting things of their exchange value, but infusing them with a 
semblance of individuality and indeed humanity through connoisseur value: “He 
makes his concern the transfiguration of things. To him falls the Sisyphean task of 
divesting things of their commodity character by taking possession of them” (AP, 9). 
This kind of utopianism, then, signifies the apotheosis of commodity fetishism for 
Benjamin, pointing to the utter enmeshment of the individual and the commodity – 
giving rise to an imagination that cannot fathom human beings freed from necessity, 
but only commodities freed from the necessity of humanity.88 Like Schreber who 
creates his private language and system of meaning, the collector strives to bring 
about an idiosyncratic model of relating to objects in the midst of Capitalist 
modernity. 
The centrality of commodities to human psychic life under capitalism is also 
expressed by Proust. Drawing on Hoffmannthal’s reading of Proust in Buch der 
Freunde (1929), Benjamin writes  
With a passion unknown to any writer before him, he took as his subject the 
fidelity to things that have crossed our path in life...Proust, in the deepest sense, 
‘perhaps ranges himself on the side of death’. His cosmos has its sun, perhaps, 
in death, around which orbit the lived moments, the gathered things. ‘Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle’ is probably the best commentary there is on Proust's 
works. In order to understand Proust...it is perhaps necessary to begin with the 
fact that his subject is the obverse side, le revers, ‘not so much of the world but 
                                               
88 A supplement to Benjamin’s characterisation of the collector appears in [H3a,1]: “The positive 
countertype to the collector – which also, insofar as it entails the liberation of things from the 
drudgery of being useful, represents the consummation of the collector – can be deduced from these 
words of Marx: ‘Private property has made us so stupid and inert that an object is ours only when we 
have it, when it exists as capital for us, or when…we use it’”. There is thus something in the 
symptomatic relation of the collector to his objects that points beyond pathology, a truth that can be 





of life itself’. [S2,3] (AP, 547)89 
Benjamin is here referring to Freud's twin formula from Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle: “‘the aim of all life is death’ and…‘inanimate things existed before living 
ones’” (BPP, 32). Crucially, where Freud speaks of the “unwelcome fidelity” of 
repetition-compulsion, a fidelity to the traumatic event, in Proust this is supplemented 
with a fidelity to material objects. These objects are of interest from the standpoint of 
Benjamin's theory of memory precisely because they are invested with unconscious 
desires, and in turn come to constitute the unconscious itself. The coexisting of 
material and immaterial objects in memory – “things that have crossed our path in 
life… an afternoon, a tree, a spot of sun on the carpet; fidelity to garments, pieces of 
furniture, to perfumes or landscapes” (AP 547) – and the externalisation of memory 
into material objects thus point to the circulation between life and death, psychic 
economy and capitalist economy.90 
Benjamin suggests that “One need only study with due exactitude the physiognomy 
of the homes of great...collectors. Then one would have the key to the nineteenth-
century interior” (AP, 218). This is a further point of connection to Freud, who in his 
1937 ‘Constructions in Analysis’ writes of the transfer of memory to objects as a 
compromise between remembering and repression. Confronted with such a 
construction, that is, a plausible scenario pieced together by the analyst, the 
analysand responds with a sudden, vivid memory. Not, however, a memory of the 
event described in the construction, but in details connected to it: the faces of the 
                                               
89 Note also that immediately preceding this passage, the quote states that “Proust never heightened 
but rather analyzed humanity” (AP, 547), which can be taken as another oblique reference to 
psychoanalysis here as it is immediately followed by the reflections on the centrality of the death-
drive in Proust. 
90 As I discuss in more detail below in the section “Death Drive in the Arcades”, Benjamin takes Freud 
literally on the grounding of life in the inanimate, supplementing it with a Marxian understanding of 






people involved in the construction or the rooms in which something of the sort 
might have happened, or...the furniture in such rooms” (SW23, 266). Freud 
concludes that these memories must be the result of a compromise between the 
repressed, which, buoyed by the construction, aims to make conscious the obscured 
“memory-traces”, while the resistance to this movement diverts or displaces it to 
“adjacent, objects of minor significance” (SW23, 266). 
 In the 1935 Expose, Benjamin states: “The interior is not just the universe but also 
the etui of the private individual. To dwell means to leave traces” (AP, 9). The 
concept of the memory-trace also links Freud to Convolute I “The Interior, the 
Trace”.91 In Benjamin’s account, furniture placement serves as an unconscious 
expression of the defensiveness of the bourgeoisie, thus manifesting class struggle in 
interior design and style. Benjamin quotes George Lukac’s “universal” observation 
that “from the perspective of the philosophy of history, it is characteristic of the 
middle classes that their new opponent, the proletariat, should have entered the arena 
at a moment when the old adversary, feudalism, was not yet vanquished. And they 
will never quite have done with feudalism” [12,3J] (AP, 215). Thus, the bourgoisie's 
repressed and unconscious desire to be like the feudal lords of old manifests itself in 
everything they do – most especially in the decoration of their interior spaces. The 
interior thus emerges as a space full of clues to be deciphered - akin to a crime scene, 
as Benjamin writes elsewhere, or indeed as a symptomatic space. What is repressed, 
unconscious, is revealed as class struggle: “the unconscious retention of a posture of 
struggle and defense” on the part of the bourgeoisie grounded in their repressed 
knowledge of the persistence of class struggle.  
In language strikingly similar to that of Benjamin, Freud concludes in ‘Constructions 
in Analysis’ that “therapeutic work…would consist in liberating the fragment of 
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historical truth from its distortions”. Where for Freud this liberation is directed into 
the analysand’s individual past – loosening “its attachments to the actual present day 
and in leading it back to the point in the past to which it belongs” (SW23, 268), as 
we shall see, the movement of liberation is not a straightforwardly retrograde one for 
Benjamin. However, Benjamin does draw from Freud’s methodology presented here: 
the “deeper explanation” (AP, 215) i.e. the tools furnished by psychoanalysis allows 
Benjamin to make visible this repressed factum of class struggle that is expressed in 
the object-unconscious.  
The withdrawal into the interior does not stop, ultimately, at the private sphere – 
despite the proliferation of gates, borders, and thresholds in nineteenth-century Paris, 
the interior swallows up spaces outside of itself. Benjamin is attuned to the 
psychoanalytic import of this movement and recognises it as an attempt at a return to 
the womb. The arcades, too, are part of this: “‘Whoever enters an arcade passes 
through the gate-way in the opposite direction.’ (Or rather, he ventures into the 
intrauterine world.) [L5,1] (AP, 415). Here, we again see the connection to Freud’s 
conceptualisation of life as aiming at a return to the inorganic. However, Benjamin 
notes in the 1939 Expose that this process itself is subject to a historical dialectic, 
whereby the reality of capitalism expands into the private sphere, leading to a crisis: 
The liquidation of the interior took place during the last years of the nineteenth 
century, in the work of Jugendstil, but it had been coming for a long 
time...Henceforth, as Fourier had foreseen, the true framework for the life of 
the private citizen must be sought increasingly in offices and commercial 
centers. The fictional framework for the individual's life is constituted in the 
private home. It is thus that The Master Builder takes the measure of 
Jugendstil. The attempt by the individual to vie with technology by relying on 
his inner flights leads to his downfall: the architect Solness kills himself by 
plunging from his tower. (AP, 20) 
Thus, this development into the separate public and private spheres is a mere 





Ostensibly triumphantly individualistic, it is revealed as a kind of Nottrieb of 
individualism, faced with its demise in the introduction of new technologies.  
The fixation on individuality is thus no safeguard against encroaching 
commodification. It culminates in the fusion of the human with the object, the 
becoming-object, expressed thus by the poete maudit Leon Deubel, whom Benjamin 
quotes in the section C. Louis Philippe, or the Interior of the 1939 Expose: “I believe 
… in my soul: the thing”.92 In submitting to the machine rhythms of the factory in 
the sphere of consumption, and the structuring of experience by commodity 
consumption in the private sphere, and the projection of empathy onto material 
objects, the very metaphysical essence of the human comes to be experienced as 
objectified. It is only on later analysis that this individuality is revealed as a 
smokescreen for the actual massification of nineteenth-century society. Benjamin 
quotes Giedion’s description of the nineteenth century as a  
singular fusion of individualistic and collectivist tendencies. Unlike virtually 
every previous age, it labels all actions 'individualistic' (ego, nation, art) while 
subterraneanly, in despised everyday domains, it necessarily furnishes, as in a 
delirium, the elements for a collective formation...With this raw material, we 
must occupy ourselves - with gray buildings, market halls, department stores, 
exhibitions. (AP, 390)93 
Again, we see how the ‘subterranean’, “despised everyday domains” come to 
function as an unconscious – the spaces of commodity consumption furnish the 
                                               
92This is also the reason for Benjamin’s interest in the figure of “the prostitute” who, like the flaneur, 
“takes him [or her]self to market”. Thus, for Benjamin, “Love for the prostitute is the apotheosis of 
empathy with the commodity” (AP, 511). 
93  In a letter to Giedion of February 1929, Benjamin writes “Your book constitutes one of those rare 
cases that everyone knows: that we know in advance of the Berührung with something (or someone: 
writing, house, human, etc) that it will be meaningful to the highest degree” GB III, 444 (letter no 
631). And indeed, Benjamin refers to Giedion's book throughout the Arcades Project, in particular to 





material building blocks of the experience of the “dreaming collective” throughout 
the Arcades Project. It follows from Benjamin's characterisation of this collective as 
a dreaming one that this experience remains unconscious, as in a dream.  
 
b) The Unconscious City 
As Weigel notes, in the initial sketches for the Arcades Project,  
“the topography and architecture of the city are regarded as the memory-space 
(Gedächtnisraum) of the collective, so that already here we find a materialized 
memory-topography, in which the external topography, the city of modernity, 
and the topographical representation of memory in psychoanalysis converge” 
(Weigel 1996, 227). 
In the Arcades Project, Benjamin also conceptualises this spatiality as a site of the 
entanglement of sleeping and waking states, city and psyche, ancient Greece and 
modernity. Like access points to the chthonic underworld in ancient Greece,  
“waking existence likewise is a land which, at certain hidden points, leads 
down into the underworld - a land full of inconspicuous places from which 
dreams arise. All day long, suspecting nothing, we pass them by, but no sooner 
has sleep come than we are eagerly groping our way back to lose ourselves in 
the dark corridors” (AP, 84). 
This passage bears clear traces of Benjamin’s engagement with the Freudian model 
of conscious and unconscious states: 
By day, the labyrinth of urban dwellings resembles consciousness; the arcades 
(which are galleries leading into the city's past) issue unremarked onto the 
streets. At night, however, under the tenebrous mass of the houses, their denser 





unless, that is, we have emboldened him to turn into the narrow lane. (AP, 84) 
Cities function as the psyche of the social organism of the nineteenth century, 
identified with both the unconscious (the city at night) and the conscious, “waking” 
mind. The psychic structuring of the city forms the complement to the spatial and 
material structuring of the psyche. At stake is the overcoming of resistances to 
delving into the unconscious in order to unearth the source of dreams; in 
“emboldening” the dreamer to delve into the “narrow lane”, the opening onto the 
“denser darkness” of the city’s unconscious contents.  
Benjamin here also links the unconscious with the “underworld” of Greek antiquity. 
The many references throughout the Arcades Project to the underworld, the mythic, 
chthonic depths, and the importance of topography in shaping the people of the 
nineteenth century disclose themselves when read with – and against – Freud's 
architectural model and his own accounts of the palimpsest of layers of historical 
epochs that make up ancient cities. Freud uses the same metaphor as Benjamin to 
render the psyche in a spatial idiom, taking Rome as an example of a city  
in which nothing once constructed had perished, and all the earlier stages of 
development had survived alongside the latest… not merely in its latest form, 
moreover, as the Romans of the Caesars saw it, but also in its earliest 
shape…And the observer would need merely to shift the focus of his eyes, 
perhaps, or change his position, in order to call up a view of either the one or 
the other. (SE21, 69)  
Here, Freud introduces an archaeological model of the psyche, with Rome as the 
paradigmatic space of the endurance of historical contents. Against this, in a passage 
that seems to grapple with the above passage from Civilisation and its Discontents, 
Benjamin contrasts Paris and Rome: 
Paris created the type of the flaneur. What is remarkable is that it wasn't Rome. 





that city too full of temples, enclosed squares, national shrines, to be able to 
enter undivided - with every cobblestone, every shop sign, every step, and 
every gateway - into the passerby's dream? (AP, 417) 
Paris as a city has this dialectical character; it is both interior and landscape. Rome 
lacks this; it Is overdetermined by its history, and therefore unable to produce the 
modern subjectivity which, encapsulated in the flaneur, encounters the ancient 
expressed precisely in the novel spaces of capitalist exchange. Antiquity must be 
present as citation, as a kind of raw material to be used in the dreamwork of the 
nineteenth century, in order to truly form a ‘phantasmagoria’, which for Benjamin is 
a dialectical category, a semblance that combines two seemingly opposed poles – in 
this case, carrying within it elements of both the primordial and the novel.  
Paris as the metropolis of nineteenth-century capitalism exhibits both the 
weightiness of ancient and recent history and the obsession with technological 
novelty. The city itself is layered like Freud's archaeological model: “The Passage du 
Caire is highly reminiscent, on a smaller scale, of the Passage du Saumon, which in 
the past existed on the Rue Montmartre, on the site of the present-day Rue 
Bachaumont” (AP, 40). It is a spatialised palimpsest of residues that functions for the 
collective like the psychic unconscious does for the individual. Where for Freud the 
architectural palimpsest of Rome becomes a metaphor for the psyche, Benjamin 
inverts this relationship, presenting a model of the psyche that is both colonised by 
architecture and expressed in it. It follows that  “topography is the ground plan of 
this mythic space of tradition [Traditionsraum], as it is of every such space, and that 
it can become indeed its key - just as it was the key to Greece for Pausanias, and just 
as the history and situation of the Paris arcades are to become the key for the 
underworld of this century, into which Paris has sunk”. At the time of Benjamin’s 
study, Paris is past its heyday, the ruined character of the arcades precisely what 







For Freud, condensation in the dream-work entails the fusion of things that are 
temporally separate. This is at play in the arcades when the most modern materials 
are expressed in the medium of the ancient – that is, the forms of ancient Greece.94 
Cities themselves become dream-like for Benjamin: “Whoever sets foot in a city 
feels caught up as in a web of dreams, where the most remote past is linked to the 
events of today...Things which find no expression in political events...unfold in the 
cities: they are a superfine instrument, responsive as an Aeolian harp - despite their 
specific gravity - to the living historic vibrations of the air” (AP, 435) [M9,4]. Like 
the unconscious, which registers things that are not consciously expressed, cities thus 
serve as a historical instrument, indicating both the most ancient and the most novel.  
Further to this temporal condensation, a spatial one is at play: Another central 
feature of the arcade is its condensation of outside and inside, veiling its street 
character through the semblance of being an interieur. As Jutta Wiegmann observes, 
what is thus repressed in the arcades are the twin features of massification and 
isolation (1989, 63). She traces how in the street, the individual is confronted with 
the fact that their perceived individuality is a mere semblance (Schein) in 
“representing, despite all eccentric singularity, only a specific type” (Wiegmann 
1989, 65). Benjamin writes in the Arcades Project and both Baudelaire texts that in 
the street, types like the flaneur and the privatier are at home “as much at home 
among house facades as a citizen is within his four walls” (SW4, 19)95. In the 
arcades, we see the apotheosis of the fusion of the semblance of public and private, 
as “The arcades are something between a street and an interieur (SW4, 19)96. 
This ambivalence is what gives them their dreamlike character, but is also an 
                                               
94 See also Wiegmann (1989, 61) on this point. 
95 “ebenso häuslich wie der Spießbürger in seinen vier Wänden” (GS1, 628). 





indication of the dialectical tension at their heart. Wiegmann links this back to the 
compensatory function of the arcades: “To subordinate the street to the interieur 
serves the purpose of making the visitor of the arcade believe that he was in a space 
which – despite being populated by the crowd – allows for the unfolding/ 
development [Entfaltung] of his individuality”. (Wiegmann 1989, 66). Thus in the 
semblance of an interior, private space that is actually public and thronged by 
crowds, a semblance of subjectivity is created, which itself arises as a compensation 
for an emptiness.  
Wiegmann points to the wealth of mirrors in the arcades as illustrative of this; an 
attempt to artificially create “ego-consciousness” (Wiegmann 1989, 67), to reflect 
back at the subject the semblance of wholeness in its encounter with its mirror-
image. However, what is at stake in the proliferation of mirrors is not merely the 
creation of the semblance of individuality and thus the enduring possibility of 
subjectivity, but the becoming-narcissism and egocentricity of that subjectivity: 
Benjamin notes “Egoistic – that is what one becomes in Paris, where you can hardly 
take a step without catching sight of your dearly beloved self. Mirror after mirror!” 
(AP, 539), substituting a multitude of self-images and a pathological fixation on this 
self as compensation. This connects the fractured subject dwelling in the nineteenth-
century city to the inward gaze of the baroque melancholic, and the inward-outward 
reach of narcissism, discussed in Chapter 2. 
The narcissism of the nineteenth century becomes apparent in the mirrors of Paris. 
They reveal that the gaze is connected to the erotic - first and foremost autoerotic: 
Paris is the city of mirrors...Women here look at themselves more than 
elsewhere, and from this comes the distinctive beauty of the Parisienne. Before 
any man catches sight of her, she already sees herself ten times reflected. But 
the man, too, sees his own physiognomy flash by. He gains his image more 
quickly here than elsewhere and also sees himself more quickly merged with 
this, his image. Even the eyes of passersby are veiled mirrors, and over that 





hanging over the drab beds in brothels. (AP, 537). 
The sky itself here becomes a mirror, endlessly reflecting the world of the nineteenth 
century back onto itself, but it does so sordidly. Like its panoramas, which make 
everything visible as though on a flat plane, the mirrors of nineteenth-century Paris 
reflect a will to domination, of an expansionist narcissism that will know no outside. 
In the mass, people do not encounter each other as subjects capable of 
intersubjective recognition, but merely as mirrors to reflect the semblance of self in a 
multitudinous flow of images. What is ultimately at stake in the multitudes of 
mirrors in the spaces of nineteenth-century capitalism is the death drive: 
…although this mirror world may have many aspects, indeed infinitely many, it 
remains ambiguous, double-edged... In its tarnished, dirty mirrors, things 
exchange a Kaspar-Hauser-look with the nothing. It is like an equivocal wink 
coming from nirvana...The whispering of gazes fills the arcades. There is 
nothing here that does not, where one least expects it, open a fugitive eye, 
blinking it shut again; but if you look more closely, it is gone... (AP, 542). 
What is reflected in the mirrors of the arcade is thus the mere semblance of a subject, 
along with the uncanny agency of things. The mention of Odilon Redon in this 
context, who “caught, like no one else, this look of things in the mirror of 
nothingness, and who understood, like no one else, how to join with things in their 
collusion with nonbeing” (AP, 542) also connects the cryptic “Kaspar-Hauser-look” 
to Verlaine's poem “Gaspard Hauser Chante”, in which the lines “Suis-je né trop tôt 
ou trop tard?/ Qu'est-ce que je fais en ce monde?” express Verlaine's identification of 
Hauser with Redon, the uprooted poet of modernity. Benjamin's fascination with 
Hauser also emerges in his 1930 radio broadcast about him and follows the line 
taken by Verlaine: Kaspar Hauser as a figure emblematic of the condition of modern 
man, disconnected from history, even language itself.  
Thus the “Kaspar-Hauser-look” exchanged by things in the mirrors of the arcades 





subject is a semblance, disconnected from all the things that could conceivably make 
it a subject; this semblance is taken on by commodities themselves in the arcades, 
but their glances, too, are only a reflection, in tarnished and dirty mirrors incapable 
of even rendering that reflection clearly, and directed at: nothingness. Underneath all 
the layers of semblance in the nineteenth-century arcade is thus the death drive, 
which Freud also referred to as the “nirvana principle” (BPP, 50). This connection is 
further stressed by the next line, in which the gaze of things is likened to “an 
equivocal wink coming from nirvana”: In this ambiguity, death itself becomes a 
mere semblance in the arcades, just as it does, as I discuss below, in fashion.97  
In the “whispering of gazes” of the ensouled objects that fill the arcades Benjamin 
describes an atmosphere of menace and paranoia, linking the demonic and thus 
mythic ambiguity with the psychological, as well as a Marxist analysis of the dual 
nature of the commodity. The visitor of the arcades is not sure whether the 
whispering of the gazes is addressed to her, or indeed, who that addressee of the “I” 
might even be, given the multitude of reflections and refractions of the self in the 
arcades. This picks up on themes from ‘Civilisation and its Discontents’, where 
Freud mentions examples of pathological states “in which the boundary lines 
between the ego and the external world become uncertain or in which they are 
actually drawn incorrectly” (SW21, 66). Dreams, too, are numbered by Freud among 
psychopathological constructions, albeit some that everyone experiences every night, 
                                               
97  Caspar Hauser also appears in Benjamin’s review of Hugo von Hoffmansthal’s Der Turm, which 
Benjamin saw as a successful contemporary reiteration of the Baroque Trauerspiel. Its prince, he 
writes, is of the type of Caspar Hauser: “In the newly-formed hero, too, words break only fleetingly 
through the churning sound-sea, looking about themselves with an alienated naiad’s gaze. It is the 
same which today affects us so deeply in the language of children, visionaries or the mad” (GS3, 99, 
transl. mine). It is here, in its Urlaute, that language is at its strongest for Benjamin. We encounter it 
in the speech of those whose experience and perception, their different relation to language and 
detachment from social conventions is for Benjamin encapsulated in their gaze, estranged from the 







in exemplifying multiple meanings and tendencies – ambiguity is thus a feature of 
psychopathology.98 
 
c) Fractured Bodies and Doppelgänger 
In his 1919 text ‘The Uncanny’, Freud takes up this theme of ambiguity again in 
relation to the Doppelgänger or double. He states that while doublings or 
multiplications arise in primary narcissism, where they serve a compensatory 
function in signifying the endurance of life, they later become “harbinger[s] of 
death” (SE17, 235). The idea of the Doppelgänger draws its energy from the 
development of a faculty capable of observing and judging the rest of the ego – to 
treat it like an object. Freud here terms this faculty “conscience” and was later to 
name it the superego. Freud writes that this “renders it possible to invest the old idea 
of a ‘double’ with a new meaning and to ascribe a number of things to it – above all, 
those things which seem to self-criticism to belong to the old surmounted narcissism 
of earliest times” (SE17, 235). Freud concludes that the uncanny character of the 
double stems from its creation at a stage of ‘primitive’ psychic development, its 
originally benign meaning having become inverted: “The double has become a thing 
of terror, just as, after the collapse of their religion, the gods turned into demons” 
(SE17, 236). The uncanny is grounded in the demonic character of the reiteration of 
something believed to belong to the past and laid to rest. Freud writes,  
                                               
98 Conty, Arianne (2013, 476) links this to aura: “Nature, like the cult object, has an aura to the extent 
that it has been invested or endowed with the capacity to return our gaze. On this reading, it is this 
investment of the imagination that empowers the cult object and can explain the sacralisation and 
anthropomorphisation or personification of nature in many ancient cultures. Aura would thus 
illustrate a theory of projection, the projection of consciousness, of familiarity, and hence of 
intentionality, to the non-human world of nature. Aura would come to signify the projection of the 






The factor of the repetition of the same thing will perhaps not appeal to 
everyone as a source of uncanny feeling. From what I have observed, this 
phenomenon does undoubtedly, subject to certain conditions and combined 
with certain circumstances, arouse an uncanny feeling, which, furthermore, 
recalls the sense of helplessness experienced in some dream- states. (SE17, 
236-7) 
This, then, is the source of the uncanny phantasmagoric atmosphere of the arcades, 
with their ambiguous blurring of old and new, inside and out, and its endless 
multiplication of images of the self. The doctrine of eternal return forms the 
temporal equivalent to this in representing the moment of the repetition of similarity 
in the nineteenth century. For Benjamin, a specific form of doubles appears in 
industrial capitalism:  
Neurosis creates the mass-produced article in the psychic economy. There it 
takes the form of the obsessional idea, which, manufactured in countless 
copies, appears in the household of the neurotic mind as the ever selfsame. 
Conversely, in Blanqui the idea of eternal return itself takes the form of an 
obsessional idea (SW4, 166).  
Benjamin makes a direct reference to psychoanalysis in linking neurosis and the 
commodity-form. Eternal return is here revealed as itself a repetition-compulsion. 
Conversely, the psychic economy is linked to the material one in the figure of the 
compulsive neurosis – the compulsive thought resembles the commodity in its 
simultaneous massification and sameness.   
In an early fragment entitled ‘Über das Grauen I’ Benjamin captures the kind of 
Versunkenheit (immersion) typical of the baroque, describing the experience of a 
profane immersion not into the divine, and “thus” not into the self, but into 
“something alien”. To illustrate this, Benjamin describes a schema in which the 
“soul” functions as a maelstrom or eddy which absorbs the mind-body duality into 





body that is merely corporeal and thus robbed of the faculty capable of recognising 
its boundaries. This leads to an experience of porosity and diffusion: the body is 
bereft of its higher meaning and blurs into its surroundings. As Lea Barbisan 
observes, “What is left behind once the lived body (Leib) is taken away with the 
spirit it belongs to, is the Körper – a body the ego can neither recognize as a part of 
itself, nor dismiss as a mere thing” (Barbisan 2017, 3). As suggested in my first and 
second chapters, this aspect of the fracturing of the subject in modernity, intimately 
connected to its fracturing from the divine, is expressed as loss and suffering. 
Carolin Duettlinger also notes the ghostly presence of Freud’s theory of the uncanny 
in this fragment, as for Benjamin, the appearance of the mother is cited as the 
paradigmatic source of this horror as her “familiar appearance becomes threateningly 
alien as the boundaries of self and other are dissolved” (Duettlinger 2007, 36). 
Additionally we can perceive here echoes of Freud’s writings on the actual neurotics, 
whose bodily symptoms are the result of a somatic tension that proves to be so 
overwhelming it “cannot enter the psychic field” (SE1, 195). Thus, “[t]he ‘actual’ 
neuroses point to a body that has lost its place in the continuum of time and 
memory” (Cohen 2015, 219) which, as Josh Cohen rightly observes, is a condition 
typical of modernity and was perceived as such by Benjamin. If we bear in mind 
Freud’s suggestion in his 1926 Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety that actual and 
psychoneuroses are more connected than their initial distinction suggests, that in fact 
“[t]he symbolic meanings of psychoneurosis may wrap themselves around a kernel 
of untranslatable, ‘actual’ bodily noise” (Cohen 2015, 227), we become aware of a 
dynamic in which the psyche repeatedly attempts to make sense of, and periodically 
fails, to account for the experience of the fracture between body and mind running 
through the modern subject. It is this dynamic that is at play in Benjamin’s men of 
the crowd, the denizens of the 19th century urban center. 
Already in the early fragment on horror, Benjamin links the loss of boundaries of the 





That which is perceived…now breaks into him, from the alien body too the 
mind-body falls into the eddy, and what remains in the visual-facial perception 
[Gesichtswahrnehmung] of horror, apart from the feeling “this is you, in gazing 
upon the other” (‘you’ because there is no boundary), is the feeling: this is your 
double, directed at the ‘other’ body, which is now without boundary or 
corporeality (GS6, 76, transl. mine).99 
The absorption of the “Geist-Leib”, the “mind-body” by the eddy created in the 
moment of contemplation of the alien leaves nothing behind but empty corporeal 
vessels which appear to be the same. Far from any intersubjectivity or mutual 
recognition, this process is a fundamentally uncanny and grauenhaft, a horrible one, 
dissolving the boundaries between self and other and indeed the very possibility of 
such boundaries. Benjamin concludes that the “originary phenomenon of the double” 
is at the root of similitude: it is not grounded in any pre-existing affinity, but 
expresses the emptiness left behind in the wake of the emptying-out, the fracturing 
of the subject, occurring under the “reign of the double” (GS6, 76). Benjamin points 
to the imitation of that which is the cause of the fright as an example.100  
This, in turn, brings the double close to Freud's hysteric emulation: “identification is 
not simple imitation but assimilation on the basis of a similar aetiological pretension; 
it expresses a resemblance and is derived from a common element which remains in 
the unconscious” (SE4, 150). The hysteric identifies with the other, or with all of 
humanity, based on a similarity of experienced suffering, of which the symptoms 
                                               
99 „Das Wahrgenommene, vor allem das im Gesicht Wahrgenommene bricht nun in ihn hinein(,) auch 
aus dem fremden Körper fällt der Geist-Leib in den Strudel und es bleibt in der 
Gesichtswahrnehmung des Grauens neben dem Gefühl: das bist Du beim Anblick des andern (‘du’ 
weil keine Grenze da ist) andererseits das Gefühl: das ist dein Doppel(,) auf den ‘andern’ nun aber 
entgrenzten und entleiblichten Körper bezogen.“ (GS6, 76) 
100 While this occurs in the encounter with an other, we may here also detect echoes of the 





become an expression: 
Identification is a highly important factor in the mechanism of hysterical 
symptoms. It enables patients to express in their symptoms not only their own 
experiences but those of a large number of other people; it enables them, as it 
were, to suffer on behalf of a whole crowd of people and to act all the parts in a 
play single-handed (SE4, 149).  
We now see what enabled Freud to characterise Hamlet as a hysteric, and can 
perceive the proximity to Benjamin’s baroque sovereign and the fractured post-
baroque subject: to become a stand-in for all of humanity, and to enact this 
suffering as play. 
In his ‘Schemata for the Psychophysical Problem’, most probably dating from 
1922/23, Benjamin restates the identity of Geist and Leib. What is new is the 
introduction of another concept of the corporeal: Benjamin now distinguishes 
between Leib and Koerper. In the Leib, humanity exists in space, and thus in relation 
to a present other, a not-I. In the Koerper, the individual human is referred back only 
to itself, and the infinity of its sensory experience (through overwhelming sensations 
of pain or pleasure). This boundlessness of the self paradoxically forecloses the 
possibility of an encounter with an other, a realisation of containedness in space, (a 
distinction between I and not I, I and other subjects, I and objects). Thus, what 
happens in the Koerper is the projection of the individual subject onto the entire 
world.  
However, in its plasticity and boundarilessness of the body also emerges as a site of 
potential. The Leib is contrasted with the body in terms of its relationship to others – 
in the Koerper, a single, solitary individual is referred to God. While the Leib allows 
for expansion, is characterised by plasticity, its elasticity, its ability to incorporate 
(an) Other/s. As Barbisan puts it, “The Leib is not to be confused with the personal 
body…It materializes at the intersection between individual life and historical 





bearing witness to the entanglement of individual life with the collective process of 
history” (Barbisan 2017, 4). Benjamin thus modifies his position: In the earlier 
fragment on horror, his focus is on the horror experienced in the “de-potentiating” of 
the mind-body, in the ‘Psychophysical Problem’, he explores the political potential 
of a humanity depleted of the concept of transcendence. The choice, as Benjamin 
writes, is up to humanity: substitute the semblance of unity with the divine in the 
form of the Koerper, or focus on the political potential of the expansive Leib. Or, in 
the vernacular of the 19th century, to accept the semblance of the commodity or 
attempt to move beyond its reach. 
That the concept of the body continues to play a role in this process in the 19th 
century and beyond becomes apparent in Benjamin’s 1929 essay on surrealism. 
Weigel convincingly links Benjamin’s use of the term “innervation” in this essay to 
Freud, for whom, in his early ‘Project for a Scientific Psychology’ it “refers to 
recordings of excitations (Erregungsaufzeichnungen); its matrix is to be found in the 
genesis of his theory of the nerve tracts (Nervenbahnen); later it was then transferred 
to the facilitations (Bahnungen) or permanent traces (Dauerspuren) in the 
unconscious” (Weigel 1996, 247). As Weigel observes, Benjamin’s early interest in 
the more neurophysiological origins of psychoanalysis is transformed in his later 
readings of Freud, where Benjamin’s interest shifts to the unconscious, without 
doing away with the body.101 This dimension of the somatic in Freud and Benjamin 
will be examined in more detail in relation to dreams in my fourth chapter. 
I will now turn to the role of the death drive in the Arcades Project, as this can give 
                                               
101 Weigel also notes that “The character of allegory as a form of writing in the Trauerspiel book was 
evidently not arrived at either without excitation (Erregung), as Benjamin writes there that the 
allegorical gaze transforms ‘things and works into excitatory writing [erregende Schrift]’ (GS I, 352)” 






us an idea why the above choice is impeded, why the discharge of collective 
innervation is blocked. Freud’s death drive, as mentioned above, has a twofold 
effect: the compulsive repetition of past traumas and, at its root, the attempt to 
restore a previous state of homeostasis. This plays out for Benjamin in two ways: 
first, in the becoming-object, dead matter, of commodification. Second, in the 
compulsive repetition of previous memories, the revisiting of trauma. As I will show, 
Freud’s theory of the death drive helps us understand how Benjamin links the 
topographical, architectural memory of cities to the reiteration of the past. 
 
d) The Death Drive in the Arcades 
 “Exhibition of 1844. Madame de Girardin' comments on the event ... ‘It is a 
pleasure,’ she remarked, ‘strangely akin to a nightmare.” [G9a,4]” (AP, 190) 
Freud's Beyond the Pleasure Principle is operative throughout in the Arcades 
Project in Benjamin’s references to the “anorganic” and the way desire is bound up 
with death in fashion and in the process of reification more generally. This desire-
death dualism is characteristic of nineteenth-century capitalism. As we saw above, 
Freud's analysis offers Benjamin insights into the death-driven nature of Proust's 
writing, which in turn expresses the thanatic tendency of the nineteenth century as a 
whole.  
New technologies and products emerge in this society and carry potential, but they 
are outgrowths of an organism that is pathological; as such, they function as 
symptoms. The tension between desire and death, expressed as ambivalence, is 
crucial for Benjamin's analysis. In Convolute B on fashion in particular, Benjamin 
delves deeper into the aspect of desire that links the commodity to both sexuality and 
death. Here, he sketches how “...fashion has opened the business of dialectical 
exchange between woman and ware – between carnal pleasure and the corpse” (AP, 





body to the inorganic” (AP 79).102 In changing fashions, repressed, unconscious 
desires are expressed, but in being expressed through the “dead”, “inorganic” 
commodity, this joins the libido with the death-drive.103 Commodity fetishism here 
becomes a sexual fetish, and vice versa. Benjamin thus fuses the use of the concept 
of the fetish in Marx and Freud, while also retaining its religious – qua mythic – 
connotations, as discussed in ‘Capitalism as Religion’. 
Benjamin writes of the different forms taken by the expression of these desires, his 
analysis allowing him to see all of them as part of the same struggle between social 
and aesthetic forms that have been overcome and the possibilities opened up by new 
forms: 
Just as the first factory buildings cling to the traditional form of the residential 
dwelling, and just as the first automobile chassis imitate carriages, so in the 
clothing of the cyclist the sporting expression still wrestles with the inherited 
pattern of elegance, and the fruit of this struggle is the grim sadistic touch 
which made this ideal image of elegance so incomparably provocative to the 
male world in those days… (AP, 62) 
Using the example of the then-newly developed bicycle, Benjamin describes how 
(male) desire is shaped by new technological developments, in particular the tension 
that arises between these and the pre-existing social configuration. New 
technological developments are thus experienced as psychic phenomena and directly 
affect the structuring of the libido, the choice of desirable object. Once again this 
unconscious process is linked, cryptically, to the dream – these early, hybrid forms 
are “dream prototypes” (AP, 62), expressing the disparate historical and stylistic 
                                               
102 The same formulation appears in both Exposes, indicating its centrality to Benjamin’s thought 
around the Arcades Project. 
103 In a 1938 letter to Adorno, Benjamin again stresses that “Empathy with the commodity presents 





elements they carry within themselves and the tension between them. These dream-
prototypes therefore function as dream-images, waiting for interpretation. The 
obsolete social forms expressed in these dream-image technologies function as 
nature, the second nature created by humanity for itself.104  
However, “Just as technology is always revealing nature from a new perspective, so 
also, as it impinges on human beings, it constantly makes for variations in their 
inmost primordial passions, fears, and images of longing”(AP, 393) - human nature, 
then, is not a fixed, innate essence, but technologically mediated. Benjamin here 
joins the Marxian notion of the “naturally-grown relations” with Freudian concepts 
of desire, fear and primordial drives. On a more extreme formulation borrowed from 
Paul Valery, under capitalism “Man is himself, is man, only at the surface. Lift the 
skin, dissect: here begin the machines” (AP, 404). Technologies go beyond shaping 
desire, or, rather, what is revealed is desire shaped by technologies as constitutive of 
human beings. It is clear that such a “man”, permeated by empathy with the 
commodity, that is, with value, the inorganic, and ultimately the death-drive; 
thoroughly objectified not only through labour, but through desire, is just as 
fractured as the baroque sovereign-subject. 
Where in the 1935 Expose the “prostitute” in her ambiguity is for Benjamin a 
dialectical image that fuses the seller and the sold, and is, as such, connected to 
death, another female figure linked to the death drive appears in this passage - the 
femme fatale. Benjamin quotes French sociologist Roger Caillois on this  
concept of a woman-machine, artificial, mechanical, at variance with all living 
                                               
104 First nature, too, frequently appears in the arcades, and Benjamin traces how they themselves 
come to look like the sea, or recreate natural environments in other ways. Indeed, the arcades, 
Benjamin notes, were originally modelled on hothouses. Thus at their root, just like Paxman's crystal 
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creatures, and above all murderous. No doubt psycho-analysis would not 
hesitate to explain this representation in its own terms by envisaging the 
relations between death and sexuality and, more precisely, by finding each 
ambiguously intimated in the other. [Z2a,1] (AP, 696) 
 This is yet another instance of the “coupling of the living body with the inorganic” – 
the femme fatale is a type, defined only by her sexuality and her relationship to 
death. Unlike the figure of the prostitute, she is both dead and death-dealing.105 This 
attraction to “the corpse” or the un-life of machines that resemble humans is another 
aspect of the fracturing of the subject in modernity, once again along gendered lines. 
Like the inauguration of the fractured subject, this linking of femininity and 
sexuality with the corpse dates back to Baroque poetry: 
The detailing of feminine beauties so dear to the poetry of the Baroque, a 
process in which each single part is exalted through a trope, secretly links up 
with the image of the corpse. This parceling out of feminine beauty into its 
noteworthy constituents resembles a dissection, and the popular comparisons of 
bodily parts to alabaster, snow, precious stones, or other (mostly inorganic) 
formations makes the same point. (Such dismemberment occurs also in 
Baudelaire: 'Le Beau Navire'). (AP, 79-80). 
The ambiguous intimation of sexuality and death is explicitly linked to 
psychoanalysis here: not only does it draw from the interrelation of the drives; it 
occurs “secretly”, remains repressed and thus unconscious. A link is established 
between this tendency in the Baroque and Baudelaire, the epitome of the nineteenth-
century poet. This brings us back to the cultural milieu that also informed Schreber’s 
neuroses: fears about female sexuality, the inversion of the identification of 
femininity with reproductive capacity into its nightmarish obverse, the death-dealing 
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woman-machine. Women are not subjects in being thus objectified, suspected denied 
interiority, identified with death. In the above-mentioned passage from the 1935 
Expose, the prostitute is accompanied by the fetish of the commodity and the arcade 
as one of a trifecta of “dialectical images” characterised by their ambiguous arrest of 
“the law of dialectics”: they embody a moment in the circulation of value, represent 
a snapshot of the movement of capital at a given point in time and space, and as such 
they are in a sense impossible – because this circulation never stands still. Thus, 
“this standstill is utopia, and the dialectical image therefore dream-image” (AP, 10): 
the arcades, the prostitute and the commodity per se are representations of 
impossible states, juxtapositions or montages of things that cannot rightfully coexist 
in the same entity, but nevertheless do. Thus, the question for Benjamin becomes, 
where are such appearances possible? And the answer, of course: In utopia – a 
fantasy of wish-fulfilment - and in the constructions of dreamwork. 
This clearly demonstrates that Benjamin drew on Freud in his concept of ambiguity, 
especially as it relates to the question of the connection of libidinal and thanatic 
drives. Freud writes in Beyond the Pleasure Principle that psychoanalysis has 
always “recognized the presence of a sadistic component in the sexual instinct”. 
Questioning how such an instinct can be derived from the life-preserving principle of 
eros, Freud speculates that “this sadism is in fact a death-instinct which under the 
influence of the narcissistic libido, has been forced away from the ego and has 
consequently only emerged in relation to the object” (BPP, 48). Sadism, aggression 
directed at the libidinally-cathected, or love object, is revealed on this analysis as a 
self-destructive drive rechannelled onto something outside of the self.  
This process, for Benjamin, is embodied in fashion, by which he refers both to 
fashion in garments and more general stylistic elements. In the former sense, 
“Fashion couples the living body to the inorganic”; that is, fashion stokes desire for 
the “living body” through the mediation of the “inorganic”, clothing, and moreover 
the dead labour, and the social meaning contained in a given garment in its socio-





caught between the elegance of the past and the new technology of cycling, 
Benjamin is alert to the “sadistic” elements of much of the fashion of the nineteenth 
century – it expresses the semblance of desire that is mediated by the commodity 
form: “Every fashion is to some extent a bitter satire on love; all sexual perversities 
are suggested in every fashion by the most ruthless means; every fashion is filled 
with secret resistances to love”. These “resistances” again, are drawn from a 
Freudian idiom, where the process of cathexis, or choice of love-object involves a 
management of the redirection not only of the libido, but also the death drive.  
The intermingling of the erotic and the thanatic in fashion serves an ideological 
function, is directly political: fashion is “a witness to the history of the great world 
only, for in every country...the poor people have fashions as little as they have a 
history, and their ideas, their tastes, even their lives barely change” [B4,6] (AP, 72). 
What fashion documents is thus not merely “history” in toto, but class history, 
specifically the history of the ruling class. The following remark by Brecht, quoted 
in Convolute B, makes it possible to recognize how fashion functions as camouflage 
for their particular interests:  
Rulers have a great aversion to violent changes. They want everything to stay 
the same – if possible for a thousand years. If possible, the moon should stand 
still and the sun move no farther in its course. Then no one would get hungry 
any more and want dinner. And when the rulers have fired their shot, the 
adversary should no longer be permitted to fire; their own shot should be the 
last. (AP, 71). 
Thus, the semblance of change in fashion obscures that the fundamentals, i.e. class 
relations, stay the same. The stasis-preserving or -seeking aspect of the death-drive 
functions in the interests of the ruling class. Where for Freud, writing in the ‘Three 
Essays on Sexuality’ (1905), perversion is a universal feature of sexuality for 
Benjamin, performing Freudian class analysis, the perversion that joins the libido 
and the thanatic together in fashion is revealed as belonging to the bourgeoisie. The 





the ruling class as a function of the fact of aiming to preserve homeostasis, that is, to 
prevent change to the social organism.   
 
5. Missed Opportunities 
As we have seen, Freud grounds one pole of repetition-compulsion in the trauma of 
the missed event. In the context of Benjamin's Arcades Project, a major source of 
this historical trauma is the revolutionary moment that was missed: The proliferation 
of the arcades in the nineteenth century is the result of a failed revolution and the 
disavowal of this trauma, much as the Baroque was a response to the trauma of the 
rupturing of Christian cosmology. This also opens up the possibility of reading the 
Trauerspiele in light of a political failure - just as the Arcades Project is written in 
the shadow of the failed commune, with the question of its making possible 
twentieth-century fascism implicit in the text, the baroque affect of mourning 
functions not just as the result of the rending of a cosmological totality, but as an 
index of the unfulfilled egalitarian promises of the Reformation and the historical 
failure of the peasant revolts.106 
The city of Paris thus emerges as analogue to the human psyche – it is a repository of 
‘revolution’ and libidinal desire which is repressed and emerges in symptomatic 
form as production, art and culture-making. Freud and Benjamin part ways here - for 
Freud, aggressive, destructive individual instincts and drives must be restrained in 
the interest of society. While for Freud, the drives often work against civilisation, 
and no emancipation can be expected from them on their own, this taming is a more 
explicitly negative thing from Benjamin's perspective of collective liberation. The 
Arcades Project thus functions as a history of reaction in France, while at the same 
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time raising the question of the possibility of the overcoming of this temporality. 
Freud's concept of repetition-compulsion is operative in Benjamin's critique of 
historicism and the experience of time in the nineteenth century, where seemingly 
nothing is new and everything is repeated in the attempt is to regain an original state 
of homeostasis. Following Freud, Benjamin points to a tension at the level of drives, 
the “mutually contradictory tendencies of desire: that of repetition and that of eternity” 
(AP, 117) which results in the idea of eternal recurrence attributed to Nietzsche, 
Blanqui, and Proust by Benjamin.  
We need to differentiate carefully between Benjamin's own position and the 
philosophy of history he depicts in the Arcades Project in order to critique it: It is the 
perception particular to the bourgeoisie that the world is ending, that the decline's of 
the life-world of one's own class is synonymous with a general downfall of the era. At 
the same time, the dialectical antithesis of this belief is that in the true novelty of the 
new, which on Benjamin's analysis is revealed as merely being the newest mediation 
of that which has always been – domination by the mythic, and relations of 
domination.  This fixation on novelty also functions as the opposite pole to the death 
drive – the expression of libido in partial form: “Why does everyone share the newest 
thing with someone else? Presumably, in order to triumph over the dead. This only 
where there is nothing really new” [D5a,5] (AP, 112). Novelty is here identified with 
life, and taken to stand in opposition to death.  
However, the philosophy of history that experiences everything as repetition, and that 
which sees the present era as a break with history in its novelty, are two sides of the 
same coin when viewed as oppositional drives of the same organism – and, just like 
the life-preserving drives are “circuitous routes to death” for Freud, the opposition 
between life- and death-drives in the nineteenth century is destabilised by Benjamin's 
dialectical view: The fascination with new technologies and the conviction that they 
were a sign of a new era coexisted with the nihilistic outlook provoked by the 
perception of the impossibility of change. The pessimists of the nineteenth century, 





right in the empirical observation of ostensible continuity of “the time of hell” (AP, 
936) in nineteenth-century capitalist modernity, but wrong about the ontological 
impossibility of change, as well as suggesting the wrong strategies for effecting 
change and interrupting this temporality. On Benjamin's reading, one such example of 
a misguided utopianism turning to utter resignation present in Blanqui.107 He thus 
functions as a paradigmatic case study of the fractured subject’s experience of time in 
the 19th century. 
 
a. Blanqui’s Eternal Return 
In the nineteenth century, capitalism was the newest form taken by class society, 
manifesting in the sensorium of the arcades. Given that the arcades were already 
outmoded by the time Benjamin wrote about them, this is illustrative of his point 
about the cyclical nature of the new and the ever-same: “the pomp and the splendor 
with which commodity-producing society surrounds itself, as well as its illusory 
sense of security, are not immune to dangers; the collapse of the Second Empire and 
the Commune of Paris remind it of that”. The form of the arcades, once experienced 
as so novel, has become archaic, but what they express is not, as it is still with him at 
the moment of writing in the twentieth century: class society, exploitation, the 
commodity form. On Benjamin's view, Blanqui is correct in identifying this but 
commits the error of eternalising or ontologising this temporality, when Benjamin is 
concerned with interrupting it: “Blanqui’s cosmic speculation conveys this lesson: 
that humanity will be prey to a mythic anguish so long as phantasmagoria occupies a 
place in it” (AP, 15). This passage from the Expose of 1939 makes it Benjamin’s 
task to dispel the phantasmagoria that tie humanity to “mythic anguish”. Blanqui 
correctly diagnosed the problem, but did not offer a solution, instead falling prey to 
                                               





it himself: blinded by “cosmic spleen” (AP, 5), Blanqui’s “terrible 
indictment...against society takes the form of an unqualified submission to its 
results” (AP, 112). Blanqui paints a vision of a lateral unfolding of parallel universes 
rather than any vision of progress, projecting what was to become Nietzsche's eternal 
return onto a cosmic scale, years before Nietzsche himself. True liberation is 
contrasted with the finitude of Blanqui’s vision, which is really just a recombination 
of fixed sets or types.  
Blanqui, to Benjamin, thus presents a claustrophobic utopia of closing in, an infernal 
interiority, withdrawing into his private hell, the hell of a capitalist society that 
imprisoned him, in the very moment of expanding his vision to a universe which is 
conceived as nothing but carcereal, and – crucially – without any hope of escape. 
Blanqui writes his last work “in order to open new doors in his dungeon” [D5a, I] 
(AP, 111). Rather than liberatory, Blanqui’s vision of eternal repetition on a cosmic 
scale is revealed as a capitulation to the philosophy of history of the nineteenth 
century. Benjamin concludes that  
The century was incapable of responding to the new technological possibilities 
with a new social order. That is why the last word was left to the errant 
negotiators between old and new who are at the heart of these phantasmagorias. 
The world dominated by its phantasmagorias, to make use of Baudelaire's term, 
is ‘modernity’... (AP, 26) 
On this view, the people of the nineteenth century appear frozen in time, incapable 
of conceiving of anything beyond Capitalism’s use of technology or anything but its 
attendant, objectified subjectivity. Conversely, Benjamin's approach, with the twin 
analytic tools of Marxism and Freudian psychoanalysis, aims to perform a reality-
testing of these phantasmagorias, in order to dispel the forces that hold back the 






b. Urgeschichte, Myth and Antiquity 
Blanqui's “extreme hallucinatory power” is “anything but triumphant; it leaves, on 
the contrary, a feeling of oppression. Blanqui...strives to trace an image of progress 
that (immemorial antiquity parading as up-to-date novelty) turns out to be the 
phantasmagoria of history itself” (AP, 25). This is also at the root of the reiteration of 
Hellenic antiquity in the nineteenth century, and the return of Urgeschichte, primal, 
mythic history, in the midst of modern capitalist methods and relations of 
production. Benjamin quotes Karl Löwith on this:  
‘The existence that has lost its stability and its direction, and the world that has 
lost its coherence and its significance, come together in the will of the eternal 
recurrence of the same’ as the attempt to repeat - on the peak of modernity, in a 
symbol - the life which the Greeks lived within the living cosmos of the visible 
world’. (AP, 116) 
In the face of the seeming meaninglessness of the nineteenth century, an appeal is 
made to the imagined golden age of the past: classical antiquity, just as the Baroque 
appealed to it in its time of crisis. Eternal return and the idea of linear progress are 
both aspects of “the mythic mode of thought”, that is, in the facts of human history 
being entirely outside the control of humanity, dictated instead by forces outside 
itself. Benjamin traces how this plays out in architecture in Convolute D: “The 
flexible and animated classical style was succeeded by the systematic and rigid 
pseudoclassical style...The Arc de Triomphe echoes the gate of Louis XIV; the 
Vendome column is copied from Rome; the Church of the Madeleine, the Stock 
Exchange, the Palais-Bourbon are so many Greco-Roman temples” (AP, 107). As in 
other fashions, nineteenth-century architecture is distinguished by the repetition of 
historical styles – specifically those of eras seen as triumphant and stable.  
The ancient resurfaces precisely in what is most modern about the city, in the 





Other European cities admit colonnades into their urban perspective, Berlin 
setting the style with its city gates. Particularly characteristic is the Halle Gate - 
unforgettable for me on a blue picture postcard representing Belle-Alliance 
Platz by night. The card was transparent, and when you held it up to the light, 
all its windows were illuminated with the very same glow that came from the 
full moon up in the sky” [D2,1] (AP, 104). 
This passage, rich in allusions to perspectives and vision, itself opens up the 
possibility of seeing the conflux of Urgeschichte and nature in an artifact produced 
under industrial Capitalism: it is modern production technologies, the mass 
production of souvenirs, that allows the postcard to be made. It renders it 
transparent, and that, paradoxically, is what allows the moonlight – elementary and 
mythic – to shine out of the windows of the modern city buildings. 
Urgeschichte is not only linked to Hellenic antiquity, but also to nature: “As rocks of 
the Miocene or Eocene in places bear the imprint of monstrous creatures from those 
ages, so today arcades dot the metropolitan landscape like caves containing the fossil 
remains of a vanished monster: the consumer of the pre-industrial era of capitalism, 
the last dinosaur of Europe”. This metaphor is mirrored in Freud’s observation that 
the neurotic’s mind resembles “a prehistoric landscape, e.g. the Jurassic. The great 
dinosaurs still mill about, and the snake grass is as high as palm trees” (GW17, 151, 
transl. mine).108  For Freud, it is in the symptoms of the neurotic that these 
‘prehistoric’ residues become most apparent. Benjamin reads the ruins, the residues 
of the arcades in the same way: they bear the imprints of the creatures that inhabited 
them, the consumers of previous eras of capitalism. It is in capitalist modernity that 
the mythic domination of humanity by heteronomous nature resurfaces via the 
commodity fetish: “The subtleties of Grandville aptly express what Marx calls the 
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"theological niceties'" of the commodity” [G5a,2] (AP, 182), thus “if the commodity 
was a fetish, then Grandville was the tribal sorcerer. [G7,2]” (AP, 186). Once more, 
we see the proximity to the language of Totem and Taboo here. As Benjamin writes, 
“Capitalism was a natural phenomenon with which a new dream-filled sleep came 
over Europe, and, through it, a reactivation of mythic forces” (AP, 391). Nature – 
determination – the mythic, and sleep are thus conjoined. This is what links the 
arcades to antiquity: the persistence of the mythic, of that which is passed down, 
unreflected, which Benjamin also likens to dreaming.  
The arcades, for all their novelty, emerge as closer to ancient caves or mythic 
entrances to hell than anything modern, and it is in the forms of capitalism that this 
structure devoid of human agency, of collective deliberation, finds expression: “The 
rebirth of the archaic drama of the Greeks in the booths of the trade fair” (AP, 88). 
What in the Baroque was expressed in the Trauerspiele – the impossibility of 
recreating the ethical community of the Greeks and its tragic mode – is now 
mediated by the economic. Tradition is revealed as repetition-compulsion, passed 
from one generation to the next:  
In the idea of eternal recurrence, the historicism of the nineteenth century 
capsizes. As a result, every tradition, even the most recent, becomes the legacy 
of something that has already run its course in the immemorial night of the 
ages. Tradition henceforth assumes the character of a phantasmagoria in which 
primal history enters the scene in ultramodern get-up. [D8a,2] (AP, 116). 
Phantasmagoria are characterised by uniting dialectical opposites within themselves 
while obscuring the tension between them, in this case that of primal history and the 
“ultramodern” in the form of tradition. Benjamin here points to a tension at the level 
of the philosophy of history of the nineteenth century: between historicism and 
eternal return. This reveals both progress and tradition into a phantasmagoria, 
because they present a contradiction that the nineteenth century cannot do anything 
other than express, in other words, it presents it as symptoms without consciousness 





perfectibility understood as an infinite ethical task” - as that of conservative eternal 
return. They are “complementary”, “the indissoluble antinomies” against which 
Benjamin posits his own “dialectical conception of historical time”. To this 
bourgeois philosophy of history, “the idea of eternal return appears precisely as that 
"shallow rationalism" which the belief in progress is accused of being, while faith in 
progress seems no less to belong to the mythic mode of thought than does the idea of 
eternal return” [DIOa,5] (AP, 119). Benjamin thus inverts the notion of progress as 
the shedding of the mythic. 
Benjamin's understanding of Urgeschichte draws from the “psychic residue” of 
previous ages discussed by Freud, who in ‘Analysis Terminable or Interminable’ 
writes of a similar historical residue:  
There is not one of the erroneous and superstitious beliefs of mankind that are 
supposed to have been left behind but has left a residue at the present day in the 
lower strata of civilized peoples or even in the highest strata of cultivated 
society. All that has once lived clings tenaciously to life. Sometimes we are 
inclined to doubt whether the dragons of primæval times are really extinct 
(SE23, 229).  
This is in keeping with Freud's conceptualisation of the libido in Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle and views put forward in Totem and Taboo. However, Benjamin 
historicises the reappearance of the mythic residue. It is the specific forms social 
organisation of an epoch that bring about its reiteration of antiquity in the modern: 
“But precisely modernity is always citing primal history. Here, this occurs through 
the ambiguity peculiar to the social relations and products of this epoch” (AP, 10), 
that is, in capitalism. In the Trauerspiel book, Benjamin investigated the resurfacing 
of ancient concepts such as acedia and taedium vitae in the early modern era. In the 
Arcades Project and the Baudelaire project, this is transposed into the nineteenth 
century. Here, baroque melancholia becomes spleen. As Benjamin outlines in 
‘Central Park’, it “interposes centuries between the present moment and the one just 





will turn to the figure most emblematic of this spleen: Baudelaire, before 
investigating other nineteenth-century types of fractured subjects. 
 
6. Men of the Crowd? 
a) Modern Melancholia: Baudelaire’s Spleen 
In a letter to Horkheimer of 16 April 1938, Benjamin describes the Baudelaire-work 
as “an extensive treatment in which the most important motifs of the Arcades project 
converge”, a “miniature” model for the whole Arcades Project (C, 556). Agamben 
draws attention to the fact that Benjamin's notes and correspondence imply that the 
Baudelaire “chapter” is in reality functioning as a principle of disaggregation for the 
entire structural unity of the book on Paris” (Agamben 2016, 221). Far from merely 
constituting a text dealing with Baudelaire the person, the Baudelaire project in its 
final form portrays the subject of Baudelaire as a manifestation of the nineteenth 
century as a whole.  
Melancholia in the nineteenth century plays out as boredom and spleen, crystallised 
in the figure of Baudelaire. Benjamin quotes a variety of commentators on 
Baudelaire, his selection focusing on the inwardness of Baudelaire's writing and his 
person. Baudelaire's confessional style, i.e. the subjectivism of his writing, is noted:  
He was the first to write about himself in a moderate confessional manner, and 
to leave off the inspired tone...The first also who accuses himself rather than 
appearing triumphant, who shows his wounds, his laziness, his bored 
uselessness at the heart of this dedicated, workaday century...spleen and illness, 
without  ever once using the word (AP, 246).  
This melancholia is explicitly characterised as symptomatic and linked to 
psychoanalytic categories. Baudelaire's writing is thus characterised as the obverse 





exuberance but to his traumas (“wounds”) and displays all the hallmarks of a 
melancholic, conceiving of himself as lacking and inadequate. Indeed, another 
commentator quoted by Benjamin notes that “Baudelaire is as incapable of love as of 
labor. He loves as he writes, by fits and starts, and then relapses into the dissolute 
egoism of a flaneur. Never does he show the slightest curiosity about human affairs 
or the slightest consciousness of human evolution...” (AP, 249). Baudelaire’s egoism 
is “dissolute” as he is focusing inward, but this merely yields a retrenchment of his 
melancholia.  
Benjamin’s characterisation of Baudelaire as the quintessential modern melancholic 
culminates in a comparison to Hamlet: “I asked myself whether Baudelaire . . . had 
not sought, through histrionics and psychic transfer, to revive the adventures of the 
prince of Denmark”. This ties his figure to the Trauerspiel book, and indeed forms 
the link between nineteenth-century subjectivity and that inaugurated in the Baroque. 
Baudelaire is a type or aspect of modern subject which is not one, hence it 
refractures into types, different forms the pathology of subjecthood is experienced 
and expressed, just as in the Baroque, the individual suffers from the injunction to 
act as a subject under conditions which make this impossible. Benjamin writes that 
while Baudelaire liked to portray himself as a quasi-demonic figure of menace 
outside the social order, his death cast him as a martyr. This dualism also speaks for 
reading Baudelaire as the modern equivalent of the Baroque sovereign, of which 
Hamlet is the seventeenth-century epitome – he is fractured along the same lines, 
into the martyr and the tyrant or, with Freud, oscillates between outward and inward 
directed destructiveness, rendering him at times melancholic, at times psychotic. Just 
as in the figure of the baroque sovereign, melancholia, far from being successfully 
worked through, turns outwards and flips into its obverse, madness and rage.  
Benjamin is interested in the deeper motivations of Baudelaire as unveiled by the 
psychoanalytic understanding of the centrality of the familial relationship, especially 
that with the mother, as it relates to the poet's later stance on sexuality. Benjamin 





Baudelaire's unconscious, repressed wish for his mother's love.109 At the same time, 
Benjamin stresses that “His artificially maintained dependence on his mother had not 
only a psychological cause (underscored by psychoanalysts) but a social one” (SW4, 
179). Of course, as discussed in Chapter 2, the psychic in psychoanalysis is inflected 
by the interplay of the individual and the social, an intra-psychic conflict arising 
when a need is not being met by the world. Freud points to this gap between wish 
and reality, the unmet needs and desires in the life of an individual, as the trigger for 
neuroses in modernity: “To-day neurosis takes the place of the monasteries which 
used to be the refuge of all whom life had disappointed or who felt too weak to face 
it” (SW11, 50).  
These reflections on the changing character of the responses to an unresolved 
conflict between individual and world can be read against seventeenth-century 
Haitzmann’s decision to take holy orders. Where Haitzmann was still capable of 
entering a monastery in order to resolve this (though, as we have seen, uneasily so), 
modernity has instead supplied neurosis as an alternative space for withdrawal, into 
the self. Just as Haitzmann unconsciously tested the world and himself and judged 
himself inadequate, Benjamin writes that in the attitude of “someone dependent on 
handouts, Baudelaire put his society continuously to the test” (SW4, 179). Both 
assume a passive, helpless attitude towards the world, and express their experience 
of being incapable of enacting their wishes on the world in historically-specific 
forms of psychic suffering. Where Haitzmann assumes a feminine role towards the 
devil in his delusion, Baudelaire expresses the inability to act as sexual impotence.  
For Benjamin, this expresses the condition of the modern subject. Baudelaire follows 
a socially-determined path because of the social character of the reasons for male 
impotence, and “Only this explains why, to sustain him on his travels, he received a 
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precious old coin from the treasury amassed by European society. On its face it 
showed the figure of Death; on its reverse, Melancholia sunk in brooding meditation. 
This coin was allegory” (SW4, 185). Melancholia and the death-drive are revealed as 
that which feeds Baudelaire’s work.110 In this, he is emblematic of his age: The 
masculine subject, enjoined to lead a vita activa and be a heroic subject, is no longer 
tenable in the nineteenth century, just as he was not tenable in the Baroque. With the 
declaration of the rights of man, with the advent of democracy, all men are enjoined 
to be sovereigns, and none of them can be. The anxieties about masculinity reflected 
in the delusions of Schreber and Haitzmann thus also play out in the figure of 
Baudelaire. He carries on the legacy of the Baroque in the form of the “treasure” of 
European culture, the coin spinning between death and melancholia.  
Modern melancholia has utterly entrapped the subject within itself:  
The decisively new ferment that enters the taedium vitae and turns it into 
spleen is self-estrangement. In Baudelaire's melancholy [Trauer], all that is left 
of the infinite regress of reflection-which in Romanticism playfully expanded 
the space of life into ever-wider circles and reduced it within ever narrower 
frames-is the ‘somber and lucid tete-a-tete’ of the subject with itself. (SW4, 
163). 
Again, we see the effects of the loss of transcendence in modernity: Like the 
bottomless reflection of the Baroque brooder, the 19th century melancholic 
encounters not truth, or knowledge, or God, but is entrapped by subjectivism. The 
constitutive fracture of the modern subject – its foundation on loss – is expressed in 
this self-centered circling. The truth of the ‘precious old coin’ of the history of the 
modern European subject is thus revealed in its ceaseless movement, death-drive and 
melancholia blurring into one in the form of spleen: “From the perspective of spleen, 
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the buried man is the ‘transcendental subject’ of historical consciousness” (SW4, 
165). Like baroque allegory, the product of a world that has lost is eschatological 
referent, the decay of experience expressed in the ennui of modernity makes all of 
history appear as decay. Robbed of transcendence, the fractured modern subject is 
entrapped by the constraints of the demand of subjecthood and lapses further into 
subjectivism. The ultimate destination of his ever-smaller concentric circles is death. 
At the same time, as Salzani observes, “This is the dialectical potential of allegory 
and thus of spleen: it destroys the Schein, the deceptive appearance of organic 
wholeness, and exposes the naked truth of the demise of experience” (Salzani 2009, 
138). Only in thus revealing the semblance of experience in modernity for what it is 
– the doomed attempt by fractured subjects to integrate their experience of the world 
in order to create meaning – is there a potential for the redemption of experience and 
the overcoming of the fractured subject.  
 
19th Century Allegory 
Benjamin thus establishes a link between the baroque melancholic and the allegorist 
of the nineteenth century, positing Baudelaire as the zenith of the conflux of 
inwardness and intense concentration on the (material) fragment. What links the 
allegory of the baroque and the nineteenth century, despite the latters’ ostensibly 
much more ‘optimistic’ historical character, is historically specific melancholy – this 
time as a response, the ‘motorial reaction’, to the commodity form. Just as in 
baroque poetry, stereotypes proliferate in Baudelaire’s writing and he returns to the 
same motifs again and again. This marks him as a melancholic:  
The magnetic attraction which a few basic situations continually exerted on the 
poet is one of the symptoms of his melancholy. Baudelaire's imagination is 
occupied by stereotyped images. He seems to have been subject to a very 





doubtless comparable to the compulsion which repeatedly draws the felon back 
to the scene of his crime. Baudelaire's allegories are sites where he atoned for 
his destructive drive. (SW4, 172).  
Baudelaire’s destructive impulse results in a constant return of the same in his 
poetry, driven by a traumatic compulsion to revisit that which was destroyed. There 
are thus historical differences between the allegories of the Baroque and those of the 
nineteenth century. The disintegrating force of allegory in capitalist modernity is 
locked in a struggle with the semblance that would disguise the commodity character 
of the objective world. Allegory works against this: “What resists the mendacious 
transfiguration of the commodity world is its distortion into allegory. The 
commodity wants to look itself in the face” (SW4, 173).111 As was also outlined at 
the start of this chapter, capitalist commodities are imbued with agency, further 
challenging the centrality of the human element in the subjective process of 
allegoresis by becoming capable of it itself. Benjamin notes the changing function of 
allegory in a ‘commodity-producing economy’ and suggests that Baudelaire’s poetry 
reflects this process in attempting to making apparent the “peculiar aura” of the 
commodity: “He sought to humanize the commodity heroically. This endeavour has 
its counterpart in the concurrent bourgeois at tempt to humanize the commodity 
sentimentally: to give it, like the human being, a home” (SW4, 173). In this, 
Baudelaire submits to the same principle at play in production, and in the bourgeois 
home: the humanisation of the commodity in “etuis, covers, and cases in which the 
domestic utensils of the time were sheathed.  
As a stylistic medium, allegoresis no longer occupies the centrality it did in the 
seventeenth century, leaving Baudelaire isolated and out of time. Benjamin grounds 
this is the socio-economic formation of capitalism, which was not the determining 
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factor for allegory in the baroque. Thus, “The devaluation of the world of things in 
allegory is surpassed within the world of things itself by the commodity” (SW4, 64). 
As Pensky observes, allegory in the nineteenth century “confronts a world of a priori 
objects that themselves have already been allegorized by the advent of the 
commodity. Exchange value, in which the object is hollowed out, to be rendered 
‘meaningful’ only by the arbitrary assignation of price, is a ‘devaluing’ force far 
more powerful than the Trauer with which the baroque playwrights contemplated 
their world” (Pensky 1993, 166-7).  
The contradictory character of nineteenth-century melancholy becomes manifest in 
its poet, Baudelaire, whose poetic gift – the melancholic gaze that allows him to 
capture the commodity nature of nineteenth-century metropolitan life – is 
simultaneously what prevents him from realising the true nature of his insight. The 
opposition between correspondences and allegory, never developed in Baudelaire, 
once again leads to the re-emergence of critical subjectivity, as the truth content of 
the fragments of social life cannot be reconstructed by the artist, but must involve 
critical incisiveness. Ultimately, then, Baudelaire’s allegory, supposedly more 
faithful to the ‘realm of things’ than the baroque, falls victim to the same fate as the 
latter. Its attempt to deliberately grasp and make manifest “moments of transcendent 
meaning from within the continuum of natural history” (Pensky 1993, 180) is 
doomed to failure. So is Baudelaire’s attempt to withstand the crowd. In this, he 
resembles the flaneur. 
 
b) The Flaneur 
Benjamin contrasts the crowd, “with its abrupt and intermittent movements” (AP, 
337). more akin to the machines they operate, with the flaneur, who “forms an 
obstacle in its path”. In his nonchalance, Benjamin detects “an unconscious protest 
against the tempo of the production process” (AP, 338). The flaneur thus attempts 





which leak from the production process into the movement of the crowds in the 
modern city. Ultimately, his protest remains futile, and he does not escape 
subsumption. The figure of the flaneur thus functions as another of the characteristic 
expression of broken, fractured nineteenth-century subjectivity: “Empathy with the 
commodity is fundamentally empathy with exchange value itself. The flaneur is the 
virtuoso of this empathy. He takes the concept of marketability itself for a stroll” 
(AP 448). For Benjamin, the flaneur's wanderings around the nineteenth-century 
capitalist metropolis signify not just mere walking, but a circumnavigation of the 
boundaries of public and private space, past and present, encapsulating the 
impossibility of remaining outside of rapidly expanding capitalism. Just as the 
products of the nineteenth century linger on the “threshold” of capitalism – 
becoming commodities but carrying the semblance of previous social forms - the 
flaneur walks on the precipice, the “threshold” of the soon-to-be total capitalist 
system, carrying within himself vestiges of the old ruling class, the aristocracy. He is 
on the way, he “takes himself to market”. In this figure, Benjamin can observe – and 
typecast – the move from aristocratic detachment to full immersion in the “world of 
things”, total commodification.  
As such, Benjamin writes “The attitude of the flaneur - epitome of the political 
attitude of the middle classes during the Second Empire” [M2,5] (AP, 420) on the 
cusp of becoming the dominant class while still mimicking – repeating - the styles of 
their aristocratic forebears. Here, as throughout the Arcades Project, Benjamin 
highlights the class position of his types. Their experience, their subjectivity is not 
neutral.  
Empathy with the commodity signifies an altered state of consciousness, an 
“intoxication”, a form of madness provoked by the sensorium of nineteenth-century 
capitalism, the presence of both past and present social formations and the residue of 
the aspirations of the past. The experience of the flaneur extends not merely to 
commodities produced in factories and displayed in the arcades, but comes to 





and ultimately all of experience suffers the same fate: “Today, for instance, as man 
and woman, both lover and mistress, I rode in a forest on an autumn afternoon under 
the yellow leaves, and I was also the horses, the leaves, the wind, the words my 
people uttered, even the red sun that made them almost close their love-drowned 
eyes” [MI7a, 4] (AP, 449). At the level of experience, the entire outside world here 
comes to be subsumed by the semblance of the individual, mirroring the 
subsumption in the sphere of exchange. The intoxication of this form of empathy 
extends across epochs, allowing the flaneur to feel in detail as though he had been 
present at various points in history, as Benjamin writes in Convolute M. The quasi-
mystical experience of oneness with the world is revealed as a product not of a 
spiritual epiphany, but of Capitalism. It draws close to the paranoid reconstruction of 
the world discussed in Chapter 2 and, as we shall see in Chapter 4, it hints at an 
attempt to recover the lost experience of childhood. 
At the same time, Benjamin contrasts the individuality of the flaneur with the 
“rubberneck”, who is absorbed by the external world… which moves him to the 
point of intoxication and ecstasy”. He thus “becomes an impersonal being. He is no 
longer a man - he is the public; he is the crowd...” [M6,5] (AP, 429).  In opposition 
to the rubberneck, who has been utterly absorbed by the mass, the flaneur clings to 
the last vestiges of individualism, even as he is ultimately unable to resist 
commodification. In this, he is related to the dandy, who forms the last vestige of the 
heroic subject.  
 
c) The Dandy: Boredom’s Hero 
In Baudelaire's words, quoted in Convolute D “Boredom, Eternal Return”, 
“Dandyism is a mysterious institution...It is of great antiquity, Caesar, Catiline, and 
Alcibiades providing us with dazzling examples; and very widespread, 
Chateaubriand having found it in the forests and by the lakes of the New World” 





Antiquity, becoming a transhistorical category, and at the same time a global 
phenomenon: “Dandyism is the last spark of heroism amid decadence; and the type 
of dandy discovered by our traveler in North America does nothing to invalidate this 
idea; for how can we be sure that those tribes which we call 'savage' may not in fact 
be the disjecta membra of great extinct civilizations?” [D5, 1] (AP, 111). Dandyism, 
on this view, is an ancient remnant in modernity, a fragment of the past.  
While the flaneur and the dandy are closely related, the former is a dynamic 
character who moves from the aristocratic mode of life to the shop floor, becoming 
subsumed by capitalism; the latter is a dying breed, embodying that same aristocratic 
existence which the flaneur is shedding. Baudelaire laments this state of affairs: 
“Dandyism is a sunset; like the declining daystar, it is glorious, without heat and full 
of melancholy. But alas, the rising tide of democracy…is daily overwhelming these 
last representatives of human pride” (AP, 239).112 Thus, the melancholia of the 
Baroque finds expression in the type of the dandy in the nineteenth century, via 
Baudelaire’s representation. Just as that of the baroque sovereign, the subjectivity of 
the ruling class is revealed as pathological here, torn by the desire for omnipotence 
and the melancholic realisation of its impossibility.  
The dandy, Benjamin writes, makes a “show of boredom”. He speculates that this 
might be grounded in boredom’s function as an “index to participation in the sleep of 
the collective” (AP, 108): The upper classes can only display a collective affect in 
the form of tedium. Benjamin quotes Friedrich Engels on “Factory labor as 
economic infrastructure of the ideological boredom of the upper classes” (AP, 106). 
The do-nothing ennui of the moneyed and idle class is the pendant to the repetitive 
tedium of factory work. As Peter Osborne notes, Benjamin’s Convolute D provides a 
social history of boredom in the 19th century (Osborne 2006, 37): Benjamin’s study 
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of the affect of boredom and the psychology of the bored thus allow him to diagnose 
the material organisation of society.113 
However, boredom functions as a symptom not only of the way the social world is 
structured, but as a repository of energies for its overcoming. Osborne notes the 
utopian potential “of boredom in modernity as the basis of a distinctive experience of 
possibility” (Osborne 2006, 36). This is encapsulated in particular in Benjamin’s 
‘The Storyteller’, where it is described as “the dream bird that hatches the egg of 
experienceʼ (SW3, 149). It is also in this text that Benjamin links boredom to the 
decay of experience and particularly pre-industrial activities (storytelling as well as 
manual practices such as weaving and spinning). As Salzani notes, “Langeweile, 
ennui, taedium vitae … if the roots are in medieval acedia – almost equated with 
melancholia in the Renaissance – ennui, Langeweile and boredom took a very 
specific connotation after the industrial revolution and are therefore strictly 
connected to modernity.” (Salzani 2009, 127). As noted in the discussion of 
Benjamin’s writing on Baudelaire, the specificity of modern boredom lies in its 
connection to the decay of experience, which in the 19th century is mediated by 
Capitalist forms. Thus, as Osborne notes, “boredom becomes a central part of that 
form of subjectivity constituted by the dynamics of the commodity form” (Osborne 
2006, 42). This also means it is mediated by class: It is the decay of bourgeois 
experience that is at stake for the dandy, the flaneur, and the collector. Both the 
worker and the bourgeois are bored, but bored differently. Where the boredom of 
one is grounded in idleness and a further deepening of subjectivism, the boredom of 
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the other is grounded in the rhythms of the factory, Michelet’s “true hells of 
boredom”.  
Andrew Benjamin also draws attention to the historical specificity of this modern 
subjectivity characterised by boredom (Benjamin 2005, 156). He frames his 
discussion of boredom through the concept of moods, which mediate between 
modernity and its subjects, organising experience: the people of the 19th century are 
bored because their century is boring. Boredom thus transcends the individual 
subject and is, as indicated above, symptomatic of what Andrew Benjamin terms 
“the world”; that is, the social world of the 19th century. 
Andrew Benjamin groups boredom together with distraction as moods that subvert 
any simple opposition between individual and mass, pointing instead to a differential 
relation between the two in modernity. Not “the individual as opposed to the mass, 
nor the mass in opposition to the individual” (Andrew Benjamin 2005, 162), but an 
individual as mass individual “both dispersed across, though also articulated within, 
this matrix” of the mass (Andrew Benjamin 2005, 163)114. Andrew Benjamin thus 
links the utopian potential of boredom identified by Osborne and Salzani to an 
overcoming of the constraints of subjectivity. Locating boredom at the structural 
level, as opposed to a boredom that ‘merely’ exists for an individual, allows for a 
different politics, Andrew Benjamin suggests: changing the structures through mass 
action, rather than placating the boredom of an individual. 
The latter attempt is precisely what characterises the eternal return of the 19th 
century; the endless search for novelty rendered futile by its lapse back into the ever-
same. As Osborne notes, this type of “[b]oredom drives subjectivity forward in the 
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search for social content, much as, in psychoanalytical accounts, boredom is 
associated with the ʻsuspended animation of desire’” (Osborne 2006, 41). This leads 
us to the last main type of nineteenth-century fractured subject to be discussed: the 
gambler, who fuses the protest against boredom in his desire for novelty with the 
inevitability of repetition-compulsion. 
 
d) The Gambler: Benjamin’s Case Study 
The many notes on the psychology - specifically the psychopathology - of the 
gambler demonstrate that Benjamin found the psychoanalytic perspective more 
relevant than to any of the others. In a lengthy quote from Paul Lafargue, Benjamin 
introduces the gambling as paradigmatic for the modern capitalism, “a giant 
international gambling house, where the bourgeois wins and loses capital in 
consequence of events which remain unknown to him”. Here, we also see how the 
mythic resurfaces in the form of gambling, that is, capitalism in toto: “The 
inexplicable is enthroned in bourgeois society as in a gambling hall… Successes and 
failures, thus arising from causes that are unanticipated, generally unintelligible, and 
seemingly dependent on chance, predispose the bourgeois to the gambler's frame of 
mind” (AP, 497). Like the gambler, the bourgeois is connected to the mythic in his 
submission to something inhuman and inexplicable – the rule of chance. His 
attempts to gain control over this process are themselves part of the mythic: “The 
habitues of gambling casinos always possess magic formulas to conjure the 
Fates...The inexplicable in society envelops the bourgeois, as the inexplicable in 
nature the savage” (AP, 497). Here, again, Capitalist domination is likened to nature 
insofar as it signifies the rule of the mythic, thus both the gambler and the bourgeois 
are governed by it. 
Benjamin frequently quotes from Edmund Bergler's article ‘Zur Psychologie des 
Hasardspielers’, published in Imago in 1936. Via Bergler, a Freudian psychoanalyst, 





First, he notes that “The gambler is driven by essentially narcissistic and aggressive 
desires for omnipotence” (AP, 510) which exceed the satisfaction of genital sexuality 
and are projected or sublimated in gambling. This is also taken up in Benjamin’s 
summary of Ernst Simmel’s take on the psychopathology of the gambler:   
The insatiable greed that finds no rest within an unending vicious circle, where 
loss becomes gain and gain becomes loss, is said to arise from the narcissistic 
compulsion to fertilize and give birth to oneself in an anal birth fantasy, 
surpassing and replacing one's own father and mother in an endlessly escalating 
process. (AP, 511) 
Benjamin here delves deeply into the psychology of capitalist individualism, 
revealed as grounded in a fantasy of omnipotence and self-sufficiency, characterised 
by boundless narcissism displayed in the “autoerotic satisfaction” of gambling. This 
links the gambler to Schreber and Haitzmann, who also fantasized about having the 
capacity for pregnancy and birth. However, in the nineteenth-century gambler the 
narcissistic aspect of this fantasy of – male - self-sufficiency becomes more 
apparent: “Thus, in the last analysis, the passion for gambling satisfies the claim of 
the bisexual ideal, which the narcissist discovers in himself” (AP, 511) .115 Again, 
this fractured subject is a classed one – what is being analysed here is the psyche of 
the bourgeois. However, with the total domination of capitalism that is inaugurated 
in the nineteenth century, Benjamin elaborates that this subjectivity is perceived as 
extending beyond the bourgeois, becoming paradigmatic for “the human”, and 
leading to the apocalyptic mood of nineteenth-century culture. He relates a 
conversation with Berthold Brecht regarding this: 
A propos of Freud's conjecture that sexuality is a dwindling function "of" the 
human being, Brecht remarked on how the bourgeoisie in decline differs from 
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the feudal class at the time of its downfall: it feels itself to be in all things the 
quintessence of humankind in general, and hence can equate its own decline 
with the death of humanity. (This equation, moreover, can play a part in the 
unmistakable crisis of sexuality within the bourgeoisie.) The feudal class, by 
virtue of privileges, felt itself to be a class apart, which corresponded to the 
reality.116 (AP, 511) 
Again, we see Benjamin joining class analysis and psychoanalysis to investigate the 
object of his study more thoroughly. The two approaches compensate for each other's 
shortcomings and thus allow a fuller picture of the nineteenth century to emerge: 
Brecht’s Marxian analysis supplements Freud's universalism with the specificity of 
the class to whom the analysis applies, while Freud's analysis of the dwindling 
function of sexuality reveals an aspect of the apparent ‘decline’ of the bourgeoisie 
not made visible by class analysis alone. Taken together, they show how the psyche 
of the bourgeoisie is enmeshed with the ‘spirit of the age’ of the nineteenth century, 
and differentiate it from the previous class formations which gave rise to a different 
subjectivity on account of their differing politico-legal structure. The dwindling 
sexuality that Benjamin attests the bourgeoisie thus becomes a symptom of its lack 
of special privileges, such as possessed by the feudal nobility, expressed in the 
phantasmagoria of constituting a universal subject.  
Benjamin turns to Bergler again on the question of the drives and principles from 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle in the psychology of the gambler: 
The game of chance represents the only occasion on which the pleasure 
principle, and the omnipotence of its thoughts and desires, need not be 
renounced, and on which the reality principle offers no advantages over it. In 
this retention of the infantile fiction of omnipotence lies posthumous aggression 
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against the…authority which has 'inculcated' the reality principle in the child. 
This unconscious aggression, together with the operation of the omnipotence of 
ideas and the experience of the socially viable repressed exhibition, conspires 
to form a triad of pleasures in gambling…At the deepest level, the game of 
chance is love's will to be extorted by an unconscious masochistic design. This 
is why the gambler always loses in the long run. (AP, 510) 
Gambling is thus revealed as a dialectic between the pleasure principle and 
masochism, of libidinal and death drives. As also seen in the analysis of fashion, this 
is typical of the nineteenth century, which submits to the domination of the market as 
previous ages have to the mythic. Benjamin quotes Anatole France: “The fascination 
of danger is at the bottom of all great passions…It is the mingling of terror with 
delight that intoxicates. And what more terrifying than gambling? It gives and takes 
away; its logic is not our logic. It is dumb and blind and deaf. It is almighty. It is a 
God” (AP, 498). The “intoxication” of gambling is grounded in its phantasmagoric, 
ambivalent character: the fusing of pleasure and terror, and the experience of 
submitting to a principle outside of human control and “logic”. It is difficult to 
overlook the closeness of this quote to other pronouncements in the Arcades Project 
on the nature of the capitalist economy, the commodity fetish and the value form.  
On the face of it, gambling differs from capitalist labour in one important respect: its 
temporality, defined by a lack of pastness in the fact that every round is independent 
of the previous one. Benjamin quotes, “Gambling strenuously denies all acquired 
conditions, all antecedents . . . pointing to previous actions; and that is what 
distinguishes it from work. Gambling rejects . . . this weighty past which is the 
mainstay of work and which makes for seriousness of purpose, for attention to the 
long term, for right, and for power” (AP 512).  Unlike traditional forms of labour, 
gambling lacks a past – but, given Benjamin's pronouncements on the changing 
nature of work under Capitalism, which sees experience and other “human” qualities 
becoming obsolete in the face of modern methods of mass production, it is again 





speculates on the implication of this temporality for experience:   
The lack of consequences that defines the character of the isolated experience 
(Erlebnis) found drastic expression in gambling. During the feudal age, the 
latter was essentially a privilege of the feudal class, which did not participate 
directly in the production process. What is new is that in the nineteenth century 
the bourgeois gambles. It was above all the Napoleonic armies that, on their 
campaigns, became the agents of gambling for the bourgeoisie. (AP, 512)  
Thus, the replacement of Erfahrung with Erlebnis under the conditions of 
nineteenth-century Capitalism are a consequence of the ruling class no longer being 
exempt from production, as the feudal class was, but becoming subject to its rhythms 
and structures even as it attempts to hold on to the obsolete feudal forms of existence 
in the private sphere.  
Gambling's relationship to temporality is also touched upon in Benjamin's initial 
quote from Bergler: “...whoever ...has experienced the mechanism of pleasure as 
abreacted in games of chance, and possessing, as it were, eternal value, succumbs the 
more readily to it in proportion as he is committed to the 'neurotic pleasure in 
duration' (Pfeifer)” (AP 512).  This emphasises the psychoanalytic dimension of 
gambling's temporality - Bergler is here referring to the desire for omnipotence 
manifested in gambling that seeks to eternalise its satisfaction in its endless 
repetition and simultaneous newness. 
 In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud also refers to Pfeifer's then-recent study of 
1919: “These theories endeavour to conjecture the motives of children’s play, though 
without placing any special stress on the ‘economic’ point of view, i.e. consideration 
of the attainment of pleasure”. For Freud, the child's fort-da game is another 
example of an attempt at omnipotence – to compensate for the displeasure of the loss 
(“fort”) in restaging its dis- and reappearance in a way that is subject to its control in 
the game, ultimately restoring balance to its psychic economy. Even though at base, 





Benjamin's gambler from the child is the pathological and compulsive nature of the 
expression of this desire, his “neurotic pleasure in duration”, touching again on the 
repetition-compulsion and the desire for eternity of the nineteenth century discussed 
in previous sections. Benjamin is clear on the destructive nature of gambling and its 
attendant mode of experience: “The ideal of the shock-engendered experience 
[Erlebnis] is the catastrophe. This becomes very clear in gambling; by constantly 
raising the stakes, in hopes of getting back what is lost, the gambler steers toward 
absolute ruin” [014,4] (AP, 515). This is not to be taken in purely financial terms; 
rather, it is the attempt to return to his previous fullness of experience that 
characterises the self-destructive behaviour of the gambler.  
This peculiar experience of temporality and constant exposure to shock contributes 
to his sense of intoxication: “the greater the component of chance in a game, the 
more speedily it elapses” (AP, 512). The sense of ever-increasing speed in gambling 
is a function of the element of chance, the greater the less control the gambler has 
over the outcome of the game. Nevertheless, this provokes a response of increased 
“presence of mind”, of focus, which is broken the instant the stakes change and the 
game begins anew, only to be built up again, and so on. In this way, gambling 
ultimately functions almost like a bodily reflex – a way of responding that “rules out 
an ‘interpretation’ of chance” (AP, 513), circumvents ratio. Thus, the body comes to 
the fore once again, but through it also the unconscious – the gambler reacts through 
reflex rather than reflection, instinct governs his decision.117 
The gambler's attempt at satisfying the narcissistic desire for omnipotence is 
ultimately doomed to failure: “money and riches, otherwise the most massive and 
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burdensome things in the world, come to him from the fates like a joyous embrace 
returned to the full. They can be compared to words of love from a woman 
altogether satisfied by her man. Gamblers are types to whom it is not given to satisfy 
the woman. Isn't Don Juan a gambler?” [013,4] (AP, 513). Thus, there is a lack at the 
root of the psyche of the gambler, which gambling attempts to compensate. It is, as 
an ambivalent, dialectical phenomenon, characterised by both the aggressive desire 
for omnipotence and a sense of incompleteness. Benjamin's speculation on the lack 
of sexual satisfaction here, alongside the insistence on the waning sexuality of the 
bourgeoisie as a symptom of its melancholic sense of being in decline, point to a 
centrality of these reflections in his analysis of the subjectivity of the bourgeoisie of 
the nineteenth century.  
Taken together with the other psychoanalytic aspects of the section on the gambler – 
his narcissistic desire for omnipotence, his relationship to time as grounded in 
repetition-compulsion, the ensuing model of experience of the gambler and the 
endurance of mythic thinking in gambling thus demonstrate the importance of 
Freudian psychoanalysis for the analysis of this type, and by extension the entire 
Arcades Project. It is also present in its offshoots: Benjamin writes in Central Park 
(1939): “Games of chance, flanerie, collecting - activities pitted against spleen” 
(SW4, 1). All the activities that come to characterise these nineteenth-century types 
are thus attempts to counter melancholia. The attempts to encounter something truly 
novel, to have an experience, are foiled in modernity – only death, the ultimate 
caesura, can provide this. All novelty within the nineteenth century is revealed as 
semblance, a reflection of nothing but the age itself. 
Thus, the last point of connection between Benjamin and Freud in the arcades 
project I will examine here are the interrelated issues of memory and experience. All 
of Benjamin's types make attempts at having an experience - The collector attempts 
to retain a fullness of experience through his collection, the flaneur seeks to 
experience the city in his meanderings, the gambler seeks out liminal experiences in 





Lebensgefuehl of the aristocracy. They are all dynamic, in the process of historically 
driven change. However, the question is raised whether experience proper remains 
possible under the conditions of modernity.  
 
 
7. Memory and Experience 
a)  Two Types of Experience: Erlebnis and Erfahrung 
In the Arcades Project, Benjamin contrasts the collector's way of relating to objects 
with the memoire volontaire, which “is a registry providing the object with a 
classificatory number behind which it disappears. ‘So now we've been there’ (‘I've 
had an experience.’)” (AP, 211). In this example, something of Benjamin's concept 
of Erlebnis, developed further in the writings on Proust and Baudelaire, is 
foreshadowed: what is experienced is spent in the moment without being committed 
to the unconscious. Benjamin contrasts the psychoanalytic concept of Erlebnis with 
this quotidian one, the “Experiences emptied out and deprived of their substance” 
(AP, 326) described by Baudelaire. Benjamin links this to Freud’s account of 
experience: “‘To experience [Erleben] means to master an impression inwardly that 
was so strong we could not grasp it at once.’ 'This definition of experience in Freud's 
sense is something very different from what is meant by those who speak of having 
‘had an experience’ [Erlebnis]” [K8,2] (AP, 402). Quoting Freud's disciple Theodor 
Reik, Benjamin suggests that this becomes most apparent in grief, as it “reveals its 
depths only long after we think that we have got the better of it’. The ‘forgotten’ 
grief persists and gains ground; compare the death of the grandmother in Proust” 
(AP, 402).  Grief thus reveals something about the unconscious nature and 





The fluctuation between the meanings of Erlebnis and Erfahrung in the Arcades 
Project show that Benjamin here had not yet arrived at the hard and fast 
differentiation between them characteristic of his 1933 Experience and Poverty; 
nevertheless, these reflections were becoming apparent and fleshed out in his work 
on Baudelaire and Proust. 
 
 
b)  Memoire (in)volontaire, Experience and the Psychoanalytic Theory of 
Memory  
Written from March to June 1929 concurrently with the Arcades Project, ‘On the 
Image of Proust’ initially functioned as a ‘breakaway’ piece, just as the Baudelaire 
texts were intended to be.118 Benjamin here conceptualises two types of life: the life 
lived or experienced, and the life recollected by the one experiencing it, which forms 
the object of Proust’s work. The main aspect of Proust’s investigation, however, is 
not the recollection of the facts that were experienced, but the construction of 
memory – the 'weaving' of it in the “Penelope work of remembrance” 
[Eingedenken]. Experience for Proust is thus connected to memory.  
However, Benjamin immediately complicates this picture of the “Penelope work”. 
Its ‘weaving’ is not a consciously willed, deliberate act, but rather a memoire 
involontaire, a memory that remains largely unconscious – a remembrance that 
appears 'spontaneously', and thus much more intimately entwined with forgetting, 
the unconscious. Thus, Benjamin poses the question whether this form of 
remembrance is not rather a counterpart to the work of Penelope, the construction of 
                                               






something – the day unravelling what the night fashioned; in other words, the 
conscious mind unpicking what the unconscious made visible in dreams.  
Rather than the conscious mind dredging up specific memories, Benjamin here 
inverts the relationship between subject and memory – Erinnerung dictates the 
pattern of this weave, rather than the other way around. Strikingly, the very unity of 
Proust’s text is only provided through memory, rather than the person of the author 
or the actual plot. They are revealed as only effects or functions of the process of 
memory, “the reverse of the continuum of memory” (SW2.1, 238). Thus, the 
centrality of memory serves to destabilise the subject in Proust's work. This is also 
what forms the kernel of Benjamin's interest in it. However, in order to flesh out 
what is at stake in Proust’s memory theory, Benjamin looks to Freud.  
For Freud in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, psychoanalysis reveals consciousness as 
a function of a particular psychic system. This part of the system does not preserve, 
it merely has the capacity for constant reception of sensory data. The psychic 
apparatus is thus divided into two functions, one of the reception of perceptions, one 
of the storing of them. Crucially, at the point of the reception of a stimulus in the 
perception-consciousness (W-Bw), this stimulus is either registered by 
consciousness (Bw), or it circumvents the Bw part of  the system and is channelled 
towards the unconscious, where it is stored as a memory-trace.119 
With Freud's model of perception and memory-formation, Benjamin can thus 
explain how a memory is formed when the psychic shield is breached by a shock and 
                                               
119 See also Weigel (1996) and Werner (2015) for a detailed reconstruction of this process. 
Additionally, Porath highlights the centrality of technology for Freud: “the models that Freud 
sketched for the so-called “psychic apparatus” often use technical metaphors and cannot be thought 
without being related to communication media and the building of models in the sciences in Freud’s 





the shocking stimulus is stored in the unconscious.120 Benjamin and Freud part ways 
on the possibility of experience in modernity; where for Freud, this remains possible, 
Benjamin is increasingly convinced that the life-world of the nineteenth century 
foreshadows a poverty of experience, culminating in Benjamin's own day. In the 
Arcades Project, he notes that in the daily experience of modern life in the modern 
capitalist metropolis, these shocks are more and more frequent, forcing modern man 
to adapt psychologically, as the overcrowded city forces people into a proximity with 
others that would be intolerable without “psychological distance” [M17,2] (AP, 
447). Benjamin thus assumes a habitual hardening to these shocks in modernity. 
Benjamin looks to Freud to account for this, quoting the attempt to belatedly process 
the traumatic experience in dreams and repetition-compulsion. Benjamin takes this 
to mean that the shock-reception of consciousness trains its ability to process 
impulses in dreams and memory. He speculates “That the shock is thus cushioned, 
parried by consciousness, would lend the incident that occasions it the character of 
an isolated experience [Erlebnis], in the strict sense” (SW4, 318). Crucially, 
Benjamin needs this notion of a “training” of consciousness in order to arrive at his 
central point: the downfall of collective experience, Erfahrung in modernity. Thus, 
he writes that “The greater the shock factor in particular in particular impressions, 
the more vigilant consciousness has to be in screening stimuli; the more efficiently it 
does so, the less these impressions enter long experience [Erfahrung] and the more 
they correspond to the isolated experience [Erlebnis]” (SW4, 319). Erlebnis is the 
conscious experiencing of impressions, caused by the chocs of modern life. These 
                                               
120 It is worth noting that in discussions in the literature on Freud, notions of trauma and shock are 
sometimes posited as opposites, as for instance by Tim Armstrong (2000). He contrasts Freud's 
trauma theory with what Freud himself terms the “old, naïve theory of shock” as a response to 
physical violence. However, as also noted by Matus (2009), the opposition Armstrong suggests 
between the economic model of shock and “the timelessness of the unconscious wound” (Armstrong 
2000, 64) is not as stark in Freud. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud's innovation is the 
transposition of the economic model to the psychic apparatus as it concerns its capacity to process 







are individual rather than collective, occurring at a specific point in time rather than 
over a duration. 
Thus, Freud helps Benjamin account for the non-linear temporality of experience. 
Benjamin relates this to Proust: “For an experienced event is finite – at any rate, 
confined to one sphere of experience; a remembered event is infinite, because it is 
merely a key to everything that happened before it and after it” (SW2.1, 238). Thus 
memory is a type of origin, in accordance with the way origin works in the 
Trauerspiel book. We see here the contrast between Erlebnis and Erfahrung that is 
not quite formulated in the Arcades Project: Erlebnis is committed to the 
unconscious and as such a “limitlessly remembered” one. It is not self-contained, or 
rather, it is self-contained in the way of a monad, in that it contains within itself 
everything else – including its pre-and post-history. A memory of an Erlebnis is thus 
a key to unlock the entirety of what is stored in the unconscious – everything before 
and after it. Thus, Benjamin's reading of Proust is influenced by a Freudian 
understanding of the psyche – the individual memory can only be made sense of in 
the context of the entire life.  
In ‘On some Motifs in Baudelaire’, Benjamin seeks to put Freud’s ‘hypothesis’ 
about the “correlation between memory (in the sense of a memoire involontaire) and 
consciousness” (SW4, 316) to work “in situations far removed from the ones he had 
in mind when he wrote” (SW4, 317). Attentive to the accelerated pace of the 
disintegration of experience in modernity, even when compared to Freud’s time, 
Benjamin looks to Reik once more: “the function of memory [the author identifies 
the sphere of ‘forgetfulness’ with ‘unconscious memory’…]  is to protect our 
impressions; reminiscence aims at their dissolution” (AP, 402). 
Investigating what happens to the sensory input once it is committed to the 
unconscious, this sets up a division between two types of memory: one remains at 
the level of the unconscious; from the standpoint of consciousness, it can be equated 
with ‘being forgotten’, as it is not attainable by it. As soon as it is dragged up again, 





exposure that corrodes archaeological artifacts dissolves the original memory-trace: 
“Put in Proustian terms, this means that only what has not been experienced explic-
itly and consciously, what has not happened to the subject as an isolated experience 
[Erlebnis], can become a component of memoire involontaire” (SW4, 317). Thus, a 
conscious attempt at recapturing the original inscription of the memory-trace is 
doomed to fail as it will destroy it, but an unbidden ‘flashing up’ of the memory in a 
memoire involontaire does not follow the same pattern, as once again the active 
involvement of consciousness is circumnavigated and the content of the memory is 
preserved.  
This is the conception of an unconscious memory operative in Benjamin’s 
autobiographical “Bullrich salt” anecdote. In Convolute G “Exhibitions, Advertising, 
Grandville” there is a sudden irruption into the succession of aphoristic quotes that 
mirrors the shock of its content: an account of Benjamin's own experience of seeing 
a striking advertisement. He writes “As is sometimes the case with very deep, 
unexpected impressions, however, the shock was too violent: the impression...struck 
with such force that it broke through the bottom of my consciousness and for years 
lay irrecoverable somewhere in the darkness” (AP, 174). The poster, an advert for 
“Bullrich salt”, struck Benjamin so strongly it was contained unconsciously for 
years, until it resurfaced years later, when he was confronted again with the slogan 
of the brand. As he recounts, the lettering alone was enough to bring up Benjamin's 
visual memory of the original poster in full - “I had it once more”. In this, Benjamin 
follows Freud's account of the formation of trauma in Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle, discussed above, where the different strata of the psychic apparatus have 
different functions relating to the processing and storing of sensory data, and the 
unconscious is only reached by impulses strong enough to breach the protective 
layer of consciousness. Here, a different aspect of this process comes to the fore: The 
formation of memories from the contents of the unconscious.  
Crucially, this memory is stored in an object – as it is for Proust, writing on the 





futile. The past is hidden somewhere outside the realm, beyond the reach, of 
intellect, in some material object...And as for that object, it depends on chance 
whether we come upon it or not before we ourselves must die” [K8a,l] (AP, 403). 
Arianne Conty comments: 
Hidden in the contingent fragment and brought to light by the flash of a 
photographic cut, Benjamin reveals that the past does not live within us, but 
rather, like Proust’s famous madeleine, in the world of things. In Benjamin’s 
historical materialism, memory thus becomes an imminently political entity, 
because the control of artefacts and their mediation is the key not only to our 
past, but also to the future of that past which brings us, for a brief instant, the 
image of our present. (Conty 2013, 478) 
Benjamin thus looks to Proust to supplement the Freudian/Reikian model of memory 
in order to allow for a type of remembrance that is not purely destructive, but 
preserves something of the character of the past precisely because it does not seek to 
recreate it in full. At the level of the philosophy of history, this is opposed to 
bourgeois historicism, which seeks to capture the past ‘as it really was’ and which is 
thus doomed only to project onto the past what it assumes of it.  
Proust, for Benjamin, attempts to “synthetically” create experience in the sense of 
Erfahrung under the conditions of modernity in his work. Memoire involontaire is 
thus already a hybrid form situated between pre-modern and modern forms of 
remembrance: experience proper encompasses a collective, from which the modern 
private individual is more and more detached. It increasingly encounters memory-
traces in material objects rather than collective practices.121  
                                               
121 These reflections form part of Benjamin’s larger corpus of writing on the change of tradition and 






As we have seen, all the types into which the fractured baroque subject refracts in 
modernity contain a truth within their untruth for Benjamin; that is, just like 
allegories, and the ruins of the arcades themselves, the truth they reveal is precisely 
the ambiguity, and thus untruth, of the world that brought them about. Just like the 
symptom in Freud, they function as an indication of a pathology. In the Arcades 
Project, the loss of the conditions of experience is being resisted by figures such as 
the collector. However, in his solitary pursuit of the objects of his collection, he too 
ultimately succumbs to empathy with the commodity. His relationships to others, as 
we have seen, are characterised by the same alienation as that of the flaneur and 
other types – thus he seeks refuge in making it his aim to liberate “things from the 
drudgery of being useful” by inserting them into a taxonomy that is ultimately 
subjective – and false. 
Al the types of the nineteenth century are incapable of having a real experience. Like 
Freud’s hysterics, this means the past instead resurfaces in pathological form: In the 
first of his ‘Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis’, which Benjamin had noted in his 
‘Verzeichnis’, Freud states: “our hysterical patients suffer from reminiscences. Their 
symptoms are residues and mnemic symbols [Erinnerungssymbole] of particular 
(traumatic) experiences”. Strikingly, Freud draws close to Benjamin in linking this 
pathological mode of remembrance to material memory-culture: “We may perhaps 
obtain a deeper understanding of this kind of symbolism if we compare them with 
other mnemic symbols in other fields. The monuments and memorials with which 
large cities are adorned are also mnemic symbols” (SE11, 16). Like the hysterics, 
nineteenth-century culture does not merely remember past experiences, they are still 
cathected: “Not only do they remember painful experiences of the remote past, but 
they still cling to them emotionally; they cannot get free of the past and for its sake 
they neglect what is real and immediate” (SE11, 17). Benjamin drew from this in 
conceptualising how mythic domination resurfaces time and again in capitalism, and 





functions like a pathological psyche, simultaneously appealing to a vision of fullness 
which is unattainable, and re-stages the losses of the past. These losses are thus still 
present in the nineteenth century, mediated by the commodity-form. The fractured 
post-baroque subject remains melancholic, torn between the semblance of 
individuality in the private sphere and the reality of increasing commodification: in 
production, as consumer, in the urban mass.  
The nineteenth-century individual, like the collector, has no defence against the 
shocks of perception; everything “strikes” him, as Benjamin says. He can be said to 
“live a dream life” where nothing is stable, all his experience is permeated by the 
things he encounters, the rhythm of his life subject to surprising impressions vis a vis 
which he is passive, just like the mass. All things and events are given equal 
attention, as in a dream. As such, just like the flaneur, who dreamily walks down 
sloping streets that all lead to regression, the collector is emblematic of the 
nineteenth century. In the next chapter, I investigate Benjamin's conceptualisation of 














 Chapter 4 – Dreaming, Awakening  
Introduction 
As shown in the previous chapter, the dream was a pivotal concept for the Arcades 
Project and what is sometimes termed Benjamin's ‘late production cycle’ as a whole. 
In this chapter, I examine in more detail the Freudian inheritance in Benjamin's use 
of the two concepts of dreaming and awakening in the Arcades Project and some 
adjacent texts, among them ‘One-Way Street’. I will examine the similarities as well 
as some differences between Benjamin’s and Freud’s thought on the dream with 
particular reference to the status of the body in the dream theory of both thinkers. 
From this discussion, it will emerge that Benjamin goes further than Freud with 
respect to the fracturing of the subject by the unconscious, using insights from dream 
analysis to move beyond the individual psyche to the collective.  
I then turn to the centrality of the concept of awakening, both false and true. 
Benjamin's engagement with surrealism will be discussed in the context of the 
former, along with Art Nouveau. At stake is the question whether these are enough 
to move beyond the dream-consciousness of the nineteenth century and break the 
spell of post-baroque subjectivity that lingers there. Finally, I turn to the tensions 
within the arcades, alongside a consideration of the centrality of the ‘tears and 
cracks’ of the dream for Freud - the question of a ‘counter-arcade’ or, that aspect of 
capitalist modernity which harbours potential for its own undoing. However, no 
automatism or teleology can be assumed from the mere existence of these tensions.  
I then examine Benjamin's transposition of awakening from the individual to the 
collective. In the context of true awakening, childhood emerges as a locus of the 
possibility of a cognition that runs counter to some of the fallacies of subjectivity. It 
will become clear that the concept of memory, as remembrance, is crucial. I then 
look to the question of a proximity between Benjamin and Freud on the issue of a 





connection with Benjamin's own dream for the possibility of a disruption of the 
dream-sleep of the nineteenth century. 
 
Part I. Dreams 
Dream themes proliferate in the Arcades Project and adjacent writing. Prior to the 
genesis of what has come to be referred to as the Passagenwerk in German, 
Benjamin originally conceived of a work entitled Paris Passages. A Dialectical 
Fairytale, which was to be closer to ‘One-Way Street’ in volume and intended to 
“transpose dream experience to historical cognition” (Lindner 2008, 162). In exile in 
1934, Benjamin wrote to Gretel Adorno that he had abandoned this project as it was 
of an “impermissible ‘poetic’” nature (C, 507). Referring to Benjamin's short text 
‘Dream Kitsch: Gloss on Surrealism’ (1926), where Benjamin asserts that “The 
history of the dream remains to be written”, Burkhardt Lindner concludes that the 
original intention remained: “The Arcades Project was the attempt to write the 
unwritable history of the dream” (Lindner 2008, 168 [transl.mine]). In the course of 
this project, superstition was to be dispelled by historical enlightenment. Elissa 
Marder is in agreement with Lindner on this point, suggesting that the Arcades 
Project is connected to a larger project on the dream, including the ‘Surrealism’ 
essay (1929) and ‘On the Image of Proust’: “In this sense, the Passagen-Werk 
explicitly makes the dream central to the philosophy of history” (Marder 2006, 186).  
While Marder suggests that “Convolute K of the Passagen-Werk can be read as an 
implicit critical commentary on Freud’s Interpretation of Dreams” (Marder 2006, 
186), Lindner (2008, 151-152) sees Benjamin as not taking a direct position vis a vis 
Freud's dream interpretation, and states that there are few traces of an intensive 
engagement with it discernible in Benjamin's work. However, I will argue that the 
motif of the dream in the Arcades and adjoining work display a strong engagement 
with the Interpretation of Dreams (1900) throughout. While Marder is correct in 





this Convolute, under the headings ‘Dream City and Dream House, Dreams of the 
Future, Anthropological Nihilism, Jung’, Benjamin’s engagement with this text and 
dream themes more generally is not restricted to this Convolute, and indeed inflects 
the Arcades Project as a whole. As Rolf Tiedemann concludes in his afterword to the 
text, “Under capitalist relationships of production, history could be likened to the 
unconscious actions of the dreaming individual, at least insofar as history is man-
made, yet without consciousness or design, as if in a dream” (AP, 933).122 This 
points to the conflux of Marxian and Freudian themes in Benjamin’s work, already 
highlighted in the previous chapter.  
 
Freud via Marx, Marx via Freud 
In a 1937 letter to Horkheimer, Benjamin wrote a propos the Arcades Project:  
I imagine that the definitive and binding plan of the book…would have to 
emerge from two fundamental methodological investigations. One would have 
to do with the critique of pragmatic history on the one hand and of cultural 
history on the other, as it presents itself to the materialist; the other with the 
significance of psychoanalysis for the subject of materialist historiography. 
(Cohen 1993, 6) 
This announcement of Benjamin's theoretical grounding of the Arcades Project in 
both materialist and psychoanalytic thought already hints at the fusion of materialist, 
specifically Marxist, concepts with those inherited from Freud. We also find clues to 
the centrality of Freud as a point of connection between Benjamin and Marx in 
Benjamin’s 1930 review of Siegfried Kracauer’s study ‘Die Angestellten’, published 
                                               






the same year. Here, too, Benjamin stresses the fall back into mythic nature in the 
“false consciousness” of capitalism, and suggests the Marxist “doctrine of the 
superstructure” must be supplemented with the “schema of repression” in order to 
grasp contradictory consciousness. 123  
Unconscious, involuntary action and dreaming are thus conceptualised as a 
resurgence of nature, which Benjamin also attributes to Freud - in his notes for the 
Arcades Project, he writes of the “doctrine of the natural dream of Freud. Dream as 
historical phenomenon” (GS5, 1214, transl. mine). This line of thought is carried 
over into the Arcades Project. In convolute K, Benjamin writes: “Capitalism was a 
natural phenomenon with which a new dream-filled sleep came over Europe, and, 
through it, a reactivation of mythic forces” [Kla,8] (AP, 391). Equal exchange is an 
example of mythic thought which comes to the fore in capitalism. To break out of 
the “dream-filled sleep”, the second nature created by capitalism and dispel the 
mythic forces, Benjamin proposes an analysis that fuses Marxian as well as Freudian 
categories in order to identify the causes, symptoms and mechanisms of repression. 
We thus see the conflux of Freud and Marx in Benjamin’s thinking; together, they 
                                               
123 The full quote reads 
 
“as long as the Marxist doctrine of the superstructure is not supplemented by the direly necessary one 
of the development of false consciousness, it will be all but impossible to answer the question “how 
does an inappropriate consciousness of an economic situation emerge from its contradictions?” in any 
way but following the schema of repression. The products of false consciousness resemble puzzle 
pictures, in which the main thing barely peer out from clouds, fallen leaves and shadows” (GS3, 223, 
translation mine). 
This suggests that, rather than pursue the question of false consciousness directly, the 
psychoanalytical concept of repression serves as a useful tool for the analysis of Capitalism. Even if 
false consciousness cannot (yet) be understood, then, its unconscious can be accessed through the 







make visible the constellation dream-nature-history-myth. As we shall see, analysis 
is to serve as an emancipatory process that allows the explosion of this constellation. 
Unlike the Baroque, which for Benjamin was still largely under the sway of 
feudalism and found the source of its conflicts in religious strife, the pathology of the 
nineteenth century is mediated by capitalism. The “working through” of memories in 
mourning is repressed in the arcades, manifesting as symptoms in the cultural 
production of the nineteenth century, such as its architecture, utopias, advertising, 
shops, etc. Benjamin's symptomatic reading does not distinguish between these 
different spheres of culture, or indeed between art and commercial cultural forms. 
From the perspective of the twentieth-century analyst, using the approaches of both 
historical materialism and Freudian psychoanalysis, these cultural forms reveal 
themselves as not distinct spheres, but as expressions of nineteenth-century 
capitalism in the metropolis. Thus, on nineteenth-century German writer Friedrich 
Gerstäcker's tale ‘Die versunkene Stadt’ (1852), which depicts a city sunken 
underwater, populated by near-anthropomorphic fish, Benjamin writes  
If a work of literature, an imaginative composition, could arise from repressed 
economic contents in the consciousness of a collective, as Freud says it can 
from sexual contents in an individual consciousness, then [here] we would have 
before our eyes the consummate sublimation of the arcades, with their bric-a-
brac growing rankly out of their showcases. Even the vitreous radiance of the 
globes of the street lamps, the utter pomp and splendor of gas lighting, enters 
into this undersea world of Gerstäcker's... [R2,2] (AP, 540). 
Benjamin makes a dual point here. On the one hand, Gerstäcker’s tale itself 
functions for Benjamin as an expression of repressed, unconscious collective wishes 
- in other words, it sublimates the objects and dreamlike atmosphere encountered in 
the arcades. Benjamin bases his reflections on his reading of Freud, speculating that 





what is at stake is no longer (just) sexual or libidinal contents, but economic ones.124 
In turn, we might speculate that this is because, as individual libido is concerned 
with survival and pleasure, these drives or principles are collectively expressed in the 
economic sphere, which mediates the meeting of needs and thus the survival of the 
social body. The unconscious of the collective, then, is a repository of the economic 
form of its age. Art and other cultural production thus emerge as a sublimation of 
this repressed economic sphere, analogous to the way sexual impulses are 
sublimated in individuals in Freud. This is the second aspect of Benjamin’s 
speculation. 
 This shows us how central Marx is to not only the theoretical underpinnings of the 
Arcades Project, but specifically the Freudian, psychoanalytic dimension of 
Benjamin's engagement with the nineteenth century: in the unconscious of the 
collective, the economic is repressed, that is, the mode and relations of their 
production, and cultural products as deformed expressions of this repressed content.  
At the same time, Benjamin is interested in the way in which psychoanalytic themes 
are also latently present in Marx, as evinced in the following passage:  
Reform of consciousness not through dogmas but through the analysis of 
mystical consciousness that is unclear to itself, whether it appears in a religious 
or a political form. Then people will see [then it will become apparent] that the 
world has long possessed the dream of a thing [of which it only needs to 
possess the consciousness in order really to possess it] [N5a, 1] (AP, 467).125  
                                               
124 It should be noted that Freud’s model of libido is non-metaphorically an economic one.  
125  See also Cohen (1993, 24) “Marx uses dream rhetoric to emphasize that ideological representation 
is subjective distortion. As Althusser comments on this use, ‘Ideology is conceived as a pure illusion, 
a pure dream, i.e. as nothingness. All its reality is external to it. Ideology is thus thought as an 
imaginary construction whose status is exactly like the theoretical status of the dream among writers 
before Freud’(…) When Benjamin, in contrast, characterizes the products of the superstructure as 





This quote contains some of the elements that Benjamin also takes from Freud's 
Interpretation of Dreams: analysis of unconscious contents, which are repressed and 
then expressed in a deformed fashion in social forms, and a conceptualisation of this 
as dream. It follows that Benjamin in the Arcades Project, starting with the expose 
of 1935, conceptualises his attempt to analyse the whole of the nineteenth century as 
a “dreaming collective” and its “wish images” as a form of historical materialism. 
Benjamin fuses together a heterodox reading of both the Marxist dynamism of 
dialectics and the psychic dynamism of conflicting drives in Freud.126 
In what follows, I examine some aspects of Freud's account in the Interpretation of 
Dreams that point to the text's fracturing of the subject, before tracing Benjamin's 
reworking of Freud's concept of the dream and dream analysis in the move from an 
individual to a collective dream. I also discuss the tension between Freud and 
Benjamin on the status of dream content/images relative to dream work/analysis. As 
we shall see, while Benjamin at times seems to be drawing from a pre-Freudian 
psychology that sees dreams as originating in somatic function, he ultimately 
transforms both, taking us far away from the merely somatic, or rather, the somatic 
conceptualised as nothing but bodily functions that translate directly into dream 
images. Rather, via Freud, Benjamin comes to view the expand the psychic to 
encompass the body, without therefore fully psychologising the somatic.   
 
 
                                               
we might call Freud's Copernican Revolution (Benjamin too conceives of his historiographical 
enterprise as a Copernican revolution)”. 
126 As Cohen (2005) points out, “In the version of ‘Paris, the Capital of the Nineteenth Century’ sent 
to Adorno, Benjamin deleted the sentence making explicit the Marxist dialogue in which his 
collective dream intervenes. Nonetheless, he retains his use of psychoanalytic vocabulary to revise a 





1. Freud's Dream 
One of the most puzzling features of dreams, Freud notes, is that they are abnormal 
psychical phenomena, but nevertheless form part of every normal persons’ psychic 
life. This is one of many indications of the slippage between the normal and 
psychopathological in his work. Dreams point to the central split of the subject into 
conscious and unconscious; they reveal that we are not “master in our own house” 
(SE16, 43). On this contradiction, Freud writes, 
Our scientific consideration of dreams starts off from the assumption that they 
are products of our own mental activity. Nevertheless the finished dream strikes 
us as something alien to us. We are so little obliged to acknowledge our 
responsibility for it that [in German] we are just as ready to say ‘mir hat 
geträumt’ [‘I had a dream’ literally ‘a dream came to me’] as ‘ich habe 
geträumt’ [‘I dreamt’]. (SE4, 48) 
This observation sets the scene for his introduction of the unconscious generation of 
dreams – rooted in a psychic agency we can never fully encounter, or 'know', dreams 
carry with them something of the strangeness of that psychic faculty. Freud stresses 
the uncontrollable, involuntary character of dream images. This cognition in images 
is typical of the dream, and delineates it from deliberate, waking mental activity, 
characterised by thinking in concepts. They arise unbidden, as “involuntary ideas” 
(SE4, 71), which may strike the waking mind as absurd or even immoral. While the 
latter in particular are experienced as running counter to the waking moral compass 
of the dreamer, all other dream images are characterised by their strangeness. This is 
at the root of the sense of the alien quality of dreams: they seem to originate from 
elsewhere, indicating an other, beyond and sometimes running counter to the 
subject's own, conscious volition. Rather than 'willing' the dream, it comes to one, 
calling into question intentionality, and thus the conscious mind, or what Freud was 





The main characteristic of the dream is thus the subject's inability to control its 
mental images. In this, the dream operates akin to perception - the dreamer 
experiences dreams as something that unfolds, a process to which she is exposed. 
Instead of constituting intentional, rational thought, the dream hallucinates, that is, it 
replaces thoughts with hallucinations – experiences that are perceived as real, even 
though they are not. This again points to the limits and fallibility of consciousness 
and the existence of other agencies within the psyche.  
As Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen (1988, 3) observes, the proposal that the subject is split 
from the start is the “fundamental hypothesis of psychoanalysis”. Analysis reveals 
the conscious mind as being far from the originary source of ideas - and not all of 
them are present to or even directly accessible by it. In this unconscious, an alien 
element is introduced into the subject: “The cogitatio - Freud's term for it is the 
psychical – exceeds and overflows consciousness at every turn, where consciousness 
is understood as certainty and presence of self in representation. This thinking thinks 
without me, without ceasing to think, moreover (as we see, for example, when it 
calculates or makes a joke)” (Borch-Jacobsen 1988, 4). Nevertheless, “that other 
subject is simultaneously the same as the subject-of-consciousness. The otherness 
labelled "unconscious" is an intimate otherness, if only because the unconscious (or 
the unconsciousness) of the subject is at stake.” (Borch-Jacobsen 1988, 6)”. He 
claims this does not indicate that there is no (one) subject; rather we are dealing with 
a unitary, yet split, subject: “In this sense, the cleavage or division of the subject that 
psychoanalysis keeps talking about takes place against a background of unity, a 
unitary subject” and points to The Interpretation of Dreams where the dreamer, in 
relation to the dream-wish, is characterised by Freud as “’an amalgamation of two 
separate people who are linked by some important common element’ (Dreams, pp. 
580-81, I)” (Borch-Jacobsen,1988 6-7). 
Freud's step-by-step revelation of the other actors on the psychic stage besides 
consciousness – the unconscious, which provides the dream-wish and the material 





later the id-ego-superego model, all constitute fractures in the concept of the subject. 
At the same time, dreams and other unconsciously-grounded psychic phenomena 
such as the many 'everyday' psychopathologies (e.g. slips of the tongue) have a 
relationship to reality; that is, waking life, consciousness. However, as we have seen, 
this relationship is not a straightforward one. The further ‘agencies’ and processes 
are introduced to account for the circuitous route taken by the dream-wish in its path 
to consciousness – chief among them repression and censorship.  
The proximity of these concepts to the political arena is not lost on Freud, who more 
than once takes recourse to analogies of sovereigns and subjects to illustrate the 
workings of the psyche, such as when he formulates the address of psychoanalysis to 
the subject in the following terms:  
‘You behave like an absolute ruler who is content with the information supplied 
him by his highest officials and never goes among the people to hear their 
voice. Turn your eyes inward, look into your own depths, learn first to know 
yourself! Then you will understand why you were bound to fall ill; and 
perhaps, you will avoid falling ill in future’. (SE17, 143) 
We see here in Freud's writing the connection between the subject, always teetering 
on the brink of a relapse into the narcissism that was its first state of being, and 
Benjamin's writing on the inauguration of the subject in the figure of the Baroque 
sovereign, discussed in Chapter 1.127 
                                               
127 Interestingly, Freud also makes reference to the latent wish as a “dream capitalist”: 
A daytime thought may very well play the part of entrepreneur for a dream; but the entrepreneur, 
who, as people say, has the idea and the initiative to carry it out, can do nothing without capital; he 
needs a capitalist who can afford the outlay, and the capitalist who provides the psychical outlay for 
the dream is invariably and indisputably, whatever may be the thoughts of the previous  day, a wish 





The unconscious stores infinitely more than is accessible directly by the psychic 
tyrant of consciousness, and finds ways around its repression. Freud speaks of the 
hypermnestia of dreams, revealed in analysis: “dreams have at their command 
memories which are inaccessible in waking life” (SE4, 12). Thus, what surfaces in 
the dream is not mere hallucinations in the sense of bearing no relation to waking 
life. Rather, they express something – but in distorted form. This distortion relates to 
the form as much as the contents of the dream - ‘Dreams yield no more 
than fragments [Bruchstücke] of reproductions; and this is so general a rule that 
theoretical considerations may be based on it’ (SE4, 21). The dream-work's fourfold 
mechanisms of condensation, displacement, censorship and presentability include a 
fifth – that of fragmentation. For Freud, ‘dream memory’ is thus infinitely more than 
mimesis, that is, the mere reproduction of memory-contents. Indeed, recall in dream 
is often fragmentary (with the notable exception of traumatic experience). This is in 
part due to the dream-work's imperative to distort the latent wish, and its use of “day 
residues” as raw materials to express something else, but also relates to memory 
itself – the unconscious stores contents in such a way that they require translation to 
be integrated into the order of the waking mind. 
 
The crucial distinction introduced by Freud concerns the manifest content of the 
dream, which is not the same as the latent dream thoughts. As discussed above, this is 
the result of the interaction of the different psychic agencies involved in the formation 
– and subsequent interpretation - of the dream. Freud names as the central and most 
peculiar characteristic of his dream-theory “the derivation of dream-distortion from an 
                                               
On this striking passage, see Tomšič (2015,106f) Tomšič posits that Freud’s dream work functions 
analogously to Marx’s thought, suggesting Freud develops a labour theory of the unconscious 






internal conflict, a kind of inner dishonesty” (SE14, 20) – the subject is not true to 
itself. Lindner suggests that “in this manner, Freud’s Interpretation opens a suggestive 
way to enable one to read oneself, so to speak insidiously, via one’s own unconscious” 
(Lindner 2008, 153, transl. mine). Analysis ‘dismembers’ the manifest dream content 
in order to allow the latent content to become intelligible. 
However, Freud wavers on the relative status of manifest dream images versus latent 
dream thoughts. While he sometimes dismisses the dream itself in favour of what lies 
‘behind’ or ‘underneath’ it in the latent wish, the importance of the manifest material 
frequently resurfaces in his own writing. Importantly, there is no instrumental 
rationality to be found in dreams – the dream may express something, but this 
‘something’ is not in itself rational, it does not obey the same laws as conscious 
thought, and neither is the dream-wishes’ path to expression governed by a 
straightforward teleology. Dreams are more than the latent dream-thoughts which they 
process, and Freud notes “how far removed it is from the purpose of a dream to 
produce attempted solutions of the life-task. Dreams are only a form of thinking; one 
can never reach an understanding of this form by reference to the content of the 
thoughts; only an appreciation of the dream-work will lead to that understanding”. 
(SE14, 65). The dream itself is thus always in excess; any insight into it is not 
immanent to the content of the dream-thoughts alone. Freud highlights the central 
importance of dreamwork – not just the static content but the dynamic process of their 
generation, and what they obscure. What matters is precisely not the dream images in 
themselves; they present a riddle, something to be solved – consciously. At the same 
time, this ‘solving’ of the puzzle does not result in the dream being revealed as taking 
part in a grand project of individual improvement, or bringing the subject closer to the 
generation of “meaning” in its life. Rather, it reveals a glimpse of the unconscious, 
and more besides: the dream expresses the latent wish in distorted form, but also the 
work of the different agencies, and the intra-psychic conflict itself, thus demonstrating 






Stella Sandford identifies two types of dream interpretation that run parallel in the 
Interpretation of Dreams: “that based on the archaeological model and that in which 
the dream itself (as a finished piece, rather than a collection of broken-up bits) is 
understood as a fragment in the Romantic sense” (Sandford 2016, 29). The former 
model aims at a reconstructive analysis that can be made into a synthesis: “the 
perfectly intelligible, rational kernel of the dream which can become an object of 
knowledge” (Sandford 2016, 29). As Freud summarises, it is the task of the 
interpretation of dreams to restore “the connections which the dream-work has 
destroyed” (SE4, 312) and thus allow the latent meaning of the dream to come to the 
fore. 
Sandford also identifies a second view of dreams in the Interpretation, which 
“accepts none of these distinctions or conceptions. On this second view, ‘the dream’s 
the thing’; it is not a false front. The fact that it says more than it says is more 
important than any one thing that it might be made to say through the process of 
interpretation” (Sandford 2016, 32). As I will discuss below, this would bring Freud 
even closer to Benjamin's use of the dream.128 Benjamin concurrently draws from 
the ‘archaeological’ model in conceptualising interpretation as a way to bring into 
consciousness repressed unconscious contents. Moreover, this model itself is split 
into a strand focused on excavating an underlying fragmented truth (in the non-
Romantic sense), and that which aims at constructing a new truth, which is where its 
emancipatory potential lies. Taken together, both models of interpretation reveal the 
subject as fractured, and both are important for Benjamin.  
                                               
128 Sandford's account of Freud's dream as a fragment would also see it draw close to Benjamin's 
early, romantically-inflected concept of criticism, present in e.g. ‘The Task of the Translator’ (1923): 
“The relation of interpretation to such a complex structure is less an overlay or addition than the 
‘completion’ of one of its threads, just as with the Early Romantic concept of criticism which 
‘completes’ the work. The dream interpretation then becomes a fragment in its own right. Further 
interpretations make up more fragments, which together make up a system of fragments, which is, 






2. Benjamin's Dream 
 
a) Unconscious versus Bodily Processes 
For Freud in the Interpretation of Dreams, none of the somatic explanations of 
dream-generation satisfactorily establish a causal link between the stimulus and the 
dream content – dream images are overdetermined rather than mimetic. Freud sums 
up the position of the authors of the somatic school as follows: “Dreams are a 
reaction to the disturbance of sleep brought about by a stimulus—a reaction, 
incidentally, which is quite superfluous” (SE4, 78). Freud's account in the 
‘Metapsychology of Dreams’ (1915) supplementing and summarising some of his 
earlier work, theorises the process of the projection of these physical impulses into 
psychic images in order to perpetuate sleep: “the internal demand which was striving 
to occupy him has been replaced by an external experience, whose demand has been 
disposed of. A dream is, therefore, among other things, a projection: an 
externalization of an internal process” (SE14, 223).  
Crucially, Freud asserts that the somatic theory is unable to satisfactorily account for 
the specific choice in dream-image. Against this, he stresses the importance of 
interpretation, which is foreclosed by the somatic theorists: “for ‘interpreting’ a 
dream implies assigning a ‘meaning’ to it—that is, replacing it by something which 
fits into the chain of our mental acts as a link having a validity and importance equal 
to the rest” (SE4, 96). The “scientific” theories of the dream, in contrast, view 
dreams as a purely somatic, and thus not psychic, process.  
In a passage expanding on the theoretical foundations for his understanding of the 
nineteenth century as a dream in Convolute K of the Arcades Project, Benjamin 
diverges, at first glance, quite significantly from Freud, in fact ostensibly returning to 
one of the popular theories for the origins of dreams Freud set out to refute in his 





Attempt to develop Giedion's thesis. ‘In the nineteenth century;’ he writes, 
‘construction plays the role of the subconscious’; Wouldn’t it be better to say 
‘the role of bodily processes’ – around which ‘artistic’ architectures gather, like 
dreams around the framework of physiological processes? [Kla,7] (AP, 391).  
He here puts forward an understanding of the genesis of dreams centred around 
“bodily”, “physiological processes”, proceeding to characterise sleep as “the 
macrocosmic journey through [the] body” (AP, 389), going as far as suggesting this 
heightened awareness of bodily functions and processes generate “illusion or dream 
imagery which accounts for them” (AP, 389).  These reflections on the relationship 
between the sub-or unconscious, the body and its processes, and the translation of 
individual-psychoanalytic concepts to the collective and the status of material and 
cultural production are to form a central web of questions for Benjamin. On closer 
examination, we can see more links between Freud and Benjamin on this point than 
a cursory examination might make us think. 
It should be noted, first, that Benjamin’s account is not entirely inconsistent with 
Freud’s own account of dream images in the Interpretation of Dreams. Freud admits 
that dreams often reveal unconscious knowledge, which also explains their 
seemingly “prophetic” character (SE4, 34). Freud allows a role for the physical in 
dream-generation, acknowledging in particular the issue of dreams as hypersensitive 
to physical illness. In the Interpretation of Dreams, Freud notes that Aristotle and 
Hippocrates both knew the characteristic of “dream life” that betrays the first 
changes of a physical illness. This is taken up again in the ‘Metapsychology of 
Dreams’, where Freud conceptualises the dreamer as a hypochondriac, experiencing 
minor physiological changes as through a magnifying glass. This intrinsic narcissism 





into the self, is what equips it with this diagnostic capacity.129  
Additionally, Freud allows for somatic excitations to make it into the dream under 
certain conditions, thus integrating the somatic model – whose correctness, he 
stresses, he does not dispute, merely its adequacy (SE4, 221) – with his theory of the 
wish-fulfilment of the dream. As “a dream appears to be a reaction to everything that 
is simultaneously present in the sleeping mind as currently active material” (SE4, 
228), it follows that somatic stimulus, too, can enter the dream. When it does, “it 
means that it has been possible to find ideational material to serve as the content of 
the dream of such a sort as to be able to represent both kinds of source of the 
dream—the somatic and the psychical” (SE4, 228). A degree of intensity is 
necessary for this – in the “extreme case” that it does happen, the somatic forms a 
kernel or core within the dream-material “a wish-fulfilment is then looked for that 
shall correspond to this nucleus, just as (see above [p. 228]) intermediate ideas are 
looked for between two psychical dream- stimuli. To that extent it is true that in a 
number of dreams the content of the dream is dictated by the somatic element” (SE4, 
238). 
While thus admitting that in some cases the somatic is at the ‘core’ of the dream, 
what differentiates Freud's position in this text from that of his forebears is that he 
distances himself from the epiphenomenalism of his predecessors, that is, the notion 
that it is the body that directly produces ‘mere’ mental side effects.130 Dreams and 
                                               
129 Note also the proximity to the processes of mourning and melancholia here. 
130 See e.g. Geert Panhuysen (1998) for a detailed reconstruction of Freud’s early departure from the 
reductionist stance of his predecessors that would conceptualise psychology as neurophysiology. 
Against many of Freud’s mid-twentieth century critics, Panhuysen maintains that this was not 
characteristic of Freud’s position even in 1895, as he observed that “[p]sychiatric symptoms cannot 
be reduced to demonstrable changes in the brain. Where changes in the brain can be found, they did 
not indicate the nature of the symptoms” (Panhuysen 1998, 28). Panhuysen also discusses what he 





other psychic phenomena, for Freud, are overdetermined, generated by stimuli that 
derive from the psyche as well as from the body. In the Interpertation of Dreams, 
Freud establishes a model where the somatic stimuli are taken up into the psychic, 
where they are merged with other, psychic “day remainders”. Unless they are of 
unusual intensity, they are “treated like some cheap material always ready to hand, 
which is employed whenever it is needed, in contrast to a precious material which 
itself pre- scribes the way in which it shall be employed” (SE4, 237). What occurs in 
this passage is a psychologisation of somatic stimuli or excitations in the dream, 
reasserting the primacy of the psychic.  
However, it is important to note that Freud did not therefore side-line the role of the 
body in psychoanalysis, or subscribe to a wholesale split between the two: The body 
is important as a source of excitation, and thus integrated with the psychic. This 
holds true for the ‘normal’ development of the ego and its drives, as Freud discusses 
in The Ego and the Id (1923), and in ‘ Instincts and their Vicissitudes’, where the 
drive “ appears to us as…on the boundary between the mental and the somatic, as 
the psychic representative of the excitation arising from the inner body that enters 
into the mind, as a measure of the amount of work imposed to the mind in 
consequence of its connection to the body”. (SE14,  121). This is the conception of 
drives we also see at play in Beyond the Pleasure Principle – the overarching aim is 
the reduction of excitation, the source of which is somatic, but indivisible from its 
mediation at the psychic level. 
This model also applies to the psychoneuroses “ - hysteria, obsessional neurosis and 
melancholia – show us that the body is inseparable from the psyche” (Cohen 2015, 
214). From the perspective of the psychoneuroses, then, what the body feels and 
shows always means something, and it is this ascription of meaning that enables 
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Freud to discover the therapeutic value of verbal interpretation. The clinician’s task 
becomes something like a translation to the patient of the unconscious sense of her 
body’s strange and insistent messages. (Cohen 2015, 215). Thus, Cohen concludes 
that “[ps]ychoanalysis does not allow us to think of the body as a raw biological 
entity, in isolation from the psyche which processes its experiences” (Cohen 2015, 
214).  
As noted above, while this model of neurosis was to be the dominant one for 
psychoanalysis, Freud also conceptualised the so-called ‘actual’ neuroses, 
“characterised by physical symptoms that “signify only themselves. Where in 
hysteria such symptoms can be understood as encryptions of memory and fantasy, in 
‘actual’ neurosis the body lacks any metaphoric capacity” (Cohen 2015, 216). 131 As 
observed above, “it is precisely in their defiance of sense that the ‘actual’ neuroses 
prove to be of real import to psychoanalysis” (Cohen 2015, 217), in their broken 
relationship with the psychic and their entwinement with the psychoneuroses. 
Again it becomes apparent how Benjamin’s reflections on the destabilisation of the 
boundary between body and psyche are influenced by Freud, who “suggests that 
rather than being discrete entities, ‘actual’ and psycho-neuroses may be intimately 
related to one another. The symbolic meanings of psychoneurosis may wrap 
themselves around a kernel of untranslatable, ‘actual’ bodily noise” (Cohen 2015, 
227), signifying the point where analysis can go no further. It is via this account of 
the interplay between actual and psychoneuroses that we can understand Benjamin’s 
tentative reformulation of Giedion’s dictum cited towards the beginning of this 
                                               
131 See e.g. Cohen (2015), and Irma Dosamantes-Beaudry (1997) on the body-self, for a discussion of 
the different paths of approaching the interrelation of the somatic and the psychic self taken by 





section: bodily processes give rise to symptoms, and their mediation by the psyche at 
times breaks down in modernity.  
We are thus dealing with two levels of suffering: that of the symptoms themselves, 
and that of being unable to even psychically make sense of the excessive somatic 
tension. To acknowledge that the “translation” of the material, the somatic, is not 
always fully successful, and that even in its failure it is again bound up with the 
psychic, draws close to Freud’s recognition of the excess of the dream. Freud 
describes the moment where the meaning of the dream becomes unintelligible even 
in analysis as its “navel, the spot where it reaches down into the unknown” (SE5, 
525) – the point beyond which meaning remains elusive. 
 
b) Benjamin's Psychic Body: From Individual to Collective Unconscious 
and Dreams  
Benjamin draws on the dynamic between psychic and somatic that is present in 
Freud’s thought in his work on dreams in the arcades. Benjamin writes that the 
“overfull stomach” of the sleeper   
“does not find its ideological superstructure in the contents of the dream - and it 
is exactly the same with the economic conditions of life for the collective. It 
interprets these conditions; it explains them. In the dream, they find their 
expression; in the awakening, their interpretation” (AP, 854-855).  
It is obvious that Benjamin is not advocating a return to the somatic model critiqued 
in the Interpretation of Dreams here. While those thinkers use the argument of its 
physical origin as a way to dismiss it entirely and rob the dream of its “dignity” as a 
psychic, rather than a physical, process, it becomes clear that Benjamin, following 
Freud, does view the dream as a psychic phenomenon: something to be interpreted. 





in Benjamin’s modus operandi with psychoanalytical figures … the corporeal 
origins, lost in the course of the development of psychoanalytical theory, are 
brought back more strongly into focus, albeit without reversing the break with 
the model of a simple and straightforward decipherability of bodily signs 
(Weigel 1996, 23). 
Benjamin thus draws on both the strand of psychoanalysis, more forcefully pursued 
by Freud, that investigates the psychoneuroses, and the earlier, latent path of the 
‘actual’ neuroses. As Benjamin puts it in a first sketch for the Arcades Project, the 
dreamer 
has this in common with the madman: the noises emanating from within the 
body, which for the salubrious individual converge in a steady surge of health 
and bring on sound sleep if they are not overlooked, dissociate for the one who 
dreams. Blood pressure, intestinal churn, heartbeat, muscle sensations become 
individually perceptible for him and demand the explanation which delusion or 
dream image holds ready. (AP, 389) 
Freud notes in the Interpretation of Dreams that some of the somatic theorists before 
him posit that only pathological somatic excitation is noted in the dream – a 
conception to which he here is more favourably inclined. Benjamin follows this 
theory but modifies it, expanding it to the “dreaming collective”: “This sharpened 
receptivity is a feature of the dreaming collective, which settles into the arcades as 
into the insides of its own body. We must follow in its wake in order to expound the 
nineteenth century as its dream vision” (AP, 842). At stake is thus the pathology of 
the social organism, which is translated by the dreaming collective into dream-
images. This would seem, at face value, to merely expand the somatic model of 
dream generation, with the social organism functioning analogously to that of the 
individual. However, we also see that the intervention of a psyche is presupposed 
here – the explanation that is provided in the dream image or illusion is demanded 





The analogy between the dreamer / his stomach and the collective / economic 
conditions becomes possible in the 19th century where, due to specific historical 
developments of Capitalism, fractured subjects are pulled together in the modern 
city. Here, the model of dream generation of the individual is thus extended to the 
“dreaming collective”, which “through the arcades, communes with its own insides” 
(AP, 389).132 The relationship between inside and outside, that which generates the 
dream image and that which is generated by it, is further complicated in a variation 
on this formulation: the methodological injunction to “expound the nineteenth 
century - in fashion and advertising, in buildings and politics - as the outcome of its 
dream visions” (AP, 389 [emphasis mine]). While what was previously an outcome 
of the internal workings of the collective, represented in the dream, is now internal to 
it: “architecture, fashion - yes, even the weather - are, in the interior of the collective, 
what the sensoria of organs, the feeling of sickness or health, are inside the 
individual” (AP, 389). What, then, is the “inside” of the dreaming collective, if the 
fashion, politics, and other cultural products of the nineteenth century, indeed, the 
century in toto, are the outcome of the dream visions – and at the same time 
dreaming signifies a communion with the insides of the dreaming collective? What 
is the social, collective equivalent of the physical body of the individual to which 
dream images correspond? 
Again Benjamin expands from the individual to the collective, this time using the 
concept of “consciousness as patterned and chequered by sleep and waking” (AP, 
389)133 and states that the phenomena of the nineteenth century “preserve this 
                                               
132 The conceptualisation of a psychologised body reprises Benjamin's early ‘Schemata zum 
psychophysischen Problem’ (1922-3), which begins the first section ‘Geist und Leib’, with the 
statement that “they are identical, distinct merely as ways of perceiving, not as objects” (GS6, 78, 
transl.mine). The formulation “Geist-Leib” is also to be found in Benjamin’s note ‘Über das Grauen 
I’ [On Horror I] (GS6, 76) where their identity is stressed once more. With the aid of Freud's concepts 
of the unconscious and the psyche, Benjamin elaborates on this early concept in the Arcades Project, 
elucidating its relationship to the “dreaming collective” of the nineteenth century. 
133 “It is one of the tacit suppositions of psychoanalysis that the clear-cut antithesis of sleeping and 





unconscious, amorphous dream configuration, they are as much natural processes as 
digestion, breathing, and the like. They stand in the cycle of the eternally selfsame, 
until the collective seizes upon them in politics and history emerges” [KI,5] (AP, 
389-390). Weigel suggests that while Benjamin does explicitly refer to 
psychoanalysis, in the early phases of the Arcades Project, “Benjamin does not yet 
make use of the term or the concept of the unconscious”, instead spatialising the 
“relationship between dream and waking or dream and consciousness” (Weigel 
1996, 232). However, here, we are dealing with the dream configuration of the 
nineteenth century as “unconscious”, lending credence to the idea that Benjamin 
expands the psychic to the somatic rather than subsuming the latter under the former, 
as his previous formulation might lead us to think.  
Analogous to Benjamin's pronouncement on the destabilisation of the sleep-waking 
dichotomy in psychoanalysis, the distinction between the inside and the outside of 
the organism, the psyche and the body, are broken down here, so that we seem to 
deal with a “psychic body”. It seems as if Benjamin, rather than undertaking a 
“somatification” of the psychic, as it first appeared, is proposing a psychologisation 
of the social body, where the “translation” that takes place in the generation of dream 
images presupposes something other than merely the “noises and feelings of [the] 
insides” (AP, 389). This is further stressed in the sentence following Benjamin’s 
methodological announcement that the insights into consciousness of psychoanalysis 
need to be “transferred from the individual to the collective” (AP 389): the contents 
of the unconscious are akin to natural processes, but they can – and must – be 
brought into consciousness, what Benjamin elsewhere terms the “waking mind”, and 
crucially, seized upon “in politics” in order for history to emerge.  
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Benjamin here draws on Freud’s model of dream analysis, the making-conscious of 
what is expressed in the dream-thoughts in analysis. For Benjamin, however, the 
process of 'denaturing' these unconscious contents must also be a political act – to be 
seized collectively rather than merely explored at the level of the individual. This is 
made possible by the collectivising tendencies of the nineteenth century, the 
massification discussed in Chapter 3: the fracturing of the subject now shows a path 
towards a different reassembly of the pieces. Benjamin thus radicalises the 
individual focus of psychoanalytic praxis by heightening its latent political aspect. 
 
c) Ontogenesis versus Phylogenesis 
Benjamin is aware of the conceptual tension between the individual and the 
collective psyche. A passage from an article in surrealist journal Minotaure by writer 
and medical doctor Pierre Mabille, which Benjamin quotes in the Arcades Project, 
sheds some light on Benjamin's thinking on the issue. Here, the unconscious is 
conceptualised as phylogenetically structured, that is, containing “the mass of things 
learned in the course of the centuries and in the course of a life”, a “Vast submarine 
fund, in which all cultures, all studies, all proceedings of mind and will, all social 
uprisings, all struggles are collected in a formless mire”. Over the course of their 
‘sedimentation’ in history, “The passional elements of individuals have receded, 
dimmed. All that remain are the givens of the external world, more or less 
transformed and digested. It is of the external world that this unconscious is made” 
(AP, 396). These unconscious contents rupture into visibility “above all at moments 
of crisis or of social upheaval; it forms the great common ground, the reserve of 
peoples and individuals. Revolution and war, like a fever, are best suited to get it 
moving” (AP, 396-7). 
This passage contains many of the elements of Benjamin's dream theory: Dreams as 
a repository of past forms, the unconscious as composed of the external world, the 





formulation that further links the somatic and the psychic in the metaphor of 
“digestion”  and “circulation” in the “depths” of something that lies beyond the 
merely-psychic, merely-somatic, but a kind of primal, “subterranean” force. We see 
this model at play throughout the Arcades Project. Here, too, the psyche itself is 
revealed as not only socially constructed, but composed of “givens of the external 
world”, a subterranean fundus of transhistorical unconscious data that erupts in 
dreams and specifically at times of social strife. This version of the unconscious is 
associated with “oblivion”, that is, it is not consciously registered as apperception, 
nor can it be made fully conscious after the fact, but erupts to the surface from the 
depths – or is discovered when one digs into its substratum; a model consistent with 
Freud's. This is true for the individual as well as the collective – but Benjamin is 
interested more in the latter, consistent with Mabille’s pronouncement that “the 
psychology of the individual is now outmoded” (AP397). Suspended in the 
confrontation between the “visceral unconscious” and the “unconscious of oblivion” 
(AP, 396) – the first of which is predominantly individual, the second predominantly 
collective – the subject is revealed as a historical anomaly:  not only is the individual 
psyche divided within itself, it is also riven further by the eruption of “subterranean” 
contents external to itself. 
On the issue of the primacy of phylogenesis and the collective unconscious over 
ontogenesis and the individual, Benjamin is sometimes accused of drawing close to 
Jung. First and foremost among these critics is Theodor Adorno. However, Benjamin 
was well aware of the reactionary dimension of this concept in Jung, as is made clear 
in his correspondence. As he wrote to Fritz Lieb on July 9, 1937, “I had intended to 
write a critique of Jungian psychology, whose Fascist armature I had promised 
myself to expose” (C, 541). This project was scuppered by the Baudelaire essay; 
however, it is implicit in Benjamin's approach to the concept of the collective 
unconscious. Compare a letter to Scholem from August 5, 1937: “I have begun to 
delve into Jung's psychology - the devil's work through and through, which should 
be attacked with white magic” (C, 543). This ‘attack with white magic’, the critique 





of the concept – on the one hand, it serves to highlight that Capitalist society of the 
nineteenth century functions as an organism that is asleep, that is, not in control or 
even fully aware of its products. After all, one of the central theoretical premises of 
the Arcades Project is that “a work of literature, an imaginative composition, could 
arise from repressed economic contents in the consciousness of a collective, as Freud 
says it can from sexual contents in an individual consciousness” (AP, 540). Where 
the individual psyche produces thoughts, production of the collective one is to be 
thought economically, insofar as all material production under Capitalism falls under 
the category of the economic. The scope of its unconscious, too, is material, and vast 
– it draws on all of human history. 
 A critique of Jung's enthusiastic espousal of this archaism of the collective 
unconscious thus also serves to draw on the specificity and contingency of this form 
of socio-economic organisation: Specific images resonate at specific times and serve 
a specific function – that of perpetuating the sleep of Capitalism. As Margaret Cohen 
points out, Benjamin's project was far removed from “the antihistorical Jung from 
whom Benjamin was careful to dissociate himself” (Cohen 1993, 43). Weigel is thus 
right to observe that “[t]he dismissal of archaic images is evidence of the distance 
between Benjamin and Jung, with whose model of the ‘collective unconscious’ 
Benjamin’s talk of the ‘unconscious of the collective’ has nothing to do” (Weigel 
1996, 297). For Benjamin, Jung's archaism serves as another instance of the 
repetition-compulsion of attempting a return to an imaginary golden age. Its 
historical and political function are clear: Where for Benjamin, “The now of 
recognizability is the moment of awakening”, “Jung would like to distance [literally 
‘keep away’] awakening from the dream” [NI8,4] (AP, 486). 
Fortunately, Benjamin didn't have to turn to Jung for a conception of a phylogenetic 
repository of symbols and a collective psyche: It is to be found in Freud, who wrote 
in ‘Analysis Terminable or Interminable’: 
even before the ego exists, its subsequent lines of development, tendencies and 





particular psychic contents, such as symbolism, have no other source than that 
of hereditary transmission, and research in various fields of folk- psychology 
seems to justify the assumption that in archaic inheritance there are other, no 
less specialized, deposits from primitive human development. When we 
recognize that the peculiarities of the ego which we detect in the form of 
resistances may be not only acquired in defensive conflicts but transmitted by 
heredity, the topographical differentiation between ego and id loses much of its 
value for our investigations. (SE23, 240-1) 
Freud here expands on the theory of the id as a remnant of phylogenetic 
development to encompass certain contents of the ego – blurring the lines between 
ego and id, inherited and acquired characteristics, and individual and collective. 
Benjamin follows him in this in all respects in his reading of the nineteenth century 
in the Arcades Project, which, he states, are “structures in which we relive, as in a 
dream, the life of our parents and grandparents, as the embryo in the womb relives 
the life of animals” [D2a,l] (AP, 106). Thus, Benjamin undertakes a dream-narration 
of the nineteenth century in the Arcades Project in order to dispel the phylogenetic 
weight of tradition that prevents the truly new from coming to the fore.  
Benjamin modifies Freud’s concept of the phylogenetic element of the unconscious 
in historicising the re-emergence of the mythic134: Urgeschichte, the primal, surfaces 
in the nineteenth century under specific conditions – and it is a specific version of 
Urgeschichte, mediated by tradition, specifically that of the most recent generations, 
whose legacy is the most strongly felt. It is the culture of the generation dominant at 
a given point in time that must be overcome. In this, there perhaps appears to be an 
echo of the Freudian “killing of the father” at play.135 However, where for Freud in 
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Totem and Taboo, this murder haunts humanity and forms the moment at which 
morality is introduced, Benjamin, aims at a decisive break with the world of the 
parents. Just as Freud posits analysis as a means of overcoming hereditary psychic 
resistances and interrupting the psychic temporality where unconscious, ‘primitive’ 
contents are acted out in the present, Benjamin looks to an awakening from the 
dream-sleep of the nineteenth century. This concept of awakening is not without its 
complications and dangers – I will turn to these first before examining the 'true' 
awakening.  
 
3. False Dawn  
“The first tremors of awakening serve to deepen sleep”.  (AP, 863) 
While dreams are sites of wish-fulfilment, they are also sites of the iteration of 
trauma. With regard to the repetition of trauma in dreams, Freud notes in Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle that an exception exists to the principle that the dream is a wish-
fulfilment: the dreams “which occur in traumatic neuroses”, and “the dreams during 
psycho-analyses which bring to memory the psychical traumas of childhood”. These 
categories of dreams “arise, rather, in obedience to the compulsion to repeat, though 
it is true that in analysis that compulsion is supported by the wish…to conjure up 
again what has been forgotten and repressed. (BPP, 26). This shapes both 
Benjamin’s conceptualisation of the nineteenth century as a dream-filled sleep, and 
of its dreamwork. On this understanding, it is not just repressed wish-images, but 
also repetition-compulsion that is displayed in the dream. The analyst's task becomes 
disentangling these, and to look beyond both - to understand how to break the 
repetition of trauma, and to distil from the dream-thought the underlying wish, which 
only finds a false, compensatory fulfilment in the dream in order to perpetuate sleep. 
Lindner states that Benjamin misreads Freud's wish-fulfilment theory, quoting 





waking life that it made the latter more bearable (Lindner 2008, 152). This would 
explain nightmares, for, as Benjamin wrote in a fragmentary note, “These dreams 
fulfil our wish to be consoled for the inconveniences with which awakening presents 
us. Awakening from them, we find a situation that is bearable compared to that of 
the dream” (GS6, 209, transl. mine). Strikingly, Benjamin‘s account of Freuds 
statement seems to run directly counter to the actual description of the mechanism of 
wish-fulfilment in dreams in the Interpretation of Dreams, reprised again in the 
‘Metapsychology of Dreams’: the wish-fulfilling capacity of the dream (or other 
hallucination) is not just a diagnostic one, but shows us the latent wish as already 
fulfilled. This is grounded in the dreamwork's requirement of presentability. 
We might argue that Benjamin’s claim is still compatible with the idea of dreams as 
wish-fulfilment since, as Freud reminds us, the manifest mood of the dream is not 
necessarily the same as the latent one, and affects, just like dream symbols, are often 
revealed as their opposite only on analysis. Thus, to awaken and find one's situation 
preferable to that experienced in the dream does not conflict with the latter's wish-
fulfilling quality. An obvious objection is that neither does it account for it. 
However, Freud acknowledges in the 1911 revision to the Interpretation of Dreams 
that his theory of dreams as distorted wish-fulfilment is challenged by a class of 
dreams that, while not traumatic iterations as established in Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle, nevertheless seem to originate in no discernible wish and are unpleasant or 
torturous. Benjamin was probably referring to this passage and in particular the 
anecdote related by Freud to illustrate this caveat: the case of the poet Peter 
Rosegger, who for years dreams of being a tailor's apprentice every night. The dull 
routine of his subordinate position and the manual labour he performs in his dream 
contrasts with his comfortable bourgeois waking life in such a way that the latter 
seems even more rewarding. 
Freud admits that “In this series of dreams dreamt by an author who had been a 
journeyman tailor in his youth, it is hard to recognize the dominance of wish-





dreams he was still haunted by the shadow of an unhappy fife from which he had at 
last escaped”. He explains the occurrence of these dreams as grounded in the 
“conflict between a parvenu’s pride and his self-criticism” (SE5, 475) and that, in the 
service of the latter, it points to the existence of a class of “punishment dreams”. 
How, then, is wish-fulfilment to remain the universal driver of the dream, if a dream 
can be punitive? Freud solves this problem by introducing a masochistic tendency 
which yearns for punishment. In an addendum from 1930, Freud also points out that 
since his analysis of the personality into ego and superego in Group Psychology and 
the Analysis of the Ego (1921) it is possible to see these dreams as wish-fulfilments 
of the superego (SE5, 476). On this later model, the superego is thus identified as the 
agency that creates a wish for punishment, but this tendency is already noted in 
1900.136 
However, in the Interpretation, Freud also allows space for ostensibly painful or 
frightening dreams to fulfil a compensatory function: 
They are dreams of consolation for another kind of anxiety felt in sleep—the 
fear of dying. 'Departing' on a journey is one of the commonest and best 
authenticated symbols of death. These dreams say in a consoling way: 'Don't 
worry, you won't die (depart)', just as examination dreams say soothingly: 
'Don't be afraid, no harm will come to you this time either.' The difficulty of 
understanding both these kinds of dreams is due to the fact that the feeling of 
anxiety is attached precisely to the expression of consolation (SE5, 385). 
Benjamin links these two strands in Freud. Continuing after the above passage 
contested by Lindner, Benjamin speculates that this terror is grounded in a fear of 
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identified in ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, if we assume it is grounded in a traumatic episode in the 






death, which is compensated by projecting it onto objects that, while holding an even 
deeper terror, are nevertheless less certain to occur. Crucially, the compensatory 
function is sometimes expressed precisely in their nightmarish quality. Displaced 
wishes, compensation for real suffering, and traumatic repetition – the threefold 
function of the dream in psychic life we have encountered in both Freud and 
Benjamin so far. I will now examine the cause for this function. 
 
 “The Keeper of Sleep” 
In the Interpretation of Dreams, Freud repeatedly stresses the overwhelming wish of 
consciousness to remain asleep. This runs counter to any unconscious wishes that 
might surface in the course of dreaming, and likewise, as we have seen, to any 
somatic excitation: If the soul is forced to acknowledge impulses during sleep, “it 
seeks for an interpretation of them which will make the currently active sensation 
into a component part of a situation which is wished for and which is consistent with 
sleeping. The currently active sensation is woven into a dream in order to rob it of 
reality” (SE4, 234). Dreaming thus functions as a counter to awakening, a defense 
mechanism of the sleeping organism. Benjamin follows Freud in this when he notes 
on the back of a manuscript for his Kafka essay: “The efforts of the dreamer, who 
wants to move his little finger and who would in reality, if he accomplished this, 
awaken” (GSII, 1259, transl. mine). What demarcates the threshold between 
dreaming and waking life is thus the actual carrying out of an intention, in this 
instance of a physical movement.137 
In the dream, any psychic conflict arising from unfulfilled wishes is presented as 
already resolved and thus made to disappear. Freud writes that “All dreams are in a 
sense dreams of convenience: they serve the purpose of prolonging sleep instead of 
                                               





waking up. Dreams are the GUARDIANS of sleep and not its disturbers” (SE4, 
233). Thus it follows that the dream repels awakening. This protective-repellent 
function is also at play in secondary revision for Freud: 
When the thought ‘this is only a dream’ occurs during a dream…it is aimed at 
reducing the importance of what has just been experienced and at making it 
possible to tolerate what is to follow. It serves to lull a particular agency to 
sleep which would have every reason at that moment to bestir itself and forbid 
the continuance of the dream… It is more comfortable, however, to go on 
sleeping and tolerate the dream, because, after all, ‘it is only a dream’. (SE5, 
488) 
The realisation within the dream that one is dreaming, even more than the other 
aspects of dream-work, thus has a conservative function: its aim is to represses the 
stirrings of consciousness in the act of awakening by encouraging censorship to 
tolerate the dream. Where secondary revision fails to make the dream appear logical, 
it thus pursues the opposite track in highlighting the ‘unreal’ nature of what is 
dreamt. It can even go as far as performing interpretation from within the dream, 
which is only later, on waking analysis, revealed as forming part of the dream itself 
(SE5, 490). Thus dream-work seeps beyond the act of sleep into awakening, 
infiltrating the first waking thoughts, and provides a substitute interpretation of the 
dream in order to prevent a conscious analysis (SE5, 446). These dreams may thus 
have been interpreted already – but, crucially, wrongly.138 
                                               
138 Sandford notes that “Explicitly, Freud identifies secondary revision with what we might call bad 
interpretation, which for him means misinterpretation. It has, he writes, the function that ‘the poet 
maliciously ascribes to philosophers; it fills up the gaps in the dream-structure with shreds and 
patches’ (V, 490).” Against this, Sandford takes the position that this model of interpretation 
grounded in “secondary revision – cutting across the distinction between dream and waking thought, 
across dream construction and interpretation, across ‘work’ and ‘criticism’ – refers us to a much 





Where Sandford (2016, 33) conceptualises the possibility of this interpretation from 
within the dream as “the absolute point of indifference between dream-work and 
interpretation”, Benjamin draws from Freud's archaeological model as it allows him 
to assume a vantage point from which to analyse the nineteenth century. We can 
perhaps speak of a primary and a secondary interpretation. The first occurs within 
the dream, where (the Leibreiz is psychologised, that is, taken up by the psyche and 
connected with a previously-existing, infantile wish, or when) secondary revision 
intervenes and forces a false interpretation on the newly-awakened mind. The second 
interpretation takes place in the ‘archaeological’ model, where the waking mind only 
has access to the unconscious in the form of fragments, or ruins of the dream-world, 
and requires the perspective “from the far bank” (SW1, 444), as Benjamin puts it in 
his aphorism ‘Breakfast Room’ from One-Way Street. The aim is to arrive at a true 
analysis that allows the dream-thoughts to become “etwas durchdrungene[s]”, 
something permeated, as Benjamin puts it in the ‘Materials for the Expose of 1935’. 
Here, Benjamin reiterates his theoretical understanding of the nineteenth century as 
dream-world: “First dialectical stage: the arcade changes from a place of splendour 
to a place of decay. Second dialectical stage: the arcade changes from an 
unconscious experience to something consciously penetrated” (No 8.).139 At stake is 
thus the making-conscious of experience in the arcades, enabled by their decay into 
ruin. On this, Alexander Gelley refers to Benjamins Begriffe, where Heiner 
Weidmann lays out the problematic as follows: “What is involved is the possibility 
of modernity as a historical discontinuity: How, historically, is a truly epochal new 
beginning, a revolutionary reversal at all conceivable that would not merely—
undialectically—consist in a bad negation of the antecedent condition and thus 
remain merely illustrative?” (Gelley 2015, 184). In what follows, I shall examine 
two such ‘bad negations’: Art Nouveau and Surrealism. 
                                               
139 Allthough the German reads “etwas durchdrungenem” and does not explicitly mention the word 







In a fragment from his ‘Materials for the Expose of 1935’, Benjamin writes 
“Epitome [Type] of the false redemption: Jugendstil. It proves the law according to 
which effort brings about its opposite” (AP, 908) and, in an alternative to this 
formulation which made its way into the Arcades Project,  
in the end, the law according to which an action brings about an opposite 
reaction holds true for Jugendstil. The genuine liberation from an epoch, that is, 
has the structure of awakening in this respect as well: it is entirely ruled by 
cunning. Only with cunning, not without it, can we work free of the realm of 
dream. But there is also a false liberation; its sign is violence. From the 
beginning, it condemned Jugendstil to failure. Dream Structure. [G1,7] (AP, 
173) 
The mention of the ‘law’ carries echoes of a mechanical understanding of dialectics. 
Operating within the causal temporality of the nineteenth century, Art Nouveau only 
dreams of a liberation and lacks the ruse, or ‘cunning’, necessary for true liberation to 
succeed, for a true awakening to take place. In this, we see the influence of Freud’s 
concept of the inversion of all psychic values in the dream-work’s disfigurement and 
inversion of the dream-wish. This inversion serves the twin purposes of 
representability and bypassing psychic censorship. However, at the same time, the 
inversion aids the purposes of censorship in ‘paralysing’ the dream's intelligibility. 
Labouring within the realm of the dream, like the attempt to interpret the dream in 
secondary revision, Jugendstil cannot but express the opposite of what it aims at. 
Gelley discusses the pitfalls of awakening:  
The summons to awakening, while it represents one aspect of what I have 





When Benjamin writes, “The imminent awakening is poised, like the wooden 
horse of the Greeks, in the Troy of dreams” (GS 5: 495 [K 2, 4]; TAP 392), this 
awakening does not so much evoke the triumph of the Greeks over the Trojans, 
but rather signals the effort to maintain “the Troy of dreams.” The implication 
is that awakening, while apparently dispelling the dream, may well be an effort 
to hold on to it. Much depends on recognizing the ambiguity of this figure” 
(Gelley 2015, 188).   
Benjamin links the dangers of not awakening to a historical oversleeping on the part 
of the ruling class: “The notion of eternal return appeared at a time when the 
bourgeoisie no longer dared count on the impending development of the system of 
production which they had set going. The thought of Zarathustra and of eternal 
recurrence belongs together with the embroidered motto seen on pillows: ‘Only a 
quarter hour’” (AP, 117). The stasis of the bourgeois class is thus linked to its 
philosophy of history, and expressed in the interior of the bourgeois home, on a 
pillow whose motto functions a knowing wink – its sleep will last considerably 
longer than proclaimed.  
 
Surrealism 
A second movement Benjamin examines for its relationship to sleep, dreaming and 
awakening is Surrealism. Benjamin was initially drawn to it for its insight into 
alternative modes of perception and cognition, its proximity to objects, and its 
recognition of the energies stored in the outmoded. Benjamin credits Breton with the 
discovery of the” revolutionary energies that appear in the ‘outmoded’- in the first 
iron constructions, the first factory buildings, the earliest photos, objects that have 
begun to be extinct, grand pianos, the dresses of five years ago, fashionable 
restaurants when the vogue has begun to ebb from them” (SW2.1, 210). In stressing 
the discovery of the importance of the outmoded, it is clear that Benjamin is 





on “being on the track of things” instead of the psyche, which appears in the Arcades 
Project140, is identified with the surrealists in ‘Dream Kitsch’. Crucially, the 
surrealist mode of apperception and experience was capable of decentering the 
subject:  
Language takes precedence. Not only before meaning. Also before the self [vor 
dem Ich]. In the world's structure dream loosens individuality like a bad tooth. 
This loosening of the self by intoxication is, at the same time, precisely the 
fruitful, living experience that allowed these people to step outside the domain 
of intoxication. (SW2.1, 208) 
At stake in surrealism and intoxication, like in the dream, is a state of being that 
allows for the constraints of individuality to become undone. However, Surrealism is 
ultimately incapable of remaining outside of the altered state of intoxication, and 
thus proved unsatisfactory for Benjamin, who was looking for a moment of truth in 
these states rather than seeing them as a resolution in and of themselves.141 Of the 
genesis of Surrealism, Benjamin writes in the Arcades Project: “The father of 
Surrealism was Dada; its mother was an arcade” [01,3], and “Surrealism was born in 
an arcade. And under the protection of what muses!” [01,2] (AP, 82), among which 
he numbers “libido”. Thus, Benjamin links Surrealism to the unanalysed psychic 
                                               
140 See Chapter 3 for a discussion of this passage. 
141 Already in 1928, Benjamin wrote to Scholem:  
In order to lift the work [the Passagen-Werk] out of an all too ostentatious proximity to the 
mouvement surrealiste that could become fatal to me, as natural and well-founded as it is, I have had 
to expand it more and more in my mind, and make it so universal in its most particular, tiniest 
frameworks that it would enter upon the inheritance of surrealism even in a purely chronological 
respect and precisely with all the absolute powers of a philosophical Fortinbras” (C, 342).  
In addition to the point about surrealism, we see here once again Benjamin’s identification of 






process, as well as the arcade, the epitome of nineteenth-century Capitalism. This is 
also revealed in its connection to fashion, in whose “mute impenetrable 
nebula…where the understanding cannot follow”, “the collective dream energy of a 
society has taken refuge with redoubled vehemence”. Thus, “Fashion is the 
predecessor – no, the eternal deputy – of surrealism” (AP, 64). To link surrealism to 
fashion in this way is to consign it to the status of yet another outgrowth of the 
“dialectics of the new and the ever-same” characteristic of nineteenth-century 
Capitalism.  
Thus Benjamin quickly became invested in a conceptual liquidation of the surrealist 
inheritance. He wrote to Scholem: “The work represents both the philosophical 
application of surrealism – and thereby its sublation [Aufhebung] – as well as the 
attempt to retain the image of history in the most inconspicuous corners of existence-
the detritus of history” (C, 505). The stress here is on the philosophical use of 
Surrealism – that is, to derive from its methods and modes of experience something 
that Surrealism itself could never furnish: meaning and truth. This is because 
Surrealism, like Art Nouveau, is itself part of the dream-world:  
it broke over its founders as an inspiring dream wave, it seemed the most 
integral, conclusive, absolute of movements. Everything with which it came 
into contact was integrated. Life seemed worth living only where the threshold 
between waking and sleeping was worn away in everyone as by the steps of 
multitudinous images flooding back and forth (SW2.1, 208). 
In insisting everything be integrated into its movement, in its attempt at a seamless 
fusion, Benjamin traces how Surrealism once again becomes phantasmagoric and 
dreamlike in itself, and thus consigned not to the moment of (historical) awakening, 
but to the continuation of the dream. What is lacking in what Benjamin describes is 
precisely the intervention of (perhaps even psycho) analysis, or the critic - “language 
only seemed itself where, sound and image, image and sound interpenetrated with 
automatic precision and such felicity that no chink was left for the penny-in-the-slot 





without. As Benjamin writes in ‘Dream Kitsch’, surrealism confuses dream 
experience with poetic inspiration (SW2.1, 4). It loses the possibility of a moment of 
awakening and substitutes an enraptured encounter with the dream-state in its stead. 
As Lindner also points out, the Surrealism essay ends on the image of the alarm 
clock that rings “60 seconds to a minute”; no awakening takes place, despite its 
constant ringing (Lindner 2008, 162). Indeed, in the ‘Materials for the Expose of 
1935’, Benjamin contrasts this sharply with his own position: “Opposition to 
Aragon: to work through all this by way of the dialectics of awakening, and not: to 
be lulled, through exhaustion [tiredly], into ‘dream’ or ‘mythology’” (AP, 908). As 
Pensky remarks, “Benjamin's later substantial critiques of surrealism…consist in 
essence of his realization that the surrealists were not capable of transposing the 
‘shock’ of the profane illumination from the model of dream to that of waking” 
(Pensky 1993, 200). Lindner concludes that Benjamin did not take Breton's “flirt” 
with Freud seriously; “dessen späteren Versuch, die Psychoanalyse und den 
Marxismus in surrealistischer Perspektive zu vereinen...fand er keiner Beachtung 
wert” [emphasis mine]. Crucially, it is the surrealist perspective Benjamin takes 




Freud states that the dream does not seem to be able to portray negation, it has no 
regard for contradictions and opposites, displaying 
a particular preference for combining contraries into a unity or for representing 
them as one and the same thing. Dreams feel themselves at liberty, moreover, 





deciding at a first glance whether any element that admits of a contrary is 
present in the dream-thoughts as a positive or as a negative.142 (SE4, 318) 
This fusion of opposites, specifically diametrically opposed class interests, is another 
feature of Freud’s dream-work present in the Arcades Project. For Freud, the social 
also irrupts into the psyche with the faculty of censorship, what was later to be 
named the superego. Social form – specifically hierarchy – emerges as root cause for 
repression. Once again Freud turns to Shakespeare to illustrate this: “Wherever there 
is rank and promotion the way lies open for wishes that call for suppression. 
Shakespeare's Prince Hal could not, even at his father's sick-bed, resist the 
temptation of trying on the crown” (SE5, 484). 
It also resurfaces in the flattening perspective of the many new vistas offered by 
nineteenth-century cultural technology as described by Benjamin: panoramas, 
dioramas, and the view from buses, showing the city and its multitudes as one 
unified mass. In this falsely unifying perspective that collapses the stratification of 
classes and oppositional class interests, common to Freud's dream and the nineteenth 
century, is reflected in many of the art forms of the nineteenth century, chief among 
them Art Nouveau. Benjamin writes that in “Exhibitions, regions and indeed, 
retrospectively, all times, from farming and mining, from industry and from the 
machines that were displayed in operation, to raw materials and processed materials, 
to art and the applied arts” a “peculiar demand for premature synthesis, of a kind that 
is characteristic of the nineteenth century in other areas as well: of the total work of 
art” becomes visible”. Crucially, “these ‘premature syntheses’ also bespeak a 
persistent endeavour to close up the space of existence and of development. To 
prevent the ‘airing-out of the classes’” [G2,3] (AP, 175). The “premature syntheses” 
thus run counter to the aims of what must come before – analysis, the differentiation 
                                               
142 In a footnote Freud here points to his 1910 ‘Gegensinn der Urworte’, where he speculates on Ur-, 
that is, originary or primitive language as having only one word for opposite pairs, pointing to an 





of class interests. Synthesis here can be thought not only in terms of a certain reading 
of Hegel, where the model thesis-antithesis-synthesis is posited, but more so in the 
sense of a Freudian dream-interpretation.  
Freud names two reasons why a dream-analysis presented by him may remain 
incomplete: Respect for boundaries and the limits of what is to be disclosed – guided 
by one's own unwillingness to unveil the recesses of one's psyche to the last. In 
particular, he applies this to those of his analysands that are in the public eye. 
Additionally, however, Freud stresses that there may be more to the dream than is 
resolved on a first analysis. In the Interpretation of Dreams (SE5, 523), he cautions 
that the task of dream-interpretation is not finished when a “complete 
interpretation… an interpretation which makes sense, is coherent and throws light 
upon every element of the dream's content” has been performed: “For the same 
dream may perhaps have another interpretation as well, an ‘over-interpretation’, 
which has escaped him”. This “over-interpretation” points to an essential 
multivalence of the dream, as does Freud's acknowledgement that there is, as 
mentioned above, at least one “spot where it reaches down into the unknown” (SE5, 
525) in every dream. Thus, not only are dreams overdetermined in that they are a 
palimpsest of “day residues”, unconscious wishes, and so on. They also themselves 
branch out into multiple directions, which Freud calls “the mycelium of thought” 
(SE5, 525). Even a seemingly complete interpretation is not truly finite; further 
interpretations may follow. This serves as a cautionary note against accepting any 
analysis as the ‘final’ or ‘true’ one, lest an analysis later recognised as partial 
obscures more than it reveals.  
This insight goes beyond dream analysis and extends to psychoanalysis as a whole. 
As Freud writes in ‘Analysis Terminable’:  
Analytic experience has taught us that the better is always the enemy of the 
good and that in every phase of the patient's restoration we have to combat his 
inertia, which disposes him to be content with a partial solution of his conflicts, 





underlying conflicts remain unresolved. (SE23, 231)  
Thus, just like the people of the nineteenth century whose art forms present a 
semblance of resolution or liberation – a false awakening – Freud's patients are 
prone to content themselves with a partial, and thus ultimately false, resolution of 
their conflicts. The analyst should thus not be too hasty to present a “premature 
synthesis” as what is at stake is the success of the analysis. 
 
The ‘Counter-Arcades’? 
Like the psyche of an individual, Paris as the nineteenth-century capitalist metropolis 
is riven between the most modern and the archaic – unlike London and Rome, which 
for Benjamin each respectively are associated with one of these poles. A 
subterranean counter-network where information is disseminated exists underneath 
Paris - as a counterpoint to the arcades, “another system of galleries runs 
underground through Paris: the Metro, where at dusk glowing red lights point the 
way into the underworld” (AP, 84). Sporadically, Benjamin alludes to the potential 
of the ostensibly capitalist space of the arcades themselves to become instead spaces 
of subterfuge for the poor, criminality, political resistance and even barricade 
fighting. The arcades and world exhibitions host worker's delegations as much as the 
displays of the fetish-commodity (AP, 186), and indeed harbours Marx and Engels 
as much as the rebellious masses: The nineteenth century “produced not only 
imperialism but also the Marxism that interrogates it with such useful questions” 
(SW3, 9), as Benjamin notes in ‘Brecht's Threepenny Novel’.143 The arcades are thus 
                                               
143 However, Marxist doctrine is not exempt from the bad historicism and economic determinism of 
the milieu of the nineteenth century in which it was brought about. Benjamin refers to an anecdote 
from Lafargue to illustrate this: “Engels told me that it was in Paris in 1848, at the Cafe de la Regence 
(one of the earliest centers of the Revolution of 1789), that Marx first laid out for him the economic 





spaces of contestation where the tensions of its age become visible. As 
phantasmagoric spaces, the arcades function as the unconscious of the nineteenth 
century: they are a repository of drives, desires, repressed knowledge, trauma. To 
expose their content to the analytical gaze is to set the social organism on the road to 
recovery.  
However, the failed revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth century – failed 
insofar as they are followed by a period of reaction, and remain incomplete – mean 
that it was “the experience of this generation: that capitalism will die no natural 
death” (AP, 667). There is no automatism, no teleological unfolding of liberation in 
history for Benjamin. Of the three delegations of workers that were sent to the world 
exhibition in London in 1851, Benjamin writes that none “accomplished anything 
significant” [G8,4] (AP, 188). They had official blessing and were thus subject to 
appeasement, taken in by the phantasmagoria of the exhibitions. This, then, is part of 
the ambiguity of the nineteenth century – its forms contain the potential for 
liberation, but whether this is recognized in awakening or again falls into the dream 
is a matter of the gaze, of one's standpoint – and of one's collective tactics. 
 
 
Part 2. Awakening 
1. The Far Bank  
In section VI.A ‘The Work of Condensation’ of The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud 
contests the notion that a dream is reproduced most accurately if it is remembered 
soon after awakening. Rather, just like dream-formation, which begins during the 
dream-day preceding the sleep in which the dream is experienced, dream analysis is 
an ongoing process, with new aspects and explanations arising throughout the course 





fulfilment of wishes that arose decades before, and indeed can be traced back to 
infantile wishes in the last instance, dream analysis disrupts linear temporality and 
the notion of an originary, authentic and complete truth of the dream to be accessed 
most directly in its immediate aftermath. There is thus an implicit danger in narrating 
dreams ‘too soon’ – both in terms of assuming their authenticity, and regarding a 
too-hasty acceptance of the immediacy of the manifest content. 
In ‘Breakfast Room’, from ‘One-Way Street’, Benjamin, following Freud, describes 
dream-narration first thing in the morning, “on an empty stomach”, as a perilous 
undertaking. This is because the recently awakened sleeper “remains under the spell 
of the dream” (SW1, 444): a too-hasty engagement with the dream risks merely 
reproducing, rather than analysing it. Dreams may only be mentioned “from the far 
bank” (SW1, 445), once the sleeper is fully awake, that is, once he has eaten. At 
stake is the detachment from the dream, for which Benjamin offers two possibilities. 
The first is the “combustion of the dream in a concentrated morning’s work 
[Morgenarbeit], if not in prayer” (SW1, 445). Linder (2008, 140).  reads this passage 
as indicating the dream must be forgotten. However, does the term “Morgenarbeit” 
not also have an echo of the dreamwork, to which it forms the oppositional pole? 
And indeed, Benjamin writes in the 1935 Expose that “Die Verwertung der 
Traumelemente beim Erwachen ist der Schulfall des dialektischen Denkens” (GS5, 
59).144 The dream is being used up, verwertet, functioning as fuel, Brennstoff, in the 
morning-work of awakening.145 Benjamin is here working with something like a 
model of a psychic economy – the dream energy, Traumkraft, lingers and must be 
                                               
144 The Selected Works translation renders this as “The realization of dream elements, in the course of 
waking up, is the paradigm of dialectical thinking” (AP, 12), which loses the connotations of 
Verwertung as a using-up of something. 
145 The translation in the Selected Works reflects this, but occludes the close terminological proximity 





'burnt' or used up in another activity, rather than a model of “forgetting” the dream, 
which would in any case merely amount to further repression of the unconscious.146 
Lindner (2008, 141) continues with the second possibility of detachment from the 
dream: breaking one’s fast in order to ‘cleanse’ oneself of the dream, not because the 
dream is dirty, but because dream and waking life must not be commingled in an 
unmediated – or rather, unanalysed – fashion. He concludes that “first, the dreamer 
must reach a ‘beyond the dream’” (Lindner 2008, 141, transl.mine), which is 
possible through eating. At stake is thus a physical and spiritual grounding of the self 
in an activity that either uses up the dream energy: intellectual, physical or spiritual 
labour, all of which require concentrated focus – or else fills it with something else: 
the intake of food. Both make it possible to break with the world of the dream and 
thus analyse it beyond its sway. When we link this passage from ‘One-Way Street’ 
to the false awakenings of Art Nouveau and Surrealism discussed previously, thus 
transposing the process to the collective, we come to see that what is at stake is true 
– historical – awakening that manages to disrupt the dream-cycle and the semblance 
of dream-analysis from within the “Bannkreis” of the dream.  
 
2. Boredom and its Inside 
In ‘Dream Kitsch’ (SW2.1, 3), Benjamin writes that “The dream has grown gray. 
The gray coating of dust on it is its best part. Dreams are now a shortcut to banality”. 
                                               
146 There is a second aspect to the “using up” of the dream-work in prayer to be found in Benjamin's 
note ‘Über das Grauen I’, where Benjamin writes that “Am leichtesten stellt sich Grauen beim 
Erwachen aus einem Zustand tiefer Kontemplation und Konzentration, wie tiefes Sinnen, 
Versunkenheit in Musik oder Schlaf, ein.” Against this, immersion in the form of prayer is described 
as “sacred immersion”, dispelling the threat of this sense of Grauen, that is, immersion in something 
alien. Benjamin suggests that the ideal-typical case of this Grauen occurs in the recognition of the 
mother, linking his notion of Grauen with the moment where Freud pinpoints the break with primary 
narcissism: in recognising that the mother and her breast are not of the self, are an other, thus 





Precisely in becoming banal, stereotypical, kitsch; in losing the appeal to the 
transcendental figure of longing – “No one really dreams any longer of the Blue 
Flower”– the dream, like Baroque allegory, has become immanent. This picks up on 
Benjamin's focus on the trivial, the banality of life in the nineteenth century in the 
Arcades Project. Like everyday objects and habits, dreams store meaning precisely 
because they are thoroughly everyday and ‘of their time’. However, the dreamworld 
of the arcades, like the individual dream, reveal their stored-up meaning only on 
analysis. 
This assessment constitutes an appraisal of the historical possibilities and uses of 
dreams in modernity. Benjamin writes in the Arcades Project that “Boredom is 
always the external surface of unconscious events” [D2a2] (AP, 106). Here 
Benjamin draws from Freud, for whom the seemingly banal is revealed only in 
analysis as anything but: it is registered and cathected in the unconscious in such a 
manner that it surfaces in dreams or compulsions, thus it holds meaning, but this, 
too, is situated in the unconscious. In the dream-work mechanism of displacement, 
“ideas which originally had only a weak charge of intensity take over the charge 
from ideas which were originally intensely cathected and at last attain enough 
strength to enable them to force an entry into consciousness” (SE5, 177). Thus, one 
of Benjamin's programmatic announcements in the Arcades Project is that “the 
theory of awakening” is “to be developed on the basis of the theory of boredom” 
(AP, 908) as, following Freud, boredom for Benjamin signals repressed, unconscious 
energies which contain an unconscious truth beyond their immediate appearance. 
Following Freud’s dream interpretation, the unconscious truth of dreams can only 
become visible from outside the dream.147 Upon awakening, the boring, grey, banal 
                                               
147 The same applies to Proust's style: A consequence of his sacrificing of a plot and giving the text up 
entirely to the dictates of memory is that the result falls back into boredom, the banal. Benjamin 
quotes contemporary critic Max Unold on Proust's “idle stories - all ordinary dreams turn into idle 
stories as soon as one tells them to someone" which precisely in their banality form “the bridge to the 





“external surface”, the manifest appearance of the underlying unconscious event, is 
to be turned inside out in the process of interpretation: 
Boredom is a warm gray fabric lined on the inside with the most lustrous and 
colourful of silks. In this fabric we wrap ourselves when we dream... But the 
sleeper looks bored and gray within his sheath. And when he later wakes and 
wants to tell of what he dreamed, he communicates by and large only this 
boredom. For who would be able at one stroke to turn the lining of time to the 
outside? Yet to narrate dreams signifies nothing else. (AP, 105-6) 
Andrew Benjamin, focusing on the ‘lining of time’, relates this passage to 
Benjamin’s other pronouncements on boredom as conditioned by waiting. This 
relationship to time contains within it the potential for its overcoming: “Awaiting and 
expectation – as necessitating the transformation of time – a transformation in which 
the future becomes a condition of the present, rather than the present being a series 
of empty moments awaiting a future, would mean that there is another mood” 
(Andrew Benjamin 2005, 167).  Another mood than that of boredom, revealed by 
and contained within boredom itself. As with Dream Kitsch and the ephemera of 19th 
century culture, it is the mood of boredom of the dream that points to this possibility: 
“The coat turning with a rapidity within which both the grey and the colour in an 
instance – the instance as ‘standstill’ – become the opening where ‘great deeds’ will 
occur. The grey and the lustrous are brought into play” (Andrew Benjamin 2005, 
168). If we read Benjamin’s comments in relation to his use of Freud, it becomes 
clear that this standstill, the ‘one stroke’, which occurs suddenly in the act of dream 
                                               
The potential of the colour grey can also be found in Benjamin’s fragmentary ‘Notes for a Study of 
the Beauty of Colored Illustrations in Children’s Books’: “The gray Elysium of the imagination is, for 
the artist, the cloud in which he rests and the wall of cloud on the horizon of his visions. This wall 
opens up for children, and more brightly colored walls can behind it” (SW1, 265). See also Caygill 
(1998) for a discussion of the centrality of the optical and particularly colour for the conceptualisation 





narration, is a moment where the unconscious is made conscious.  
Betancourt comments on this passage that the act of dream narration is 
unsatisfactory at first, as it only manages to show the grey outside: “we only 
communicate the boredom of the dream, the manifest content that overcame our 
defense” (Betancourt 2008, 28). He asserts that there is a dialectical movement at 
play in a dream analysis that manages to make visible the unconscious:  
Latent content will be discovered, revealed: the colourful inside of a grey 
outside will be turned inside-out not once but many times until we see the 
constitutive tension...The dialectic of it escapes us, it is no longer at a standstill, 
but we go back to it, from another perspective: this motion is philosophically 
eternal, only politically [can we] take hold of it. (Betancourt 2008, 28-29).  
Dream narration is an attempt to make visible the colourful “arabesques” of the 
unconscious wish contained within the manifest “grey”, banal appearance of the 
dream. However, something more is revealed: Crucially, the grey boredom that is 
communicated is not merely appearance, but expresses a truth about the 19th century 
- its structural boredom.  
The potentiality of dreams, of boredom, to configure things differently – to envisage 
another mood, another experience, another structure - enables their political use. As I 
discuss below, this “political seizing” of the dream is indeed Benjamin's ultimate 
aim. To him, “Arcades are houses or passages having no outside – like the dream” 
[Lla,l] (AP, 406). Thus, we need to break out of arcades, awaken from dream: “Just 
as Proust begins the story of his life with an awakening, so must every presentation 
of history begin with awakening; in fact, it should treat of nothing else. This one, 
accordingly, deals with awakening from the nineteenth century” [N4,3] (AP, 464). 
To this end, the aim of the Arcades Project is the narration of the nineteenth century 
as a dream: “in no other way can one deal with the arcades - structures in which we 
relive, as in a dream, the life of our parents and grandparents, as the embryo in the 





accent, like the events in dreams” [D2a,l] (AP, 106). Benjamin follows Freud in 
equating dream perception with dream experience – and we see again his 
transposition of the dream to the collective in this passage.  
 
3. ‘Each epoch dreams the one to follow” 
This dictum by French historian Jules Michelet, quoted by Benjamin in the Arcades 
Project, encapsulates Benjamin's own position: the historical reality of an epoch is 
formed by the unconscious dream-processes of previous ones. The formulation of a 
dreaming “epoch” also hints at the collective nature of dreaming in the arcades – as 
discussed, it is the social organism as a whole that expresses its repressed wishes in 
the dream-world of the arcades. However, as we have seen, the expression is 
deformed by the censorship imposed in order to keep the collective from awakening. 
In transposing this process of dream-formation to the collective, Benjamin politicises 
it – as Buck-Morss points out, “Class differentiations were never lacking in 
Benjamin's theory of the collective unconscious”, and thus, “the collective dream 
manifested the ideology of the dominant class” (Buck-Morss 1991, 281). Far from 
being “ideological” in the sense of a fully deliberate manipulation on the part of the 
bourgeoisie, the introduction of Freudian dream theory allows Benjamin to 
demonstrate that this process of deformation and censorship is itself unconscious. 
“In the dream”, Benjamin writes of the “economic conditions of life” of the 
collective, “they find their expression; in the awakening, their interpretation”. 
Following Freud, the manifest content of the dream can only become intelligible 
once worked through by the waking mind. In what follows, I will examine how 
Benjamin conceptualises this “awakening” of the collective. 
Benjamin here once again links dreaming to phylogenetic development, in which we 






For the flaneur, a transformation takes place with respect to the street: it leads 
him through a vanished time. He strolls down the street; for him, every street is 
precipitous. It leads downward - if not to the mythical Mothers, then into a past 
that can be all the more profound because it is not his own, not private. 
Nevertheless, it always remains the past of a youth... it is not a past coming 
from his own youth, from a recent youth, but a childhood lived before then that 
speaks to him, and it is all the same to him whether it is the childhood of an 
ancestor or his own. (AP, 416) 148  
This is precisely the conception of history that Benjamin aims to break with in his 
theory of awakening: the phylogenetic determination of life and the semblance of 
eternal return must be interrupted. At the same time, the flaneur's experience of the 
inevitability of a return into the past makes this repetition-compulsion of the 
nineteenth century visible – a first stage in the movement towards its resolution. 
However, there is a second aspect to his downward precipitation: it reveals 
something about the specificity of childhood and youth in the movement of dream 
and awakening.149  
Thus, Benjamin opens Convolute K with the words 
                                               
148 As the editors of the Selected Works note, this is “a reference to Goethe's Faust, Part II, Act1, in 
which Faust visits “the Mothers,” vaguely defined mythological figures, in search of the secret that 
will enable him to discover Helen of Troy. The phrase has now entered into proverbial speech, 
evoking the search for the ultimate mysteries of life” (SW2, 266). We can also see a covert allusion to 
Bachofen’s ‘Sage von Tanaquil’ (1870) and Bachofen’s work on ancient matriarchy. As Mali notes, 
Bachofen “spent his life pursuing the most archaic levels of ancient civilization and consciousness, 
which literally led him to descend into the hidden depths of pre-Roman tombs, and beyond them into 
contact with the dead, with the Mothers, and thus assumed the form of a mythological journey. (Mali 
1999, 179). 
149 Mali suggests that, “In the opening scene of the ‘Tiergarten’ Benjamin realizes that his steps there, 
which had led him ‘downward, if not to the mothers of all being then certainly to the mothers of this 
garden,’ predestined his life to be a quest to regain this lost maternal paradise” (Mali 2003, 258). Mali 






Awakening as a graduated process that goes on in the life of the individual as in 
the life of generations. Sleep its initial stage. A generation's experience of youth 
has much in common with the experience of dreams. Its historical configuration 
is a dream configuration. Every epoch has such a side turned toward dreams, 
the child's side. For the previous century, this appears very clearly in the 
arcades [K1,1,] (AP, 388). 
Linking the experience of dreams to childhood and youth, individually and 
collectively, introduces awakening as a gradual development that occurs in stages, 
and introduces the issue of pedagogy. This developmental metaphor – at an 
individual and social level  – is in keeping with Freud's statement that “the work of 
analysis aims at inducing the patient to give up the repressions (using the word in the 
widest sense) belonging to his early development and to replace them by reactions of 
a sort that would correspond to a psychically mature condition” (SE23, 257).  At 
stake for Benjamin is a collectivised form of this pedagogical task of psychoanalysis.  
Benjamin continues his reflection on the process of awakening by pointing to a break 
in modernity:  
whereas the education of earlier generations explained these dreams for them in 
terms of tradition, of religious doctrine, present-day education simply amounts 
to the distraction of children. Proust could emerge as an unprecedented 
phenomenon only in a generation that had lost all bodily and natural aids to 
remembrance and that, poorer than before, was left to itself to take possession 
of the worlds of childhood in merely an isolated, scattered, and pathological 
way. (AP, 388) 
Education is conceptualised here as the ‘explanation of dreams’, that is, an 
interpretation of the unconscious wish via tradition or religion, a process which has 
been broken in modernity – replaced by the 'distraction of children'. Benjamin then 
performs a movement from dreams to remembrance, demonstrating that the two are 





century, this passage implies previous modes of remembrance as characterised by 
richness; a focused, collective, healthy activity. Having reached this impasse in 
collective memory, which as we saw in the previous chapter has become an 
impossibility over the course of modernity, Benjamin insists on the need to awaken, 
which is equated with “An attempt to become aware of the dialectical - the 
Copernican - turn of remembrance” (AP, 388). Together with the Michelet quote 
above, this introduces a generational aspect to the dream and its end: awakening is 
premised on interrupting the sequential flow of dreams; it must occur at – or 
precipitate - an epochal break, as an awakening from the dream of a specific epoch. 
In the case of Benjamin's own age, that is recent past of the nineteenth century, 
which laid the groundwork for what was to come in the twentieth, and cannot 
awaken from itself. This awakening must thus occur at a later time. 
Thus Benjamin notes in the materials for the 1935 Expose: “We have to wake up 
from the existence of our parents. In this awakening, we have to give an account of 
the nearness of that existence” (AP, 908).  In particular, it is the recent past and its 
tradition – the world of the parents – that must be ended in this awakening. Where 
for Freud the psychic life of the individual is structured by infantile experiences and 
traumas, most centrally those experienced in relation to the parents, which are to be 
reworked in psychoanalysis, Benjamin expands this to “generations”, or “epochs”, 
that is, once again, a collective at a specific historical point. Just as in Freudian 
dream analysis the dream’s proximity and influence on waking consciousness has to 
be acknowledged, Benjamin expands on this aspect of awakening by adding that this 
“new, dialectical method of doing history teaches us to pass in spirit – with the 
rapidity and intensity of dreams – through what has been, in order to experience the 
present as waking world, a world to which every dream at last refers” (AP, 884). 
Without this making-conscious of the ongoing influence of the dream, we risk 
merely reproducing it, remaining under its sway, as happens in the incomplete 
breaks of Art Nouveau and Surrealism. Benjamin thus conceptualises the Arcades 
Project as “an experiment in the technique of awakening” which, as we saw above, 





remembrance” (AP, 388). The technique of collective awakening is to be altered, 
experimented on, by including the movement of remembrance within it.  
 
4. Childhood  
There exists a tension between two versions of childhood in the process of dreaming 
and awakening for Benjamin. On the one hand, childhood’s particular relationship to 
the past and to the dream situates it at the cusp of awakening, signalling a moment of 
open-ended possibility. On the other, it is characterised by attempts at the 
foreclosure of present and future through tradition and the theory of eternal return. 
The latter, as we have seen, forms the philosophical complement to Freud's concept 
of repetition-compulsion, which as discussed Benjamin drew on extensively in his 
work on the 19th century. It also manifests in Freud's treatment of childhood in the 
Interpretation of Dreams and in particular his thought on regression. Of interest in 
this context is the analysis Freud provides of one of his own dreams, where he 
concludes that the dream’s condensation of people he knew at different times in his 
life implies the latent thought that “‘No one is irreplaceable!’ ‘There are nothing but 
revenants: all those we have lost come back!” (SE5, 486). He traces this thought to 
the names of his children, chosen in memory of lost loved ones – and in this custom, 
“their names made the children into revenants. And after all...is not having children 
our only path to immortality?” (SE5, 486). Childhood and new life emerge here as 
overdetermined by the present generation of parents, and, mediated by them, by 
further reaches of past generations. This is expressed in Benjamin’s injunction to 
wake up from the existence of our parents.  
Against this foreclosure of possibility by the past, Benjamin posits a second vision of 
childhood when he writes in ‘Dream Kitsch’ that children are not yet engaged in an 
“agonized protest” (SW2.1, 4) against the world of their parents, but are superior to 
it by refusing to enter into the dialectical unfolding of thesis and antithesis. Thus 





it, but by managing to remain outside of its all-encompassing reach. Salzani notes 
that the figure of the child “represents a condition preceding the Fall into bourgeois 
modernity, still immune to the phantasmagoria of the city and of the commodity, and 
is thus related to pre- modern Erfahrung; secondly, it epitomises the state of waiting, 
which is for Benjamin the fundamental threshold into a revolution of experience”. 
The child’s boredom is different from that of adults; the habit of children’s play is 
different to the habituation of factory labour and other modern habits that are more 
rightly characterised as repetition-compulsion, such as gambling: “repetition that still 
construes habits, but not as the wieder-tun of the child’s play, a “doing again” which 
is active creation [schaffen] (GS 3:131-2/SW 2:120). Rather, these new habits are a 
Wieder-kehr, a passively suffered return of the same as a numbing anaesthetic” 
(Salzani 2009, 132). Children, as Salzani also notes, dwell on the threshold. Their 
experience is not yet fully overdetermined by the fractured subjectivity of modernity, 
as they are still practicing creativity in play. 
As discussed, Benjamin follows Freud in positing two psychic agencies, with dream-
consciousness intransparent to itself and only able to be illuminated from the vantage 
point of the other, waking mind. Benjamin expands on this in ‘On the Image of 
Proust’, where he writes “The similarity of one thing to another which we are used 
to, which occupies us in a wakeful state, reflects only vaguely the deeper similarity 
of the dream world in which everything that happens appears not in identical but in 
similar guise, opaquely similar to itself” (SW2.1, 239). It is intransparent to itself 
because the dream cannot rightfully analyse itself - as discussed above, interpretation 
within the dream results not in a resolution, but forms a ‘bad’ interpretation. A true 
analysis is premised on awakening. Children, however, are able to perceive from 
both in- and outside of the dream. Thus, Benjamin continues, they “know a symbol 
of this world: the stocking which has the structure of this dream world when, rolled 
up in the laundry hamper, it is a ‘bag’ and a ‘present’ at the same time” (SW2.1, 
239-40). In the perception of children, the unconscious associations characteristic of 
the dream is transposed into their waking life, and manifests in play. The stocking 





allows it to be both a bag and a present. This perception is able to move back and 
forth quickly, in one move, between the waking world and the dream-world, seeing 
the object as both literal and metaphorical and being able to move between both 
modes of perceptions quickly. 
This ability is where for Benjamin the similarity to Proust appears; like children 
metamorphosing the bag and that which is inside it back into a sock, “Proust could 
not get his fill of emptying the dummy, his self, at one stroke in order to keep 
garnering that third thing, the image which satisfied his curiosity – indeed, assuaged 
his homesickness” (SW2.1, 240) The ego [das Ich] is here likened to the sock of 
children's play, in being something that is entangled with itself, its insides and 
outsides blurring, simultaneously vessel and content. In Proust's last sleight of hand, 
they are both turned back into an image. This image provokes homesickness for the 
dream-world – of childhood, of intoxication, in which the world is “disfigured” in its 
similitudes, which reveals the “true surrealist face” of being, in which all its possible 
identities are visible at the same time. Benjamin's formulation of “the dummy, his 
self” has a further dimension to it: Once again the subject is fractured, revealed as 
comprising an ego that is nothing but a prop. Thus, at stake is an overcoming of the 
semblance of the subject through the revelation of its constitutive fracture. 
 
Primary Narcissism 
In a 1938 note published as ‘Ergebnisse, Ideen, Probleme’, Freud summarises his 
earlier insights on the process where children lose the ability of identification over 
the course of their development, first discussed in his 1914 ‘On Narcissism’:  
“Having and being in the case of the child. The child favours expressing object-
relations through identification: I am the object. Having is the later relation, and falls 





part of me, I am the breast. Later only: I have it, i.e., I am not it…” ([June 1938] 
GW17, 151, transl. mine). 
The wholeness of primary narcissism is thus unattainable once a differentiation 
between self and world, between having and being, are introduced. This is precisely 
what Benjamin refers to as “Freud’s brilliant interpretation of the superiority of the 
child (in his study on narcissism)”  (GS3, 273, transl.mine). In asserting that it is 
experience that proves the very opposite of this infantile superiority, Benjamin 
follows Freud’s account of the development away from primary narcissism.150 This 
overestimation of the reach of the self is then repressed as a loss, and thus committed 
to the unconscious. This is at the heart of Proust's violent affect of ‘homesickness’ 
associated with this experience of the inaccessibility of childhood; that is, ultimately, 
the inaccessible experience of wholeness of the subject in primary narcissism. This 
gives rise to an attempt at a re-enactment both of the state of primary narcissism, and 
of the moment of its loss. Benjamin explicitly links the “law of repetition” governing 
play to Freud’s concept of repetition-compulsion:  
The obscure urge to repeat things is scarcely less powerful in play, scarcely less 
cunning in its workings, than the sexual impulse in love. It is no accident that Freud 
has imagined he could detect an impulse ‘beyond the pleasure principle’ in it. And in 
fact, every profound experience longs to be insatiable, longs for return and repetition 
until the end of time, and for the reinstatement of an original condition from which it 
sprang … This is not only the way to master frightening fundamental experiences 
[Urerfahrungen]– by deadening one's own response, by arbitrarily conjuring up 
                                               
150 This appears in n a review of Alois Jalkotzy’s Märchen und Gegenwart. Das Deutsche 





experiences, or through parody; it also means enjoying one's victories and triumphs 
over and over again, with total intensity (GS2, 120).151 
Benjamin, writing in 1928, is thus alert to the entanglement of desire and trauma in 
repetition, and presupposes an “Ursituation” to which both strive to return. Child’s 
play, as we have seen, manages to recreate the experience in a way that is 
inaccessible to the subject in later life. Lindner comments that the connection of the 
motifs of dream and childhood in the early stages of the Arcades Project are “not 
merely an indicator of the as yet unresolved difference between autobiography and 
historiography… but simultaneously a reference to a specific, irretrievable access to 
history” present in childhood (Lindner 2008, 156, transl. mine). As Werner puts it in 
her analysis of memory in the Berlin Childhood Around 1900, Remembrance 
[Erinnerung] may attempt to counteract irretrievability, but this effort only serves to 
demonstrate even more clearly that lived moments cannot be brought back. Despite 
or perhaps precisely because of this insight into the irretrievability of the past, Berlin 
Childhood aims at a conscious approach to the past” (Werner 2015, 47, transl. mine). 
This is characterised by a specific way of engaging nostalgia: Benjamin writes in the 
book that he “sought to limit its effect through insight into the irretrievability – not 
the contingent biographical but the necessary social irretrievability – of the past” 
(SW3, 344). Read together with the theme of awakening as historical change or 
interruption, the importance of safeguarding against nostalgia is another way to 
approach the question of the movement from the nineteenth into the twentieth 
                                               
151 This is also at play in the Imperial Panorama, referenced in Benjamin’s description of the Cabinet 
des mirages (where the scenery is constantly transformed) in the Arcades Project:  
A fluctuating light and gentle music accompany the performance, and coming before each 
transformation is the classic signal of the hand bell, and the jolt, which we recognize from our earliest 
trips around the world, when, in the Kaiserpanorama, before our eyes that were full of the pain of 
departure, an image would slowly disengage from the stereoscope, allowing the next one to appear” 






century as a move against melancholia. But how does the dreaming collective avoid 
becoming a “historical re-enactment society” in its dual move of remembrance in 
awakening? How do we move beyond melancholia and regression? 
 
5. The Movement of Awakening 
a) Remembrance 
As Freud outlines in ‘Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through’, compulsive 
repetition, the acting out of the past can be overcome in turning it into remembrance, 
that is, something consciously processed and verbalised within analysis. This insight 
into the ongoing influence of the repressed, which must be made conscious in order 
to be overcome, is at the heart of Benjamin's thought on awakening. Indeed, for him 
“Awakening is the exemplary case of remembering” (AP, 908). To make the nearest, 
“most obvious” actually visible requires a change in perspective, which is to be 
attained via remembrance. In opposition to Max Horkheimer's position that history is 
finite, that the past is past and “the slain are really slain” (AP, 471), Benjamin 
stresses the transformative potential of remembrance: 
The corrective to this line of thinking may be found in the consideration that 
history is not simply a science but also and not least a form of remembrance, 
‘Eingedenken’. What science has ‘determined’, remembrance can modify. Such 
mindfulness can make the incomplete (happiness) into something complete, 
and the complete (suffering) into something incomplete. That is theology; but 
in remembrance we have an experience that forbids us to conceive of history as 
fundamentally atheological, little as it may be granted us to try to write it with 
immediately theological concepts. [N8,1] (AP, 471) 
Remembrance thus modifies the past not only epistemologically (that is, in terms of 





incomplete, capable of dissolving past suffering with its rupturing force. Benjamin 
acknowledges that this places remembrance's reach into the theological, even if it is 
not to be grasped with “immediately theological concepts” (AP, 471).152 However, it 
is also a psychoanalytic insight: placed in a different, therapeutic context, the return 
of repressed memory can function as liberating. The incompleteness of history, 
revealed in remembrance, thus indicates that it is “capable of change,” through 
transformative memory.153  
 
b) The Flash of Awakened Consciousness 
But how is this remembrance to be conceptualised if, as we saw Chapter 3, the path 
to remembrance is blocked in modernity? In awakening, in a thorough rupture with 
the world of the nineteenth century and its forms, laying bare both its underlying 
unconscious, repressed, deformed dream-wishes and past traumas. Benjamin 
speculates that “All insight to be grasped according to the schema of awakening. 
And shouldn't the ‘not-yet-conscious knowledge’ have the structure of dream?” (AP, 
907), and thus be in need of interpretation. Benjamin conceptualises this as a process 
of making visible and becoming-conscious: the “Knowledge of what has been as a 
becoming aware [making conscious for oneself - Bewusstsichmachen], one that has 
the structure of awakening’…on the part of the collective” (AP, 907). This is to be 
understood as the “dissolution of ‘mythology’ into the space of history” (AP, 458) – 
the caesura in the temporality of myth, of the dream, where the not-yet becomes the 
                                               
152 These reflections from Convolute N were, of course, to form the basis of Benjamin's exploration of 
the interrelation of theology and materialism in his 1940 ‘Theses on the Concept of History’. 
153 With Cathy Caruth, we can perceive a specific closeness to Freud on this point: Caruth draws 
attention to Freud’s conceptualisation of monotheism as an awakening in Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle and suggests that “[t]he belated experience of trauma in Jewish monotheism suggests that 
history is not the passing on of a crisis but also the passing on of a survival that can only be possessed 
within a history larger than any single individual or any single generation” (Caruth 1996, 71). See 





'now' of consciousness and its unconscious, compulsive force is thus broken. 
Benjamin describes the experience of awakening as a uniquely “dialectical” one 
“which “refutes everything ‘gradual’ about becoming” and shows all seeming 
“development” to be dialectical reversal” (AP, 389), the “flash of awakened 
consciousness” (AP, 388).  
This seemingly runs counter to Benjamin’s other conceptualisation of “awakening as 
a graduated process” (AP, 388). Lindner takes the view that Benjamin sees 
awakening only as such an instantaneous event: “Benjamin wollte mit der 
Blitzartigkeit und Intensität des Traums das Gewesene als noch nicht bewusstes 
Wissen aufladen und in die Gegenwart als Wachwelt umschlagen lassen” (Lindner 
2008, 167). Perhaps we can make sense of these apparently contradictory 
temporalities if we remember that when Benjamin speaks of the “graduated” process 
of awakening, he refers to different stages, the first of them characterised, 
paradoxically, by sleep. This earlier stage is still under the sway of the dream, while 
true historical awakening can only occur as a flash, rather than as the certain 
outcome of a gradual movement of becoming-conscious over time.  
Benjamin is here refuting the bourgeois philosophy of progress in his model of 
awakening. If we read him with Freud, we come to see that the occurrence of these 
flashes can nevertheless happen over a period of time, embedded in a process of 
interpretation. Freud writes 
The interpretation of a dream cannot always be accomplished at a single sitting. 
When we have followed a chain of associations, it not infrequently happens 
that we feel our capacity exhausted; nothing more is to be learnt from the 
dream that day. The wisest plan then is to break off and resume our work 
another day: another part of the dream's content may then attract our attention 
and give us access to another stratum of dream-thoughts. This procedure might 





This “fractional” dream interpretation, which Benjamin draws on,154 relies not on a 
certain disclosure of the dream within a fixed timeframe, but on a movement of 
return and re-examination, interspersed with sudden flashes of recognition. Thus, 
there exist striking similarities of Benjamin's notion of a process of “advancement... 
of a not-yet-conscious knowledge of what has been” (AP 389) to the role of 
awakening in the Freudian model – awakening as suspended between the dream-
world and the waking mind, secondary revision and the beginning of dream analysis, 
from the vantage point of being outside the dream but bringing its elements into 
consciousness, reordering and ‘working through’ them in the process.  
 
c) The Dialectical Image, The Historian, The Collective 
At the same time, recognition for Benjamin can only occur in a specific moment in 
connection – constellation – with a specific moment of the past. This is at the root of 
his pronouncement in ‘Capitalism as Religion’ that “We cannot draw closed the net 
in which we are caught. Later on, however, we shall be able to gain an overview of 
it” (SW1, 288). In the materials for the 1935 Expose, Benjamin conceptualises this 
as follows: “The dissolution of historical semblance must follow the same trajectory 
as the construction of the dialectical image” (AP, 918). The processes of dissolution 
and construction are thus intertwined. As Pensky points out,  
The dialectical image does not simply appear, fully formed, as the result of 
destruction. Destruction is the necessary but not sufficient condition for the 
appearance of the dialectical image. Only by the constructive act of materialist 
historiography does the dialectical image appear as monadological; that is, not 
as the archaic image, but represented through the details, fully concrete and 
historically determinate yet also monadically containing its entire pre- and post-
                                               





history within it. (Pensky 1993, 223) 
As Freud notes, the dream does not reveal itself at once, it may take days, or weeks. 
Additionally, wishes don't always find their fulfilment in dreams in any temporal 
proximity to their generation. Freud recounts events where wishes from decades 
before are fulfilled in a dream once the circumstances of the dreamer's life have 
changed so as to make this wish no longer' actual. Beneath this layer of wishes that 
arise throughout life, there is another layer of infantile wishes that persists and will 
be reawakened again and again. Benjamin notes that “the overdetermined elements 
of the dream in Freud are capable of being interpreted two, three or more times” 
(GS3, 588, transl.mine), showing he knew Freud’s dream theory well, and carrying 
over its troubled temporality into his own theory of dreaming in proposing just such 
a process of recognition at specific points in time:  
In the dialectical image, what has been within a particular epoch is always, 
simultaneously, ‘what has been from time immemorial’. As such, however, it is 
manifest, on each occasion, only to a quite specific epoch - namely, the one in 
which humanity, rubbing its eyes, recognizes just this particular dream image 
as such. It is at this moment that the historian takes up, with regard to that 
image, the task of dream interpretation. [N4,1] (AP, 464)  
Awakening is identified as the moment where the dialectical image is constructed, 
and thus where historical semblance is dissolved. This is at stake in Benjamin's 
figure of the historian who takes up “the task of dream interpretation” - to 
deconstruct historical semblance in interpretation, by constructing the dialectical 
image from out of the dream elements.  
However, for Benjamin there is a further step involved: to decode the wish images 
contained in the dream, but also to take the insights of the analysis into the 
realisation of the fundamental motivators behind them – as Benjamin writes, “The 
realization of dream elements in the course of waking up is the canon of dialectics. It 





the figure of the historian – or, variously, the historical materialist – the repressed, 
unconscious ‘dream-elements’ thus find both their interpretation and their 
realisation. Awakening mediates between dreams and remembrance – carrying over 
elements of the dream to be realised into waking life. As Elissa Marder observes, 
“Benjamin declares that the work of the historian is not to recount history, but to 
interrupt its course” (Marder 2006, 191). 
Crucially, the historical materialist/historian is not to become a substitute for the 
collective - As Wohlfarth notes, separating the dialectical from the ‘archaic’ image is 
a practical, collective task (Wohlfarth 2011, 262). Awakening, just like this process 
of separation, then, is both an individual and a collective task. In an unpublished, 
hand-written note, Benjamin draws the contrasting points up in the following way: 
“Thus on the one hand: Not-yet-conscious knowledge of what has been 
(phylogenetically and ontogenetically) (Freud: Beyond the Pleasure Principle). 
On the other: the presently happening perceived as memory. Is the first, 
objective view correct, or the second, subjective one? Or is there a synthesis?” 
(WBA 618/3, WBA Ms 646], transl. mine).155 
Benjamin here identifies apperception, the “flash of recognition” in the now-time, 
with a “subjective” point of view. By the time of producing preliminary sketches for 
the Arcades Project, however, Benjamin asks “wouldn’t it be possible, furthermore, 
to show how the whole set of issues with which this project is concerned is 
illuminated in the process of the proletariat's becoming conscious of itself?” (AP, 
863). Perhaps we get the closest to the “synthesis” Benjamin seeks between 
                                               
155 “Also einerseits: Noch nicht bewusstes Wissen vom Gewesenen (phylogenetisch und 
ontogenetisch) (Freud: Jenseits des Lustprinzips) Andererseits: das Gegenwärtige, Geschehende als 
Erinnerung apperzepiert. Ist nun die erste objektive oder die zweite subjektive Ansicht zutreffend? 





individual and collective in the ‘Materials for the expose of 1935’, No 8: “We 
conceive the dream (1) as historical phenomenon, (2) as collective phenomenon. 
Efforts…to shed light on the dreams of the individual with the help of the doctrine of 
the historical dreams of the collective” (AP, 908-9). And just as the dream is a 
collective, historical phenomenon, and the dreams of the individual can be explained 
via the collective repressed wishes manifested in a specific historical moment, “Here 
the question arises: In what different canonical ways can man [der Mensch] behave 
(the individual man, but also the collective) with regard to dreaming? And what sort 
of comportment, at bottom, is adequate to the waking being?” (AP, 907). This points 
beyond the dream, and the moment of awakening, towards being truly awake. At 
stake is action in the world – individual, as much as collective, political action. 
Dream interpretation can thus serve as a model for historical materialist philosophy 
of history – just as dreams can only be analysed when put into the context of a 
particular life and its circumstances, as well as the repressed wishes of the dreamer, 
so history can only be made sense of at particular moments in time, when it becomes 
possible to recognise the particular dream image, that is, as particularity, torn out of 
its original context of meaning and revealed as speaking of something other than its 
manifest content. Together, psychoanalysis and historical materialism furnish 
Benjamin with the insights and the tools to both get at the unconscious knowledge 
and realise it. 
 
d) Therapeutic Historiography 
We have already seen the influence of Freudian dream interpretation on Benjamin's 
theory of dreaming and awakening: Only on analysis can the false dawn of the 
compensatory fantasy of nineteenth-century utopianism be revealed; the dream needs 
to be interpreted. In collectivising this praxis, Benjamin also draws from the 
psychoanalytic situation more generally. What is specific about the psychoanalytic 





patient’s normal life, where thoughts are made conscious and verbalised without 
censorship. The psychoanalyst may interrupt and probe certain aspects of the 
patient's narration, and provide a construction which confronts the patient with both 
a conjecture about the originary trauma and its ongoing influence.  
Cohen sees Benjamin's fascination with the wish images of a collective as 
“exemplary of the therapeutic dimension to his notion of praxis. This therapeutic 
dimension also manifests itself in his notion of ‘the dialectical image’ that is a 
‘dream image’ (Cohen 1993, 38 -37). She links Benjamin's dialectical image to 
Freud's “constructions of analysis in the curious objectivity that Benjamin attributes 
to it”, an objectivity that is revealed not as a truth as measured by the actually-
occurring past: “The gauge of the accuracy of the new construction is not only its 
faithfulness to what has been forgotten but also its therapeutic effectiveness in the 
present; Freud simultaneously stresses that this gauge is far from confirming that the 
construction ever existed as such” (Cohen  1993, 47). At stake is not authenticity, but 
effectiveness – and indeed, this is close to Benjamin's attempt to make the past 
something that is recognised in the present rather than something to be reconstructed 
“as it really was”. 
Freud emphasises that dreaming and waking thought are ultimately not that different 
from each other; both aim at wish-fulfilment, the former merely needing to be 
decoded – interpreted – to be inserted into the sequence of waking thought. At the 
same time, as we have also seen, the unconscious determines action far beyond the 
reaches of the dream, in psychopathology as much as in everyday revelations such as 
slips of the tongue. Psychoanalysis can serve to make this unconscious influence 
visible and, if successful, interrupt it. This brings us close to Benjamin's thought on 
awakening as an interruption of the dream-continuum of the nineteenth century, the 
arrest of thinking that allows the dialectical image to “flash” up. The arrest of 
thinking is also what is at stake in psychoanalytic praxis – interrupting the flow of 
thoughts and associations, allowing psychic contents to be broken out of their usual 





conceptualise psychoanalytic insights as dialectical images, “a configuration 
pregnant with tensions”. With Freud, we can understand Benjamin's temporality of 
interruption as a collective therapeutic moment, to be carved out of life, in its arrest. 
This also entails a new, psychoanalytically-inflected philosophy of history: 
The enshrinement or apologia is meant to cover up the revolutionary moments 
in the occurrence of history. At heart, it seeks the establishment of a continuity. 
It sets store only by those elements of a work that have already emerged and 
played a part in its reception. The places where tradition breaks off –hence its 
peaks and crags, which offer footing to one who would cross over them –it 
misses. [N9a,S] (AP, 474). 
Benjamin thus positions his approach against the bourgeois one, putting his hope in 
the “peaks and crags” overlooked by its smoothing gaze. Benjamin writes of the 
“destructive or critical momentum of materialist historiography” that it “is registered 
in that blasting of historical continuity with which the historical object first consti-
tutes itself” (AP, 475). Materialist historiography explodes historical objects out of 
the continuum of history. For Freud, contents of the unconscious are likewise 
exploded out of their normal constellation in analysis, made conscious, and thus 
become malleable. 
Drawing explicitly on Freud's theory of drives in ‘Central Park’, Benjamin writes 
“The labyrinth is the habitat of the dawdler. The path followed by someone reluctant 
to reach his goal easily becomes labyrinthine. A drive, in the stages leading to its 
satisfaction, acts likewise. But so, too, does a humanity (a class) which does not 
want to know where its destiny is taking it” (SW4, 171). Class struggle itself here 
functions as a “beyond the pleasure principle”, with the “self-abolishing” class of the 
proletariat acting like the drive in delaying its gratification. Like the suffering of 
psychopathology for Freud, the labyrinth this delay constructs in the forms of 
nineteenth-century Capitalism is self-made, but not consciously so. Thus arises the 
need to shock “humanity (the class)” out of this, as the course of history, 





the catastrophe. It is not an ever-present possibility but what in each case is given. 
Strindberg's idea: hell is not something that awaits us, but this life here and now” 
(SW4, 184-5). Thus, like Benjamin’s grasping for the “peaks and crags” of history, 
“Redemption depends on the tiny fissure in the continuous catastrophe” (SW4, 185).  
The hellish, traumatic continuum of time in capitalism must be interrupted. This 
interruption requires a shock: In the original preface to the Trauerspiel study, 
Benjamin writes of the echo of a slap (rather than a kiss) that awakens Sleeping 
Beauty in his renarration of the fairytale (GS1.2, 901-2). And indeed, this thought 
remains in the Arcades Project: “To the process of rescue belongs the firm, 
seemingly brutal grasp” [N 9 a, 3] (AP, 474). Much like Sleeping Beauty, the 
sleeping collective must be shocked out of its dream. In this, Benjamin's method 
follows not just Marx and the figure of revolution, but also Freud, who as we have 
seen acknowledges that the process of psychoanalysis is sometimes apparently cruel 
to the patient, ostensibly deepening suffering in order to truly ease it. 
On the possibility of a ‘benign’ shock for Freud, from which she observes Benjamin 
draws, Wiegmann states that true liberation presupposes a recognition of hitherto-
existing helplessness, as “in the recognition of its helplessness, the individual 
receives such a shock that it manages to overcome it” (Wiegmann 1989, 35-6, transl. 
mine). She suggests that Freud hints at the empowering dimension of this making 
conscious of suffering and the shock it provokes, overcoming the helplessness and 
becoming an “acting subject”. A further clue to the possibility of a ‘positive’ shock 
for the purposes of awakening is given in Freud’s example of the poet who becomes 
a tailor in his dreams. At the moment in the dream where his tailor-master sends him 
away, the dreamer incurs a fright, or shock, causing him to awaken from the dream. 
Thus, it is a further shock that interrupts the continuum of traumatic repetition. For 
Freud as for Benjamin, awakening is a struggle against the wish to remain asleep – 






The temptation to link Benjamin’s somewhat cryptic references to “cunning” to the 
Hegelian “cunning of reason” must be resisted, as this concept is too determinist to 
be compatible with Benjamin’s focus on interruption. Rather, we can find a clue to it 
in Freud, who warns that not every dream can be successfully interpreted, as  
in interpreting a dream we are opposed by the psychical forces which were 
responsible for its distortion. It is thus a question of relative strength [“eine 
Frage des Kräfteverhältnisses”, a question of the balance of power] whether 
our intellectual interest, our capacity for self-discipline, our psychological 
knowledge and our practice in interpreting dreams enable us to master our 
internal resistances. (SE5, 524-5) 
In this battle for mastery of the dream, an agonistic intrasubjective relationship 
between the different psychic faculties is suddenly made visible. Freud theorises that 
the body has to be ‘tricked’ into waking up, because of the strength of the sleep-
wish, where the momentary return to the inorganic seeks not to be interrupted. 
Benjamin picks up on this feature of Freudian awakening, writing that “we seek a 
teleological moment in the context of dreams. Which is the moment of waiting. The 
dream waits secretly for the awakening; the sleeper surrenders himself to death only 
provisionally, waits for the second when he will cunningly wrest himself from its 
clutches. So, too, the dreaming collective...” [K 1a, 2] (AP, 390). Transposed to the 
political arena of the nineteenth century, this is a struggle between classes: the stasis 
of the ruling class, comfortable in the dream-world of capitalism, and the impulse 
towards awakening on the part of those that are striving to “wake up from the 
existence of our parents”. This is also one of the ways in which Benjamin 
conceptualises the function of the Arcades Project: it is to imitate the ‘trick’ 
awakening uses in the physiological sense, to overcome the organism’s wish to 
return to the inorganic. 
 





bourgeoisie, as class, can never arrive at a perfectly clear awareness of itself? And if 
this is the case, isn’t one justified in annexing to Marx’s thesis the idea of the dream 
collective (that is, the bourgeois collective)?” [0°,67] (AP, 863). In this, Lindner sees 
Benjamin as a more radical thinker than Marx on the question of the collective 
dream and awakening, in that his “speculative use of theory consisted in the 
assumption that capitalism as a collective dream sleep had overcome modernity, and 
blocks historical memory” (Lindner 2008, 166, transl. mine). At stake is the question 
of the possibility of a real awakening in the face of such a blockade of memory. This 
has to be premised on the end of the dreaming collective in the moment of 
awakening – it cannot remain once the dream is dissolved, and must itself become 
something else. 
Gelley suggests that “the dreaming collective remains suspended at the moment of 
awakening” (Gelley 2015, 91). This is at the heart of Benjamin's interest in the 
threshold, liminal spaces, in the Arcades Project: Awakening itself is a threshold. It 
is in the in-between space, not yet in the waking world and no longer in the dream – 
that re/cognition is possible. Benjamin writes  
We have grown very poor in threshold experiences. Falling asleep is perhaps 
the only such experience that remains to us. (But together with this, there is 
also waking up...The threshold must be carefully distinguished from the 
boundary. A Schwelle (threshold) is a zone. Transformation, passage, wave 
action are in the word schwellen, swell… [O2a,I] (AP, 494). 
Thresholds are thus differentiated from boundaries as they signify an experience of 
change, or at least the potential for change, within a “zone”, a space of possibility, 
while boundaries are closed off, sharply demarcated lines. This is why, as Weigel 
notes, thresholds have “paradigmatic significance” in the Arcades Project and 
present its most “prominent location” (Weigel 1996, 48).  
Gelley conceptualises awakening as “a solicitation, a call to a collectivity to 





2015, xii). Developing Ranciere's argument, Gelley terms this Benjamin's 
“retrograde temporality”, conceived of as “not some inversion of historical sequence 
but rather a need to revise our relation to history, to assume ‘the past’ as relevant 
only to the present” (Gelley 2015, 188). Breaking out of the arcades and awakening 
from the dream-sleep of the nineteenth century is thus premised on the dissolution of 
the dreaming collective, which “knows no history. Events pass before it as always 
identical and always new. The sensation of the newest and most modern is, in fact, 
just as much a dream formation of events as ‘the eternal return of the same’” [S2,1] 
(AP, 546).  
Against this dreamlike mode of perception and its stasis, Benjamin posits a 
temporality that breaks with this flow of events and introduces one in which 
everything, even truth, is thoroughly temporalised: “‘The truth will not escape us’… 
the concept of truth with which these presentations take issue” (AP, 463). Truth can 
escape us, must be seized, as it is perceptible as a truth only for a specific moment, 
the Jetzt der Erkennbarkeit. This is Benjamin's concept of actuality, always 
threatened by its own disappearance. Impending destruction thus functions as 
catalyst for cognition in the arcades: Quoting Aragon, Benjamin writes  
It is only today, when the pickaxe menaces them, that they have at last become 
the true sanctuaries of a cult of the ephemeral, the ghostly landscape of 
damnable pleasures and professions. Places that yesterday were 
incomprehensible, and that tomorrow will never know'... but today they can be 
recognized”. [C2a, 9] (AP, 87) 
 This recognition, for Benjamin, is a political act: “The change in fashions, the 
eternally up-to-date…escapes ‘historical’ consideration; it is truly overcome only 
through a consideration that is political (theological). Politics recognizes in every 
actual constellation the genuinely unique - what will never recur” (AP, 543). This 
political-theological moment of awakening is thus aimed at an engagement with the 
past that aims, as Agamben puts it, “not to restore its true dignity, to transmit it anew 





the past is fulfilled and thereby brought to its end once and for all” (Agamben 1999, 
153). 
 
Freud writes the following on the topic of unequal cultures in The Future of an 
Illusion: “It goes without saying that a civilization which leaves so large a number of 
its participants unsatisfied and drives them into revolt neither has nor deserves the 
prospect of a lasting existence” (SE21, 109). Reading Freud with Benjamin, we can 
see how these infrequent interjections and latent political currents of psychoanalysis 
can be radicalised. Nevertheless, this is the point where Benjamin and Freud part 
ways – where the aim of the latter is primarily to provide a cure for the individual, 
for Benjamin the moment of a ‘cure’, of a ‘making whole’, and of catharsis is always 
deferred.  
For Benjamin, history itself, and thus its interruption, is the litmus test for the truth, 
the success of awakening. This runs counter to the bourgeois, melancholy conception 
of history: “Spleen is the feeling that corresponds to catastrophe in permanence” 
(SW4, 164). This vision of history  
can actually claim no more attention from thinkers than a child's kaleidoscope, 
which with every turn of the hand dissolves the established order into a new 
array. There is profound truth in this image. The concepts of the ruling class 
have always been the mirrors that enabled an image of ‘order’ to prevail. – The 
kaleidoscope must be smashed. (SW4, 164) 
 Alongside this politicised image of a kaleidoscope reflecting the order of the rulers, 
containing all revolutions within it, Benjamin also writes about another kaleidoscope 
in ‘On some Motifs in Baudelaire’: “Baudelaire speaks of a man who plunges into 
the crowd as into a reservoir of electric energy. Circumscribing the experience of the 





We may surmise that this kaleidoscopic mode of subjectivity, too, must be shattered 
in order to go beyond its already-existing fractures. 
Pensky writes a propos the Baroque allegorist that he  
becomes the source of meaning, but this power is also a defeat, since the 
allegorist's allegories are dedicated not to the creation of meaning, but to its 
recovery. And the more allegories the allegorist dedicates to this goal, the more 
the network of allegorical references multiplies and intertwines, the more 
distant this goal becomes, the more urgently the allegorist works, and the 
deeper the allegorist plunges into the well of subjectivity. (Pensky 1993, 27) 
As we have seen, the problem of Baroque subjectivity remains in the nineteenth 
century. Neither age is capable of producing an allegory that goes far enough in its 
destruction – allegorical intention may tear objects out of life, but it is 
simultaneously “shattered and preserved”, and in clinging to this sublation of the 
dismembered object as ruin, allegory “offers the image of petrified unrest. 
Baudelaire's destructive impulse is nowhere concerned with the abolition of what 
falls prey to it” (SW4, 169). Remaining within the dream-world of the nineteenth 
century, Baudelaire cannot take the final step: of shattering it in awakening. 
Against this stands Benjamin's ‘Destructive Character’ (1931) who pursues 
destruction not for its own sake, or for the sake of the ruins, but for the way leading 
out of them.156 We can perhaps read him as another iteration of the “contemporary” 
that forms an object of Benjamin's speculation in Convolute N:  
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The contemporary who learns from books of history to recognize how long his 
present misery has been in preparation (and this is what the historian must inwardly 
aim to show him) acquires thereby a high opinion of his own powers. A history that 
provides this kind of instruction does not cause him sorrow, but arms him. (AP, 481) 
Emboldened by the insights of the historical materialist - that previous history has 
been a dream, which it is in the interest of the ruling class to perpetuate, and which 
consequently must be smashed on awakening, its wish-elements 'realised' in this 
moment – the destructive character does not fall back into melancholy, but is spurred 
to action. As Wohlfarth writes in his seminal article; “The ‘destructive character’ is 
no ‘character’ in the psychological sense. Character is rather one of his targets. What 
emerges from its effacement is the faceless model of a positively conceived 
characterlessness” (Wohlfarth 1978, 50). He signifies the overcoming of the types of 
the nineteenth century, its semblance of subjectivity in its excessive focus on 
inwardness and the interieur – he is the “enemy of the etui-man” (SW2.2, 542), the 
bourgeois whose main goal is comfort and who is compelled to leave traces 
wherever he goes. In him, a thoroughgoing awakening from the dreamworld that 
does not remain attached to its ruins is to be realised - The destructive character 
obliterates even the traces of destruction” (SW2.2, 542). He stands against those who 
“pass things down to posterity, by making them untouchable and thus conserving 
them” (SW2.2, 542) – bourgeois historiographers. The destructive character does 
have a relationship to historical transmission: He “has the consciousness of historical 
man”; “sees nothing permanent But for this very reason, he sees ways out 
everywhere” (SW2.2, 542). What he is alert to is the possibility of change in history, 
at a specific moment: “liquidating” the potential of situations, breaking the 
transmission of trauma and rupturing the continuum of myth and mourning. 
 
Walter Benjamin's Dream 





dreams, bringing together the themes of dreaming, awakening and the question of a 
humanity beyond the vicissitudes of the bourgeois subject. Drawing on dream 
symbolism of the house as a stand-in for the dreamer's life as a whole, Benjamin 
begins his narration with “enemy bombs” striking the house, reducing it to rubble 
and unearthing “perverse antiquities” in its underground foundations. (SW1, 445). 
These otherwise hidden depths function as the unconscious, much as the “chtonic 
depths” of Paris do in the Arcades Project. It is at this moment of danger that the 
repressed, forgotten, ritualistic dimension of everyday habit is violently unearthed.  
Suddenly, in this “night of despair”, Benjamin's unnamed first childhood friend157 
appears in a manner reminiscent of a dream of Freud’s own narrated in the 
Interpretation. Freud here describes the appearance of the first close friend of his 
childhood in various guises throughout his waking and dreaming life as a “revenant” 
(SE5, 486). Benjamin ardently renews their friendship and fraternal bond. This 
compensatory moment does not survive the moment of awakening, however, and 
neither does the dream-image of his friend: “when I awoke, it became clear that what 
despair had brought to light like a detonation was the corpse of that boy, who had 
been immured as a warning: that whoever one day lives here may in no respect 
resemble him” (SW1, 445). 
Despair is recognised on awakening to function as a “detonation”, which, like the 
enemy bombs, make visible that humanity of the future must follow a break with the 
return of the repressed, with the semblance of the bourgeois subject – it must not 
resemble the revenant in any way. In this, it goes beyond even the destructive 
character, but is implied in his “clearing up”, making space: like the destructive 
                                               
157 There is good reason to read this figure as Benjamin's friend Fritz Heinle, the youth movement 
poet who committed suicide at the age of 19 in protest against the first World War. See Pike, D. 
(1997, 237-243) for a reading of the piece in context with the other No.113 “rooms”, “Vestibule” and 
“Dining Room”. Pike connects the appearance of Goethe in these above-ground, that is conscious, 
spaces, to Heinle's identity as a poet and concludes: “he embodies the fate of the youth movement 
(victims of the war) but equally, and inseparably, the difficulty of writing about it, for lyric was killed 





character, Benjamin does not need to know what the subject will be like in future, 
whether there will be one, and does not name this future being. What will appear in 
the stead of the fracture, the ruin of that which has been destroyed, is “First of all, for 
a moment at least, empty space – the place where the thing stood or the victim lived. 
Someone is sure to be found who needs this space without occupying it” (SW2.2, 
541). Someone who will inhabit without possessing – beyond melancholia, beyond 
narcissism, beyond the dream and awakening, beyond the revenant, beyond the 










































“It is good to give materialist investigations a truncated ending.” (AP, 473) 
 
In this thesis, I traced the concept of the fractured subject in Benjamin’s work, 
starting with his early philosophical writings on experience. This served to set the 
scene for the emergence of the modern fractured subject in the book on German 
Trauerspiel, where the sovereign emerges as the paradigmatic form of subjectivity. I 
then examined the development of this fractured subject in the nineteenth century, 
concluding with Benjamin’s attempt to point beyond it. I have aimed to show the 
centrality of Freud for the development of this concept in Benjamin’s thinking. 
Starting with an investigation of the inauguration of the subject in the Trauerspiel 
book from sovereignty and the loss of transcendence, I traced a line to ‘Mourning 
and Melancholia’ and Freud’s case studies on possession and paranoia. We saw that 
mourning and possession both emerge as responses to the loss of the stability 
provided by the cosmological horizon of Christianity. In this context, Greek 
Antiquity was appealed to as another, hidden lineage, and I investigated the differing 
ways in which Freud, Benjamin and Warburg conceptualise the relation to past 
cultures and the repetition of trauma. We saw that Benjamin draws on Freud both in 
conceptualising phylogenetic elements, but also in understanding the incorporation 
of a past other as a violent act, connected to the narcissistic attempt to make the 
world subject to the self. 
I examined how the fractured subject develops in the nineteenth century, mediated 
by capitalist forms, baroque melancholia lingering as spleen. I showed how 
Benjamin draws extensively on Freud in the Arcades Project in investigating the 
psychology of the types subjectivity is here refracted into. I demonstrated the 
centrality of Beyond the Pleasure Principle to Benjamin’s text, in particular the 
death drive and repetition-compulsion, in relation to the nineteenth century and 





Benjamin’s thought on memory and experience in modernity draws on Freud in 
elaborating a psychic model that is split into a receiving and a storing agency. 
Benjamin developed Freud’s notion of trauma and shock to arrive at his historicised 
understanding of experience as isolated and no longer communal in modernity. At 
the same time, Benjamin’s focus on the way people are drawn together in cities and 
the production process in Capitalist modernity, resulting in a society that functions 
itself as an organism. Thus the fractured subject of the nineteenth century, just as the 
fractured baroque sovereign/subject, expresses a pathology that resides at the supra-
individual level. I showed that with Freud, Benjamin can thus read all of social life 
as symptomatic.  
People are drawn together in the modern city in a way that Benjamin terms the 
“dreaming collective”. In his dream theory as in his other writings of the 1930s, 
Benjamin expands on Freud, fusing Freudian and Marxian concepts in order to arrive 
at an interpretive strategy that is alert to the political implications of psychoanalysis 
and the need to supplement materialist analysis with psychoanalytical insights. In my 
final chapter, I thus analyse Benjamin’s dream theory, showing that it too draws on 
Freud, grappling in particular with the question of the role of the somatic. I establish 
that Benjamin’s aim in this investigation of the dream is to move beyond the 
dreaming collective as well as the fractured subject of the nineteenth century. I 
conclude that Benjamin thus radicalises Freud’s methodological and therapeutic 
approach in dream interpretation and psychoanalysis more generally. 
The present work necessarily only provides a fragment of the relationship between 
Benjamin and Freud, and to the understanding of the subject in Benjamin. The 
themes investigated in this thesis point towards many avenues for further research. 
Both Benjamin and Warburg investigated the function of ancient culture in the 
construction of a European identity. The Warburg institute thus attempted to provide 
a corrective to triumphalist narratives that position European civilisation as self-
contained and intrinsically superior to others; unveiling it rather as porous to the 





However, it did so from within this same tradition, and ended up reproducing a lot of 
its blind spots, revealed for instance in Warburg's assumption that ‘primitive’ 
religions are closer to an underlying truth, making it easier to strip off its layers and 
reveal the pure kernel of its beliefs than those of more ‘advanced’ European 
civilisation. In his 1923 text on serpent rituals, Warburg attempts an examination of 
the snake dances and associated rituals of some Pueblo Indians, hoping to uncover a 
link to ‘primitivism’ that remained in European modernity. The same holds true for 
Freud, but as for Warburg, it coexists with a valorisation of the racialised other. 
Edward Said’s Freud and the Non-European (2003) forms an important basis for 
any future examination on this issue and bears further relevance for the question of 
Freud’s relationship to Judaism. Additionally, it opens up the possibility of linking 
this discussion to Benjamin on the issue of the absorption and subsumption of the 
other, to which, as I have shown, Benjamin was alert. 
This could lead to an engagement with the specifically European character of the 
pathology of capitalist modernity, and, following on from this, the relationship of 
coloniality and the unconscious in Benjamin's work. This is present more often than 
not in short fragments rather than fleshed-out, as also noted by Adorno, who in his 
1935 ‘Hornberg letter’ relates the arcades to imperialism and “imperial conquest” 
(C, 501). John Kraniauskas' article ‘Beware Mexican Ruins!’ provides an important 
starting point here. He shifts the focus to a re-evaluation of place in Benjamin's work 
and observes “America is not just present...as the sign of the industrialisation of 
culture (US) but also, more problematically perhaps, as a site of its mythological 
critique (Mexico)” (Kraniauskas 2005, 355) Kraniauskas also points to the 
importance of the 'underground terrain' of the colonial in Benjamin’s other writings 
on cultural modernity. 
While I have to some extent addressed the gendered aspect of the fractured subject, 
showing that subjectivity emerged as a problem of masculinity, this discussion could 
be extended. In particular, Benjamin’s focus on corporeality, touched upon in the 





provides a promising starting point. This could also lead to an engagement with 
feminist critiques of Freud. Luce Irigaray’s work on the lack of a female subjectivity 
in Freud also makes it possible to relate this to Benjamin – as became apparent in my 
discussion, femininity emerges as outside of the trajectory of the development of the 
fractured subject in modernity. Julia Kristeva’s conceptualisation of a subject that is 
more a process than a stable locus provides an interesting point of connection here, 
which Sigrid Weigel’s discussion of Benjamin’s work in relation to Kristeva has 
begun to address. Laura Mulvey’s seminal essay “Visual Pleasure and Narrative 
Cinema” (1975) made it possible to read the cinematic gaze as gendered. The 
concept of the gaze, so central to Benjamin’s work on photography and film, was 
only touched upon in the present work. To further pursue it in relation to Freud’s 
writing on the gaze could also be of interest here. 
Jean Laplanche, writing on what sets apart Freudian psychoanalytic interpretation 
from other approaches, states that 
As understood by all non-Freudian hermeneutics – cabalistic or paranoiac, 
ancient or patristic – to interpret is to place oneself beyond the given, and, from 
that point, to aim at back at this side. A procedure which is meant to be allied to 
a branch of knowledge [savoir], and which would not hesitate to compare itself 
with a scientific procedure. But here the given comes already freighted with 
meaning, it is a word to be deciphered, a book that is at once to be read, 
translated, and replaced with a more truthful and authentic text. (Laplanche 
2006, 172) 
This provides intriguing questions for Benjamin’s work, for Benjamin attempts 
interpretation that is both immanent, reading reality as a text, and makes space for 
the alterity of truth. Additionally, the method of reading concealed ‘truths’ out of the 
fragments of the world is arguably cabbalistic, complicating Laplanche’s distinction. 
Starting with his ‘On Language as such and on the Language of Man’ (1916), many 
central themes of which Benjamin reproduces in the Trauerspiel book, the issue of 





work. In a letter to Werner Kraft of 1935, Benjamin suggests the theological has 
been absorbed in his thinking, referring to “the far distant period of my immediately 
metaphysical, indeed theological thinking, and the upheaval was necessary so that 
they could nourish with their full force my present disposition” (C, 486). 
Nevertheless, the relation of truth to the theological remains prominent, right to the 
1940 ‘On the Concept of History’, where the language of theology is to be taken into 
the service of historical materialism. Recent scholarship, such as the 2016 collection 
of essays on Walter Benjamin and Theology, and Judith Butler’s 2012 Parting Ways, 
make this a promising aspect to pursue. 
As discussed in this thesis, Benjamin was also alert to the truth made visible in the 
discarded, the trivial, and the “mad”. A more sustained investigation of these themes, 
presently discussed in Chapter 2 in relation to subjectivity and the critic, could 
investigate the constellation of the theological, in particular the messianic, between 
Benjamin’s early and late work. On Benjamin’s messianism, informed both by 
materialism and Jewish traditions, the work of Giorgio Agamben, Eric Jacobson and 
more recently Sami Khatib could form the basis of a further investigation of the 
theological, here discussed in relation to the loss of the cosmological horizon of 
Christianity and in contrast to the mythical. Where Freud’s ‘The Future of an 
Illusion’ is an obvious starting point here, in a different vein, Santner makes a brief 
reference to tikkun in Freud’s interpretation of Schreber’s paranoid world building 
(1996, 57). This could lead to a new re-engagement of the debates in work such as 
Dennis Klein’s Jewish Origins of the Psychoanalytic Movement (1985), Richard 
Bernstein’s Freud and the Legacy of Moses, and Peter Gay’s A Godless Jew: Freud, 
Atheism and the Making of Psychoanalysis (1987), which Jan Assman’s 2006 article 
“The Advance in Intellectuality: Freud’s Construction of Judaism” begin to address. 
For Benjamin, language is connected to the issues of truth and theology. This could 
form another vector of inquiry, in particular in connection to a discussion of the 
deranged, paranoid language of Schreber. Alexander Mette’s review of the 





Roff’s article on this text. A sustained investigation of the theological, specifically 
the Jewish motifs, in both Freud and Benjamin could thus provide new insights into 
their relationship.  
Benjamin’s rejection of empathy in art and the philosophy of history discussed here, 
coupled with the stress he places on the impossibility of Greek theatrical forms in 
modernity, in particular catharsis, forms a point of connection between his work on 
Baroque and modern theatre. While the present study investigates Benjamin’s work 
on Baroque drama, the question of dramatic form contemporary to Benjamin was left 
open. Both aspects could form the basis of further investigation, in particular in 
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